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»Abstract
This research analyses the explanatory and descriptive limitations of strategic groups 
research, a theory that addresses a number of important issues for strategy research. 
That is, it considers rivalry among firms in a similar competitive environment, the 
relation between strategy and performance and similarities and differences among 
competing firms.
An historical study of the origins and development of strategic groups research shows 
that the concept of strategic groups was independently developed in strategic 
management and industrial organisation in the mid-1970s. Much research has been 
conducted since its inception. However, this research has been mainly empirical in 
nature. Empirical research has not brought unambiguous findings with regard to some 
of the fundamental hypotheses of the theory of strategic groups. This has led researchers 
to raise fundamental questions about the usefulness of the concept of strategic groups.
A number of approaches emerged in the 1980s that question some of the fundamental 
hypotheses of strategic groups theory. Our analysis shows that each approach has its 
limitations and that strategic groups theory is still the most comprehensive approach, 
addressing a number of issues of interest for strategy researchers.
Given the problems identified at both theoretical and methodological levels, an 
exploratory approach is used in this research. An historical analysis of the dynamics of 
firms’ strategies and competitive structure in the UK grocery retailing industry between 
1980 and 1995 is used to gather information. This forms the basis of the analysis of (a) 
the importance of similarities and difference in the strategies of comparable firms and 
(b) for understanding the mechanisms underlying industrial and business dynamics.
The empirical research shows the severe limitations that characterise strategic groups at 
analytical, descriptive and theoretical levels. The information gathered in the empirical 
research is an important basis to start thinking about developing a better approach to 
analyse and explain the dynamics of firms’ strategies and competitive structures.
♦♦
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.0 The Research
The key question of this research is: what are the limits of ‘traditional’ strategic groups 
research for ‘analysing and explaining’ the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry 
structure?
The concept of strategic groups1 was developed at Harvard University, at the beginning 
of the 1970s, when a number of researchers studied differences among firms in an 
industry and the implications of these differences for market equilibria. At around the 
same time, researchers at Purdue University developed quantitative models to analyse 
the effectiveness of firms’ strategies in an industry using clustering techniques. These 
were subsequently used widely in strategic groups research. However, while research 
carried out at Purdue tended to be empirical in its characteristics, research carried out at 
Harvard was mainly theoretical.
In following years, research on strategic groups was conducted in both Industrial 
Organisation (IO) and Strategic Management (SM). Clear differences exist between the 
two research fields. In IO, researchers study industries at the macro-level in order to 
assess the impact of the characteristics of an industry on consumer welfare. 
Consequently, the concept of strategic groups has been used in order to explain the
1 Porter (1980: 129) defines a strategic group as "the group of firms in an industry following the same or 
similar strategy along strategic dimensions". Variuos definitions of strategic groups will be analysed in 
more detail in Chapter four.
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existence of heterogeneity in the industry and in firms’ performance. SM is its opposite 
as a focus of analysis. It concerns research on the single firm rather than on the 
aggregate of firms, and on the competitiveness of the specific firm in the market. 
However, strategy researchers are also interested in issues of organisational 
performance (Hofer and Schendel 1978), and since the mid - 1970s there has been an 
increasing use of quantitative techniques, previously typical of IO (Rumelt et al. 1991).
The development of the concept of strategic groups was seen as opening new avenues in 
the strategy field. Hatten and Hatten (1987: 329) argue that strategic groups is a 
“powerful tool in the armoury of the strategic analyst.” In their view, the concept would 
allow researchers:
1. to preserve the information of individual firms, which is lost when performing 
industry studies; and
2. to investigate the effectiveness of strategic actions, since, by conducting a study 
over a wide range of firms performing in the same industry, it would be possible to 
assess the most successful strategies in the industry.
However, the fact that both the Harvard and the Purdue research focused on the analysis 
of the relationship between firms’ strategies and performance and used quantitative 
techniques successively created some confusion, with researchers often unable to 
distinguish the differences between the two approaches. This confusion has been made 
worse by the publication by some of the first researchers of strategic groups in both SM 
and IO2 and by the overall little attention that has been given to a number of related 
methodological issues.
1 Halten and Schendel (1977) reproduced their model and empirical research in an article published in the 
Journal o f Industrial Economics. Porter (1980) published his book, bringing the theory he had developed
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Since the early 1980s, considerable research has been conducted on strategic groups. 
However, while initial research was mainly conceptual, subsequent research mainly has 
been empirical in its characteristics. A variety of methodologies has been used by 
researchers to study the relation between strategies and performance. This variety has 
been a matter of concern among researchers. “There is no uniformity in the treatment of 
strategic groups in empirical research settings. A variety of methods have been used to 
derive groupings in empirical research setting, which make the much-needed exercise at 
the accumulation of research findings an almost impossible task” (Thomas and 
Venkatraman 1988: 538).
At the beginning of the 1990s, some researchers expressed doubts about the usefulness 
of the strategic groups research. The argument is that there are fundamental problems 
with the concept and that it should be abandoned (Barney and Hoskisson 1990). 
However, notwithstanding the problems with strategic groups, no valid alternative to it 
has been proposed. The theory of strategic groups is the only concept that 
comprehensively addresses fundamental issues for strategy researchers such as:
1. the relation between strategies and performance;
2. the importance of similarities between firms in a competitive market;
3. stability and change of strategy over time;
4. managerial perception of the competitive environment; and
5. the existence of asymmetries in firms’ positions in the industry and their role for the 
dynamics of firms’ strategies.
in IO into SM.
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In this research, we use a critical approach to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the 
limitations of strategic groups research for analysing and explaining the dynamics of 
firms’ strategies and industry structure.
The research focuses on the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure in the 
UK Grocery Retailing Industry (GRI) between 1980 and 1995. A longitudinal historical 
study of the strategies of a number of firms and of the industry is used as a basis for 
assessing two themes that are fundamental to the research question:
1. the mechanisms characterising industrial and business change; and
2. the importance of similarities and differences among firms that are competing in the 
same industry for the dynamics of these firms’ strategies and industry structure.
I
The UK GRI has been chosen for a number of reasons.
1. There is high degree of rivalry among firms operating in the industry. Hence, it is 
possible to study in detail the dynamics of firms’ strategies, as well as the effects of 
competition on firms’ strategies.
2. Firms operating in the UK GRI tend to be specialised businesses, drawing most of 
their revenues from grocery retailing in the UK. Further, there is a minimal presence 
of foreign operators. The combination of these two elements reduces to a minimum the 
level of external influence on the dynamics of firms’ strategies in the UK GRI.
3. Because firms mainly operate in the GRI, there are a few differences between the 
management at the corporate and the business level. Senior management is often also 
involved in business operations and is knowledgeable about issues such as pricing 
strategies, logistic strategies, merchandising, supplier relationships, competition and 
consumer markets. Hence, when talking about firms’ strategies, senior management
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often refers to business operations.
4. Firms’ activities and the industry have a high public profile. This is probably due to 
possible implications of firms’ activtities in the GRI on consumer welfare. Because 
of the nature of the industry, media coverage of what happens in the industry is 
broad and much information is available about retailers’ activities (price 
promotions, market positions and store location, as well as mergers, changes in 
management and diversification).
Because of the combination of these elements, the UK GRI offers an ideal case for 
testing the descriptive and explanatory power of strategic groups theory, which directs 
its attention to firms’ strategies at the business level.
1.1 Structure of the Research
Chapters two and three analyse the theoretical foundations of the concept of strategic 
groups. (Harvard Approach and Purdue Approach). The purposes of their research are 
considered. The review also analyses the underlying view of firms’ strategies, industry 
structure and their dynamics, as it emerges from the original approaches. The Harvard 
approach proposes a number of hypotheses about industry structure, while saying little 
about dynamics of firms’ strategies. The Purdue approach says little about the dynamics 
of industry structure and firms’ strategies, while exposing the complexity of firms’ 
strategies and the difficulties in distinguishing between strategic and operational issues.
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Since the concept of strategic groups was created, little theoretical work has been 
conducted. Research was initially directed at demonstrating the existence of groups 
structures within industries; successively, research has been directed at testing some 
hypotheses. Chapter four, thus, focuses on how researchers have used strategic groups 
to study firms’ strategies, industry structures, and their dynamics. Specific attention is 
given to the definition of strategic groups used by researchers to operationalise firms’ 
strategies for strategic groups analysis, and to the view of firms’ strategies and industry 
structure emerging from the way research on strategic groups is normally conducted. 
We argue that differences between the two approaches have blurred over time, with a 
shift towards an IO approach to strategic groups analysis.
Chapter five analyses the concept of strategic groups in light of the development of 
alternative and complementary theoretical approaches. The emergence of other 
frameworks has not provided a “best alternative” to strategic groups. Some researchers 
have argued that the concept of strategic groups should be abandoned, others that we 
should try to develop a meta-theory of strategic groups. The position taken here is that 
more exploratory work first needs to be done to understand the dynamics of firms’ 
strategies and industry structure. This position leads to a number of specific questions. 
The objectives of this research are thus twofold: to test some of the fundamental 
assumptions characterising the concept of strategic groups as it was developed at 
Harvard; and, to improve our understanding of the dynamics of firms’ strategies and 
industry structure.
Chapter six specifies the methodological characteristics of the empirical research. In the 
analysis of the questions driving this empirical research, we draw from Chandler’s
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(1962) research on the evolution of firms’ strategies and organisational structures in the 
US corporations, at the beginning of the century. In his book “Strategy and Structure”, 
Chandler (1962: 1) notes that “historians have provided social scientists with little 
empirical data on which to base generalizations or hypotheses concerning the 
administration of great enterprises.” His main purpose was to provide an empirical basis 
to be used by researchers to develop hypotheses and assumptions about the evolution of 
firms’ organisational structure. He did this, through an historical analysis of the 
development of organisational structure. In this research, Chandler’s process is 
reversed. Having analysed the theoretical and methodological foundations of strategic 
groups, we subsequently examine the assumptions and hypotheses characterising the 
theory of strategic groups through an historical analysis.
The analysis focuses on changes in the industry structure and the strategies of a number 
of firms operating in the UK GRI. This industry has already been object of strategic 
groups research (e.g. Lewis and Thomas 1990).
Chapter seven analyses the dynamics of the UK GRI since the 1950s until 1995. The 
analysis describes in detail how the microstructure of the industry has changed between 
1980 and 1995.
Chapters eight, nine, ten and eleven analyse in detail the historical developments of the 
strategies of four firms (Argyll, ASDA, Sainsbury’s, and Tesco) in the industry.
Chapter twelve discusses the research issues highlighted in Chapter Five. The historical 
reconstruction of changes in firms’ strategies and industry structure is the basis for the 
assessment of the questions outlined at the end of Chapter Five. The analysis shows
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severe limits of strategic groups and of its descriptive and prescriptive power relative. 
The concept remains an interesting theoretical construct, but from a SM standpoint, it is 
clear that we need to move forward.
Chapter thirteen concludes the research. Having reviewed the earlier work done and 
summarised the research findings, this chapter looks at how the information gathered in 
the empirical research could be used for future research into the dynamics of firms’ 
strategies and industry structure, and by top management in the strategy process.
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Chapter 2 The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic 
Groups: the Harvard Approach
2.0 Introduction
The concept of strategic groups and mobility barriers originates in the early 1970s at 
Harvard university, where a number of doctoral researchers (Hunt, Newman, and 
Porter), guided by Richard Caves, studied the existence of structural (strategic) 
asymmetries within an industry and the implications of these asymmetries on market 
equilibria and on firms’ behaviour. This research was carried out in an Industrial 
Organisation framework and produced a theory of strategic grojps and mobility barriers.
Caves and Porter’s work (1977) is unquestionably the most important paper published 
by researchers working on that research at Harvard. The article addresses the 
fundamental issue of why the study of strategic groups and mobility barriers is 
important. It also examines the effects that strategic groups and mobility barriers have 
on market equilibria and on firms’ strategies.
A second important article by Porter (1979) attempts to develop the research by 
proposing a theory of the determinants of firms’ profitability; but, in so doing, it 
develops a number of hypotheses that conflict with the 1977 paper. However, the 1979
Research on strategic groups carried out in the last 20 years has been greatly influenced 
by that research carried out at Harvard. Researchers have tried either to confirm some of 
the hypotheses developed by the authors or to develop some of the issues presented in 
these two articles.
In this review, we analyse the content of the theory of strategic groups and mobility 
barriers. In so doing, we consider their origins and the influence of the standpoint taken 
as well as the assumptions made. We start by analysing the research context that led to
the development of the concept of strategic groups and mobility barriers. Subsequently,
>
the analysis focuses on the theoretical foundations of the concept of strategic groups and 
mobility barriers and on the view of firms’ strategies and industry structure. In the final 
part, we analyse Porter's (1979) work on the determinants of firms’ profitability and the 
consequences of this article for the theory of strategic groups.
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paper has had little impact on subsequent research on strategic groups'.
2.1 The Research Context: Industrial Organisation and the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Paradigm
The concept of strategic groups developed in IO research where researchers have 
originally been interested in studying the relation between industry structure, firms’
1 This is clearly indicated by the fact that Porter (1979) is rarely mentioned in bibliographies of research 
on strategic groups, and by the fact that its assumptions about the determinants of firms’ profitability have
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conduct, and performance. Mason (1939) and Bain (1956, 1968) developed the SCP 
paradigm to explain why industries have different average profitability. Their research 
has provided the theoretical justification for industrial policies (typically competition 
policies), designed to prevent market structures from promoting behaviour and 
performance that are against the public interest.
In the original formulation of the SCP paradigm, the reason for the existence of 
differences in average profitability among industries is the existence of barriers to entry. 
This implies that a potential entrant faces additional costs compared to incumbent firms 
when entering an industry. The existence and the height of barriers to entry and the 
dimension of the plants are the primary determinants of the industry structure, and the 
industry structure determines the profitability of firms operating in the same industry. 
The possibility of new firms entering the market and the existence of barriers to entry 
are the elements determining the market price. As incumbent firms try to limit 
competition, the market price is fixed at a level limiting new firms entry. However, 
potential entrants enter the market only if they expect to earn extra profits. Firms decide 
price of products, advertising, capacity and quality, but ultimately decisions are 
determined by the characteristics of the industry structure, and firms’ management does 
not really have discretionary behaviour. In its original version the model was 
summarised in the following form:
Figure 2.1 The Original SCP Model
Industry Structure -----------► Firms’ Conduct ---------► Performance
been widely ignored.
The SCP paradigm is based on neo-classical economics, and as such, is characterised by 
the following assumptions:
1. technology is given and accessible to all firms;
2. economies of scale exist in the industry;
3. incumbent firms will not modify their production level as a result of new entries in 
the industry;
4. price is set by firms with large plants and it is unique in the market;
5. there are no significant differences among firms in the same market except for the 
scale of operations;
6. there is no uncertainty in the market or asymmetry of information. Potential entrants
and incumbent firms know the demand and the cost curves;
1
7. firms exhibit a perfect rational and maximising behaviour; and
8. firms operating in the industry are all in competition with each other.
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Since the SCP paradigm was created, a large amount of research has been conducted, 
both at an empirical and theoretical level. A famous modification of the original form of 
the SCP paradigm recognises a feedback effect from a firm’s own performance on its 
conduct and from the conduct of firms on the industry structure (Scherer 1970):
Figure 2.2 The SCP Model in the Revised Form
Industry Structure Firms’ Conduct
♦
......X .........
Performance
I
..... >
The argument is that firms’ conduct (decisions to merge and to acquire other businesses; 
advertising expenditures) raises entry barriers and affects the number and size
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distribution of firms in the market (elements of industry structure). At the same time, 
these strategic decisions are made possible by the high performance earned by extant 
firms.
However, the feedback effect creates some problems (Sutton, 1991). While the initial 
formulation of the model with its causation links, is easy to test with linear equation 
techniques, the new version creates significant econometric difficulties. It was initially 
thought that the use of simultaneous equations techniques could solve this issue. 
However, results have not been very productive*.
Despite modifications, it has to be said that lO researchers still regard industry structure 
as the determining factor for firms’ performance, whether or not it has resulted from the 
past conduct of firms or from external elements. This is exemplified by the emphasis 
placed on elements which are characteristic of industry structure for the analysis of 
firms’ performance.
In the 1970s, the SCP paradigm came under increasing criticism. Researchers then, 
argued that it was unable to explain differences in profitability among firms operating in 
the same industry. This created a fertile ground for the development of the concept of 
strategic groups.
At around the same time that the concept of strategic groups was developed, late 1970s,
2 The application of simultaneous equation techniques is itself somewhat problematic. Whilst single stage 
linear regression can overcome some of the problems of high unexplained variance by resort to large 
samples (Wensley 1997), more complex instrumental variable approaches that help to deal with the 
simultaneity issue also have considerable problems in estimating reasonable equations for the instrumental 
variables themselves (Rumelt and Wensley 1981).
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a new approach to IO was also developed, and this was to receive a lot of attention in 
the 1980s. This approach posed as a fundamental assumption that “variations in conduct 
or behaviour were the major influences on outcomes, and in the longer term on 
structure, rather than conduct being itself strongly affected by structure.” (Singh et al. 
1995: 1). Conduct, and not structure, became the primary object of attention among 
researchers, who investigated “the powerful influences that changing behavioural 
assumptions could make. In particular, behaviour was often presumed to take very 
sophisticated account of rivals.” (ibid.) This approach materialised in numerous studies 
modelling firms’ behaviour. These were to come under the umbrella of game theory. 
This stream of research, which has been deemed as “revolutionary” has also been 
described as the “new IO” (Singh et al. 1995). However, as it happened to the SCP
I
paradigm, it has been object of severe criticism, especially from “structuralists”. In fact, 
although there has been a decline in the importance of the SCP paradigm in lO, the 
emergence of behaviourists has not had the effect of wiping out structuralist research. 
Structuralists point out the problems of behaviouralist research. Sutton (1991: 507) 
argues that, as multiple equilibria are endemic in modelling industry behaviour and that 
the structures of strategic moves is capable of subtle variations, “the richness of possible 
formulations leads to an often embarrassingly wide range of outcomes.” Shepherd 
(1988) argues that although strategic behaviour has been modelled in a variety of ways, 
little empirical research has actually been conducted to show the importance of the types 
of strategic behaviour. This is a point also taken by Scherer (1988: 517), who argues that 
“a sorting-out, based upon solid empirical work, quantitative and qualitative, is needed.” 
Hence, important doubts also exist about the supposed superiority of game theory on
structuralist frameworks.
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2.1.1 Firms’ Strategies and the Industry Structure in the SCP Paradigm
The SCP paradigm has a neo-classical view of the firm and of the industry. The industry 
exists a priori and its size is determined by market demand. The market is homogeneous 
and the industry structure is stable over time. The model is deterministic in its 
characteristics, firms are seen as “black boxes” with strategic decisions determined by 
the industry structure conditions. There is no process in the strategy making, information 
is shared at the top management level, and top management agrees on the strategic 
decisions. Furthermore, once decisions are taken, no significant (in economic terms) 
problems are encountered in the implementation of decisions. This is because of the 
absence, in a neo-classical framework, of time as an important variable and because of 
the incorporation of decision - making activities in the theory of the firm (Zan and 
Zambon 1993). It is not surprising therefore that there is no question of how firms came 
to exist or how they developed their positions.
In the form of the SCP paradigm that assumes the existence of a feedback effect from 
firms’ conduct on market structure (figure 2.2), some importance is placed on firms’ 
decisions. However, ultimately strategic options are determined by market conditions. 
The issues of the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure are not taken into 
consideration. The model is static in its characteristics. When changes occur, they are 
driven by external events (mainly technological change or governmental intervention), 
breaking the extant equilibria and creating opportunities that lead to changes in the 
industry structure. However, new equilibria immediately follow changes in the structure.
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2.2 The Theory of Strategic Groups and Mobility Barriers
Having analysed the research context preceding the development of the concept of 
strategic groups, the following sections analyse how the theory of strategic groups was 
developed by Caves and Porter in 1977. The analysis begins with an assessment of why 
it was important to study strategic groups. In the following section, we analyse how 
Caves and Porter developed their theory of strategic groups, the assumptions proposed 
about the origins of strategic groups and firms’ strategic behaviour and related 
hypotheses about mobility and industry dynamics.
“Strategic groups" is a term coined by Hunt (1972). In his PhD dissertation, he defines
I
strategic groups as “a group of firms within an industry that are highly symmetric ... 
with respect to cost structure, degree of product diversification — formal organisation, 
control systems, and management rewards and punishments ... (and) the personal views 
and preferences for various possible outcomes” (Hunt 1972: 8). The concept of strategic 
groups was originally developed as “an intermediate level of analysis to explain 
competitive rivalry observed in an in-depth analysis of the home appliance industry” 
(Thomas and Venkatraman 1988: 538). Research (Newman 1973; Porter 1973) initially 
focused on proving the existence of differences in firms’ structural characteristics and 
the existence of stable group structures in an industry.
The concept of strategic groups introduces an important innovation in the SCP 
paradigm. The argument is that firms of the same industry are likely to differ in traits 
other than size. In 1977, Caves and Porter published an article that examines the 
implications of the existence of stable groups structures on firms’ strategic behaviour
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and on an industry structure:
“Common observation suggests that the firms in an industry often differ from 
one another in their degree of vertical integration or diversification, the extent to 
which they advertise and “brand” their product, whether or not they use 
“captive” distribution channels, whether they are full-line or narrow-line sellers, 
whether they operate in the national market or only regionally, whether they are 
multinational in operation, etc. An industry thus may consist of groups of firms, 
each group composed of firms that are quite similar to one another along some 
structural dimensions.” (Caves and Porter 1977: 251).
The starting point of a strategic groups theory is that it is possible to observe the 
existence of groups structures in an industry. From an economic point of view, the key 
issue is how relevant are structural differences among firms operating in an industry 
(i.e., what is the impact of these differences on firms’ collusive behaviour and on firms’ 
profitability in industries?). It could be argued that researchers already knew that these 
structural differences exist but, in the SCP paradigm, had not taken them into 
consideration because they were not perceived as having relevant implications for firms’ 
profitability and collusive behaviour. To pose a credible challenge to the assumption 
that firms are homogeneous in all “economically” important aspects except for their 
size, it is necessary that structural differences among firms are associated with 
advantages or disadvantages that have consequences on collusive behaviour and/or 
market equilibria. Nonetheless, in the SCP paradigm, advantages and disadvantages are 
directly related to barriers to entry, which only exist at the industry level and are 
exogeneously determined. Therefore, to move towards a theory of strategic groups, it is 
necessary to:
a) modify another assumption of the SCP paradigm (i.e. the exogeneity of barriers to 
entry), and
b) argue that barriers to entry also exist in the industry.
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The existence of endogeneously created barriers to entry at the industry level is not 
enough per se. Barriers to entry could be endogeneously created but could protect all 
firms composing the industry in the same way. It is necessary that barriers to entry also 
exist in an industry and they are associated with structural differences among firms. In 
other words, it is necessary to break the hypothesis of homogeneity among firms of the 
same industry and argue that there are economic rents associated with these differences. 
In the following section, we analyse the first part of Caves and Porter’s (1977) paper, 
which focuses on the issue of endogeneity of barriers to entry and their relevance.
2.2.1 Structural and Endogenous Barriers to Entry
I
Caves and Porter (1977: 245) argue that if incumbent firms decide to try to deter entry, 
“none of the structural sources of entry barriers, advanced by Bain as purely exogenous 
stockades around going firms, is immune to change through their actions”. Forms of 
entry deterrence result from firms’ investment decisions rather than from structural, 
exogenous factors. In conditions of uncertainty about the future state of the industry, 
firms take decisions that change the structure of the industry and the height of barriers to 
entry. Among the decisions incumbent firms take to alter conditions of entry, are:
1. excess capacity in several forms (production, funds, fixed assets), which strengthen 
firms retaliatory power;
2. product differentiation, which reduces the cross-elasticity of demand between going 
brands and the potential entrant’s product, and forces entrants to make extra 
expenditures in order to offset the goodwill assets of incumbent firms;
3. cost structures, whereby investments by the incumbent can augment fixed costs or
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shift the production curve by increasing the diseconomies of small scale; and
4. vertical integration, which increases the financial investment required.
The existence of endogenous barriers significantly changes the nature of strategic and 
competitive behaviour in an industry and it specifically raises problems with regard to 
the “‘form and extent of collusion"(Caves and Porter 1977: 247). An investment in entry 
deterrence is not only going to protect the investor but also his oligopolistic rivals. 
Further, expenditures exceeding levels that maximise short-run joint profits for going 
firms “can build entry barriers surrounding firms as a group, yet at the same time they 
can disrupt consensus and reduce joint monopoly profit." (ibid. 1977: 247).
According to Caves and Porter, this dual role has several implications:
1. the entry barriers surrounding an industry can be viewed as a collective capital good, 
generating joint profits for the going firms;
2. firms’ share of the rents from collective entry barriers will probably be in proportion 
to their shares of sales. However, if each firm styles investment in order to maximise 
its own profits, the result could be that investments at the industry level could either 
be higher or lower than the ones needed in order to deter entry; and
3. oligopolists, in the absence of collusion, have an interest in diverting their rival’s 
behaviour to activities that contribute to entry barriers (i.e., over-capacity and not 
price limiting).
Investments in building mobility barriers augment the risk for the firm making the 
investment as well as for its going rivals. To the incumbent firm, "they reduce short-run 
profits, and they may increase the probability of a ruinous loss by increasing the fixity of 
costs or lowering the average salvage value of the firms’ assets. The firm investing in
higher barriers often purchases an intangible asset, seldom a tangible one that can be 
sold or rented out on short notice. This self-exposure to risk should discourage barrier­
raising investments to some degree. If the rivals imitate the investment in order to avoid 
the diversion of market share and profits away from themselves, they assume the same 
increase in risk exposure as the incumbent who started the process. Therefore, entry- 
barrier investments are likely to increase the risk faced by all incumbents and their 
susceptibility to fatal accidents and exit from the industry, even if barrier-building 
outlays are no larger than those that maximise joint profit for the incumbents.” (ibid. 
1977: 248-249).
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2.2.2 Barriers to Mobility and Strategic Groups
Having observed groups structures in an industry and having argued that barriers to
entry are partially the results of firms’ investment decisions. Caves and Porter (1977:
249) then argue that barriers also exist between firms trying to move inside an industry:
“The key to conjoining barriers to entry to a more general theory of inter-scales 
mobility of firms is the hypothesis that sellers within an industry are likely to 
differ systematically in traits other than size, so that the industry contains 
subgroups of firms with differing structural characteristics; we refer to them 
simply as groups. ... group boundaries impede (but do not prevent) the 
development of oligopolistic consensus, and thus an industry with a more 
complex structure of groups shows more competitive performance ceteris 
paribus. Barriers to entry then become specific to a group rather than protecting 
all firms in the industry equally, and barriers to mobility between groups rest on 
the same structural features as barriers to entry into any group from outside the 
industry”.
By linking groups structures of an industry to the existence of barriers within an 
industry, the authors propose a strong argument for the relevance of differences in
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structural characteristics between firms composing an industry. The existence of 
differences in structural characteristics (i.e., those which matter in terms of strategic or 
competitive behaviour and performance) between firms in an industry is the common 
feature to all research on strategic groups and mobility barriers. It is the declared and 
undeclared commonality to all research on strategic groups. The argument that structural 
differences are partly the results of firms’ strategic investments, which in IO are thought 
to be aiming at the creation of disadvantages to the potential entrant, represents the 
passage from group structures to strategic groups.
2.2.3 The Origins of Strategic Groups and Firms’ Strategic Behaviour
Observation of similarities and differences among firms structural characteristics have 
led to definitions of groups structures in an industry. These groups have been defined as 
strategic because structural characteristics result from firms’ strategic decisions, which 
are linked to mobility barriers. Caves and Porter’s (1977) next step is to propose a 
number of assumptions about how strategic groups develop and how firms behave in 
presence of groups structures.
In their paper. Caves and Porter do not explore the issue of how strategic groups come 
to exist. They argue that if we assume the existence of an industry with firms that are 
initially identical in all aspects except for random differences in scale, the investment by 
a firm will also affect competitors, who will react either by matching the initiating 
strategy or by adopting different strategies more suitable to their initial sizes. If rivals 
systematically follow different strategies, we have the basis for groups structures.
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Groups may also be a consequence of different risk aversion strategies, of random initial 
differences in their preferences or skills or of qualities of firms’ assets.
In their theory, firms have a history of similarities in objectives, risk attitude, and
strategic behaviour, which result in similarities in structural dimensions. Because of this
history, firms recognise the existing interdependence and behave in a similar way.
“Because of their structural similarities, group members are likely to respond in 
the same way to disturbances from inside or outside the group, recognising their 
interdependence closely and anticipating their reactions to one another’s moves 
quite accurately. Profits rates may differ systematically among the groups 
making up an industry, the differences stemming from competitive advantages 
that a group may possess against others. The industry’s profits and (perforce) the 
average level of its groups’ profits depend on the general structural traits of the 
industry and also the internal heterogeneities that demarcate its groups.”1 (ibid. 
1977: 251-252).
According to Caves and Porter, firms of a group are not the same but resemble one 
another along key strategic variables, and it is because of the importance of these 
similarities that firms recognise their mutual dependence and behave in a certain 
manner. Differences among firms in the same group are insignificant. Caves and 
Porter’s model of firms’ behaviour stems from the assumptions characterising the SCP 
paradigm, where firms, ceteris paribus, behave similarly and achieve the same 
performance.
2.2.4 Intergroup Mobility, New Entry and Mobility Dynamics
Having analysed the impact of the existence of strategic groups on firms’ strategic
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behaviour, Caves and Porter (1977) analyse the implications of the existence of strategic 
groups on entry and mobility of firms in an industry.
In Section 2.1, we have seen that according to Caves and Porter entry barriers are partly 
defined by characteristics existing at the group level, but also result of investment 
decisions by incumbent firms. These two elements may differ among strategic groups, 
which has important consequences on the industry dynamics and firms’ profitability.
The existence of strategic groups, which are protected in different measure, means that 
mobility barriers protect firms from external entry as well as from other firms trying to 
change their position in the industry. Because of the hypothesis of differences in 
profitability among strategic groups due to intergroup mobility, if one strategy is more 
profitable than another, then it would be expected that remaining firms would try to 
copy that strategy. If this does not happen, it is either because of the existence of 
differences in management’s preference function, or because firms trying to achieve a 
specific strategic position do not possess the asset structure to assume that strategic 
position.
The existence of different strategic groups with different structural characteristics and 
mobility barriers has a number of implications for entry and mobility patterns, with 
entry being easy in a group and blockaded into another.
Firstly, the existence of strategic groups with various degrees of protection raises the 
possibility of entry paths within an industry. A potential entrant has the possibility of *
’ "Firms within a strategic group resemble one another closely and, therefore, are likely to respond in the 
same way to disturbances, to recognise their mutual dependence quite closely, and to be able to anticipate 
each other’s reactions quite accurately" (Porter 1979: 215).
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choice on which group to target. It could target the group with the lowest barriers to 
entry, or other groups. However, it could also be that a firm may follow a pre-fixed 
entry path. “If the firm will ... alter position within its industry after entry, and if it is not 
completely ignorant of this possibility when it makes its entry choice, then the initial 
entry plan will rationally include some provision for expected future moves. An outsider 
entering a group-segmented industry may proceed by a sequence of moves, as may a 
going firm’s intergroup shift” (ibid. 1977: 255). The probability of successful entry into 
the most profitable group may be higher if the firm proceeds indirectly. The presence of 
a successful strategic position in the industry means that “the newcomer (or firm in 
another group) could prefer entry into j by a sequence of moves even if the expected 
probability of reaching j successfully via the indirect route is no higher or even lower 
than via direct entry. This follows from the irreversibility of the decision to enter” 
(ibid.). Unsuccessful entry into the less protected group may result in a much smaller 
loss. Groups may differ in the degree of irreversibility of their investment, a condition 
that favours a strategy of circuitous entry. Investments in production are largely 
reversible while expenditures on product differentiation are more risky, because they are 
mostly irreversible. The advantage of entering a group with lower barriers may affect 
entry-deterring investments made by that group’s sellers. “Easy entry in an industry’s 
fringe group is therefore no guarantee against monopoly profits and resource 
misallocation in an industry if strategies chosen by the dominant group block all 
expansion possibilities for the fringe” (ibid. 1977: 257).
Secondly, entry is an issue of comparative analysis between the factors (determining the 
strategic position) an incumbent has and those a potential firm possesses. Different 
firms may possess these factors in various degrees. The assets and capabilities a firm
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possesses are, at the same time, the basis for a measurement of the firms’ competitive 
advantage and disadvantage. A competitive advantage is measured by the assets and 
capabilities a firm possesses compared to those of a firm trying to acquire the same 
strategic position. A competitive disadvantage is calculated by the difference between 
the structural characteristics needed to get to the strategic position desired and those 
already owned. Caves and Porter classify assets and capabilities into: absolute-cost 
barriers, skilled management, vertical integration, intangible goodwill assets, scale 
economies, and diversification of risks.
In Caves and Porter’s view, entry is easier when the potential entrant is an established 
firm in another market. In this case, the strategic path followed may differ from that of a 
newly formed firm. However, “the established firm in the same industry enjoys 
advantages over the newcomer, if only from learning by doing and the inexpensive 
acquisition of information” (ibid. 1977: 256). “Some going firms enjoy advantages in 
overcoming each of the structural sources of barriers to mobility, although there is no 
basis for thinking that the assets of going firms eliminate the advantages of incumbent 
sellers over entrants” (ibid. 1977: 259).
2.3 The Characteristics of Strategic Groups Theory
Caves and Porter (1977) argue about the importance of structural (strategic) differences 
among firms within an industry. They propose a theory of firms’ behaviour in an 
oligopolistic industry characterised by the existence of groups structures. Although they 
only argue for the potential existence of a relationship between strategic groups,
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mobility barriers and firms’ performance4, their theoretical framework is based on the 
existence of a relation between firms’ strategies and performance. The persistent 
differences in profit rates among groups of an industry are explained through ‘intergroup 
mobility’ (i.e., without mobility barriers, firms of the same industry would have the 
same rate of profitability). If differences exist in performance among firms of the same 
group, then difficulties arise in terms of the understanding of firms’ strategic behaviour 
and the consequences for collusive behaviour within an industry.
Strategic groups, whose mobility barriers differ in their respective “height”, influence 
the distribution of profits among firms of the same industry. The higher that the mobility 
barriers are, the higher the profits of the incumbent firms and the stability of the group. 
As differences in performance exist between the different strategies and firms tend to 
maximise profits, firms will try to enter the most attractive group in the long term, but 
this will be made difficult by the existence of mobility barriers.
The development of strategic groups puts an end to the idea of one best strategy. It 
recognises that firms can successfully follow different strategies within a similar 
competitive environment. However, at a level of firms’ strategies, the theory is a 
deterministic one. Performance is determined by the strategy a firm followed in the past, 
expressed in terms of asset endowments, rather than firms’ behaviour. No specific 
factors at the firm level influence its profitability. If a strategy represents part of a firm’s 
complexity, it can be said that other parts (i.e., operational issues) not considered are 
irrelevant. The meaning of strategy used in strategic groups is a very simple one, 
characterised by underlying assumptions such as the existence of a direct relation
‘ "Profits rales may differ systematically among the groups making up an industry, the differences 
stemming from competitive advantages that a group may possess against others" (Caves and Porter 1977: 
251).
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between strategic decisions, implementation, and results. No discretionary behaviour is 
acknowledged at the firm level. The strategy options are determined by the structure of 
the industry. This is a neo-classical view of strategy and the firm, where the firm is still 
treated as a “black box”.
With regard to the issue of industry dynamics, “the most evident lacuna ... is the extent 
to which the longevity of any particular mobility barriers is seen as relatively 
unproblematic.” (Wensley 1996: 45). The industry is fundamentally static. The 
perspective characterising the strategic groups theory “is one of comparative static rather 
than a dynamic one.” (ibid. 1996: 45).
Overall, strong similarities exist with the SCP paradigm examined in Section 2.1, the 
main difference being that a homogeneous industry structure is replaced by a more 
complex strategic groups structure (Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3 The Strategic Groups Model of Firms’ Performance
Strategic Groups Structures ----- ► Firms’ Conduct ------► Performance
*
Similar to the SCP paradigm, the hypothesis proposed is one of a causal relationship 
between structure, conduct, and performance. As with the initial version of the SCP 
paradigm, there is no feedback effect. In the eventuality a feedback effect was identified, 
similar problems for econometric testing would arise.
The conceptualisation of strategic groups by Caves and Porter is strongly influenced by
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the characteristics and assumptions of the SCP paradigm, to the extent that it is possible
to imagine a homogeneous industry being replaced by a set of smaller industries.
However, Caves and Porter (1977: 250-251) stress that this view should be excluded:
Our concept of industry subgroups inevitably raises the question of industry 
boundaries. We stress that the following discussion does not reduce to a 
redefinition of the homogeneous set of sellers as a group instead of an industry, 
for two reasons. First, although we suppose that oligopolistic interdependence is 
recognised more fully within groups than between them, we also suppose that it 
is recognised by firms in the same industry than by firms in different industries.
The industry becomes segmented but does not disappear. Second, groups may be 
distinguished from one another because their products are imperfect substitutes, 
but this is not necessary. As we shall see, groups can be differentiated by factors 
that affect the conditions of sale of a good but not the good itself (such as the 
width of the product line of which it is a part), or by factors (such as vertical 
integration) that differentiate the product not at all in the eyes of the customer”.
Since the paper was published, little research has been conducted on the validity of the 
assumptions and the hypotheses proposed of how groups structures emerge and how 
firms behave [see McGee and Thomas (1986), Thomas and Venkatraman (1988) for 
reviews]. The main study that concerns some of the hypotheses and assumptions 
proposed in Caves and Porter's paper, is that by Porter (1979), which addresses the issue 
of the determinants of firms’ profitability. The following Section analyses the 
characteristics of Porter’s (1979) paper.
2.4 Further Theoretical Development: Porter’s (1979) Theory of a 
Firm’s Profitability
The main objective of Porter’s (1979) is the analysis of the determinants of firms’
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profitability.
“The purpose of this paper is to present a theory of the determinants of the 
companies’ profits which rests on the structure within industries as well as on 
industrywide traits of the market structure. Built upon the concepts of strategic 
groups and mobility barriers, this theory provides an explanation both for stable 
differences in competitive strategies among firms within an industry, and for 
persistent differences among firms” (Porter 1979: 214).
In his paper. Porter partially abandons the hypothesis of a ‘pure’ relation between
strategic groups and performance to develop a contingency theory of firms’
performance. In his new theory, the strategy followed by a firm is only one of the
elements at play in potentially explaining profitability differences:
“Industrywide traits (such as industry growth and the structure of buying 
industries) influence the profits of all firms in the industry, and hence firms 
profitability. In this context, however, the height of mobility barriers protecting a 
particular strategic group determines its potential profitability. The degree to 
which these potential profits are eroded by rivalry with other strategic groups is 
determined by the position of the strategic group in the group structure in the 
industry ..., and the potential profits of the group also depends on its bargaining 
power with adjacent industries and its exposure to substitute products. We need 
a number of additional elements to complete the model of firm profit 
determination. First the profitability of the strategic group will be influenced by 
the degree to which firms within the groups compete among each other. ... The 
second element is differences in firms scale within the strategic group. ... The 
third element is differences in the cost of mobility into the strategic group. ...
The final element in the theory is the ability of the firm to execute or implement 
its strategy in an operational sense” (ibid. 1979: 218-219).
Structural characteristics defining strategic groups membership is only one of the factors 
potentially influencing firms’ profitability. Other relevant factors are rivalry existing 
among and within groups, other groups’ characteristics and firms’ specific 
characteristics. Having already addressed the relationships between mobility barriers 
and strategic groups, we now analyse the other elements which Porter argues influences 
firms' profitability.
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2.4.1 Oligopolistic Rivalry and Firms’ Performance
Divergent strategies reduce the ability of oligopolists to co-ordinate their actions tacitly 
because firms with different strategies have different preferences about market prices, 
rates of new product introduction, and so forth. Porter questions whether all strategic 
groups are equally powerful in influencing industry rivalry or if changes in the make-up 
of strategic groups affect the outcome. He argues that “the impact of strategic groups on 
industry rivalry depends on three factors that also hold the key to the rivalry of particular 
groups with each other” (ibid. 1979: 218):
1. The number and size distribution of groups. Other things held constant, the more 
numerous and equal in size that strategic groups are, the higher the rivalry. On the 
other hand, if one strategic group constitutes a small portion of an industry while 
another forms a very large portion, then strategic asymmetry is likely to have little 
impact on rivalry since the power of the small group to influence the large group is 
probably low.
2. The strategic distance between grouns. this refers to the degree to which strategies in 
different groups differ in terms of the key strategic decision variables. The greater 
this distance, the more difficult tacit co-ordination becomes and the more vigorous 
rivalry is in the industry.
3. The market interdependence among croups. Diversity of strategies increases rivalry 
among groups, the most where market interdependence is high. Nevertheless, those 
strategic groups that possess high mobility barriers are relatively more insulated 
from rivalry. However, when strategic groups are targeting very different segments.
their effect on each other is much less severe.
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These factors interact to determine the pattern of intergroup rivalry “in the industry as a 
whole” (ibid. 1979: 218). However, each factor is complex in its characteristics and can 
present a variety of values. It is possible to have few large strategic groups or many 
small ones. Consequently, the impact of intergroup rivalry on a particular strategic 
group depends on a complex combination of elements.
2.4.2 Strategic Groups’ Factors Influencing Profitability
Further reasons why profits among strategic groups vary are related to:
1. The bargaining power some strategic groups have towards customers and/or 
suppliers. Differences in bargaining power are due to differences in scale, threat of 
vertical integration or product differentiation following from differing strategies.
2. The exposure of strategic groups to substitute products produced by other industries.
3. The degree to which firms within the croup compete with each other. Porter argues 
that while mutual dependence should be fully recognised within a group that 
contains few firms, it may be difficult to sustain if there are numerous firms in the 
strategic group or if the risk profiles of the firms differ.
2.4.3 Firms’ Specific Factors Influencing Their Profitability
The characteristics specific to firms that influence their profitability are:
1. Differences in firms scale within the strategic group. Although firms within the
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same strategic group are likely to be similar in the scales of their operations, 
differences in scale may exist and work to the disadvantage of smaller firms in the 
group where there are aspects of the strategy subject to economies of scale.
2. Differences in the cost of mobility into a strategic group. If there are absolute cost 
advantages of being early in establishing brand names, locating raw materials, a late 
entrant in a specific strategic group face some disadvantages with respect to 
established firms. Timing is, in this case, a factor that impacts on profit differences. 
This is also the case if an established firm possesses assets from its operations in 
other industries that can be jointly utilised.
3. Ability of the firm to execute or implement its strategy in an operational sense. 
Some firms may be superior in their ability to implement strategies. “While these are 
not structural advantages of the sort created by mobility barriers ... they may be 
relatively stable advantages if the market for managers, scientists and creative 
personnel is imperfect.” (ibid. 1979: 219). Therefore, firms in a group with superior 
abilities to execute strategies will be more profitable than others firms in the same 
group.
“In view of the interacting nature of these considerations, the profit potential of 
a firm in any group is affected by the outcome in those strategic groups that 
interact closely with its groups but have higher mobility barriers. These groups 
have greater profit potential than the less protected group if competition within 
them is not too great. However, if competition within them is fierce for some 
reason and prices and profits are competed down, this will ruin the profits of the 
firms in the interdependent groups less protected by mobility barriers. Lower 
prices (or higher costs through advertising competition, etc.) spill over via 
market interdependence to require that less protected groups respond, driving 
down their own profits” (ibid. 1979: 219).
"The firm will have higher profits if it is located in a group with the best 
combination of high mobility barriers, insulation from intergroup rivalry and 
substitute products, bargaining power with adjacent industries, the fewest other 
members, and suitability to the firm’s execution ability. One or another of these
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elements may involve a tradeoff with the other. For example, the strategic group 
with the highest mobility barriers (and greater profit potential) may have to 
compete more vigorously with other groups than one with lower mobility 
barriers (lower potential profit), or a firm entering the group may be a relatively 
small scale (less profitable) member of the group” (ibid. 1979: 219).
Porter’s (1979) paper represents a significant departure from the underlined assumptions 
about the relationship between strategic groups and profitability presented in the 1977 
paper. In a simplistic way, the strategic groups model of firms’ performance (Figure 2.3) 
becomes the following one:
Figure 2.4 Porter’s (1979) Model of Firms’ Performance
Industry Structure --------------
Strategic Groups Characteristics
Firms Specific Characteristics
However, each variable is a complex factor that can assume a variety of values. The 
theory loses the determinism that characterised the earlier version, as it is recognised 
that firms play a role in determining their own profitability, while highlighting the 
importance of the relation between structural differences, competition in an industry,
-► Performance 
▲
and profitability.
Chapter 2 -  The Theoretical Foundations o f Strategic Groups: the Harvard Approach -  page 34
2.5 The Implications of Porter’s (1979) Paper on the Theory of 
Strategic Groups
The objective of Caves and Porter’s (1977) paper is to prove that structural differences 
among firms of an industry have relevant implications for firms’ strategic and 
competitive behaviour. The authors also propose a number of hypotheses about firms’ 
behaviour based on groups structures characterised by strong assumptions about the way 
the groups emerge, industry boundaries, top management ability to understand the 
composition of the environment and its ability to implement strategies. Their set of 
hypotheses complement their argument regarding the importance of structural 
differences among firms of an industry rather than represented a core part of the 
publication.
In the later paper. Porter develop a theory of firms’ profitability, clearly stating that 
although there is a potential relationship between strategy (meaning asset endowments) 
and performance, other factors play an important role in determining profitability 
differences among firms. According to Porter’s (1979) theory, profitability is the result 
of the interaction of factors at the industry level, strategic groups level, and firm level. 
Porter’s (1979) article significantly complicates the analysis of strategic groups and 
raises important questions about what was argued the Caves and Porter’s (1977) paper. 
However, it also has a number of weaknesses. In our view there are two elements 
complicating Porter’s (1979) analysis:
a) that the consumer market is heterogeneous and that rivalry among firms in the 
industry varies (so that some firms may be more subject to substitute products from
Chapter 2 -  The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Croups: the Harvard Approach -  page 35
other industries); and
b) that firms’ specific characteristics matter in terms of performance and therefore in 
terms of collusive behaviour.
These two elements have consequences for the theory of strategic groups as proposed in 
the 1977 paper:
1. the concept of strategic groups is no longer a good enough indicator predicting 
firms’ performance as other elements also matter; and
2. if we assume that other elements of the same group matter in terms of performance, 
then another concept other than mobility barriers is needed at the firm level to 
explain profit differences among firms of the same group. However, the existence of 
profit differences among firms of the same group may have consequences for firms’ 
strategic behaviour, both in terms of collusive behaviour and investment strategy.
Therefore, the basis of the theory of strategic groups and mobility barriers, as developed 
in 1977, collapses. However, there are some flaws in the reasoning of Porter’s (1979) 
paper. Porter maintains a neo-classical framework for his theory of firms’ profitability. 
Therefore, to be consistent with the characteristics of the framework, he should have 
considered the following elements.
First, if a firm were not as capable of implementing the strategy as other companies of 
the same strategic group, then at some point the underperforming company would leave 
the group. A necessary condition for a firm staying in the same group over time is to 
have similar success in implementation processes (a constant under-performance by a 
firm implies that this company is not able to regenerate the funds necessary to maintain 
the investment strategies of other firms of the same group).
Second, if differences in terms of market segments served existed among firms of the 
same strategic group, then they should not have implications for profit potential; 
otherwise, they would, by definition, be of strategic importance and consequently lead to 
clustering of firms in different strategic groups. Furthermore, if firms of the same group 
did not focus on the same market segments, then it would be difficult to argue that they 
would recognise their interdependence and would behave similarly, as strong influences 
would also come from firms of other strategic groups. At the same time, if differences in 
market segments were of strategic importance and firms targeting the same market 
segments were grouped together, we would have an industry populated by smaller sub­
industries, as there would be a coincidence between strategic groups within the industry 
and competitive groups within the market, where the latter identified groups of firms 
serving the same market segment.
In concluding our analysis of the Harvard approach to strategic groups, it is necessary to 
say that Caves and Porter’s contribution is an important one. It highlights the 
importance of differences among firms of an industry. It returns some role to the firm 
and lays the basis for studying firms’ strategic position, as well as their strategic and 
competitive behaviour. On the other hand, it leaves a number of issues unresolved. The 
theory of strategic groups as they have developed it, is based on a neo-classical 
economic framework, and as such, is characterised by strong assumptions and a strong 
normative content. Furthermore, at a practical level, methodological issues, such as how 
to identify strategic groups5, are not addressed.
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’ This issue was nol considered in the 1977 paper. In the 1979 paper. Porter tested (he theory using the 
relative size of a firm in its industry as a proxy for its strategic group membership.
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In light of this review, we can say that the theory of strategic groups as developed at 
Harvard should have been considered as the starting point of a research programme of 
the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure, rather than the end result. On 
the other hand, the objective of Caves and Porter’s paper was to show to lO researchers 
the importance of studying difference among firms for public policy purposes. From this 
point of view, their objective was achieved.
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Chapter 3 The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic 
Groups: the Purdue Approach
3.0 Introduction
In the early 1970s, at the time Caves and Porter were trying to demonstrate the 
importance of differences among firms within an industry, Hatten and Patton, at Purdue 
University, under the supervision of Schendel and Cooper, used the concept of strategic 
groups to develop a model for studying relationships between strategies and 
performance. This stream of studies forms the Purdue approach to strategic groups 
research, the focus of this chapter.
3.1 Strategic Groups in Strategic Management: the Purdue 
Approach
“While mathematical model building has been commonplace over the last quarter 
century, what about models at a macro-level, models that capture the total 
enterprise, as the top management views the firm, models that can enter the 
boardroom and be used? Here, little work has been done, both conceptually and 
empirically. To be sure, the economist has been engaged with models that relate 
industry competitive (market) structure to conduct and in turn to performance. ... 
But these models have dealt primarily with variables managers cannot manage, 
e.g. numbers of competitors or concentration ratios. Moreover, the economist’s 
concern has been with public policy issues. Corporate financial models have also 
been developed, but these models are concerned mainly with funds flows 
generated by decisions about variables external to the model. Similar limitations
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in scope and purpose exist for models built in other functional areas such as 
marketing.” (Schendel and Patton 1978: 1611)
Confident of the benefits of the use of quantitative models in strategy, and building on 
ideas about the development of quantitative research in business studies, Hatten and 
Patton use the concept of strategic groups and quantitative techniques to study the 
effectiveness of firms’ strategies within an industry. The objective is to build a bridge 
“between the qualitative nature of corporate strategy now finding so much current usage 
by top managers in strategic planning, and the mathematical model building 
characteristic of management science.” (Schendel and Patton 1978: 1611)
In their research, strategy is defined as “a pattern or a positioning of resources of the 
firm relative to its environment, all to achieve desired performance outcomes.” 
(Schendel and Patton 1978: 1611). Having distinguished between corporate, business, 
and functional level strategy, their research studied the effectiveness of strategy at the 
business level. However, they note that “at whatever organizational level considered, the 
concept of strategy is related to three fundamental aspects of any purposive 
organization: (1) the goals of the organization, (2) the means or resource allocations 
possible, and (3) the environmental constraints to which the firm must adapt.” 
(Schendel and Patton 1978: 1612). Viewing performance as the measure of goal 
achievement, the three components of strategy are related in the following form:
(3.1) Performance = / (means, environmental constraints)
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where means are variables under the control of top management and environmental 
constraints are elements beyond managerial control. Alternatively, equation 3.1 takes 
the following form:
(3.2) Performance = / (controllable variables, non controllable variables).
What can be defined as the strategic groups model proposed by the Purdue researchers is 
synthesised in equation 3.2. However, what has traditionally been seen as a unitary 
approach to strategic groups research has a number of significant differences.
The first important difference among the papers concerns the type of controllable 
variables considered and their impact on profitability. Controllable variables are 
distinguished into strategic variables and operating variables. Schendel and Patton 
(1978) choose both strategic and operational variables to analyse the relation between 
strategy and performance. The decision to include operational variables is taken on the 
basis of previous research showing “the severe effects of inefficient operations” (ibid. 
1978: 1612) on performance. Nevertheless, Hatten et al. (1978: 598) assert that “over a 
long time period, strategy, whether good or bad, dominates operational efficiency”, and 
therefore, they only consider strategic variables. Consequently, they further develop 
equation (3.2) as follows:
(3.3) Performance = /  (Controlled or Strategic Variables; Non-controllable or
Environmental Variables)
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Hatten and Schendel (1977) take a similar position. In an article published in The 
Journal of Industrial Economics, the equation (3.3) takes the following form:
(3.4) Profitability = / (Market Conduct, Market Structure)
However, there are no significant changes in content, as the market conduct variables 
represent “the strategies of firms within the industry” (ibid. 1977: 106).
Commonly, researchers at Purdue use a single industry, the US brewing industry, as the
basis for testing their model. The US brewing industry is particularly apt for researching
brewers’ strategies, as in the period considered most companies were single businesses
and quoted on the stock market. This is important in order to assess the relation between
firms’ strategies and performance properly.
“Recall that the focus of this research is on business strategy and not on product / 
market choice. The selection of the brewing industry controls the product / 
market variable - diversification - at a low and non significant level. Indeed, to 
maintain control of the product / market variable over the 1952-71 period, one 
company, Rheingold, was dropped from the study since it obtained a large 
percentage (about 50 percent) of its profits from soft drinks.” (Hatten et al. 1978: 
598).
Schendel and Patton (1978: 1615) also argue that the choice of a single industry, without 
diversified firms, is made in order to “avoid cross-industry, cross-product 
heterogeneity.” The brewing industry is particularly appropriate to study the 
effectiveness of firms’ strategies as,
“between 1952 and 1971, the brewing industry underwent a major transition. In 
this period the number of breweries declined from 357 to 148 and the market 
share of the four largest brewers increased from 24.2% to 48.%. During this same 
period, the fortunes of many companies, both large and small, shifted 
dramatically. Schiltz lost its position as market leader to Auheuser-Bush whose 
market share increased from 7.1% to 19.2%. Once prominent large firms like
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Ballantine and Blatz disappeared while firms like Carling, Hamm, Falstaff and 
Associated Breweries enjoyed a short period of vigorous prosperity and then 
began to wane. Companies like Coors, and more recently Miller, began to grow.” 
(Hatten and Schendel 1977: 2).
Having studied the institutional features of the brewing industry using interviews, 
industry and business press, and public documents, a number of variables representing 
the companies’ strategies and environmental forces are identified. Variables are chosen 
according to their significance and availability. Here, the second important difference 
emerges between the research. Different variables are used in the different papers 
to operationalise firms’ strategies. Hatten and Schendel (1977) specify an eight 
variable model relating profitability to six strategic variables (three manufacturing 
variables and three marketing variables) and to two structural variables.
Hatten et al. (1978) specify a sixteen variable model relating profitability (ROE)1 to 
twelve strategy variables (five manufacturing variables, two financial variables, and five 
marketing variables) and four environmental variables. Strategy variables are related to 
a multiplicity of functional areas as:
“The thrust of strategic management or business policy area is that managing the 
whole of an organisation is a different task than managing the sum of its parts. ... 
General managers face both challenges and are finding that doing the right thing, 
i.e., strategic management, requires concepts and ways of thinking about 
problems that differ from those of operations management, which is concerned 
with doing things right or efficiently. One cannot substitute the other” (Hatten et 
al. 1978: 595).
The focus of Schendel and Patton’s (1978: 1611) paper is a different one:
1 'The choice of a single dependent variable, ... was not made lightly. It can be argued that over the long 
time period relevant to strategy, the firm will survive only to the extent that it can show profits. Although 
management may give growth (or some other objective) priority over profit in the short term, it will do so 
only when profits are expected to flow from the growth achieved. Hence, it is assumed here that the need 
for profit, the ultimate key to survival, will dominate any quest for growth (or other objectives) in the long 
term. The choice of return on equity as a measure of profitability was made on the grounds that it takes 
into account alternative financial structures and risk levels while it measures the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the firms' resources allocations." (Hatten et at. 1978: 598)
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“Prior research has been limited to single equation models linking strategy and 
environment to only one performance goal, profitability. While there is some 
controversy about it, complex organizations set multiple, and sometimes 
conflicting goals, creating a need for models that can encompass more than a 
single performance goal. Moreover, the interactive effects of strategic variables 
governing the efficiency of daily operations, suggests that single equation models 
of strategy cannot capture the complexity of the modern firm.”
They thus propose “a simultaneous equation model of corporate performance as a means 
of overcoming the multiple performance goal problem, while capturing the complex 
patterns of the strategic, operating, and environmental variables that influence goal 
achievement.” (ibid. 1978: 1611). They specify a twenty-three variable model relating 
three performance2 variables to sixteen strategic and operational variables and to seven 
non-controllable variables.
Once the researchers have identified the variables, a third important difference 
emerges: the use of different techniques to clusters firms. Hatten et al. (1978) and 
Hatten and Schendel (1977) consider the possibility of clustering firms on the basis of 
similarities in management goals or on the similarities in resources among firms. 
However, they cluster firms on the basis of the strategic variables identified and use a 
statistical technique in order to maintain objectivity3. However, Schendel and Patton 
(1978: 1615) assume the existence of “homogeneous subgroups ... on the basis of firm 
size and geographic scope of operations”. Having identified the clusters, tests of 
statistical homogeneity are carried out in order to be sure that the clusters are internally
1 The three variables were ROE, market share, and production efficiency. ROE is taken as a measure of 
profitability, because without profits, long term survival is not possible. Market share is taken as a 
measure of sales growth. This is based on a detailed analysis of the industry and indicated that although 
the industry had not grown over the decades, some firms had grown considerably in size. Finally, their 
analysis reveals that production efficiency was a clear goal in the industry “has been a key factor in the 
failure of many firms, while increased efficiency has been a key success factor for many firms." (Schendel 
and Patton 1978: 1614-1615).
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homogeneous. Results show that the clusters identified are internally homogeneous and 
externally heterogeneous.
Early research on strategic groups by Hunt (1972) and Newman (1973) is criticised 
because although it was argued that heterogeneity existed within an industry, this 
hypothesis was not correctly tested.
“Prior studies of the profit impact of strategic and environmental variables have 
often indiscriminately pooled firms into single composites, and industries have 
been pooled into even more heterogeneous aggregations of data. Not only does 
the tradition of business policy argue for care in considering firms in 
combination, but so too does the strategy construct itself. Bass (1974) 
demonstrated that indiscriminant pooling of firms and industries could be 
misleading in understanding the impact of advertising on profitability. Thus, for 
both theoretical and statistical reasons, because they were drawn from pooled 
samples, the conclusions of many prior studies of the causes of profitability must 
be suspect. Indiscriminant data pooling can mask the very essence of both 
corporate and business strategies and the key contribution they make to 
differential corporate performance.” (Hatten et al. 1978: 597)
The use of different variables and methods leads to the identification of a different 
number of clusters in the three studies. In some cases, there are also significant changes 
in the way firms are clustered. While significant similarities exist between the papers by 
Hatten and Schendel (1977) and Hatten et al. (1978), both in terms of numbers of 
clusters and companies clustered together, important differences exist between these 
two studies and the third by Schendel and Patton (1978). As we can note from Table 
3.1, Hatten et al. (1978) identify five groups: (1/B) large national operators, (2/B) semi­
national and financially weak firm, (5/B) relatively strong regional brewers; (3/B) weak 
regional brewers; (4/B) small regional brewers. Hatten and Schendel (1977) identify six 
clusters: 1/A, 2/A, 3/A and 4/A correspond to groups 1/B, 2/B, 3/B and 4/B. The only 1
1 Hatten and Schendel (1978: 105) develop a quantitative method for grouping firms based on cluster 
analysis. However, they point out that the groups needed to be made up of "firms which have a priori 
some theoretical or logical similarity.”
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difference is that firms clustered together in 5/B (relatively small regional brewers) are 
put into separate groups, 5/A and 6/A. Finally, Schendel and Patton (1978) identify three 
groups: (1/C) the large national firms, (2/C) large regional firms, and (3/C) small 
regional or local firms.
Table 3.1 Characteristics of the Strategic Groups Research at Purdue
H atten and Schendel 
(1977)
Hatten, Schendel and 
C ooper(1978)
Schendel and Patton 
(1978)
Number of Firms 13 13 12
Independent
Variables
8 16 23
Dependent Variables 1 (ROE) 1 (ROE) 3 (ROE, Market Share, 
Production Efficiency)
Number of Clusters 6 5 3
Strategic Groups Anheuser Bush, Schlitz 
(1/A)
Anheuser Bush, Schlitz 
(1/B)
Anheuser Busch, Schlitz, 
Pabst (1/C)
Associated Breweries, 
Falstaff (2/A)
Associated Breweries, 
Falstaff (2/B)
Olympia, Heileman, 
Falstaff, Associated 
Breweries, (2/C)
Iroquois Industries, Lucky 
Breweries (3/A)
Iroquois Industries, Lucky 
Breweries (3/B)
Grain Belt Breweries, 
Lucky Breweries, Rainers, 
Pittsburgh, Lone Star
(3/C)
Pittsburgh, Rainers (4/A) Pittsburgh, Rainers (4/B)
Heileman, Lone Star, 
Olympia (5/A)
Heileman, Lone Star, 
Olympia, Grain Belt 
Breweries, Pabst (5/B)
Grain Belt Breweries, 
Pabst (6/A)
3.1.1 Research Findings
“Generally, a comparison of industry versus group-level equations reveals a 
number of instances where the consequences of business strategies followed by 
specific groups of brewers differ, and certainly differ from the “averaging” and 
perhaps misleading industry estimates. So, the hypothesis derived from the 
strategy concept, that different firms can ... use different resource deployments to 
compete successfully, is supported by the estimated coefficients.” (Hatten et al. 
1978: 604).
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This research finding is shared by the three publications. As can be seen by examining 
the results in Table 3.2, there are many cases where results at the industry level 
contradict results for some of the groups. When a more detailed analysis is carried out, 
notwithstanding the use of different variables, clustering methods and results in terms of 
clusters, findings on the effectiveness of firms’ strategies within the sector in the three 
papers tend to converge. It also seems that the information gathered at the beginning of 
the studies significantly support the convergence of research findings.
The general picture is of efficiency at a national level, the maintenance of some 
defensible hold for regional companies, while the critical issue for smaller brewers was
not to expand.
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Table 3.2 Results of the Econometric Regressions
H a t te n  a n d  S c h e n d e l  (1 9 7 7 ) H a t te n ,  S c h e n d e l  a n d  C o o p e r  
(1 9 7 8 )
S c h e n d e l  a n d  P a t to n  (1 9 7 8 )
N u m b e r  o f  
P la n ts
N eg a tiv e  at th e  in d u s try  level. 
P o s itiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t fo r  
g ro u p  2/A .
N eg a tiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t  fo r  3 /A
N eg a tiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t at the  
in d u stry  lev e l, a n d  fo r  5/B . 
P o s itiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t fo r 
g ro u p  1/B.
M a r k e t  s h a re :  p o sitiv e  and  
s ig n ifican t a t all levels.
N e w n e ss  o f  
P la n ts
P o s itiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t a t the  
in d u stry  lev e l, fo r  1/A , 2 /A , 3 /A , 
an d  5/A .
N e g a tiv e  and  s ig n if ic a n t fo r  4 /A .
P o s itiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t at the 
in d u stry  level an d  fo r 2 /B , 3 /B  
and  5/B .
R O E : N eg a tiv e  an d  s ig n ific a n t at 
the  in d u stry  level.
P o s itiv e  an d  s ig n ifican t fo r  1/C. 
E ffic ie n c y : P o s itiv e  and 
s ig n ific a n t at th e  in d u stry  level. 
N eg a tiv e  an d  s ig n ifican t fo r  1/C.
A v e ra g e  
C a p a c i ty  o f  
P la n ts
N /A N eg a tiv e  a n d  s ig n if ic a n t at the  
in d u stry  level an d  fo r 5/B .
E ffic ie n c y : p o s itiv e  and  s ig n if ic a n t 
at th e  in d u stry  level an d  fo r 1/C. 
N eg a tiv e  an d  sig n ifican t fo r  3 /C .
L e n g th  o f  th e
P r o d u c t io n
C y c le
N /A N eg a tiv e  a n d  s ig n if ic a n t at the 
in d u stry  lev e l an d  fo r 1/B.
R O E : n e g a tiv e  an d  s ig n ific a n t at 
th e  in d u stry  level an d  for 1/C. 
E ffic ie n c y : n eg a tiv e  and 
s ig n ific a n t at th e  in d u stry  level and  
fo r 3/C .
C a p i ta l
I n te n s i ty
N e g a tiv e  an d  g e n e ra lly  
s ig n ific a n t.
N eg a tiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t at the  
in d u stry  lev e l, fo r  1/B. 2 /B  and  
5 /B
R O E : n e g a tiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t at 
a ll levels.
L e v e ra g e N /A P o s itiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t fo r  4 /B  
an d  5 /B .
N eg a tiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t fo r 2 /B
R O E : p o s itiv e  an d  s ig n ific a n t at 
th e  in d u stry  lev e l, 1/C an d  3 /C . 
N eg a tiv e  an d  s ig n ifican t fo r  2 /C .
M a r k e t  S h a r e N /A P o s itiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t at the 
in d u stry  level.
N eg a tiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t fo r  1/B.
R O E : p o s itiv e  and  s ig n ific a n t at 
th e  in d u stry  level.
N e g a tiv e  but n o t s ig n ifican t fo r 
each  su b g ro u p .
D i s t r i b u t io n
C o s ts
N e g a tiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t a t the  
in d u stry  lev e l, an d  fo r  1/A  and
2/A .
N eg a tiv e  a n d  s ig n if ic a n t at the  
in d u stry  level an d  fo r  1/B , 2 /B  
an d  3/B .
R O E : n e g a tiv e  an d  s ig n ific a n t at 
the  in d u stry  lev e l, and  fo r 3 /C .
M a r k e t in g
E x p e n d i tu r e
N /A P o s itiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t at the  
in d u stry  level.
A d v e r t i s in g N /A N /A M a r k e t  s h a re :  p o s itiv e  and  
s ig n if ic a n t a t the  in d u stry  lev e l and  
fo r 1/C.
N u m b e r  o f  
B r a n d s
N eg a tiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t a t the 
in d u stry  lev e l, an d  fo r  2 /A , 6 /A . 
P o s itiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t fo r  5 /A . 
(N o te  th a t in  its  g ro u p ,
H e ile m a n  is  th e  o n ly  firm  w ith  a 
su c ce ss fu l m u ltip le  b ra n d s  
s tra teg y ).
N eg a tiv e  a n d  s ig n if ic a n t at the 
in d u stry  lev e l, fo r  1/B  and  4 /B . 
P o s itiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t  fo r  5/B .
R O E : n e g a tiv e  and  s ig n if ic a n t at 
th e  in d u stry  level an d  fo r 3 /C . 
P o s itiv e  and  s ig n ifican t fo r  2/C . 
M a r k e t  s h a re :  n e g a tiv e  and  
s ig n if ic a n t fo r  2/C .
E ffic ie n c y : n e g a tiv e  and 
s ig n ific a n t fo r  1/C.
P r ic e N e g a tiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t  fo r  1/A , 
4 /A  an d  6 /A .
N eg a tiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t  fo r  1/B 
an d  2/B .
Positive  an d  s ig n if ic a n t fo r 3 /B
M a r k e t  s h a re :  p o s itiv e  and  
s ig n if ic a n t at th e  in d u stry  level. 
N eg a tiv e  an d  s ig n ifican t fo r  1/C.
S ize Not s ig n ific a n t e ffe c ts P o s itiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t at the  
n d u s try  level an d  1/B.
R O E : p o s itiv e  an d  s ig n ific a n t at 
all levels.
E ffic ien cy : n e g a tiv e  and 
s ig n if ic a n t at th e  in d u stry  level for 
1/C  an d  2 /C .
3o s itiv e  and  s ig n ifican t for 3 /C .
C o n c e n t r a t io n 3o s it iv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t a t the  
n d u s try  level.
N eg a tiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t fo r  3 /A . 
and 4 /A
N eg a tiv e  a n d  s ig n if ic a n t for 1/B 
and 3 /B .
V la rk e t s h a re :  p o s itiv e  and  
s ig n ific a n t at a ll levels.
R O E : n e g a tiv e  an d  s ig n if ic a n t at 
h e  in d u stry  level an d  for 2 /C .
The strategy by the large brewers (Anheuser Busch - Schlitz) was clearly one of growth.
A number of the large national firms expanded the scope of their operations over the 
period considered. They expanded by building new production facilities rather than by 
acquiring older plants. Modem plants were highly automated with large capacity, which, 
when fully utilised, offered economies of scale. Having more plants spread out in the 
country also offered a flexible solution to expansion strategies. Interestingly, Hatten and 
Schendel (1977), when analysing heterogeneity across time, find that the newness of 
plants changes from ‘not significant’ in the first period to ‘significant’ in the second 
period4. This issue is not explored in detail, but it indicates that the relevance of some ) 
variables may be time dependent. Successful expansion was made possible by the 
support given by distribution and advertising expenditures, which had a negative impact 
on profitability but a positive one on market share. Because marketing expenditure and 
receivable/sales were negative, and because a negative and significant relation between 
market share and profitability is found, it is argued that the larger "national firms have 
been deliberately sacrificing current profits for sales growth (which they have achieved) 
and they have been doing so since the mid-1950s." (Hatten et al. 1978, p. 606).
I
Stronger differences exist among regional companies than national companies. 
Heileman and Olympia (5/A) were successful in increasing market share with the 
support of a strong balance sheet. The larger but financially weak Associated Breweries 
and Falstaff (2/A and 2/B) suffered a declining market share. Large regional firms had 
been in direct competition with the expansion strategies of the national firms but they 
were less effective in their strategies. A major conclusion is therefore that within the
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’ "The meaning of the finding is unclear; it could signal a change in management's policies or in the 
effectiveness of its decisions, or it could signal a major change in the structural environment of the
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same industry, similar strategic actions may be associated with different performance 
consequences for firms belonging to different groups. Heileman and Associated 
Breweries were the only companies with a multiple brand strategy but only Heileman 
was successful with that strategy. Findings seem to indicate that it was not possible to 
give market support to the various brands. For Associated Breweries and Falstaff, two 
negative relationships are found between profitability and distribution costs, and 
between profitability and market share (although the latter is not significant). These 
firms suffered a decline in their market share. Consequently, it is suggested that these 
firms traded profitability for market share without achieving the desired result. It also 
has to be noted that these firms tried to match their rivals but took a cheaper ‘plant by 
acquisition’ route, preferring to match their rivals on advertising dollars/barrels. This 
expansion strategy did not work, probably because the plants were technologically 
obsolete. However, it affected negatively on leverage and therefore on profitability.
At regional level, different studies cluster firms in various groups. Thus, a 
comprehensive analysis is more difficult. Hatten et al. (1978: 606) suggest that some 
smaller regional companies (Iroquois and Lucky) might improve profits by increasing 
price with caution: “it can be speculated that these small, regional brewers, with loyal, 
and in some cases, intensely serviced local markets, have a clientele less sensitive to 
price changes.” Schendel and Patton (1978: 1619) argue that "the smaller firms do not 
have the resource necessary to follow a successful multiple brand strategy." This is 
based on research findings that indicate that the number of brands had a negative and 
significant impact on profitability. Average capacity of plants was also negative and
industry. Alternatively the change could be due to an unidentified or exogenous change in the wider social 
environment.” (Hatten and Schendel 1977: 110)
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significant, (probably because large plants were under-utilised). These results are 
confirmed by the other two pieces of research.
Having analysed the research carried out at Purdue, in the next part of the paper, we 
focus on an assessment of similarities and differences between the Harvard and the 
Purdue approach to strategic groups.
3.2 The Purdue Approach and the Harvard Approach to Strategic 
Groups Research
Similar to Caves and Porter’s theory of strategic groups, the Purdue approach to 
strategic groups also draws on the SCP paradigm. The SCP paradigm views 
performance as a result of the industry structure, with firms’ decisions resulting from the 
industry structure:
Figure 3.1 The Original SCP Model
Industry Structure -------------► Firms’ Conduct -------------- ► Performance
Caves and Porter (1977), in their theory of strategic groups, transform the SCP paradigm 
without, however, significantly changing the content of the SCP paradigm. In their 
theory, a homogeneous industry structure is replaced by a more complex structure of
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strategic groups, which is internally homogeneous and externally heterogeneous. Firms 
within the same group recognise that they are part of the same group, and their conduct 
and performance follow the strategic groups structure:
Figure 3.2 The Strategic Groups Model of Firms’ Performance
Strategic Groups Structures -------► Firms’ Conduct ------ ► Performance
The Purdue approach differs in a number of ways. Although the variables that are 
considered are the same, the relations among them are different. Firms’ strategic and 
operational decisions have a much higher degree of independence from the industry 
structure:
Figure 3.3 The Purdue Model of Firms’ Performance
Firms’ Conduct (Firms’ Strategic and Operational Decisions)
▼
Performance
Industry Variables
The use of the same variables is virtually about the only similarity between the two 
approaches. While Caves and Porter’s theory of strategic groups has an underlying 
theory of the firm and firms’ behaviour, the model developed at Purdue does not contain 
any theoretical framework about the nature of the firms and firms’ strategic behaviour
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within an industry. In the Harvard approach, similarities among firms are substantial and 
they have consequences for firms’ behaviour. In the Purdue approach, strategic groups 
are the result of a statistical technique rather than entities existing within industries. 
Strategic groups are viewed as an aggregation of companies with similarities along a 
number of strategic characteristics, but firms within the same groups “are comparable 
but different” (Hatten and Hatten 1987: 333). Further differences lie in the complexity 
of the variables. In Caves and Porter’s theory, strategy and performance are seen in 
simplistic terms and a straightforward relation is assumed to exist between decision, 
implementation and performance. At Purdue, the issue of strategy and performance 
receives much more attention. Schendel and Patton (1978: 1612) argue “a conceptual 
distinction can be made between effective strategy and efficient operation, but their 
respective effects on performance are difficult to isolate.” They initially assume that 
variables related to strategic and operational decisions are independent, although “in 
reality the components form a dynamic system and are interactive over time.” (ibid. 
1978: 1613). Findings support this view by indicating that:
1. strategic and operational decisions are complex, with a multiplicity of interactive 
effect among themselves and on performance;
2. firms have a structure of multiple goals that are not always positively correlated. For 
example, the authors have found that for a long period of time there was a 
significant negative relation between market share and profitability;
3. some explanatory variables have multiple effects on different performance measures, 
with the same controllable or non-controllable variable displaying different 
directions and magnitudes of effect on the various dimensions of performance. For 
example, concentration had a strong positive effect on market share of firms in
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group 2/C, while it had a strong negative effect on profitability for the same firms; 
and,
4. the relationships between performance measures, controllable and non-controllable 
variables vary among the different subgroups of firms. A research finding shared by 
the various research, with Hatten et al. (1978: 604) concluding that “different firms 
can (and must) use different resource deployments to compete successfully.”
The complexities of firms’ strategies, linked with the fact that strategic groups are seen
as statistical artefacts rather than real entities, means that when examining the
effectiveness of strategic decisions, the analysis centres on the relations between the
variables of a group and performance rather than between the group and performance.
Because strategy is complex and because there is not a ‘single strategy’ but a series of
decisions that have a varied impact on performance, researchers try to isolate the effects
of single variables. The complexities of firms’ strategies also means that in explaining
research findings, the authors have to make a strong use of qualitative information.
“The present research is empirical and quantitative in nature. Yet, it becomes 
feasible only when the empirical nature is combined with conceptual and 
qualitative study ... Qualitative investigation of the sample under consideration is 
necessary to identify the relevant sets of performance measures, managerially 
controllable, and noncontrollable factors used to specify the model. With a proper 
background study and model specification, the benefits of explicit mathematical 
modelling can be more fully realised." (Schendel and Patton 1978: 1620).
The use and integration of qualitative information is a specificity that has not since 
occurred in strategic groups research.
The differences between IO and SM with regard to the specification of the model and 
the complexities of the variables have to be examined by considering the differences in
the research focus. At the time the concept of strategic groups was developed, IO 
researchers were mainly interested in the way markets operated for the purpose of 
understanding their implications for welfare efficiency issues from a public policy 
viewpoint. Because of the large numbers of firms, researchers generated assumptions 
that tended to highlight similarities, and to simplify what happened within firms. 
However, SM was oriented to management decision-making in an individual firm 
context, with more attention given to single specificities as potentially the source of 
competitive advantage. It is not surprising, therefore, that apart from differences in the 
characteristics of the models and in the complexities of the single variables, significant 
differences also exist in the way strategic groups originate. In IO, the concept of 
strategic groups emerges for the purpose of demonstrating that differences exist among 
firms in an industry. Caves and Porter (1977) argue that the existence of differences 
among firms have relevant implications for market structure and competitive behaviour. 
Firms were previously assumed similar in all relevant aspects except size. The 
assumption of homogeneity within an industry is eliminated but it is still possible to 
identify a cluster of relatively homogeneous firms within an industry.
The main objective of research carried out at Purdue (SM) on the brewing industry is “to 
show that the strategy construct can be mathematically modelled and that quantitative 
approaches can provide top management with help in the major resource allocation 
decisions that it must make to achieve its goals in a complex, changing environment” 
(Schendel and Patton 1978: 1611). On the other hand, in a context that has traditionally 
stressed the specificities of companies (Rumelt et al. 1991), researchers at Purdue 
indicate the existence of important similarities among firms operating within the same
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competitive environment.
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Having analysed in detail the different papers published by researchers at Purdue and the 
similarities and differences between the Harvard and the Purdue approaches, in the next 
section we assess the methodological and theoretical weaknesses of the Purdue 
approach.
3.3 The Purdue Approach to Strategic Groups Research: 
Methodological and Theoretical Issues
Researchers at Purdue argue that the proposed strategy model has clear advantages in 
terms of greater objectivity and rigour compared to other techniques used at the time. At 
a practitioner level, the advantages are:
1. the provision of a better understanding of the relation between the variables and 
performance;
2. the provision of the means for an ex-ante evaluation of proposed strategies. Given 
the accumulation of competitive information, the model could be used as a what if 
technique; and,
3. the acquisition of information on alternatives that could be used as strategy choices.
Having conducted the empirical analysis, Hatten et al (1978: 608) argue that the
usefulness of the model have been proven:
“The research has shown that it is possible to build quantitative models of 
business strategy that go beyond qualitative statements of the basic nature of a 
business and reveal significant relationships between purpose, strategy and the 
environment in which a firm operates. ... While not substitutes for management
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judgement and decision making, strategic models can provide important help in 
assessing past strategies, defining new strategies, and evaluating proposed 
strategies before their adoption and implementation.”
However, having analysed the different papers published from the research carried out at 
Purdue, it is possible to identify weaknesses in both the theory and methodology, hence 
raising questions about the usefulness of the technique.
At a methodological level, although quantitative techniques can deliver more objective 
results, the number and the type of variables to be considered is an important issue. This 
is particularly when we consider that a common criterion to cluster firms together has 
not been specified. Schendel and Patton (1978) use a geographical criterion and Hatten 
and Schendel (1977) and Hatten el al. (1978) cluster firms on similarities and 
differences in the variables, they identify. Although results tend to converge, it was 
expected that these researchers, using the same industry in the same time frame, would 
adopt similar methodologies. However, this has not happened, thus raising new 
questions about the ability of researchers to objectively identify the strategic variables 
responsible for firms’ performance. A final element, not considered by researchers, is 
that, in analysing the effectiveness of firms' decisions, it would have been sensible to 
analyse firms that have disappeared during the 20 year period they studied, and analyse 
the reasons behind their exit from the industry.
At a theoretical level, the first main issue concerns the fundamental ambiguity about 
what types of variables have an impact on performance: strategic, or strategic and 
operational? Hatten el al. (1978: 598) make a distinction between strategic and 
operational issues but only consider strategy variables as they assert that “over a long 
time period, strategy, whether good or bad, dominates operational efficiency.” This
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position is not shared by Schendel and Patton (1978), who show that operational 
inefficiencies have an important role on performance and can lead to exit from the 
industry.
A second weakness relates to the specification of the model. While Caves and Porter 
(1977) fall into structural determinism in their strategic groups theory, at Purdue, 
researchers assume independence between firms’ strategies and the industry structure. 
Nonetheless, in their analysis it is clear that firms’ strategies have consequences for the 
dynamics of strategic options available to firms over time. This leads directly to the 
third issue: the use of the model to assess the effectiveness of strategic options. The 
cornerstone of the Purdue approach is that the model may be used by senior executives 
to assess the effectiveness of their strategic options. The model uses variables related to 
past firms’ strategies to assess ex-ante strategic options available to firms. This position 
completely ignores the fact that the past strategies were also successful because external 
conditions were favourable to those strategies, as well as that the structure and nature of 
competition within the industry may have changed'.
The argument that the choice of the strategy to follow is the main factor responsible for 
performance and the relative insignificance of operational issues reproduces the neo­
classic economic view of a company as a “black box”, where the role of market 
mechanisms is replaced by the role of strategy decisions. Firms are now seen as playing 
a determining role of their performance, but this role is restricted to strategy choice and 
is only loosely linked to the inner context of the firm. Furthermore, it is possible to 
abstract firms’ strategies from their context without significant consequences.
Hatten and Schendel (1978) indicate that the effect of some variables may vary over time, which again 
raises questions about the possibility of utilising the model to predict firms' future success and specifically 
about the effectiveness of the same strategy over time.
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In management research, this view was, in the 1970s, not exclusively limited to strategic 
groups research. At Harvard Business School, Scott and his doctoral students built upon 
Chandler’s (1962) work and developed research which analysed the relationships 
between strategy, organisational structure and performance. This research also shared a 
similar view of “decision” being the single most important variable in determining 
performance differences. It has to be remembered that, at the beginning of the 1970s, 
SM was in its early stages as an independent research field. “Until the seventies, 
academic strategy research consisted chiefly of clinical case studies of actual situations, 
with generalisation sought through induction.” (Rumelt et al. 1991: 8). New concepts, 
models and methodologies, typical of Economics, were being introduced. Consequently, 
some of the economic views were also being transposed into business studies. This 
economic view of strategy research has had an enormous influence in the strategy field, 
with the nature of research, for a long time, being on strategic decision rather than on 
the strategy process. There has been, among some researchers, an implicit and naive 
trust in the company’s abilities to implement strategies. This view was successfully 
challenged during the 1980s building on conflicting results achieved by researchers 
trying to verify the existence of a relation between strategy and performance and on a 
large amount of research stressing the importance of processual characteristics 
(Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret 1976; Mintzberg and Waters 1985; Pettigrew 
1985).
By comparing the strategy model proposed by Hatten, Schendel and Cooper, and 
generally the tendencies emerging in the strategy field to what was happening in 
economics, a striking paradox emerges. In IO, there was a trend towards less 
deterministic approaches, highlighted by the modification proposed by Scherer to the 
SCP paradigm in 1970 and by the theory of firms' performance proposed by Porter in
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1979. This was driven by a growing dissatisfaction with the deterministic models that 
had characterised the field over the previous decades. In SM, the trend was in the 
opposite direction and researchers were moving towards more quantitative and 
deterministic cause-effect type of studies. This has led to deterministic and reductionist 
approaches (Bourgeois 1984).
3.4 Summary
The analysis of the Purdue approach to strategic groups concludes with the publications 
of Schendel and Patton (1978). However, research at Purdue continued throughout the 
1980s. In 1987, Hatten co-authored an article (Hatten and Hatten 1987), stressing the 
differences between the Harvard and the Purdue approach and analysing the role of 
asymmetrical mobility barriers and contestability in the process of industry 
consolidation and concentration. Concepts and ideas generated at Harvard were used but 
the theoretical foundations of concepts were not considered, contributing to the 
ambiguity and confusion in strategic groups research which we shall analyse in the next 
chapter. In the first part of the 1980s, Cool completed his PhD at Purdue under the 
supervision of Schendel. However, little theoretical progress was achieved in his work 
(Cool 1985; Cool and Schendel 1987).
The initial objective of the research carried out at Purdue was to develop a model that 
can be used by top management to make decisions about their strategic and operational 
decisions. The problems both at a theoretical and methodological level raise serious 
doubts about whether this objective was achieved.
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Chapter 4 The Development of Strategic Groups 
Research: a Critical Review
4.0 Introduction
Following the development of the concept of strategic groups, research was initially 
directed at demonstrating the existence of groups structures within industries (Porter 
1973; Newman 1978; Oster 1982). Successively, strategic groups research developed 
into two streams. The main objective of the first stream of research was to test the 
hypothesis of the existence of a relationship between strategic groups and performance. 
A second, minor stream of research focused on the dynamics of groups structures and 
firms’ strategies within an industry over time.
Research trying to prove the existence of a relationship between strategy and 
performance constitutes the bulk of strategic groups literature. Towards the end of the 
1970s, SM was on its way to becoming a relatively independent research field. Its 
development was supported by the publication of books by Hofer and Schendel (1978) 
and by Porter (1980), as well as by the establishment of the Strategic Management 
Journal in 1980. Strategy research was mainly interested in issues of organisational 
performance (Hofer and Schendel 1978) and was characterised by an increasing use of 
quantitative techniques. In this context, strategic groups research well reflected the trend 
of that time. It linked firms’ strategies to performance and it had been among the 
innovators with respect to using quantitative techniques. It is, therefore, not surprising
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that following research at Purdue and Harvard, strategic groups became a popular 
technique in the analysis of the relationship between firms’ strategies and performance 
in an industry.
A variety of methodologies was initially used by researchers to study the relation 
between strategy and performance, this being reason of concern in the strategy field: 
“there is no uniformity in the treatment of strategic groups in empirical research settings. 
A variety of methods have been used to derive groupings in empirical research setting, 
which make the much-needed exercise at the accumulation of research findings an 
almost impossible task” (Thomas and Venkatraman 1988: 538). The initial
fragmentation characterising research on strategic groups is not surprising, given that 
research was conducted in two different research fields (IO and SM) and given the 
absence of a conceptual framework which was common to the two research fields. The 
confusion was worsened by the publications by some of the earliest researchers on 
strategic groups in both SM and IO1 and by the use of the concept of mobility barriers in 
strategy research, initially developed by Caves and Porter (1977) in IO.
In the first part of this chapter, we examine some empirical characteristics of strategic 
groups research. By looking at the method employed, we show that whilst the 
complexity of the strategy field was increasing (as the development of a number of 
research interests with different foci indicate), research on strategic groups has been 
characterised by an increasing simplification of the concepts of firms’ strategies, 
industry structure and performance, more typical of the Harvard approach. The
1 Hatten and Schendel (1977) reproduced their model and empirical research in an article published in the 
Journal o f Industrial Economics. Porter (1980) published his book, bringing the theory he had developed 
in IO into SM.
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consequence is that the initial theoretical differences between the two approaches have 
blurred.
Notwithstanding numerous empirical studies on the strategic groups - performance link, 
there is no general agreement among researchers about whether there is a relationship 
between firms’ strategies in the industry and their performance. McGee et al. (1995) and 
Thomas & Venkatraman (1988) have extensively reviewed past research and found 
conflicting evidence. However, researchers that have analysed the dynamics of firms’ I
strategies in an industry have found that firms tend to maintain similar strategies over ■ 
time. When changes occur, they are usually incremental with firms moving into the next 
similar group. These patterns of change have been explained with the existence of 
mobility barriers, inhibiting firms from significantly changing their strategies.
4.1 A Shift Towards the Harvard Approach
The publication of the article by McGee and Thomas in 1986 opens up a period of 
reflection on the characteristics of empirical research on strategic groups. McGee et al. 
(1995), Thomas and Venkatraman (1988) and McGee and Thomas (1986) extensively 
review past research2. In this chapter, we are interested in a critical analysis of how 
researchers have conducted their research. This is the basis for assessing the 
implications this type of research has on the view of firms’ strategies and industry
structure.
Chapter 4 -  The Development of Strategic Groups Research: a Critical Review -  page 63
4.1.1 Firms’ Strategies and the Concept of Strategic Groups
A first issue that merits attention is what defines strategic groups. Hunt (1972: 8), who 
coined the term in his PhD dissertation, defines strategic group as “a group within an 
industry that are highly symmetric ... with respect to cost structure, degree of product 
diversification ... formal organisation, control systems, and management rewards and 
punishments ... (and) the personal views and preferences for various possible 
outcomes.” Hunt’s dissertation was never published and its definition has rarely been 
used in research. In the following years, neither researchers at Harvard or Purdue gave a 
definition to the concept of strategic groups. What researchers meant by strategic groups 
has to be deduced from the content of their articles. However, in the 1980s, a number of 
definitions with varying foci were advanced.
The first published definition of strategic groups is given by Porter (1980: 129) who 
affirms that a strategic group is “the group of firms in an industry following the same or 
similar strategy along strategic dimensions”3.
Porter’s definition is the most popular in strategic groups research. At first, it may give 
the impression of referring to firms’ strategic investments rather than to firms’ 
strategies. The difference between the two terms is a subtle but important one. It is 
possible to think of a firm’s strategy as referring to a firm’s position at one point in time 
in an industry; position illustrated by its asset endowments, resulting from past 
investments. Firms’ strategic investments can be seen as the dynamic part of firms’ 1
1 We invite researchers interested in some methodological and technical issues to refer to these articles.
1 The dimensions to use in order to identify strategic groups are: specialisation; brand identification; push 
versus pull: channel selection; product quality; technological leadership; vertical integration; cost position; 
service; price quality; leverage; relationship with parent company; and relationship to home and host 
government.
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strategies. It can be regarded as indicating the current firms’ investments or firms’ 
approaches to their asset structures. Cool et al. make a similar distinction, by 
distinguishing between stocks (identifying the strategy) and flows (identifying 
investment): “ “stocks” ... are accumulated over time through a history of investments or 
“flows”. ... Asset stocks are “state” variables, which describe a firm’s competitive 
position. Flows are the policy instruments which the firm directly controls and as such 
represents “current strategy” ” (Cool et al. 1994: 222-223). However, Porter refers to 
firms’ strategies rather than firms’ strategic investments. This is clear when we examine 
the context in which the definition is located. Porter talks about strategic groups being 
helpful in structural analysis of an industry: “The first step in structural analysis within 
industries is to characterise the strategies of all significant competitors.” (1980, p. 129). 
The dimensions indicated as useful to identify groups mostly concern past, long-term, 
firms’ commitment, which confirms that Porter refers to firms’ strategies. It also has to 
be remembered that Porter’s (1980) book stems from the theory of strategic groups 
developed with Caves in the 1977 paper (analysed in chapter 2), where the concept of 
strategic groups clearly refers to the analysis of groups structures.
Cool and Schendel (1987: 1106) defines strategic group as “a set of firms competing 
within an industry on the basis of similar combinations of scope and resource 
commitments.” Where the scope commitment relates to:
• the range of market segments targeted by the firm;
• the type of products and/or services offered in the market selected; and
• the geographic reach of strategy.
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In addition, the resource commitment relates to:
• the business-level deployments of resources (both material and immaterial).
Cool and Schendel (1987) emphasise that past research has not always been attentive to 
the concept and the definition of strategy. They stress that their definition of strategic 
groups is still general, but specifies the components that must receive minimum 
attention. They argue that scope and resource commitments are industry specific and 
that the determination of the variables used to identify strategic groups is contingent to 
the industry studied.
Cool and Schendel clearly refer to firms’ stocks rather than firms’ flows. Nevertheless, 
their definition may lead to confusion between strategic groups and competitive groups. 
An industry is supposed to be formed by firms in competition for the same customers. 
However, it is often the case that an industry comprehends firms focusing on different 
market segments. Consequently, competition within an industry is not for a 
homogeneous market, but for a market linked by the elasticity of demand to price 
variations for the goods offered. From this paper, it is clear that the criterion used to 
cluster firms together is not one leading to groups characterised by maximal internal and 
minimal external competition. It seems, rather, that ‘competing within an industry’ has a 
broader meaning, incorporating direct and indirect competitive relationships. Therefore, 
in a heterogeneous, geographically-dispersed market, where not all firms are in direct 
geographic competition, firms in direct competition may be clustered in different 
strategic groups and firms which are similar but do not compete in the same 
geographical area will be clustered in the same groups.
Mascarenhas and Aaker (1989: 475) take a different view of what strategic groups 
identify, affirming that a strategic group is “a grouping of businesses within an industry 
that is separated from other groupings of businesses by mobility barriers, barriers to 
entry and exit.” In their view, mobility barriers represent the theoretical core of strategic 
groups and consequently they should be used to study strategic groups. In Chapter 2, we 
saw that Caves and Porter created the concept of mobility barriers to address the 
common financial advantages or disadvantage of firms of the same strategic groups. 
Mascarenhas and Aaker argue that, because mobility barriers deter movement between 
groups, a definition based on mobility barriers is better for judging the attractiveness of 
each group and about the assets and skills needed to compete successfully within each 
group. In their view, a strategy can be supported by a set of assets and skills but such a 
linkage does not always exist. If the strategy is not supported by a unique set of assets 
and skills, then it can be easily duplicated because mobility barriers do not exist.
Mascarenhas and Aaker’s view had already been advanced by McGee and Thomas 
(1986)4, who similarly argue for the importance of the analysis of mobility barriers. “A 
firm within a group makes strategic decisions which cannot be imitated by firms outside 
the group without substantial costs, significant elapsed time, or uncertainty about the 
outcome of those decisions. These barriers to causal imitation by firms outside the 
group, and the definition of group, require the existence of such barriers.” (ibid. 1986: 
150). However, McGee and Thomas do not see the necessity of defining strategic 
groups using a definition of mobility barriers. For them, it is obvious that the strategic 
variables that are used to identify groups are linked to mobility barriers: “recognising
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* “Classification of groups by their mobility barriers (or through similar notions of idiosyncratic capital 
and isolating mechanisms) is an appealing idea which stresses the cost advantages enjoyed by group 
members and emphasizes the elapsed time as well as the investment expenditures required of would-be
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that these mobility barriers (or group-specific entry barriers) afford protection to group 
members, it is natural to envisage the key strategic variables as those which affect the 
height of mobility barriers.” (ibid. 1986: 150).
Having analysed these three definitions of strategic groups, what can we conclude? 
Using Dierickx and Cool’s (1989) terminology, we can say that the concept of strategic 
groups and some of the definitions analysed here may give the impression of a shift of 
focus from the analysis of firms’ stocks to firms’ flows. However, the shift is illusionary. 
Some researchers have identified strategic groups based on similarities in firms’ 
strategic investments [Oster (1982) used ‘advertising to sales’ ratio to cluster firms], but 
most researchers have favoured an analysis based on similarities in firms’ asset 
endowments, said to represent firms’ strategies.
However, the fundamental question is “what is the concept of strategic groups supposed 
to identify?” Cool el al. (1994: 223) state that “if strategic groups are conceived as 
elements of industry “structure”, then they should be identified on the basis of structural 
or stable firm attributes, i.e. stocks. In contrast, if strategic groups are conceptualised as 
a mapping of industry “conduct”, then it is appropriate to use control or flow variables 
to define strategic groups.”
We believe that the issue of definition of strategic groups is complex and needs to be 
linked to the theoretical foundations of the concept of strategic groups.
Thomas and Carroll (1994) have distinguished between a strong definition of strategic 
groups and a weak one. A strong definition arises from the way the concept of strategic
‘entrant' to overcome the barriers" (McGee and Thomas 1986: ISO).
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groups was developed at Harvard. Firms are similar in all relevant aspects, and because 
of these similarities, they recognise interdependence and copy each other’s moves. 
Firms of the same strategic groups are also expected to achieve a similar performance. 
From a typical neo-classical perspective, there is an identification of theory of decision­
making with the theory of the firm, so the difference between strategy flows and strategy 
stocks is not at issue. However, the attention is on structural elements. Therefore, 
strategic groups should identify strategy “stocks”.
A weak definition derives from the view of strategic groups as developed at Purdue. 
Strategic groups therefore identify firms taking similar independently strategic 
decisions. The emphasis is on strategy formulation or choice and little attention is given 
to the relation between strategy formulation and realised strategy or to that between 
strategy formulation and asset configurations. Therefore, it is not clear whether stocks or 
flows should be used to identify strategic groups.
Hence, what emerges is that early researchers of strategic groups did not think of 
differentiating between strategy stocks and strategy flows. The most appropriate 
explanation seems to be the simplistic view research has taken about the relationship 
between asset structures and firms’ decisions about strategic investments (as well as 
between strategy and competition). However, because of the popularity of Porter’s 
(1980) book and his definition, as well as Caves and Porter’s (1977) paper, we believe 
that strategic groups should identify firms’ strategic positions in their industry (i.e., their 
asset endowments). Nevertheless, researchers studying strategic groups should clearly 
state the type of strategic groups they are investigating.
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4.1.2 Strategic Groups and the View of Firms’ Strategies and Industry Structure 
Emerging from Empirical Research
Fiegenbaum et al. (1987) and Fiegenbaum & Thomas (1990) developed a method for 
empirical strategic groups research. This method comprises five stages:
(a) choice of the strategy space (industry);
(b) choice of organisational level to analyse (corporate, business or functional);
(c) identification of the variables which best capture firms’ strategies;
(d) identification of stable time periods; and
(e) clustering of firms into strategic groups.
This method captures the important phases of the operationalisation process 
characterising strategic groups research. In this section, we are interested in examining 
the view of firms’ strategies and industry structure emerging from the analysis of the 
method used for the identification of strategic groups.
The main issue concerning the choice of the industry (phase a) relates the identification 
of the boundaries of an industry. Thomas and Venkatraman (1988) criticise the implicit 
acceptance of the pre-specified boundaries of industry based on Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes. Their argument is that it is inappropriate to be bound to a 
SIC scheme that mostly mirrors product variation. Further, when using the SIC codes, 
the focus tends to be on national companies, and the exclusion of foreign-owned 
companies and products poses questions about the validity of research findings. They 
suggest a pragmatic approach, where national and international industries are seen as 
complementing each other.
When choosing the organisational level at which to analyse firms’ strategies (phase b), 
possibilities exist for identifying firms’ strategies at the corporate or business level. 
Researchers usually consider the latter, the main reason being that the concept of 
strategic groups has traditionally been directed at the analysis of firms’ strategies within 
the industry. Hence, there is a simplification of the complexity of firms’ strategies, as 
the relation between corporate and business strategy is not examined. However, this 
process of reduction and simplification appears in even clearer form when we analyse 
the subsequent phases: the identifications of the variables representing firms’ strategies 
(phase c),; the identification of stable time periods (phase d), and the clustering of firms 
into strategic groups (phase e)5.
4.1.2.1 The Identification of Variables Representing Firms’ Strategies
On identification of the variables representing firms’ strategies (phase c), Porter (1980: 
129) argue “usually ... there are a small number of strategic groups which capture the 
essential strategic differences among firms in the industry”. Thus, he suggests that the 
chosen variables should capture the relevant strategic differences and that a pragmatic 
approach to the operationalisation of firms’ strategies should be used.
Thomas and Venkatraman (1988), in their review of empirical research, find that some 
researchers use a narrow definition of strategy, focusing on one functional area or a 
single dimension, whereas other researchers view strategy in broader terms and analyse 
multiple functional areas or dimensions. IO researchers predominantly use a single
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5 In the discussion, the analysis of clustering of firms into strategic groups (phase e) will he undertaken
before the analysis of the identification of stable time periods (phase d). This swap is solely to facilitate 
the discussion.
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variable as a proxy to firms’ strategies6. This common practice reflects the neo-classical 
tradition of IO research being concerned with strategic groups analysis, seeing firms in 
simplistic terms.
The operationalisation of firms’ strategies in a simplistic manner has been a matter of 
concern within SM. Hatten et al. (1978) argue that the process of identification of the 
variables representing firms’ strategies within an industry should be based on in-depth 
case study research. They also assert that strategy should refer to the whole of an 
organisation. Thomas and Venkatraman (1988: 539) also argue that “the development of 
strategic groups using a narrow conceptualisation of strategy is unlikely to capture the 
complexity of the strategy construct, thus limiting the usefulness of strategic groups for 
both descriptive and prescriptive purposes”. Lewis and Thomas (1990, 1994) find that 
using a narrow or broad definition of strategy has important consequences for the way 
firms are clustered. In their analysis a number of businesses are clustered in the same 
groups irrespective of the definition of strategy used, but other businesses are grouped 
differently.
There is, therefore, an open question about the operationalisation of firms’ strategies and 
the number of variables to use to cluster firms. It is easy to agree with Thomas and 
Venkatraman that a classification of strategic groups, which uses multiple criteria to 
group firms, would provide a better view of firms’ strategies. However, a more 
fundamental question is: to what extent is the use of multiple criteria referring to the 
whole of an organisation likely to capture the complexity of firms’ strategies?
‘ Newman (1978), Porter (1979), Oster (1982), and more recently Kumar (1990), all use a single variable 
to identify strategic groups. Newman (1978) use the degree of vertical integration. Porter (1979) use size 
as a proxy for strategy. Oster (1982) use ‘advertising to sales ratio’ as a proxy for product strategy. 
Finally, Kumar (1990) use country of origin as a variable for grouping firms. The only exception is Amel 
and Rhoades (1988) who use 15 variables to group firms.
1. In the analysis of definition of strategic groups, the concept of strategic groups can 
be used to identify either firms’ strategic flows or strategic stocks.
2. Strategic groups are defined either at the corporate level or at the business level. If 
the relationship between corporate and business strategies is not considered, as often 
happens, then we may have a simplistic view of firms’ strategies.
3. The exclusive use of data on what businesses have done, implies that only the result 
of the strategy process is observed7. Mintzberg has extensively analysed the 
differences between an intended strategy and a realised one (Mintzberg et al. 1976; 
Mintzberg and Waters 1985).
It is therefore possible to say that the quantification of firms’ strategies into variables 
inevitably reduces the complexity of firms' strategies. The use of more variables 
referring to the realised strategy of a business, which may be part of a diversified 
company, gives a simplified view of the business strategy. This can be seen as a 
necessary process for comparing and contrasting firms within the same industry. 
However, problems may arise when the analysis of firms’ strategies is exclusively based 
on the variables identified and it is said that it represents firms’ strategies.
4.1.2.2 Clustering of Firms into Strategic Groups
A number of different methods exist for clustering firms into groups (phase e). 
Harrigan’s (1985) article examines some analytical tools that may be used to group
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What emerges from the analysis is that:
Dess and Davis (1984) use 'intended strategy' based on Porter's typology of the three generic strategies 
(cost leadership, differentiation and focus) to group firms within the industry. However, by not 
considering the realised strategy. Dess and Davis also offer a partial view of firms’ strategies.
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firms based on some criteria. Taxonomies are seen as offering better solutions to 
researchers for understanding the similarities and differences among firms within the 
same competitive environment. Among the various taxonomies, cluster analysis is 
preferred to factor analysis. When using factor analysis, meaningful interpretations of 
the factor scales used as dimensions in grouping competitors may be somewhat complex 
unless a reasonable theoretical construct is represented by each factor. Further, object- 
based factor analysis techniques create overlaps in the identities of firms assigned to 
different groups. According to Harrigan, cluster analysis does not present the problems 
of factor analysis, and it has a number of advantages:
1. Cluster analysis does not pre-specify the boundaries of the group. Consequently, if 
researchers cannot isolate dimensions that describe essential differences among 
competitor, they can use additional interpretation to identify to which groups assign 
some of the firms.
2. Cluster analysis indicates the distance existing between strategic groups as well as 
between companies of the same strategic group. The distance between clusters can be 
considered as approximating the height of mobility barriers, while the distance 
between firms can be used as a basis to analyse the differences existing among firms 
of the same group.
The analysis of empirical research indicates that most researchers use cluster analysis. 
However, when conducting research on strategic groups, researchers have often made 
use of cluster analysis in a less than ideal fashion [see Ketchen and Shook’s (1996) 
review on the way cluster analysis has been used in strategy research].
At Purdue, the concept of strategic groups was initially nothing more than an analytical 
convenience (Hatten and Hatten 1987: 329). Clustering techniques were used to verify 
the statistical significance of “specific” strategic variables on performance. Hence, 
qualitative research had to be used to assess the link between the various variables. This 
approach has the advantage of clearly showing the complexity of the firms’ strategies 
and of stressing the existence of differences among firms of the same groups.
Subsequent research has used a different method. Once strategic variables have been 
identified, researchers generally use clustering techniques to form groups so that 
homogeneity is at its maximum internally and at its minimum externally8. The way 
cluster analysis has been used in strategic groups research has strongly affected the view 
of firms’ strategies and industry structure. Cluster analysis has the advantage of 
indicating the distance among companies of the same cluster. However, an analysis of 
the differences among firms of the same cluster has rarely been made. Groups are 
generally presented as highly homogeneous internally and highly dissimilar among 
themselves, which results in a further simplified view of firms’ strategies, with 
differences among firms of the same groups being excluded. However, the view of the 
industry structure has also been influenced. The industry is no longer seen as a 
collection of heterogeneous firms, but as a collection of groups of similar firms, a view 
very similar to Caves and Porter's (1977) perception of the industry.
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Thomas and Vcnkatraman (1988) argue that most researchers do not actually test for the internal
homogeneity hypothesis. They only assume it. This leads, in their view, to dubious research findings.
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4.1.2.3 Identification of Stable Time Periods
Lastly, we analyse the impact the identification of stable time periods (phase d) has on 
the view of firms’ strategies and industry structure as it emerges from the empirical 
analysis.
The issue of the identification of stable time periods is important when conducting 
longitudinal research on strategic groups. The analysis of empirical research indicates 
that most longitudinal research is conducted in SM. In lO, researchers are mainly 
interested in either confirming the assumption of the existence of heterogeneity within 
an industry or in proving the existence of a relationship between strategy and 
performance. This has mainly been done by examining several industries and 
geographical markets over a short time period, with the assumption that these markets 
are in equilibria9.
SM empirical research is more varied. Although many researchers still study firms’ 
strategies over a short period, there has also been research on single industry over a long 
period. (Hatten et al. 1978; Cool and Schendel 1987; Fiegenbaum and Thomas 1990, 
1993).
When studying strategic groups longitudinally, there is a problem about how to measure 
change. Hatten (1974) first paid attention to the influence of time on competitive 
strategy. “He initially assumed that the brewing industry would exhibit homogeneity in 
strategic behaviour across time, and then subsequently relaxed this assumption by using
’ Newman (1978) consider 34 four-digit producer goods industries all related to chemical processes. 
Porter (1979) analyse 38 three-digit consumer goods industries. Oster (1982) examine approximately 
2700 firms in over 40 consumer goods industries for a over 7 year period, and Kumar (1990) analyse 43,
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content analysis of annual reports to determine break-points at which strategic 
heterogeneity manifested itself’ (Fiegenbaum el al. 1987: 139). Cool and Schendel 
(1987) develop a more objective technique to identify changes in firms’ strategies and 
groups structures. A statistical technique, based on the test of the variance-covariance 
matrix of strategic variables for a given firm over time, enables the identification of 
‘transition points’ separating sub-periods with distinct strategic groups structures. Cool 
and Schendel (1987: 1114) stress that the “statistical procedure alone, however 
objective, cannot establish whether the transitions observed are owned to exogenous 
shocks in the environment, are triggered by autonomous firm actions, or are due to some 
combinations of both”. Their study of the industry indicate that major changes had taken 
place in the industry. This provided a potential explanation for the changes in firms’ 
strategies. However, “a more extensive analysis would be needed to establish causal 
relationships between these changes and the observed patterns of strategic group 
formation” (ibid. 1987: 1114). Once stable periods and groups have been identified, 
Cool and Schendel study the relationship between strategy and performance for each 
period.
The use of statistical technique to identify ‘relatively’ stable sub-periods enables 
researchers to form strategic groups in a relatively easy way. The technique also enables 
researchers to identify the dynamics of firms’ strategies and groups structures. However, 
the way longitudinal strategic groups research is conducted reveals two interesting 
issues:
1. Firms’ strategies and industry structure are seen in equilibria during each strategic 
time period. When the equilibria end, some firms change their strategies; at the same
three digit, Indian manufacturing industries.
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time, new strategic groups are formed while others disappear. This process is 
instantaneous and new equilibria follow as companies move into the next stable time 
period. Only the result of the process of change is observed. Nothing is known about 
the internal and external context as well as how the process of change has 
developed. Transition points are identified on the basis of statistical techniques, thus 
averaging out differences between firms that may have started this process in 
different years.
2. The stability of firms’ strategies and groups structures is justified through the 
existence of mobility barriers inhibiting firms from changing their strategies. 
However, thè end of each stable period should, theoretically, be characterised by 
changes in the relevance of mobility barriers. However, the dynamics of mobility 
barriers are not considered. This is consistent with the little attention given by 
researchers to changes in the importance of strategic variables. The same strategic 
variables have been used across the entire period of study to identify firms’ 
strategies. There is therefore an underlying assumption that these strategic variables 
have remained significant for the whole period, even when changes in the strategic 
groups structures have occurred.
3. As mobility barriers, by definition, only refer to group-common characteristics, no 
attention is given to firms’ specific characteristics, thus strengthening the view of 
firms of the same strategic groups as being very similar.
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4.1.3 Summary
In this review, we have seen that:
1. Different definitions of strategic groups have been proposed with emphases on 
different elements. However, there is general agreement that strategic groups should 
identify groups structures within the industry, reflecting asset endowments. In the 
original development of strategic groups, no distinction was made between firms’ 
asset endowments and firms’ strategic investments. This is a consequence of the 
simplistic view initially taken about the relationships between strategy stocks and 
strategy flows.
2. Strategic groups are generally identified at the business level. However, as it 
happens, if the relationship between business unit and corporate centre is not 
examined, an important variable for the analysis of firms’ strategies within an 
industry will not have been considered (Porter 1980).
3. Strategies are operationalised through a number of variables representing the 
relevant aspects of firms’ strategies. This is a necessary step for the classification of 
firms’ strategies but inevitably simplifies the complexity of firms’ strategies.
4. Clustering techniques tend to highlight similarities among firms and therefore, the 
use of these techniques further smooth out differences among firms.
5. In strategic groups research, it is generally assumed that the industry is in equilibria. 
When longitudinal analysis is carried out, the period taken into consideration is 
divided into stable sub-periods o f time. In the analysis of the dynamics of firms’ 
strategies and industry structure, changes in the structure of the industry and in 
firms’ strategies occur instantaneously. However, the significance of the strategic 
variables remains the same and nothing is said about the dynamics of the variables
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responsible for firms’ performance or inhibiting firms from changing their strategy.
It is therefore clear, that at each stage of the empirical process leading to the formulation 
of strategic groups, the method used for strategic groups analysis tends to simplify the 
complexity of firms’ strategies, smooth out the differences and homogenise firms into 
groups. The resulting view is one of an industry composed of internally homogeneous 
groups structures. This poses some questions in relation to the epistemological 
meanings of the way strategic groups research has been conducted, the focus of next 
Section.
4.2 The Epistemological Characteristics of Strategic Groups 
Research
The review indicates that research on strategic groups as performed in SM and IO 
carries a neo-classical economic perspective of firms and industry structure. The 
industry is static, in equilibria, which are broken at a specific point in time either by 
internal or external events. At this point on time, a firm may change its strategy; new 
groups may be created while others may disappear. Changes happen instantaneously and 
new equilibria are again reached within the industry. When analysed longitudinally, the 
method gives little indication as to the process of change and how it was carried out. 
The view of firms’ strategies is a static one and the analysis of change is a multi-static
one.
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The simplistic view of firms’ strategies as exposed in strategic groups analysis can only 
be partially attributed to the origins of strategic groups. As we have seen in the previous 
chapters, the concept of strategic groups as developed at Harvard (IO) is posited on the 
neo-classical theory of the firm. In neo-classical economics, there is a correspondence 
between the theory of the firm and the theory of decision-making (Zan and Zambon, 
1993). Consequently, the identification of the final results of firms’ strategies could 
effectively be thought as identifying firms’ strategies. Further, the deterministic tradition 
of IO pays little attention to contextual complexities. However, the story is a different 
one in SM. When the concept of strategic groups was initially developed at Purdue, the 
concept was nothing more than an analytical convenience. Firms’ strategies were seen 
as complex and firms of the same groups were comparable but different. The use of 
clustering techniques was undertaken to maintain the complexity of firms’ strategies and 
to stress differences among firms. Research since then has used different methods. Once 
strategic variables have been identified, clustering techniques are used to identify groups 
where homogeneity is supposed to be at its maximum internally and at its minimum 
externally. Differences among firms have a residual role. They are analysed when the 
main variables do not suffice to explain initial hypotheses about firms’ strategic 
behaviour or the relationship between firms’ strategies and performance. At the same 
time, the concept of mobility barriers has been used to stress the existence of elements 
inhibiting firms from changing their strategy within the industry. This was originally 
developed in the lO stream of strategic groups research, and the context in which it was 
developed was meant to identify those barriers protecting incumbent firms (enabling 
them to earn higher profits).
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Based on this analysis, it is clear that, in the SM research stream of strategic groups 
research, there has been an increasing use of concepts and methods typical of IO. 
However, there has been little integration with other theoretical developments in SM.
When the concept of strategic groups was developed, strategy formulation was the 
dominant approach in the strategy field (Rumelt el al. 1994). Researchers were mainly 
interested in issues relating to the alignment between firms’ resources and a theoretical 
‘optimal’ existing in the environment. This view paid little attention to the continuous 
dynamics of the environment; it also paid little attention to the firms internal 
complexities. It was not until the late 1970s that the complexities of the environment 
and internal characteristics were fully appreciated (Mintzberg el al. 1976; Weick 1979). 
However, little of this complexity has been incorporated in strategic groups research.
Having analysed the historical evolution of strategic groups research over the 1980s and 
early 1990s, it is possible to say that strategic groups research has been characterised by 
an increasing simplification of the strategy construct. In the next section, we will analyse 
the implications of this type of approach to strategy research.
4.2.1 Simplistic and Deterministic Approaches to Strategy Research
Simplification is typical of deterministic approaches to management and strategy 
research. Researchers, in pursuit of deterministic explanations, reduce the complexity of 
the object they research, leading to a simplification of the events. Bourgeois (1984: 590) 
point out the problems of using such an approach for the study of firms' strategies:
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“The primary limitations of deterministic theories ... are that they: (1) are 
reductionist, resulting in losing the richness of both independent variables (such 
as environment) and dependent variables (structure, strategy); (2) ignore 
reciprocal cause - effect; (3) if pursued to their extreme, result in hyper - 
contingency theories or studies of situational cases; most important; (4) reduce 
managers to mechanistic computers who must apply scientific laws to achieve 
results; and (5) relegate managers to a passive role, constrained by a variety of 
forces.”
Thus, “the inherent reductionism eliminates much of the richness that characterizes the 
strategic management process, and that they may constrain the advancement of strategic 
management as an academic discipline.” (ibid. 1984: 586). He finds ‘curious’ the 
development of a deterministic approach in management research. It is difficult, he 
argued, to explain the spread of deterministic approaches in a research field traditionally 
characterised by qualitative, processual types of research.
For strategic groups research, the use of a deterministic approach has implied that 
although a distinction between strategic and operational issues has been proposed 
(Hatten et al. 1978), only strategy variables have been considered as “over a long time 
period, strategy, whether good or bad, dominates operational efficiency” (Hatten et al. 
1978: 598). The argument that the strategy a company follows determines its 
performance and the relative insignificance of operational issues, reproduces on a 
smaller scale the neo-classic economic view of a company as a “black box”, where the 
role of market mechanisms is replaced by the role of strategy decisions. Firms are now 
seen as playing a determining role in their performance, but this role is restricted to the 
choice and is only loosely linked to the inner context of the firm. Top management has
little discretion; it can chose the right strategy or fail.
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A second problem is that firms’ profitability depends upon the profitability of the other 
firms of the same group. We have therefore a second important problem of recognising 
the role of the specific firm in a group structure.
Barney and Hoskisson (1990) fundamentally doubt the advantages of using a model
based on IO economics deriving from a neo-classical theory of the firm in strategy
research. They question whether it is worth continuing research on strategic groups or
whether the concept should altogether be abandoned “in favour of a model based on the
idiosyncratic attributes of individual firms.” (ibid. 1990: 195)10.
“Despite the apparently close link between IO economics and the theory of 
strategy, the integration of these two theoretical traditions has not been without 
difficulties ... Primary among these has been the different units of analysis they 
employ. IO economics has been developed at the industry level of analysis and IO 
economists have generally assumed that firms in an industry are homogeneous 
except for differences in size ... while strategic theory has been developed at the 
level of the individual firm, or at the level of the strategic business unit within a 
firm, and strategy theorists have assumed that firms within an industry are 
idiosyncratic in strategically important ways ...
These differences between IO economics and strategic theory manifest 
themselves most clearly when applying IO logic to help firms choose strategies ...
IO logic can only assist firms in analyzing their external opportunities and threats 
... It cannot be used by firms to analyze their individual strengths and weaknesses, 
strategy theorists require a conceptual model that includes some degree of intra­
industry firm heterogeneity as a key component. Traditional IO economics ... 
does not meet this requirement” (ibid. 1990: 188).
Our position is that if there are no doubts about what determines what and this is 
empirically proven, there are not inherent problems with deterministic approaches to 
strategy research. The problem is that the existence of an unequivocal link between 
strategic groups and performance is arguable.
Barney and Hoskisson's argument is mainly directed at the theory of strategic groups emerging from the 
paper of Caves and Porter (1977) and was analysed in the second chapter. Their analysis is not complete 
as strategic groups as developed at Harvard stands in opposition to the view of strategic groups emerging 
from the research conducted at Purdue, where "... groups do not exist and a strategic group is not an 
antropomorphized unified competitive force of many firms. It is merely an analytical convenience.”
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4.3 Summary
The initial objective of this chapter was to analyse the view of firms’ strategies and 
industry structure as it emerges from strategic groups research. A number of interesting 
observations surface from this analysis:
1. The simplification of firms’ strategies and industry structure characterising strategic 
groups research is only partially due to the theoretical framework which was initially 
proposed. At Purdue, the focus of the analysis was on similarities and differences 
among firms of the same group.
2. Over time, the strategy concept in the strategy field has become more complex. This 
complexity, it could be argued, would require a more refined type of analysis and 
multiplicity of methods. However, there has been a trend in strategic groups research 
conducted in SM to adopt a more simplistic view of firms’ strategies, though this 
was initially only typical in IO. The stress on similarities rather than on differences, 
the relatively simplistic view of firms’ strategies and the use of the concept of 
mobility barriers as a means of explaining stability in firms’ strategies over time, all 
contributed to a significant shift within strategic groups research from a view of 
groups as being a cluster of firms with significant similarities but fundamental 
differences, to a view of groups as being a homogeneous entity. In other words, there 
has been a shift in SM to a way of undertaking research that reflects Caves and 
Porter’s IO view of strategic groups. This has been supported by the method used in 
analysing the dynamics of firms’ strategies with strategic groups analysis.
3. Finally, while the practice has been to identify firms’ strategies through variables, 
the review questions the extent to which this approach illuminates firms’ strategies
(Halten and Hatten 1987: 329).
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and industry structure. Research has focused on either confirming the hypotheses of 
the existence of a relation between firms’ strategies and their performance or on 
analysing the dynamics of firms’ strategies and groups structure in an industry. The 
approach used says nothing about the reasons behind the dynamics of firms’ 
strategies and industry structure. However, the way quantitative techniques are used 
leads to a neo-classical view of the firm and the industry. The main consequences 
include a reification of the nature of the firm and an increasing importance of 
hypotheses about other external conditions.
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Chapter 5 Strategic Groups Research and the 
Development of other Theoretical Approaches
5.0 Introduction
In the preceding chapters, we analysed the theoretical foundations of the concept of 
strategic groups (Chapters two and three) and we examined the characteristics of the  ^
development of strategic groups research (Chapter four). On the one hand, the analysis 
indicates a number of problems with strategic groups theory and, on the other hand, an 
increasing reliance on quantitative techniques in studying strategic groups, with a shift 
towards a neo-classical view of firms and industry structure. The latter is characterised 
by a simplistic view of firms’ strategies and by a mechanistic view of industrial and 
strategic change.
Since the late 1980s, studies have developed which, directly and indirectly, question 
strategic groups research. At one level, is the development of a number of studies W 
looking at groups structures within an industry from different perspectives. At a second 
level, there are some attempts to stress the specificities of firms, in a context that still 
highlights the importance of similarities among firms of the same groups. At a third 
level, is the emergence of an evolutionary theory of the firm, which challenges the 
assumption and hypotheses characterising research based on neo-classic economic 
theory. In this chapter, we analyse these three streams of research.
Attempts have been made to reconcile some approaches for the analysis of groups
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structures within the industry. However, fundamental questions and challenges for 
strategic groups, have remained unanswered. The problem is that there is still little 
understanding of the industry structure and the dynamics of firms’ strategies within an 
industry. We believe that there will be little progress on these issues until a better 
understanding of the dynamics of the industry structure and firms’ strategies, and of the 
complexity of this process, is achieved. Having reviewed these approaches and assessed 
their impact on strategic groups, two research themes are set up, which will drive the 
empirical research. Around these themes, a number of more detailed questions for the 
empirical research are outlined.
5.1 Alternative Frameworks for the Analysis of Groups Structures 
within an Industry
In this section, we analyse the main characteristics of two approaches that look at 
groups structures in similar competitive environments from two different theoretical 
perspectives: population ecology of organisation and cognitive communities.
5.1.1 Strategic Groups and Population Ecology of Organisations
Ecology approaches to the study of population of organisations have developed out of 
the seminal paper by Hannan and Freeman (1977): The Population Ecology of 
Organizations. Hannan and Freeman argue the advantages of using population ecology
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models originating from biology to study and explain the emergence, growth and 
decline of populations of organisations.
In population ecology, the existence of different organisational forms is explained by 
the existence of different environments (i.e. niches). Growth of an organisational 
species and its stability over time is a function of (a) the quantity of resources that a 
specific environment can offer and (b) of competition with other species living in the 
same environment.
The same territory can provide many niches for a plurality of species that use different 
resources. However, if a second population migrates to the same niche and makes use of 
the same resources, there will be competition among species. The more similar that 
populations are, the more difficult it is for the same environment to sustain two 
populations in equilibria. The tougher that competition for scarce resources is, the more 
likely it is that the less apt organisation will be eliminated.
The existence in the environment of (a) limited resources, (b) competition, and (c) 
stability explains the phenomena of stability, homogeneity within species and 
isomorphism (i.e., the existence of an ideal match between the niche and an 
organisational form). Isomorphism can result either because non-optimal forms are 
"selected out” of a community of organisations or because organisational decision­
makers learn optimal decisions and adjust organisational behaviour accordingly. 
Although it is recognised that a selective view must be complemented with an adaptive 
one, population ecology focuses exclusively on selection processes. This is justified by 
the existence of structural inertia, which constrains the range of alternatives available to
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firms. One implication is that if radical changes occur in the environment, organisations 
will tend to be relatively inert to environmental changes, and therefore will be selected 
out. Inertial pressure is due to both internal structural arrangements and environmental 
constraints.
As the focus of population ecologists is on the dynamics of populations of 
organisations, performance is also an important issue. However, whilst performance has 
traditionally been measured in management research with financial ratios, population 
ecologists have introduced different measures of performance (i.e., rates of deaths and 
survival of organisations over time).
With the attention on populations of firms with similar characteristics in relation to a 
number of criteria and on the performance of populations over time within a certain 
environment, it is not surprising that there have been studies proposing population 
ecology of organisations as a theoretical framework for strategic groups research. Two 
studies have analysed strategic groups from a population ecology perspective: Boeker 
(1991) and Carroll and Swaminathan (1992). The key premise is to examine strategic 
groups as species and to analyse their dynamics within the same competitive 
environment.
According to Carroll and Swaminathan (1992), the existence of conflicting evidence on 
the relationship between strategy and performance is due to two methodological 
aspects: (a) how strategic groups are identified and (b) how performance is measured. In 
their view, groups should be identified on the basis of some organisational form criteria 
rather than on the basis of criteria trying to identify the strategies of firms, as the latter
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are vague and ambiguous, and therefore open to different interpretation. By 
organisational form, Carroll and Swaminathan (1992: 68) mean “much more than the 
formal structure of the organisation - it includes all factors that define a population’s 
niche, including especially environmental factors”. Interestingly, Boeker (1991) and 
Carroll and Swaminathan (1992) use the same industry (the US brewing industry) for 
their analysis but they employ different criteria to identify strategic groups and cluster 
groups differently1. There are therefore doubts concerning the unequivocal advantage of 
using a population ecology approach to study strategic groups.
At a theoretical level, there are interesting similarities and differences between the 
theory of strategic groups and organisational ecology. Researchers of both approaches 
argue that there are mechanisms that inhibit firms from changing their strategy (mobility 
barriers and structural inertia) and in both approaches, the focus is on groups analysis. 
Similarly to strategic groups theory, population ecology of organisation is deterministic 
in character. However, the determinants are contrary in the two theories. In strategic 
groups, performance is determined by strategy. In population ecology, the environment 
determines the fortune of businesses. Hannan and Freeman recognise that adaptive and 
selective views ought to be seen as complementary rather than as alternatives. However, 
the entire theory of population ecology and related models are based on the fundamental 
assumption that it is the environment that determines firms’ fortunes. This issue creates 
notable difficulties for using population ecology frameworks in strategic groups 
research. Further, the deterministic nature of population ecology, with its focus on the 
environment, means that little attention is paid to the nature of industrial and business 
change over time.
1 Boeker (1991) identifies three groups of Brewers: national firms, regional firms and local firms. Carroll 
and Swaminathan (1992) identify three different groups: mass producers, microbreweries and brewpubs.
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At another level, it is particularly interesting in organisational ecology is the idea of 
distinguishing between firms and environment with attention to the relationships 
between these two elements (in strategic groups, the environment is incorporated in the 
industry/groups). By analysing these two elements independently, there is a possibility 
of increasing our understanding of the complexity of the relationship between the two.
5.1.2 Strategic Groups and Cognitive Communities
A second research stream that analyses groups structures within an industry comes from
cognitive analysis and goes under the name of cognitive communities. The theoretical
background of this research lies in cognitive science. Stubbart and Ramaprasad (1990:
251-252) describe the nature and scope of cognitive analysis:
“Cognitive science characterizes minds ... as intentional, representational, and 
computational. In addition, it stresses the significance of tracking the overt 
manifestations of intelligent behaviour: intelligent strategic behaviour in strategic 
management - that is, observing what strategists do. These four themes span 
philosophy, cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, and anthropology, 
respectively. A cognitive science approach ... uses these four themes to 
comprehend managerial minds: fathoming managers’ strategic intentions, 
deciphering their representational knowledge about strategy, studying their 
reasoning processes and recording a description of managerial behaviour in 
strategic management settings. In short, cognitive science applied to strategic 
management means that scholars must research, model, understand and extend 
the mind(s) of strategic managers”.
Research on cognitive communities has developed from research concerned in how 
management of different firms perceives the competitive environment and acts on the 
basis of it. The argument is that there is a difference between what has traditionally been 
defined as an objective environment and what top management perceives. Top 
management takes decisions on the basis of how it perceives the environment; the way
Chapter 5 ■ Strategic Groups Research and the Development of other Theoretical Approaches -  page 92
management sees its firm’s activities and its competitors is expected to have tangible 
effects on strategy reformulation and subsequent industry structure. “Material decisions 
ultimately reflect the intuition and cognitive constructions of decision makers. At a 
cognitive level, business competition must be analysed in terms of the mental models of 
decision-makers and how such mental models lead to a particular interpretation of the 
competitive milieu” (Porac et al. 1989: 398).
Thomas and Carroll (1994) argue that two definitions of cognitive communities can be 
identified. The weak definition limits the analysis to similarities of cognitive 
communities. It is argued that individuals sharing similar beliefs about a given 
transaction will be more likely to interact among themselves. Furthermore, they may 
influence each other through the diffusion of information. The strong definition 
requires further active interactions, mutual influence and collective efforts. These have 
also been defined as cognitive oligopolies (Porac et al. 1989) to indicate the importance 
of interaction between firms. A cognitive community could therefore extend the 
boundaries of rationality by pooling existing information and cognitive resources.
Porac et al. (1989) examine the relevance of managerial cognition for strategic groups 
analysis. They indicate that industry participants share perceptions about strategic 
commonalties among firms and that participants cluster competitors in subtle ways not 
reflected in extant research on strategic groups. They also argue that decision-makers’ 
perceptions and cognitions are phenomena that can be expected to influence industry 
evolution. They therefore call for complementing traditional strategic groups analysis 
with a cognitive-based type of research. “When attempting to understand the strategic 
interactions occurring within and among groups of similar firms, the social
Chapter 5 ■ Strategic Groups Research and the Development of other Theoretical Approaches -  page 93
psychological reality of ‘the group’ must be taken into account” (ibid. 1989: 413). The 
argument is that strategic groups is a useful technique when the aim is to assess 
similarities and differences among firms regardless of their strategic relevance. 
However, for a comprehensive analysis, it is necessary to examine managerial 
perceptions and how they influence strategy formulation. [See also Bogner and Thomas 
(1993) and Reger and Huff (1993)].
By using a cognitive perspective, it is also possible to provide a solution to the problem 
of the underlying static characterising strategic groups research. In both strategic groups 
and cognitive communities, top management has some external reference points 
influencing its decision activities. However, in cognitive research, reference points 
change because cognition is a continuous process, with a continuous internal dynamics. 
In strategic groups, sensemaking is not a continuous process. Management has a clear 
cognitive structure of industry and competition, and this state remains until new changes 
occur in the industry.
However, there are a number of problems with cognitive research. Reger and Huff 
(1993: 119) point out that “Research shows, ... that established mental maps lead 
individuals to ignore contradictory data (e.g., Prahalad and Bettis 1986). Thus, a 
problem with cognitive associations is they may not reflect evidence from a changing 
world. Cognitive structures also are inevitably based on incomplete knowledge, and 
even the simplest inferences are frequently biased (Schwenk, 1984)”.
Weick (1995) also notes that there is little understanding of how cognitive structures 
develop. The focus of cognitive studies is on attending to cues in the environment, 
interpreting the meaning of such cues and then externalising these interpretations via
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concrete activities. Meaning is created when cues are linked with already learned or 
developing cognitive structures (Porac et al. 1989). However, what is left unspecified is 
how the cues got there in the first place and how these particular cues were singled out 
from an ongoing flow of experience. Also unspecified is how the interpretations and 
meanings of these cues were then altered and made more explicit and sensible, as a 
result of ‘concrete activities’ ” (Weick 1995: 8). Cognitive communities “seems more 
evolutionary than planned, having developed over several decades in response to 
problems encountered in the market place” (Porac et al. 1989: 404).
There is no doubt that cognitive research provides an interesting area of research for 
strategy researchers interested in the dynamics of firms’ strategies, especially in the area 
related to the process of changes in firms’ strategies. The main problem lies in the little 
attention given to firms’ performance and dynamics, which are at the heart of strategic 
groups research and strategy research (Rumelt el al. 1991). Further, where the focus of 
analysis is on industrial and business change, it is necessary to complement cognitive 
analysis with other approaches, to help us understand the mechanisms underpinning the 
dynamics of the competitive environment (i.e., innovation and competitive positions).
5.2 Integration of Firms’ Specific Aspects with Strategic Groups
Having analysed research on groups structures in similar competitive environments 
from different perspectives, in the following two Sections we examine research on 
firms specificities within a context that still highlights the importance of commonalities
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among firms. The first approach examined argues for an integration of Porter’s (1979) 
theory of firms’ profitability. The second supports the integration of the Resource Based 
View of the firm.
5.2.1 A Stronger Integration of Porter’s (1979) Theory of Firms’ Profitability
In Chapter two, we examined how Porter’s (1979) paper departs from his 1977 paper 
with Caves. Porter (1979) argues that when studying the relationship between strategic 
groups and performance, other elements at group and firm levels should be taken into 
account. These may be responsible for differences in performance among firms of the 
same strategic groups. Cool and Schendel (1988) find that little of Porters (1979) 
theory on firms’ performance has been included in empirical research. “That this 
empirical research produced mixed results should not be surprising given the many 
(potentially) intervening variables that have been identified since the formulation of the 
original IO model. If the conflicts noted are to be resolved, then it is likely that a richer, 
unfortunately more complex, model which includes the moderating factors ... needs to 
be developed” (Cool and Schendel 1988: 208). In particular, they call for a stronger 
integration of Porter’s (1979) paper as a way forward for understanding performance 
differences among firms of the same strategic groups. However, researchers on strategic 
groups have rarely tried to incorporate elements other than firms’ strategies in their 
analyses in groups structures. The only attempts to integrate Porter’s (1979) theory on 
research studying the relation between strategic groups and performance has been made 
by Cool, who has often addressed this issue (Cool and Schendel 1988; Cool and 
Dierickx 1993). In the first paper. Cool and Schendel analyse the relevance of risk on
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performance differences. In the second, Cool and Dierickx study the role of rivalry on 
performance differences among firms. However, the theoretical inconsistencies of 
Porter’s (1979) paper identified in Chapter two are not taken into consideration. 
Therefore, the problems in the theoretical framework proposed by Porter in his 1979 
paper, which were discussed at the end of Chapter two, remain.
5.2.2 The Resource Based View (RBV) of the Firm and Strategic Groups
Researchers of the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm have also stressed the role 
of firms’ specificities as a determinant of profitability. The RBV can be seen as a 
development of the Chamberlainian view of the firm and Penrose’s (1959/1963) theory 
of the growth of the firm. As such, the RBV has affinities with the Chicago School of 
lO. In lO, the Harvard School of thought stands in opposition to that of the Chicago 
School (Rumelt et al. 1991). Researchers from Harvard argue that higher profits are due 
to the market power of large companies, which exploit market inefficiencies. On the 
other hand, researchers from the Chicago School claim that higher profits within an 
industry result from greater efficiency by the leading firms. Greater efficiency is 
expected to lead to greater market share and profitability. This view stems from the 
character of US legislation that, for a long time, had strong anti-merger and anti­
acquisition policies for firms operating in the same sector. According to the Chicago 
School, efficient firms are able to earn higher profits and consequently are able to fund 
faster growth. Hence, they will outpace competitors and increase the level of 
concentration in the industry. Consequently, the industry structure reflects efficient 
outcomes rather than market power (Rumelt et al. 1991).
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In her seminal work on the theory of the growth of the firm, Penrose (1963: 24) argues:
“The cohesive character than an administrative organization imparts to the 
activities of the people operating within it provides the justification for separating 
for analytical purposes such a group from all other groups. The activities of the 
group which we call an industrial firm are further distinguished by their relation 
to the use of productive resources for the purpose of producing and selling goods 
and services. Thus, a firm is more than an administrative unit; it is also a 
collection of productive resources the disposal of which between different uses 
and over time is determined by administrative decision”.
Penrose’s work is characterised by her focus on the firm, and specifically, on its internal
characteristics. She distinguishes between physical and human resources and makes an
important distinction between resources and services:
“it is never resources themselves that are the ‘inputs’ in the production process, 
but only the services that the resources can render. The services yielded by 
resources are a function of the way in which they are used - exactly the same 
resource when used for different purposes or in different ways or in combination 
with different types or amounts of other resources provides a different service or 
set of services. The important distinction between resources and services is not 
their relative durability; rather it lies in the fact that resources consist of a bundle 
of potential services and can, for the most part, be defined independently of their 
use, while services cannot be so defined, the very word ‘service’ implying a 
function, an activity” (ibid. 1963: 25).
Since the late 1980s, the RBV has received considerable attention in strategy research. 
A number of researchers have explored in more detail the idea of examining a firm as a 
system of resources and have tried to link firm’s resources and performance. Grant 
(1991) and Amit and Schoemaker (1993) have proposed a somewhat different way of 
looking at the firm than offered by Penrose. They distinguish between resources and 
capabilities. Resources are defined as stocks of available factors that are owned or 
controlled by the firm. They are converted into final products or services by using a 
wide range of other assets of the firm and bonding mechanisms such as technology, 
management information systems, incentive systems, and trust between management 
and labour. Resources consist also of knowledge that can be traded (e.g., patents and
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licences), financial or physical assets (e.g., property, plant and equipment) and human 
capital. Capabilities, on the other hand, refer to a firm’s capacity to deploy resources 
using organisational processes to effect a desired end. The focus is therefore on 
resources rather than the services these can provide.
In the RBV, each firm has specific resources and capabilities. Two firms may resemble 
each other along some important structural dimensions. However, they are still regarded 
as unique and distinct entities.
At the level of the practitioner, it is argued that in the formulation of strategy, each firm 
has to examine the potential of its resources for the generation and the appropriability of 
the returns and to assess how sustainable its competitive advantage is. Hence, based on 
this analysis, it has to select a strategy that best exploits the firms’ resources and 
capabilities. “The general point is that by analyzing his resource position, a manager 
would have a clearer understanding of whether his situation meets necessary conditions 
for a sustainable advantage. Fewer strategic mistakes would be made” (Peteraf 1993: 
187).
Lawless et al. (1989) have proposed a model of firm’s performance using the RBV. 
They test for a relation between strategic groups and performance, finding little 
empirical support for their hypothesis. This leads them to further develop their model, 
whereby performance becomes a function of industry structure, group membership and 
firms’ capabilities:
Performance = /  (industry structure, group membership, and firm capabilities)
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However, by looking at the terminology used by Lawless et al. in their model (i.e., 
group membership), we can say that there is not much difference in it from Porter’s 
(1979) theory of firms’ performance, which implies that groups structures exist as 
entities within the industry and are clearly identified by their members. Nevertheless, it 
is very different from what Hatten et al. (1978) theorise. Researchers from the RBV of 
the firm have not addressed the issue of how firms behave within a competitive 
environment. Therefore, a more appropriate way of putting the determinants of 
performance would be as follows:
Performance = /  (Environmental factors; firm specific factors; common
factors at the group level)
However, this represents a backward step compared to Porter’s (1979) theory of firm’s 
profitability as the RBV pays little attention to the characteristics of the external 
environment and to firms’ behaviour given the existence of strategic similarities. The 
RBV is a more introspective theory - the focus is on the firm rather than on the external 
environment.
A number of other problems rest with the RBV of the firm. Porter (1994) notes that the 
RBV has been proposed as a theory of strategy. Surely, he says, to maintain their 
competitive advantage, firms should take care of their resources, still in the RBV:
a) there is little understanding about how resources are developed and about changes in 
the value of resources;
b) little attention is given to the issue of sustainability of firms’ performance; and
c) resources and capabilities are seen as the determinants of firms’ success. However,
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resources are not valuable in themselves. Their value is a function of their 
availability on the external market. This issue is not addressed in the RBV of the 
firm.
Porter (1994: 446) notes that researchers of the RBV are just beginning to discuss these
issues and that the RBV of the firm cannot be seen as an alternative theory of strategy
until these fundamental issues are solved.
“The resource-based view cannot be an alternative theory of strategy. It cannot be 
separated from the cross-sectional determinants of competitive advantage or, for 
that matter, from the conception of a firm as a collection of activities. Stress on 
resources must complement, not replace, stress on market positions”.
Porter argues that the resource-based view does not shed any light on “why can valuable 
resources be created and sustained?” (ibid. 1994: 448). It has to be said that Peteraf 
(1993) has written a paper that spells out the underlying the economics, the conditions 
underlying competitive advantage, which are at the heart of the RBV of the firm. In her 
view, the four conditions are:
(a) heterogeneous resource-based bundles and capabilities underlying firms’ production. 
Heterogeneity in an industry may "reflect the presence of superior productive factors 
which are in limited supply” (ibid. 1993: 180);
(b) the preservation of the condition of heterogeneity. “By this I mean that subsequent to 
a firm’s gaining a superior position and earning rents, there must be sources which limit 
competition for those rents” (ibid. 1993: 182). Two critical factors limiting ex-post 
competition are imperfect imitability and imperfect substitutability;
(c) imperfect mobility of resources. If resources are immobile or imperfectly mobile, 
resources are non-tradable or less valuable to other users; and finally,
(d) ex-ante limits to competition. “By this I mean that, prior to any firm’s establishing a
superior resource position, there must be limited competition for that position” (ibid. 
1993: 185).
However, Porter (1994: 445) is highly sceptical of Peteraf s theory of strategy “what is 
really unique about a firm, so the argument goes, is its bundle of resources. It is factor 
market impediments, then, rather than product-market circumstances that define 
success. The role of internal resources is an important insight for economic modeller, 
though not as novel a notion for strategy researchers”.
The position taken here is that Peteraf spells out the conditions necessary for a firm’s 
competitive advantage. However, she is limited in her analysis of the characteristics of 
the process leading to a superior performance and its dynamics. Furthermore, she uses 
some concepts that are characteristic of the evolutionary theory of firms’ strategies 
without examining their potential implications. As already noted, notwithstanding the 
considerable step made toward incorporating elements of the external environment, her 
focus is still very much on the firm and little attention is given to the characteristics of 
the external environment.
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5.3 The Evolutionary Theory of Firms’ Strategies and Strategic 
Groups Research
Alongside the approaches just examined, a research stream has emerged within SM that 
criticises the neo-classical theoretical framework characterising the strategy literature.
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This approach also proposes an alternative theoretical framework for the analysis of the 
dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure as well as for the determinants and 
dynamics of firms’ profitability. This is the evolutionary theory of firms’ strategies.
5.3.1 The Evolutionary Theory of Firms’ Strategies
In the context of this research, we are particularly interested in the evolutionary 
approach originating from economics and the theory of firms and organisation*. The 
former has its main reference point in the work of Schumpeter (1911/1934, 1942). The 
latter has developed from the work of Simon (1957), Cyert and March (1963), Penrose 
(1959/1963) and Nelson and Winter (1982).
Schumpeter reasoned that the focus of research in economics should be on how 
capitalist economies develop. In the Theory of Economic Development (1911), 
Schumpeter argued that entrepreneurs are the key to economic development and that 
the economy is in continuous evolution because of the innovations entrepreneurs 
introduce into the market, enabling them to earn profits. The introduction of new and 
better products has the effect of changing the initial conditions of the market, with 
established firms forced to adapt to changes or to exit the market. “There are winners, 
and losers in Schumpeter’s ‘process of creative destruction’, and these are not 
determined mainly in ex-ante calculation, but largely in ex-post actual contest” (Nelson 1
1 It is not easy to accurately define what constitutes an evolutionary approach. Saviotti and Metcalfe 
(1991: 2) argue that “in order to establish the conceptual foundations o f an evolutionary approach it must 
he realised that a number of research traditions are related and contributing to it." They identify five 
research traditions that discuss evolutionary approaches (Economics; Biology; Chemistry and Physics; 
Theory of Complex Systems; and Theory of Firms and Organisations). Although, there are important 
differences among these approaches, they assume a secondary role when compared with the more 
fundamental differences with the neo-classical theory of the firm.
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1991; 66). By 1942, when he published Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 
Schumpeter’s view of the how capitalist economies develop had evolved. The 
development of large corporations, with their Research & Development laboratories 
influenced his thought. He argued that the “modern firm, equipped with research and 
development laboratories, became the central innovative actors in Schumpeter’s theory” 
(Nelson 1991; 67).
For a long time evolutionary researchers have been primarily concerned with criticising 
the most ‘famous’ and widespread neo-classical competitive models and their 
descriptive or normative validity. However, while the economic analysis of innovation 
and entrepreneurship has been only weakly concerned with the description of real 
events. However, since the late 1970s, notable progress has been made in the 
development of an evolutionary theory of firms’ strategies. A number of researchers 
have analysed the role of uncertainty (Boxer 1979; Wensley 1979) and ambiguity 
(Mintzberg et al. 1976; Rumelt and Wensley 1980; Wensley 1982; Rumelt 1984) in 
management research. This has led to a number of papers (Wensley 1982; Rumelt 1984; 
Rumelt 1987) that emphasise the problems of using a neo-classical model for the 
analysis of the firms’ strategies within an industry and for analysis of the competitive 
environment. The most important paper is by Rumelt (1984), who poses the basis for a 
strategic theory of the firm. In 1987, Rumelt published a second paper, completing the 
arguments presented in the first paper. The papers use an evolutionary framework, 
where the fortunes of firms are the result of both entrepreneurial activities by firms as 
well as of the behaviour and characteristics of the competitive market. The focus is 
mainly on the interface between firms and competition rather than on the internal
characteristics of the firm.
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At around the same time, the work of Nelson and Winter (1982) gave an important 
impetus to research analysing the internal characteristics of the firm from an 
evolutionary perspective. In the following two Sections, we analyse (a) the view of the 
firm and the market as it emerges from the evolutionary theory and (b) the 
organisational context of the firm.
5.3.2 Firms, Competitive Market and Profitability in an Evolutionary Perspective
The simplistic view of entrepreneurship, resource heterogeneity, uncertainty and 
ambiguity that characterises models based on a neo-classical perspective, is a matter of 
concern for evolutionary researchers. In traditional neo-classical models, innovation is 
external the market and firms are generally seen as having a perfect knowledge of the 
factors determining performance and how to combine them. Consequently, it is 
expected that firms, with similar deployment of assets and resources, achieve, ceteris 
paribus, similar performance. When uncertainty is taken into account, the possible 
outcomes are known ex-ante and uncertainty is seen in terms of probabilities associated 
with the possible outcomes (Wensley 1982). The industry and the market are stable and 
this state continues until changes are generated by the introduction of innovations into 
the market. In an evolutionary perspective, the market evolves because of the innovative 
and imitative activities of firms. Changes in the industry structure are not the result of 
the adoption of an externally-generated technology, but of the diffusion of innovation 
generated by firms inside the industry. Rumelt (1987) distinguishes between two basic 
kinds of entrepreneurial discovery: resource value and demand patterns. Discoveries of 
resource value include mineral exploration, real estate development, technological
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invention and the creation of new means of producing and delivering products and 
services. Discoveries of demand patterns include satisfying new consumer needs and 
wants and identifying new market segments worthy of attention. Interestingly, 
innovation does not only refer to the invention of new technologies, but also 
encompasses organisational and social innovations.
Firms innovate because they may earn returns above the average returns through
entrepreneurial activity. In a neo-classical framework, it is usual to look at profits more
than fully competitive returns as monopoly profits. In evolutionary theory this is defined
as entrepreneurial rent and is measured by the “difference between a venture’s ex post
value (or payment stream) and the ex ante cost (or value) of the resources combined to
form the venture”3 (Rumelt 1987: 143). Rumelt (1984) defines the situation of a firm
that does not know ex-ante whether the action taken will be successful as one of
potential rent. Given expectational equilibria, it is uncertainty that produces the
possibility of entrepreneurial rents (Rumelt 1987). Uncertainty is seen as a different
type of phenomenon in evolutionary theory.
“In considering the problem of risk most economists are much happier with the 
idea of probability distributions ... and often unwilling to recognise uncertainty as 
a different type of phenomenon ... In strategic analysis, others have however been 
less cautious and suggested that doubts about the causal structure should be seen 
as essentially different from risk under such terms as structural uncertainty ... or 
ambiguity” (Wensley 1982: 152).
Changes in technology, relative price, consumer tastes, law, tax and regulation or new 
discoveries and inventions are sources of potential rent for firms, which, at the same 
time, trigger the established success of other firms within an industry, “if the basis for 
success in a market shifts to a new function, firms that have been successful in the past 
may now be at a disadvantage relative to outside firms possessing demonstrated skills
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related to the new required competence” (Rumelt 1984: 566). For the existing firm, the 
possibility of sustaining or improving its competitive position depends upon its ability 
to quickly recognise changes in some underlying factors and its reaction to it. 
“Opportunities for profit can arise through two rather different mechanisms: either the 
firm is best placed in competitive terms to exploit the opportunity or it has access to 
private information which gives prior indication of such an opportunity” (Wensley 
1982: 153). Potential rent does not necessarily become entrepreneurial rent. This 
requires the existence of a number of conditions (Rumelt 1987):
1. the innovation must be a sufficient and efficient replacement for substitutes;
2. the firm must resist the appropriation of rents by other players such as powerful 
buyers or suppliers (including employees), the owners of co-specialised assets, and 
governments; and
3. the firm must have some protection against imitative competition. The existence of 
barriers to imitability is due to the existence of isolating mechanisms, which are 
defined as “phenomena that limit the ex post equilibration of rents among individual 
firms” (Rumelt 1984: 567). The emphasis on the ex post is posed to stress the 
difference from an ex ante situation, when what exists is only potential rent.
The most important isolating mechanisms are property rights (Rumelt 1987). The law 
provides firms with property rights over discoveries of minerals, patentable inventions, 
written material and trademarks, but no such protection exists for most business 
innovations. “New packaging concepts, method of distribution, manufacturing methods 
and planning techniques, consumer research methods and information, and the most 
new product ideas entail no assignment to property rights” (Rumelt 1987: 145). Where 
no legal property rights exist, causal ambiguity may entitle firms to earn higher than 3
3 Rumelt (1987: 142-143) distinguishes between Ricardian Rent, Pareto Rent and Entrepreneurial Rent.
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average profits. In fact, the existence of (a) an irreducible uncertainty connected with 
the creation (or production) of a new production function and (b) non-recoverable cost 
associated with such entrepreneurial activities implies that there will be “ambiguity as to 
what the factors of production actually are and as to how they interact.” (Rumelt 1984: 
562). The existence of uncertainty and ambiguity produces an ex-post barrier to 
imitability. Therefore, in the absence of property rights, there are “numerous lags, 
information asymmetries, and friction that function as quasi-rights, thereby sustaining 
entrepreneurial rents” (Rumelt 1987: 145). The isolating mechanisms that protect 
entrepreneurial rents from imitative competition normally appear as “first mover” 
advantages. Wensley (1982: 154) argues that for an established firm, the chance to 
substantially improve the competitive position depends on the prompt recognition of 
change in some underlying factor and the firm’s reaction to it. “In the product-markets 
most private information is context specific and ambiguous. The more we wish to 
validate information by standards of generalizability and clarity, the more the 
information is likely to be public rather than private”.
In the original conceptualisation of strategic groups by Caves and Porter (1977), firms 
within the same strategic groups have similar structural characteristics resulting from 
similar strategic decisions. Uncertainty, ambiguity and bounded rationality do not exist, 
and mobility barriers collectively protect all firms within a group. Because of the 
similarities in external and internal conditions, firms are assumed to have similar 
performance. In an evolutionary perspective, “there is no theoretical reason to limit 
mobility barriers to groups of firms” (Rumelt 1984: 567). Each firm is a unique and 
distinct entity and although firms may be grouped according to similarities in their 
assets, this might not lead to similar performance. In evolutionary theory, innovations
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are firm specific and because of the characteristics of the entrepreneurial process 
(uncertainty and ambiguity), isolating mechanisms exist at the firm level.
5.3.3 The Organisational Context in Evolutionary Theory
Having examined the characteristics of the relationships between firms and the market 
context, we now analyse firms’ internal contexts from an evolutionary perspective. The 
work of Teece et al. (1994), which builds on the Evolutionary Theory of Economic 
Change of Nelson and Winter (1982), provides the framework for examining the 
characteristics of the firm in an evolutionary perspective.
For a long time in Economics, there was not an alternative view to firms other than the 
“black box” of neo-classical economics. Transaction cost economics has developed a 
view of firms as internal markets displacing external market organisation. This theory 
originates from the famous article by Coase (1937) but was developed by Williamson 
(1975, 1985).
In evolutionary theory, a portfolio of business units, which amalgamate through formal
contracts, cannot replicate the properties of internal organisation. This is because firms
are learning entities, and the very nature of the learning process inhibits a proper
valuation and formalisation of the contract.
“A fundamental characteristic of economic activity is that it provides the 
opportunity for learning. Learning is a process involving repetition and 
experimentation which enables tasks to be performed better and quicker, and new 
production opportunities to be identified. As Simon (1991) notes, ‘All learning 
takes place inside individual human heads; organization learns in only two ways:
(a) by the learning of its members, or (b) by ingesting new members who have 
knowledge the organization didn't previously have” (Teece et al. 1994: 11). 1
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Routines (Nelson and Winter 1982) and standard operating procedures4 are created 
inside the firm for maximising the benefits of the learning process. Their role is to 
incorporate the knowledge generated by the learning process into common codes of 
communication and co-ordinated search procedures that can be easily comprehended 
and used by individuals inside the firm. However, because of the complexity of the 
learning process, knowledge cannot be fully captured in a codified form. There is often 
a tacit dimension to the learning process that cannot be fully articulated. This constitutes 
a barrier to imitation by other firms and may contribute to the development of a firm’s 
distinctive competencies and capabilities. “Such capabilities, by virtue of their evolution 
in particular environment and organizational contexts, are likely to differentiate firms 
from each other and provide the basis for differential performance vis-à-vis 
competitors.” (Teece et al. 1994: 15). The extent to which such competencies and 
capabilities can contribute to a firm’s profitability depends on the value they generate 
and on whether the firm can appropriate the rents generated by the effects of the 
learning process.
Two important aspects of the learning process concern the technologies being employed 
and the product markets in which the firm already operates. Because of the local nature 
of the learning process, a firm’s future activities, and the development of new products 
“are highly dependent on what they have done in the past” (Teece et al. 1994: 16). This 
leads to the notion of path dependency. A firm’s ‘history’ with its collection of past 
investments and its repertoire of routines with their tacit dimensions, constrains its 
future activities and success. History may therefore create an embedded inertia to 
change.
1 There are different types of routines. Slahe routines are oriented at replicating certain tasks. Dynamic 
routines are directed at learning and at the development of new products and processes (Teece et al.
Chapter 5 -  Strategic Groups Research and the Development o f other Theoretical Approaches -  page 110
The existence of an evolutionary path also affects top management. In neo-classical 
economics, top management has a perfect knowledge of the structure of the industry, 
the factors determining performance and how to combine them. In the evolutionary 
framework, the existence of bounded rationality, uncertainty, ambiguity and asymmetry 
of information
“restrict the range of businesses and products that most managers can understand. 
The limited capability of information systems to render useful information and 
the limited ability to understand multiple competitive environments appears to be 
a binding constraint, particularly in dynamically competitive markets. This is not 
only because of dynamics of technological change and market evolution are 
always complex, but also because dynamics are likely to vary markedly across 
industries and product lines and because long lags may be necessary to capture 
the performance feedback necessary for learning” (Teece et al. 1994: 17).
5.3.4 An Evolutionary Perspective of Firms’ Strategies and Related
Implications for Strategic Groups Research
Having analysed the characteristics of firms and the competitive market from an 
evolutionary perspective, this Section examines the view of firms’ strategies that 
emerges from evolutionary theory and the associated implications.
Rumelt (1984: 568) argues that “a firm’s strategy may be explained in terms of the 
unexpected events that created (or will create) potential rents together with the isolating 
mechanisms that will act to preserve them. If either element of the explanation is 
missing, the analysis is inadequate". From an evolutionary perspective, there is a 
significant shift from a view of the firm as the ultimate determinant of its own success 
to a view that stresses the roles of both firms and their external environment. This is 
evident in the analysis of firms’ profitability but also in the strategy process, where the
1994).
Chapter 5 - Strategic Groups Research and the Development o f other Theoretical Approaches -  page 111
focus is on the firm and its management and on the dynamics of the competitive market. 
Management discovers new source of rents and/or try to protect existing ones. However, 
its activities are influenced by its experience and by the path followed by the company 
with its set of routines. Furthermore, the position that the firm has in the competitive 
market, its image among customers and ease of access to tangible and intangible 
resources also play an important role for both management decision and the dynamics 
of firms’ strategies. This is why the analysis has to focus on both: events creating 
potential rents and isolating mechanisms.
However, what are the implications of an evolutionary theory of firms’ strategies for the 
theory of strategic groups? When the concept of strategic groups was developed in the 
strategy field, at Purdue University, the objective of researchers was to develop a 
technique that would assist top management in taking decisions about how to compete 
within an industry. Their argument is that by analysing firms’ past strategies by using 
econometric techniques and clustering techniques, top management would be able to 
identify the most effective strategies and this would be the basis for making strategic 
decisions about the most effective way of competing within the industry. Jacobson 
(1992: 793-794) questions this and argues that “the econometrician is an economic 
historian ... The criticism of econometric models is especially pertinent with regard to 
models of business profitability. If these regressions have detected regularities in 
business performance, why don’t all businesses follow those strategies that are known 
to lead to supranormal profits?” In the evolutionary perspective, it does not make much 
sense to use strategic groups as a technique to study the strategic options available to 
firms. Undertaking strategies whose values and implementation are known involves 
little entrepreneurial discovery and will not generate abnormal returns. As we have seen
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in Section 5.3.2, Wensley (1982) argues that if the success formula could be identified, 
then it would become public information and the advantages associated to it would thus 
disappear.
The shared view among evolutionary researchers is that strategy involves a complex 
interaction among a number of variables, but historical events are unique and the 
variables and the relationships between them are likely to change over time. 
Consequently, no strategy can be fully reproduced. The changing nature of competition 
suggests that no replicable strategy allows businesses to earn long-term supra-normal 
profits. Further, as unobserved factors may be correlated with some of the observed 
strategic factors, this might result in biased estimates of the effect of strategic factors 
and an overstatement of their explanatory power (Jacobson 1992).
That an evolutionary framework does not allow for control and for prediction in the way 
that strategy research based on neo-classical framework does, is a controversial matter. 
Many researchers argue that it is a significant problem, limiting the diffusion of an 
evolutionary framework in strategy research. However, it is not problematic for 
evolutionary researchers who assert that many more benefits can be gained by 
addressing the issues that management should pay attention to (Rumelt 1984; Wensley 
and Day 1992)\ Rumelt (1984: 568) in particular argues that there are normative 
implications of this view of strategy and “they can be based on much sounder theory 
than much of the currently popular prescription. First, it should be clear that a firm’s 
stability and profitability fundamentally depend upon entrepreneurial activity. There
This is the most important difference between an evolutionary approach to strategy and the RBV of the 
firm. Researchers of the RBV have often mentioned the same references as we have done here (see, for 
example. Mahoney and Pandian 1992). However. RBV tends, in our view, to be more prescriptive in its 
characteristics for the content o f the strategy to follow for achieving superior performance, as opposed by
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cannot be a single algorithm for creating wealth”. He summarises some normative 
elements that could be used to advice top management for its strategy-making activities 
in seven points. The picture that is presented is one where significant changes in the 
competitive environment occur infrequently and the success of a firm depends upon the 
early recognition of events changing the importance of factors underlying firms’ 
strategies in an industry. If external shocks threaten the established structure of the 
industry, firms that recognise these changes sooner than others and act on this 
knowledge can be very successful. In this context, speed is a critical factor and 
management will have to pursue the idea notwithstanding the existence of ambiguity, 
“if firms wait until the proper method entering a market or producing a product is fully 
understood it will normally be too late” (ibid. 1984: 569). Further, because of the 
uncertainty characterising these events, strategy analysis must be a continuous and 
situational process and judgement therefore play an important role. If firms misjudge 
the strength of isolating mechanisms, investments might be wasted. Rumelt also argues 
that where industries are characterised by a high level of stability, firms that are in 
strong positions may ignore strategy for a long time and still appear profitable. As a 
corollary, high levels of profitability are not necessarily an indicator of good 
management. If a strategic position is strong enough, even fools can churn out good 
results (for a while)” (ibid. 1984: 569).
From a research perspective interested in the competitive dynamics of firms within a 
competitive environment, the realism characterising the assumptions of an evolutionary 
view of strategy is much more appealing than neo-classical based frameworks. 
However, the problem is that, notwithstanding the progress that has been made, the 
focus is still on the firm and a somewhat undifferentiated competition. Only Wensley
to evolutionary approach to strategy.
(1982) argues for the importance of noting differences in competitive positions for 
extant firms when changes are taking place. Rumelt discusses isolating mechanisms. 
However, he does not say whether isolating mechanisms exist in absolute terms or are 
relative to the competitor, depending on the positions other firms have in a competitive 
market. In this sense, strategic groups theory, with its focus on comparative analysis, 
entry paths, and asymmetry of mobility barriers, is still one step ahead of evolutionary 
frameworks.
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5.4 Themes and Questions for the Empirical Research
In the previous three chapters, we analysed the origins of strategic groups research and 
the way it has developed. We also highlighted some problems with the theory and the 
methodology. This analysis has led to the examination of the epistemological view 
underlying the theory and method of strategic groups research, and the related problems. 
In the previous sections of this chapter, we have reviewed a number of research 
approaches that have:
1. highlighted factors that traditional strategic groups research has put in a secondary 
position (the differences in cognitive structures of top management, the role of the 
environment as a force determining the success of firms and the relevance of firms’ 
specificities); and
2. posed further questions about the underlying theoretical framework characterising
strategic groups.
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The analysis indicates that, beyond the criticisms concerning the concept of strategic 
groups, no valid alternative has been proposed for the analysis of the same issues 
addressed in strategic groups research. Among the frameworks analysed here, the most 
promising is the evolutionary approach to firms’ strategies. However, research has still 
focused on single firms rather than aggregates.
Some attempts have been made to reconcile the various positions6, stressing the 
potential complementarities among different approaches. However, the advantages of 
this are not clear. Jacobson (1992) argues that inconsistencies can arise when attempting 
to integrate other frameworks with different ontological positions. Willmott (1996) 
notes the difficulties of developing a meta-theoretical perspective in an ‘a-critical’ 
fashion. Astley and Van de Ven (1983) argue that any attempt to develop a meta- 
theoretical approach must try to preserve the authenticity of distinct viewpoints.
We believe that, until a better understanding of the limits of each theoretical framework 
is achieved, the development of a meta-theory of strategic groups does not offer a 
solution to the problems highlighted in this review. Hence, the following part of the 
research will have two objectives: (a) to complete the review of strategic groups and (b) 
to try to develop a better understanding of the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry 
structure. However, whilst this concluding part of the research has been theoretical in 
nature, the following will be empirically based. In order to achieve these objectives, we 
take two themes that are fundamental to strategic groups and to this research. Based on 
these themes, we develop a number of questions for empirical research.
‘ Thomas and Carroll (1994) proposed Porter's (1980) competitive strategy as a basis for the developmen! 
of a unitary framework for researching grouping structures in an industry. However, Porter's competitive 
strategy develops his work on strategic groups (1973, 1977, 1979). Therefore, their approach is based in 
IO. They are using a framework and trying to incorporate other approaches in that framework.
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The key question of this research is: “what are the limits of traditional strategic groups 
research for analysing and explaining the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry 
structure?” In this research question, there are two fundamental themes:
1. the analysis of the mechanisms characterising industrial and business change; and
2. the importance of similarities and differences between firms that are competing 
within the same industry for the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure.
The development of an understanding of these two themes will characterise the 
empirical research.
The first theme aims to understand the characteristics of industrial and business change. 
There is an underlying static in strategic groups research. When equilibria are broken, 
firms change their strategies immediately and new equilibria follow. However, the 
evolutionary theory of firms’ strategies argues that firms’ strategies and industry 
structure are in a state of continuous change. We want to assess this issue of stability 
and change more in detail. In particular, our focus is on the mechanisms driving 
industrial and business change. This leads to the first question:
Question 1 How do changes in firm s’ strategies relate to changes in the industry 
structure? Are firms responsible for the process o f change or do they 
react to changes in the external environment?
Strategic groups theory is silent on the origins of changes in the competitive structure. 
The objective of this question is to give an insight into the process of strategic change 
within the industry, and specifically, to understand the relationships between firms and
Chapter 5 ■ Strategic Groups Research and the Development of other Theoretical Approaches -  page
the external environment. We also want to understand to what extent the external 
environment influences firms’ strategies and how firms influence the external 
environment. However, it is also important to understand the synchronism existing 
between industry changes and firms’ strategic changes. These are issues of general 
interest in management research, which for a long time has been characterised by a 
debate between supporters of the role of strategy choice and supporters of the role of 
environmental determinism (Child 1972 and Aldrich, 1979).
The second theme focuses on similarities and differences between firms that are in 
competition within the same industry. The concept of strategic groups assumes, for both 
explanatory and prescriptive purposes, the relevance of similarities existing among 
firms of the same groups and the significance of differences between firms of different 
groups. The theoretical framework developed by Caves and Porter is built on the 
assumption that similarities between firms of the same groups are significant enough 
and their differences are negligible enough to justify the analysis of firms in groups 
structures. We question this assumption by addressing the following issues that are at 
the heart of the strategic groups theory as developed at Harvard by Caves and Porter, 
and also of general interest in strategy research.
Question 2 What are the similarities and differences in the strategies of 
comparable firms within the same industry?
The concept of strategic groups asserts that firms within the same strategic groups are 
similar in all significant aspects. Because of these similarities, firms have similar
performance and, in the future, will follow a similar strategy. The purpose of this 
question is to see whether it is possible to form groups of firms where the similarities in 
their strategies are more important than the differences. This is an issue of interest to all 
research using clustering techniques for the analysis of similarities and differences 
among firms.
Question 3 How did firms develop their respective strategies? Are there important 
similarities in their origins and strategic investments over time?
Having analysed the similarities and differences existing in the strategies of these 
companies, we want to see how these companies came to develop their respective 
positions in the industry. Caves and Porter (1977) argue that similarities among firms 
come from firms having a similar history of past investment. Because of this, firms 
recognise their interdependence and continue to follow similar strategies. The story is a 
simple one, of strategic similarities emerging from similar strategic investments, and of 
reciprocal influence among firms of the same groups.
With this question, we want to explore this issue more in detail. There is no doubt that 
these companies must have had similar investment strategies in the past. However, 
beyond these similarities, we want to see (a) if these companies did recognise similar 
opportunities in the environment at around the same time and (b) if these firms have 
similar origins. This question will inform us of the following issues: (a) if there has 
been a best way for firms’ strategies of growth; and (b) if it is possible to develop a 
successful strategy in different period of times, at different stages of the industry’s
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history.
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Question 4 Are there reference points in the industry influencing management in 
its strategic decisions about investment strategies?
In strategic groups theory, it is argued that some groups are more profitable than others 
and because of their higher profitability, other firms try to copy their strategies. Hence, 
some companies within the industry, with their successful strategies, play the role of 
“reference points” for other firms. In order to enrich our understanding of the dynamics 
of firms’ strategies and industry structure, we need to understand more about the 
potential existence of points-of-reference for firms’ management in the industry.
Question 5 Are there similarities in the cognitive structures of firms operating in 
the industry?
Caves and Porter (1977) argue that firms of the same group have important similarities 
in their strategies and their cognitive structure. Because of these similarities, they follow 
similar strategies. This question aims to analyse the issue in more detail by trying to 
understand if there are similarities in the cognitive structures of similar firms.
The influence of cognitive structures on strategy-making is a theme that strategic groups 
share with cognitive research where the cognitive structures of firms operating within an 
industry with regard to the competitive environment are well defined and firms with 
similar cognitive structures follow similar strategies.
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Question 6 Is it possible to identify unequivocal determinants o f  firms' 
performance in a way that they can be quantified and clear 
relationships between these determinants and firm s’ performance can 
be drawn? I f  this is the case, is it possible to use successful past 
strategies as a recipe fo r  future strategy formulation ?
At the basis of strategic groups research and the preferred methodology used, there 
some fundamental assumptions, i.e., that (a) it is possible to classify firms’ strategies 
into variables without missing out significant information; (b) it is possible to clearly 
define cause and effect relationships existing between these variables; and (c) a link can 
be established between these variables and performance. This analysis may later be used 
in strategy formulation to chose among the various strategic options.
This question aims to inquiry these assumptions and see (a) whether it may be possible 
to significantly represent firms' strategies in a set of variables, (b) if unequivocal 
relationships may be established between these variables and performance and (c) if this 
analysis may be used by management to identify the most successful strategies to 
follow.
The analysis of these issues will inform us on the debate between research on the 
evolutionary theory of firms’ strategies and that on neo-classical approaches, which was 
exposed in Section 5.3.4.
In the next chapter, we will discuss the methodology used for the empirical analysis.
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Chapter 6 Methodology
6.0 Introduction
Over the past few years, there has been an increasing discussion about which 
methodologies to use in management research. The consolidation of a variety of research 
traditions, and a multiplicity of foci and theoretical positions, justify and explain the 
existence of a multiplicity of research methods (Burrell and Morgan 1979; Gioia and Pitre 
1990; Alvesson and Willmott 1996). However, the decline of the idea that a "best theory” 
and a “best methodology” exist has led, over the past decade, to increasing attention to 
methodological issues. Hence, if the use of different methodologies is more easily 
accepted, the justification of the use of a particular methodology has assumed increasing 
importance.
In the earlier chapters, we reviewed the theoretical foundations of strategic groups 
(Chapters 2 and 3), we also conducted a critical review of the development of strategic 
groups research (Chapter 4) and of how the development of other theoretical approaches 
has impacted on the concept of strategic groups (Chapter 5). The combination of problems 
in theory, methodology and the emergence of alternative theoretical frameworks has posed 
a number of fundamental questions about strategic groups as a theoretical concept and as a 
practical technique for the analysis of firms’ strategies and industry structure. However, 
notwithstanding these problems, strategic groups still represents a very interesting 
theoretical and practical concept.
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Having critically analysed the limits of strategic groups from a theoretical point of view, 
we need to empirically assess its limits. This led to the definition of two themes 
fundamental to the research question and to strategic groups research. Around these 
themes, a number of questions for the empirical research were outlined in the previous 
chapter.
The empirical research examines the historical developments of the UK Grocery Retailing 
Industry (GRI) between 1980 and 1995, and the historical development of the strategies 
of the four largest firms operating in the industry in 1995, by looking at their strategies 
over the period from 1980 to 1995. The longitudinal characteristic of the empirical 
research, linked with the comparative analysis of the four firms’ strategies, will form the 
basis for the discussion. The empirical analysis comprises the next five chapters. The first 
describes the changes that have characterised the structure of the GRI since the end of the 
Second World War, with particular attention to the period between 1980 and 1995. The 
remaining four chapters present individual case studies of the dynamics of the four firms’ 
strategies in the industry. The case studies are intended to be descriptive rather than 
analytical. The information provided in the empirical research constitutes the basis for 
subsequent chapters where we discuss the findings and the implications for strategic 
groups research. In this chapter, we now discuss the methodology used in the empirical
research.
Chapter 6 -  Methodology -  page 123
6.1 Methodology
The term methodology has a Greek etymology and results from the combination of two 
words: methodos and logos. The former refers to way of proceeding-, the latter refers to the 
study of (something/ someone). Hence, methodology can be expressed as the study of the 
way of proceeding. This section provides a critical reflection of the way of proceeding in 
this research.
It can be said that the research method used in empirical research is directly linked to the 
epistemological stance that is taken. The epistemological origins of this research lie in 
Critical Theory and in Hegels' philosophy on dialectics (see Appendix 1). However, the 
existing literature on critical methodologies in management research is very small. The 
recent monograph by Alvesson and Willmott (1996), concerned exclusively with 
Critical Management Theory, is vague with respect to its discussion of possible 
empirical methods to follow in critical analysis. The paucity of literature on critical 
empirical methods is not a surprise as researchers making use of critical analysis seem 
to prefer theoretical to empirical discussions. Hypothesis testing is rare in critical 
analysis and the representation of countervailing views are presented in theoretical 
terms, with resolution of competing interests occurring via dialectic methods. However, 
Grawitz (1990) argues that a critical approach may make use of different research 
methods, which draw from philosophy, economics, sociology, and history.
It is therefore not surprising that we faced some problems when deciding which method 
to adopt for this empirical study. The chosen method is the result of a long reiterative 
process, rather than a logical planned one. It can be described as a dialectical method
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based upon historical analysis. However, for understanding the choice of the method, it 
is necessary to go back to the key research question: ‘what are the limits of traditional 
strategic groups research for analysing and explaining the dynamics of firms’ strategies 
and industry structure?’ The first part of the study was dedicated to a critical review of 
the origins and the development of strategic groups. We also examined the challenges 
that have been posed, both directly and indirectly, to strategic groups by the emergence 
of other theoretical approaches. Each approach has its own limits, and strategic groups 
seems to be the approach that addresses important issues for strategy research, more 
than others. However, this does not represent a satisfactory solution, given the problems 
we identified in the theory of strategic groups in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. Thus, this 
contributed to the decision that the empirical research would have two objectives: (a) to 
complete the review of strategic groups and (b) to try to develop a better understanding 
of the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure.
In order to achieve these objectives, we could not set a number of hypotheses and test 
them using the traditional strategic groups techniques. As we have posed fundamental 
doubts about the basic assumptions of strategic groups theory and about the 
methodology traditionally used in related research, it would be illogical to assess the 
validity of the technique - method -  theory, by using the same technique and methods. 
Thus, it has been decided that the empirical research would be exploratory in character 
and would focus in particular on two themes which are fundamental to strategic groups 
research: (a) an assessment of the mechanisms which characterise the dynamics of 
industrial and business change and (b) the analysis of similarities and differences among 
firms competing within the same industry.
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To assess these themes and specific issues, the empirical study will be based on an 
historical analysis of the development of the industry and a number of firms operating 
within it.
Historical research is concerned with the clarification of structures and the associated 
generative mechanisms from which generalisations are derived. The theory of strategic 
groups proposed by Caves and Porter (1977) informs through a set of underlying 
assumptions and explicit hypotheses, about the structure of the industry and the dynamics 
of firms’ strategies. They propose their theory of strategic groups on the basis of the 
argument that it is possible to identify stable groups structures in an industry. In 
developing their theory, they draw heavily from the SCP paradigm and from neo-classic 
theory of the firm. Strategic groups research, as it was developed at Purdue, has its 
origins in the experimental use of quantitative techniques. However, both approaches 
are little informed by history.
In management research, historical research has become well-known with the work of 
Chandler on the evolution of firms’ strategies and organisational structures in US 
corporations in the early XX century. In his book "Strategy and Structure”, Chandler 
(1962: 1) notes that “historians have provided social scientists with little empirical data 
on which to base generalizations or hypotheses concerning the administration of great 
enterprises”. His main purpose is to provide an empirical basis for use by researchers in 
developing hypotheses and assumptions about the evolution of firms’ organisational 
structure. Chandler achieves this through an historical analysis of the development of 
organisational structures. In his research, “complex decisions, actions, and events are not 
taken out of context and presented as mere illustrations as they would have to be in a
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general history of American business or of the American economy. They are not used to 
illustrate generalizations; they are the data from which the generalizations are 
derived.” (ibid. 1962: 7; emphasis added). In this research, Chandler’s process is 
reversed. Having analysed the theoretical and methodological characteristics of strategic 
groups, the research examines the dynamics of the industry structure and the strategies 
of a number of firms through a comparative historical analysis. This will form the basis 
for the conclusions, where information is used to examine the issues addressed in the 
previous chapter. By comparing the facts emerging from the historical analysis with the 
assumptions and hypotheses characterising strategic groups (that have led to the 
specification of the questions for the empirical research), we will be able to complete 
the review on the limits of the concept of strategic groups. Moreover, we will also 
develop a better understanding of the highlighted issues. Further, as a number of studies 
have already been conducted in the industry, it will also be possible to make a direct 
comparison between the information gathered here with others that have used a traditional 
strategic groups approach.
6.1.1 Historiography
In this research, the entire discussion is based upon the analysis of the historical 
development of the strategies of the four firms and the history of the industry. In this 
section, we examine the importance of historical methods in management research.
Historical methods have often been subject to criticism in management research, in light 
of whether it is possible to use findings originating from historical analysis for
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generalisation. According to some researchers, information derived as a result of such 
measures constitutes description rather than explanation. Nietzsche (1882: 820) argued 
that “only things without history are definable”. Any entity produced by a unique course 
of events through time cannot be adequately described by general concepts. 
Consequently, history is informative to the degree that things are the products of a 
causally connected series of events that produces unique configurations in each thing. 
“The philosophical position of Nietzsche’s aphorism is an illusion, but an illusion that 
reflects the difficulties of forming general concepts in history. This argument holds that 
general concepts in history are intellectual achievements which are more likely to be 
brought about by thinkers who take the problem posed by Nietzsche seriously.” 
(Stinchcombe 1978: ix). Stinchcombe distinguishes between different approaches to 
history. In analysing the relationships between theories of social change and historical 
analysis, he argues that the test of any theory of social change is its ability to analyse the 
narrative of a sequence of events. Indeed, he argues against the excessive simplification 
of history: “great theorists descend to the level of such detailed analogies in the course 
of their work. Further, they become greater theorists down there among the details, for it 
is the details that theories in history have to grasp if they are to be any good” (ibid. 
1978: 124).
Zald (1996) argues that organisations have histories and are located in history. It is 
therefore necessary to reconstruct the historical development of a firm within its context 
and to analyse the historical development of the context itself. This is necessary in order 
to avoid possible misinterpretations of the importance of elements inside or outside the 
firm1.
“All behaviour is historical. It takes place over time and in particular contexts. Moreover, contexts 
themselves, the social relations and institutional forms, rules, and processes in which we exist, are subject
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In this research, the focus is on firms’ strategies and industry structure. At the firm level, 
the attention is on the relationships between the internal and external contexts, on the 
succession of internal and external events and how they shape firms’ strategies. We also 
analyse the background to these events. By analysing statements made on various 
occasions by senior executives and by analysing other secondary sources, we also see what 
the objectives of the management initially were and how events are positioned in relation 
to management objectives.
As for the analysis of the changes in the industry, we reconstruct the changes that have 
occurred in the industry in logical progression and drawing from various sources. The 
focus is on the dynamics of the events that characterised the changes in the industry 
structure, events that have had important consequences for the structure of the industry 
and the strategies of firms operating within it.
This study is the basis for a critical examination in the discussion and the conclusion 
chapters, of issues highlighted in Chapter Five.
6.1.2 Historical Analysis and Strategy Process Research
Within SM, historical analysis has mainly been used in strategy process research. 
Strategy process researchers are very critical of the quantitative and logical approaches
to historical change. Although these statements would seem to be unexceptionable, most of our 
mainstream journal articles are written as if they apply to some disembodied abstracted realm. Articles are 
written about abstract topics ... or abstracted entities .... as if the paper dealt with some timeless entity. In 
the text, if the article is empirical, the time and place frame of the data may be mentioned; however the 
implications of that time and place frame for the topic under consideration may barely be mentioned 
(Zald 1996: 256).
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characterise mainstream strategy research. Mintzberg et al. (1976), Mintzberg (1978), 
Quinn (1980) and Pettigrew (1985) have challenged the rational view of strategy 
formulation and change. They argue that firms’ strategies are more readily understood as 
being crafted rather than planned. “Strategic change should be regarded as a continuous 
process which occurs in a given context ... The hallmark of the processual dimension is 
that strategy does not move forward in a direct, linear way nor through easily identifiable 
sequential phases. Quite the reverse, the pattern is seen as continuous, iterative, uncertain” 
(Pettigrew 1992: 6).
The focus of process research is on the succession of actions, decisions, processes, stances
and events characterising the life of a company. Mintzberg and Waters (1982), in
describing the method used in examining how strategies and processes are formed in
organisation, argue that the first step of the process is collection of basic data, the second
step is to infer patterns and periods, the third step is to further investigate each period and
the transitions between period, and finally comes building of theory.
“The research team sat down with a detailed report on the organisation's history - 
the descriptions and explanations of its patterns and periods - for a series of 
brainstorming sessions. These focused on a set of major conceptual issues, with 
the intention of extracting and inducing whatever theoretical conclusions could be 
drawn from these particular results” (ibid. 1982: 467).
The use of a method that is typical of strategy process research and the critical spirit 
towards neo-classic research means that important similarities exist between the 
methodology followed in this research and the mainstream strategy process research. 
However, there are also important differences.
First, the consolidation of process research within the strategy field has led to the
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development of a research methodology where historical analysis is put into a wider 
context of a theory of method driving research on change (Pettigrew 1990, 1992). In this 
research, we do not apply theory to history; rather, we use history to test the theory of 
strategic groups. Stinchcombe (1978) in the introduction of his book, “Theoretical 
Methods in Social History”, writes: “I would have written neither this book nor any 
other book on the subjects of historical methods, unless I thought that the question of 
how to apply social theory to historical materials, as it is usually posed, is ridiculous. 
One does not apply theory to history; rather one uses history to develop theory” (ibid. 
1978: 1). The objective of his book is to “get down to historical methods, methods of 
thinking about historical facts” (ibid. 1978: 2) and to show that good historical 
interpretations exist independently of the theory of social change in which they are used. 
In this research, we use a similar approach. We believe that the analysis of historical 
materials has a purpose of its own and does not need to follow any theory. Nor is the 
validity of the historical interpretation seen as depending on the theory in which the 
interpretation would be made.
Second, strategy process research is strongly influenced by organisational behaviour, as 
such the focus is traditionally inside the firm. Child and Smith (1987) argue for the 
development of a firm-in-sector perspective in research on the organisational 
transformation of firms within a sector. However, in their research, the analysis of changes 
in the external environment has been limited to explain how and why internal processes of 
change were initiated. The attention has mainly been on the firm. Furthermore, when 
talking of success stories in terms of innovation introduced by firms within the sector, the 
analysis of the external environment is again limited to a basic argument that firms were in 
no condition to cope with the introduction.
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Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) argue that the focus of strategy process research is to
capture strategic change and competition as holistically as possible. They see strategic
change and competition as intimately linked.
“We find it impossible to comprehend such (strategic) changes as separate 
episodes divorced from their historical, organizational and economic 
circumstances from which they emerge. The point to appreciate is the richness 
of these contexts and their simultaneous shaping of strategic change.” (ibid. 
1991:27).
Figure 6.1 shows the three fundamental dimensions necessary for the analysis of 
strategic change according to Pettigrew and Whipp.
Figure 6.1 The Three Essential Dimensions Shaping Strategic Change
Adapted from Pettigrew and Whipp (1991: 26)
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In the external context, Pettigrew and Whipp pay particular attention to competition. They 
argue that its complexity is best understood by distinguishing its two main dimensions 
(Figure 6.2): (a) the levels at which competition operates and (b) time. The three elements 
characterising the competitive levels are the firm level, the sector level, and the economy 
level. They conclude that: “the competitive performance of a firm hinges therefore on the
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recognition that business compete not merely against one another but at the same time 
within the sectoral and national/intemational structures and relationships” (ibid. 1991: 27).
Because of the interconnection between strategic change and competition, many
similarities exist between the approach taken in this research and that of Pettigrew and
Whipp. Nevertheless, as soon as Pettigrew and Whipp define the focus of the analysis,
important differences emerge between the two approaches:
“The sectoral and national conditions in which a firm operates and hence the 
bases on which it competes are quintessentially unstable. ... It is to these changes 
that management has to respond continuously and which provide part of the major 
external impultions for strategic change. The ability to perceive those changes 
and to take necessary action diverges considerably between and within 
firms. It is those divergences of choice and execution which interest us” (ibid. 
1991: 28, emphasis added).
Figure 6.2 The Three Levels of Competition
Adapted from Pettigrew and Whipp (1991: 27)
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Therefore, although in the search for a holistic explanation, their focus is on firms, and 
specifically, on the internal context and process. The analysis of the interface between
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the internal and external environment is limited to how firms adapt to major changes in 
their environment. With the stress being on how change unfolds in the companies, it is 
understandable that researchers emphasise the importance of being inside the company 
and of the analysing actors involved in the strategy process (Van de Ven 1993). The 
centre of Whipp and Pettigrew’s research is therefore the inner, rather than on the outer, 
context. Focusing inside the company, there is inevitably stress on the agents involved 
in the process of change and on the role of management involved in the process of 
change. The focus of this research is significantly different. With attention in strategic 
groups research on firms’ strategies within the industry, the attention here is on the 
relationships between the firms’ strategies and the industry structure. The objective is to 
analyse the process of change in firms’ strategies within an industry and to see how 
industry structure changes.
The combination of the issues highlighted above means that the research strategy used in 
here differs from traditional strategy process research. In the next section, we describe in 
detail the technical characteristics of the methodology.
6.2 Research Method: Technical Details
In order to answer the questions posed in the previous chapter, the empirical research 
needs to look at both the industry and firms operating within it. The units of analysis 
remain single firms, rather than groups structures. By looking at specific firms, we avoid 
the problem of having to argue that these similarities are important a priori. By
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comparing and contrasting the strategic characteristics of firms, we will be able to assess 
the significance of similarities as well as differences existing between them, and 
indirectly we will assess the relevance of the concept of strategic groups in strategy 
research. Therefore, firms chosen for the empirical research need to a priori have some 
important strategic similarities. Another important element to consider is that strategic 
groups theory argues that because of these similarities, companies recognise the 
existence of strategic interaction with other firms which will influence top management 
in decision-making about investment to make. It is therefore necessary that some 
strategic interaction exists between the chosen companies. These three features, that is, 
analysis of firms’ strategies and industry structure, the existence a priori of some 
important strategic similarities between the firms chosen and the existence of some 
strategic interaction between the chosen firms, are the key criteria around which the 
empirical research will be built.
6.2.1 Choice of Industry
The choice of the UK GRI for empirical research has been taken for a variety of reasons:
1. Considerable information on this industry and on the largest companies operating in the 
industry is available.
2. Operative issues (both in terms of product market issues as well as in terms of internal 
logistics) have a high strategic content. Therefore, senior management regularly makes 
statements about operative issues and the dynamics of the competitive market.
3. Companies mainly operate in the grocery retailing industry and there is a minimal 
presence of foreign operators. This allows to minimise the influence of other businesses
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and countries on the dynamics of firms’ strategies in the UK GRI. Furthermore, 
because the dominant activity of firms is in the GRI, there often are no differences 
between management at the corporate and the business level. This again enables us to 
have senior management talking about the dynamics of firms’ strategies at a business 
level, competition, and consumer markets.
6.2.2 Choice of Organisations
The choice and number of the organisations to study has strongly been influenced by the 
choice of the research method. The case studies have been written on the basis of 
information gathered from on-line newspaper sources. The collection of newspaper 
articles is a lengthy exercise. For example, out of the articles available for Sainsbury’s 
on The Financial Times on line, 200 pages of articles have been selected as ‘potentially 
interesting for the research’, forming a text of circa 127,500 words. For Argyll, where 
Textline has been drawn on for the period 1980 - 1993 and The Financial Times on-line 
for the period 1994 - 1995, there are 457 pages of newspaper articles, totalling 233,700 
words.
Given time and resources constraints, there is a trade-off between the breadth and depth of 
the analysis. If we examine two companies, we would have some problems in arguing the 
significance of the results. On the other hand, if we examine more than four companies, 
we will not be able to analyse in-depth their histories. Because we want to understand in 
detail the dynamics of firms’ strategies, we have decided to limit the analysis to four 
companies. However, material on other companies has also been collected, and this has 
provided important information for the analysis of the dynamics of the competitive
environment.
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Table 6.1 Market Share of the Four Companies Analysed at the End of 1994
1994(%)
Sainsbury’s 20.6
Tesco 19.1
ASDA 10.7
Arpyll 10.8
Total Market Share 71.2
Source: AGB (1996)
We have selected the four largest companies at the end of 1995 and analysed their 
strategies in the period between 1980 and 1995. At the end of 1994, these four firms had a 
market share in the UK GR1 of 71.2 per cent.
In IO, which has, for a long time, been the exclusive forum for industry studies, it has 
traditionally been argued that large companies can, with their policies, have an 
important influence on the dynamics of firms’ strategies within the industry. The 
underlying idea is that, because of their size, the implications of their decisions with 
reference to investment decisions and competitive policies, are more far-reaching than 
those for smaller firms. It is not surprising, therefore, to learn know that size has been 
used as a proxy for firms’ strategies in strategic groups research (see Porter 1979). 
Although we criticised the IO approach in Chapter 2, we must recognise that, generally, 
larger companies tend to operate on a larger geographic area than smaller companies. 
Therefore, decisions taken by a national firm may influence decisions of another 
national firm.
In choosing the four largest companies, we therefore respect two of the three above- 
mentioned criteria of the empirical analysis, that is the existence, a-priori, of some 
important strategic similarities between the firms chosen and the existence of some 
strategic interaction between the chosen firms. The choice seems appropriate also
Chapter 6 -  Methodology -  page 137
because in a study made by Lewis and Thomas (1990) on the UK GRI, two of the four 
companies chosen here have been clustered together to form the same strategic group.
6.2.3 The Choice of Time Frame
With the objectives of the research centring on understanding the dynamics of firms’ 
strategies and industry structure, longitudinal analysis is required. Initially, it was decided 
to analyse changes in the industry structure and firms’ strategies in the period of 1980 - 
1992. It was decided that 1980 would have been the first year for the analysis of firms’ 
strategies in detail, because secondary data were available since 1980. Earlier information 
to 1980 was also collected to give a background to the analysis of firms’ strategies and the 
dynamics of the industry. The analysis was initially supposed to terminate in 1992, but this 
has been extended to 1995 because the research has been suspended twice and interesting 
events have taken place in the industry over this period.
6.2.4 Data Sources
This study uses secondary sources as its main source for the industry study and four case 
studies. As already noted, the case studies are written on the basis of information gathered 
from on-line newspaper sources (Textline and The Financial Times). This information is 
complemented by an examination of annual reports, other articles on specialised 
management and industry reviews on companies. Journal articles from on-line sources 
have also been collected for other companies (Iceland, Morrison, Hillards, Fine Fare,
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Budgens, WM Low, Waitrose, Oriel, Amos Hinton, Lennons, Safeway US, WM Jackson, 
Fitch Lovell, and Isosceles), and have provided important information on the dynamics of 
the competitive environment.
Financial data have been collected from Datastream and annual reports. Datastream is a 
better source because it standardises data and makes comparisons easy. Unfortunately, it 
does not provide information on single business units. This information has been collected 
from the companies’ annual reports.
The main source for the industry analysis is the Retail Trade Review of The Economist 
Intelligence Unit (which provides the data as well as background information on the 
dynamics of the industry). Key Note, and specialised sectoral reviews (e.g. The Grocer). 
Other sources of information are the library of the Institute of Grocery Distribution and 
Audits of Great Britain (AGB). For the analysis of the changes in the industry in the period 
preceding 1980, we use a variety of sources, mainly books reviewing the early changes in 
the industry structure, and the review Retail Business from the early 1960s onwards. The 
analysis of newspaper articles on the companies listed earlier also provides important 
information on the dynamics of the competitive environment.
6.2.5 The Role of Documentary and Archive Data
Qualitative methods have been criticised with regard to their internal and external 
validity. The former refers to the accuracy of the information acquired by such methods 
as interviewing, the latter to the issue of objectivity. In this research, we have avoided 
the use of interviews as a primary source for the development of the case studies. This
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decision was been taken because of the following factors:
1. With the analysis being on the dynamics of firms’ strategies over a considerable 
period, it was not certain, initially, that we would have been able to consistently 
interview management who had been responsible for firms’ strategies since the late 
1970s. Few changes had taken place in senior management and the information 
might no longer have been available, thus there would have been problems in getting 
the information needed for writing the case studies.
2. There is always a danger of ex-post rationalisation of the strategy process in 
interviews. Newspaper articles offer the best way to avoid this danger. Because we 
are able to get the information related to the time events happen, newspaper articles 
give the best perspective of the internal and external context at the time events take 
place. The main problem in technique relates to the potential bias introduced by the 
journalists writing the articles. However, because the primary focus of the analysis is 
on the events reported rather than on the journalists’ comments, we believe this does 
not represent a main issue. Furthermore, by comparing external sources with 
information given by companies’ annual reports, it is possible to have an intuitive 
feeling of the validity of the interpretation made.
3. Whilst the focus on the inner context justifies the importance of interviews as 
research method in strategy process research, here the focus is on firms but from an 
external viewpoint. Further, the inner context is more tangible than the analysis of 
the relationship between firms and the market.
The second source of concern for using secondary data is their external validity, that is, 
whether our interpretation of the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure 
reflects the interpretations other researchers would give to the same elements. We
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believe that the use of newspaper articles over a long period helps to overcome this 
problem. As the emphasis is on the stream-of-events and actions taken over time, rather 
than on a specific event, there is less margin for mis-interpretation of the role of events. 
Further, the companies analysed here are all quoted on the stock market. Therefore, if 
misleading information is published, it could be argued that, for their own interest’s 
sake, companies would make sure that the public is correctly informed. In this context, 
the use of relevant financial newspapers is of much help. A second reassurance comes 
from the fact that, information gathered through newspaper articles is confronted with 
that from other sources. In a critical spirit, there is no need to only show the existence of 
a single interpretation. Therefore, when conflicting information has emerged in the 
analysis of the dynamics of firms' strategies and industry structure, either further 
information has been collected or if it is a matter of interpretation of the dynamics of the 
industry structure, these conflicting interpretations have been highlighted and discussed.
6.2.6 The Role of Interviews
When the research started, it was decided that the main source for the empirical research 
would have been the analysis of newspapers articles. However, it was also decided that 
for companies where little information is available, it would have been necessary to 
conduct some interviews. Furthermore, we had no guarantee that this technique would 
have worked. Therefore, interviews always represented an option, their role dependant 
on the results from newspaper analysis.
Two interviews were carried out in one company, on which, of the four companies, we
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held least information from secondary sources for the early 1980s. Although, it was 
large by 1995, the company was still very small in the early 1980s. Therefore, there was 
a danger that the data collected were insufficient to properly reproduce the history of 
this company in its early stages.
One interview was with the company’s chairman and deputy chairman; the other was 
with the chief executive. The three had worked in the company at senior executive level 
since the end of the 1970s. Before the interview, a revised form of the case study made 
on the basis of information gathered from newspaper articles and other secondary 
sources was sent to the management. The revised text did not contain management’s 
statements collected from newspapers where the company’s strategy was justified and 
explained. The text was a description of changes in the firm’s strategy. There were three 
reasons behind this decision:
1. to see whether or not our interpretation of the dynamics of the firm’s strategy was 
correct;
2. to assess whether our interpretation of the reasons behind some decisions or action 
taken was valid; and,
3. to not influence top management’s view of the history of their companies by 
recalling their own statements.
The role of the interviews was to examine the accuracy of our interpretation of the 
dynamics of their firm’s strategy within the industry over a particular period, by 
discussing it with senior management. However, it was also to provide a stronger 
understanding of the internal view about how the strategy of the firm was evolving, as 
well as of the industry dynamics. The objective was therefore to give external validity to
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our interpretation of the history of the company and to the technique we had decided to 
use, whilst endeavouring to comprehend the importance of the standpoint taken in 
addressing specific issues.
The interviews gave excellent results, beyond expectation. Much time was spent 
discussing the history of the company. What emerged from the analysis of newspaper 
articles on the company was largely confirmed in the interview. The results reassured us 
of the validity of the technique we had decided to use for the development of the case 
studies, especially because little information was available on this company. The 
information available made us certain that, given the larger amount of information 
available on other companies, continued investigation would have added little to the 
stories of these companies. However, we asked the chairman for advice about how to 
contact the management of other companies, hoping for a “snowball effect”. The 
chairman advised us to write directly to the management of other companies. However, 
the other companies declined our invitation and it was decided that interviews in these 
companies would have not been undertaken.
6.2.7 Timing
The collection of newspaper articles from Textline was carried out in Spring 1993. 
However, by 1994, because of budget constraints, Textline was no longer available in 
the library. The collection resumed in Autumn 1994 and Winter 1996 with The 
Financial Times on line. Whilst, Textline is a better source as it contains articles from 
all the UK newspapers, The Financial Times on-line represented a very good alternative.
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Chapter 7 The UK Grocery Retailing Industry
7.0 Introduction
The grocery retailing industry (GRI) is part of the broader food retailing industry. The 
British Standard Industry Classification identifies the former as “5411” and the latter as 
“5400”. Companies operating within the GRI have traditionally been distinguished as 
multiples, independents and co-operative companies. Multiples are defined as 
companies operating 10 or more retail outlets. In this chapter, we review the evolution 
of the UK GRI from the end of the Second World War until the mid - 1990s. The 
objective is to describe the changes in the structure of the industry and the nature of 
competition.
Table 7.1 Share of the UK Grocery Retailing Industry According to Type of Shop
Years ‘Multiples Co-operatives Independents
*1950 24 22 54
*1961 27 21 52
*1971 43 15 42
*1975 48 16 36
**1980 60.9 14.2 24.9
**1985 70.4 11.6 18.3
**1990 75.8 10.3 13.9
**1994 81.7 8.6 9.7
Sources: * Baden Fuller (1986) based on Nielsen
** IGD Research Services based on Nielsen: and AC Nielsen Trade Statislics (1995)
Over the past 50 years, the structure and nature of the industry and the market have 
changed significantly. In the 1950s and 1960s, the food market grew in real terms, 
mainly because of an increasing population. However, since the 1970s, the population
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has been growing more slowly. This, together with changing eating habits, has meant 
that there has not been real market growth (Mussannif 1988). Companies in the GRI 
have pursued market penetration and product development strategies. Multiples have 
increased their share in the market at the expense of co-operative companies and 
independent retailers (Table 7.1). On the other hand, by replacing larger retail outlets, 
they have been able to increase the range of products and services on offer to customers. 
A large superstore nowadays stocks any dry and fresh produce (which, after the war 
were retailed through food specialists such as fishmongers, butchers, dairymen, 
greengrocers, and bakeries), and also medicines, alcoholic drinks, newspapers, 
magazines and books. Nowadays, superstores often have photoprocessing services, dry- 
cleaning and post office facilities. Petrol stations are often attached to superstores. It is 
therefore possible to say that by opening larger retail outlets, multiple retailers have 
transformed themselves from traditional retailers of packed-dry food to retailers of a 
variety of fresh produce, other household products and to services providers. The 
expansion of multiples, with their market penetration and product development 
strategies linked with the increasing presence of large supermarkets and superstores, has 
meant that the boundaries of the industry have changed. It has also impacted on the 
number of companies operating in the GRI. The replacement of smaller units with larger 
ones has also meant that the number of outlets has slowly but steadily decreased (Table
7.5; page 151).
Chapter 7 -  The UK Grocery' Retailing Industry -  page 145
7.1 The UK Grocery Retailing Industry in the 1950s and 1960s
At the start of the 1950s, the structure of the GRI was highly fragmented with multiples 
only having 24% of the grocery market. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the structure 
of the UK GRI remained highly fragmented, with multiples only increasing their share 
of the grocery market to 27% by 1961 (Table 7.1). Various reasons are behind this slow 
increase in concentration. The period following the end of the Second World War was a 
difficult one for the United Kingdom. Food rationing became stricter because of the end 
of the Lend-Lease arrangement with the US, which had made possible for Britain to buy 
food on credit during the war. Food demand grew significantly only in the second part 
of the 1950s after controls were lifted in 1954. However, the increase was also due to a 
growing population and income.
In the post-war period, new retailing concepts, such as self-service and supermarkets 
were imported from North America. However, strict planning permissions made it 
difficult for companies to build new shops, meaning that supermarkets and self-services 
were slow to diffuse. According to Retail Business (1961), in 1960, out of 275,000 food 
shops, 150,000 were grocery shops, and these comprised 6,733 self-services and 367 
supermarkets. The remainders were counter service outlets. After the war, companies 
were only able to restructure the outlets that had been damaged by the bombing during 
the war or to open new stores on sites previously used as warehouses or cinemas. At a 
competitive level, price was not an important variable for companies. The existence of 
resale price maintenance (RPM) meant that there were little price differences among 
different types of retailers. RPM had first been introduced in the 1890s to protect small 
independent retailers against multiples' price-cutting strategies. However, it also
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enabled individual suppliers to control retailing price. Suppliers had the support of the 
industry in collectively enforcing the prices. In 1954, the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
abolished collective enforcement but individual suppliers were still able to fix the prices 
at which their goods were sold (Cox 1988).
In the 1960s, important changes took place in the GRI. Between 1961 and 1971, 
multiples increased their share of the grocery retailing industry from 27% to 43% (Table 
7.1). In a growing market, resulting from the growing population and income, multiples 
followed a market penetration strategy. Companies expanded the scope of their 
operations by increasing the number of outlets and the geographic scope of their 
operations. Counter service outlets were progressively replaced by supermarkets and 
self-services, while superstores appeared for the first time around the country. Larger 
stores had some cost advantages over smaller stores. McClelland (1966) argued that 
economies of scale exist in establishments related to labour costs, equipment, occupancy 
costs, and stock costs'. Further, larger stores also enabled companies to enlarge the 
range of products on offer to produce economies of scope, defined by Dawson and Shaw 
(1989: 53) as “the economies associated with the assembly of groups of different 
products for common sale”. During this period, price became an important competitive 
variable. After the Restrictive Trade Practices Act (1954), retailers pushed for the 
abolition of the RPM in food retailing. In 1964, the Resale Prices Act put an end to 
RPM in the food industry. Manufacturers could still enforce resale prices, but it was 
necessary to demonstrate to a Restrictive Practices Court that RPM would be in the 1
1 Dawson and Shaw (1989: 52) argue that “the detailed operation of economies of scale at establishment 
level is unclear, and data are particularly difficult to obtain. On the basis of the evidence currently 
available, however, some size effects appear likely to exist".
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public interest. Only one case was put forward, by confectionery manufacturers, but this
was voted against in 1967 (Fulop 1983).
7.2 The UK Grocery Retailing Industry in the 1970s
Changes in the GRI continued in the 1970s, with multiples achieving 61% of the 
grocery market in 1980 (43% in 1971). Over this period, multiples took market share, 
not only from other food retailers, but also from other specialist retailers (Table 7.2). 
This trend, which started in the 1950s, continued until 1994.
Table 7.2 Share of the Grocery Industry on the UK Food Retailing Industry
Years Grocery Total 
Sales 
(£ Mn)
Food Total 
Sales 
(£ Mn)
Percentage of 
Grocery over 
Food Sales
1961 2335 4090 57.1
1970 3633 6052 60.0
1980 17342 22858 75,9
1990 40382 48239 83,7
1994 54920 62081 88,5
Source: Our Estimation. Based on data from Retail Businesses (1962, 48; 1971, 165) and Retail Trade 
Reviews (1988, 8; 1995,36).
Since the 1950s, great progress has continued to be made in “convenience food”. 
Initially, this group included cooked-canned frozen meat and fish, frozen and canned 
vegetables, pastries, biscuits, puddings and other pre-cooked or prepared foods, with 
highly competitive prices. If consumers had previously had to buy recipes singly and 
prepare specific dishes by combining the recipes themselves, with the development of 
convenience meals, this task began to be performed by the manufacturer. However, the 
rapid growth in the demand of convenience food was also due to the growth in families
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owning a fridge, and by the increasing number of women at work. This meant higher 
demand for convenience goods and a decreasing number of trips for food shopping. 
Furthermore, grocery retailers, by replacing smaller stores with larger ones, were able to 
broaden the range of products on offer and take advantage of these trends. What 
emerges, therefore, is that parallel changes were taking place in the consumer market, 
food retailing and food manufacturing.
Baden-Fuller (1986) identifies retailers’ market power as the reason behind the increase 
in concentration in the UK GRI in the 1970s. The argument is that a larger market share 
would have enabled multiples to improve their buying conditions from manufacturers. 
According to Baden-Fuller, this is confirmed by the fact that food manufacturers saw 
their profits going down in the 1970s. However, we might doubt this hypothesis, 
because multiples would have cashed in the better price bargained against manufacturers 
and increased their profits. This was not confirmed by the Monopolies and Merger 
Commission whose report (1981) indicates that lower prices were transferred to 
customers. In our view, the reason behind the increase in the share of the multiples in 
the 1970s is the internal expansion by multiples retailers, accompanied by strong price 
competition. This hypothesis is supported by Howe (1990).
In the 1970s, price was undoubtedly the most important competitive variable being used 
by grocery retailers (others included market segment positioning, localisation of the 
outlets, services, and range of products). The 1970s were turbulent years for the UK 
economy, and were characterised by two economic recessions. In March 1974, the Price 
Commission introduced stringent gross margin controls upon grocery retailers. Further, 
after two decades of rising demand, a low growth rate in the UK population means that
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demand for grocery products stagnated in the 1970s. The stagnating demand and 
recessions, linked with rising prices (due to inflationary pressure), created many 
uncertainties among consumers. This means that price was an important competitive 
variable for grocery retailers. The way to increase profitability for companies was to 
expand the geographic scope of operations and the range of products on offer to 
customers in search of potential economies of scale and scope. Companies expanded the 
geographic scope of operations while also replacing smaller stores with larger 
supermarkets and superstores. The number of grocery outlets continued to decrease, but 
the number of supermarkets and superstores increased. In 1979, there were 7,130 
supermarkets and 276 superstores, compared with 4,400 supermarkets and 24 
superstores in 1970(Fiori and Stellatelli 1983).
Table 7.3 Market Share of Main Companies in the Grocery Retailing Industry
1970/71 1980
Tesco 7.2 13.8
Sainsburv 6.1 12.2
Allied Suppliers 7.9 4.8
Fine Fare 4.8 5.2
International Stores 3.2 4.8
ASDA 1.5 7.7
Kwik Save 0.3 5.2
Total 31 53.7
Source: AGB (1996)
At a competitive level, the 1970s witnessed the emergence of significant differences 
among multiples. After the 1964 Act, which had put an end to RPM in the food 
industry, a number of discounters appeared on the market. It is possible to distinguish 
between two price policies in food retailing: average low prices on all the goods and low 
prices on a limited range of products for a limited period. Kwik Save and ASDA 
followed a strategy of low prices for all the goods. At the beginning of the 1970s, ASDA
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and Kwik Save had a marginal presence within the market. Within a few years, they had 
expanded their operations by offering a limited range of products at low prices. ASDA 
used large supermarkets and superstores, often on the edge of towns, whilst Kwik Save 
focused on city centre sites. Their success encouraged these companies to expand their 
operations. Large retailers initially downplayed the emergence of discounters (Fiori and 
Stellatelli 1983). However, they were later forced to quickly respond. Other grocery 
retailers, with a much wider range of products (between 2,000 and 3,000, against the 
300 averaging discounters), lowered their prices. Later, some companies started to 
convert smaller units into discount formats (Allied Supplier launched Presto at the 
discount end of the market, Fine Fare launched Shoppers’ Paradise).
Between 1977 and 1979, a strong price campaign was launched by Tesco and Sainsbury. 
Because of the price campaigns, these companies significantly increased their market 
share in the GR1.
Table 7.4 The Co-operative Movement: Turnover and Number of Companies
Year Total Turnover of 
Co-operatives 
(£M n)
Number of 
Coops 
Societies**
1941 N/A 1059
1953 N/A 988
1961 N/A 835
1970 N/A 357
1980 »3641 206
1982 •3860 145
1984 *4151 112
1986 *4442 100
1988 *4986 85
1990 **5826 77
1992 **6217 62
1994 **6013 52
Source: * Retail Trade Reviews (1988, 8; based on DTI indices)
** Retail Trade Reviews (1995, 36; based on data from the Co-operative Union)
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7.3 The UK Grocery Retailing Industry between 1980 and 1995
Changes in the GRI have continued to the current time. Multiples continued to increase 
their share within the GRI until 1994 (the last year when data were available) with their 
share reaching 81.7% in 1994 (it was 61% in 1980). The decline of independent retailers 
and co-operatives companies has continued. This has occurred despite the consolidation 
that has taken place in the co-operative movements, where the number of co-operative 
societies has decreased (Table 7.4) mainly as a result of a number of mergers aiming at 
strengthening the position of a limited amount of larger co-operatives. The decline of 
the co-operative movement goes back for some time. Already in 1962, Retail Business 
(1962: 19, n. 52) wrote, “even though the co-operatives were the pioneers of self-service 
in this country, they have been steadily losing ground to multiples”.
Table 7.5 Structure of the Grocery Retailing Sector: 1961 - 1992
Large Grocery 
Retailers
O ther Grocery 
Retailers
All Grocery 
Retailers
Number of Businesses
1961 N/A N/A 109034
1971 N/A N/A 82666
1980 116 38814 38930
1984 98 34053 34151
1988 69 24821 24890
1992 71 18557 18628
Number of Outlets
1961 N/A N/A 131982
1971 N/A N/A 97747
1980 12218 44342 56560
1984 9742 37636 47378
1988 8328 26992 35320
1992 8003 20584 28587
Source: Retail Trade Review (1994, 1992) Retail Business (1982). Tucker (1978), for 1961 and 1971 
data.
Note: The distinction made between large grocery retailers (with a turnover higher than £ 
12m) and other grocery retailers has been dropped due to reclassification and data are 
not available since 1993.
According to Bamfield (1987: 158) "co-operatives declined because they were unable to 
respond to the rapid changes in retailing.” While co-operatives had been innovators in 
the 1950s, they have since been unable to configure their operations in ways that match 
the effectiveness of multiples.
At a macro level, the 1980s were characterised by a decreasing number of multiples 
(Table 7.5), which have significantly increased the geographic scope of their operations. 
Using a terminology developed by Duke (1991), we might say that retailers have 
followed a geographic "flanking attack” strategy. That is, they have developed new sites 
in catchment areas with little or no direct competition from similar offers, thus flanking 
the competitors, attacking them where they are weak or where they do not have outlets. 
By replacing smaller units with larger ones (there were 919 superstores in 1994, 
compared to 276 in 1979), the portfolio of stores among multiples has significantly 
changed (Table 7.6).
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Table 7.6 Size Profile of Multiple Stores
Sales Area 
(sq. ft.)
1984 1988 1992
< 4000 44.6 28.9 26.6
4000 -  9999 29.1 28.1 22.5
10000 -  14999 9.5 13.0 12.2
15000 -  19999 6.7 10.1 9.7
20000 -  24999 3.2 6.0 7.0
>/ 25000 6.9 13.9 22.0
Total 100 100 100
Source: IGD Research Services
The importance of superstores and supermarkets has increased. This has happened in a 
context that has witnessed a continued decrease in the number of outlets. The expansion 
in the number of superstores has been made possible by easier planning permissions for
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building superstores since 1985. This trend has continued throughout the 1980s and
1990s. Companies, when possible, have preferred to develop large supermarkets or
superstores, because of the higher margins reported by these stores.
“The quality of our new stores is reflected in their financial performance and we 
are seeing excellent sales growth from the stores in the previous years. New 
stores generally now come into profit in their first year of trading, and on maturity 
are currently exceeding our operational and financial criteria in terms of both 
sales and return on capital. The ability of our new stores to deliver substantially 
higher net margins than the corporate average ... gives us confidence in the future
With regard to future development programmes, contrary to general market fears 
of saturation, all our detailed research has led the Board to conclude that there is 
substantial profitable opportunities for new superstores and so our development 
programme is being increased” (MacLaurin, Chairman of Tesco, Annual Report, 
1989: 6-7).
The share of specialised businesses (fishmongers, butchers, dairymen, greengrocers and 
bakeries) has continued to decrease - slowly but continuously. A trend started in the 
1950s. The novelty is that supermarkets and the superstores have given multiples the 
opportunity to expand the ranges of products on offer to customers. This has effectively 
enlarged the competitive basis and has changed the boundaries of the industry. “Filling 
stations are now big business for the major grocery multiples and one leading analyst 
estimates that the top grocers take over £2.5 bn a year from fuel sales. Tesco, Sainsbury, 
ASDA, Argyll and Wm Morrison are estimated to account for 17.7% of the UK petrol
market, which compares with 8.4% in 1989.” (Key Note 1995: 10).
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7.3.1 Firms’ Strategies and Industry Changes from 1980 to 1995: A Micro 
Analysis
Having examined the dynamics of the industry at a macro-level, we now look at it more 
in detail for the period between 1980 and 1995.
Following the recession at the end of the 1970s and price competition between the 
largest multiples, we find a situation where the market share of the various companies 
had significantly changed within a few years. Between 1976 and 1980, Tesco, 
Sainsbury, ASDA and Kwik Save made significant gains in terms of market share. The 
main losers were smaller multiples, Co-ops and Independent stores.
The price competition in the second part of the 1970s (from 1976 to 1979) was followed 
by a second price skirmish in 1982 launched by Tesco, which was losing sales to 
competitors.
Table 7.7 Market Share of Main Companies in the Grocery Retailing Industry 
between 1976 and 1984
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Sainsburv 8.9 9.0 11.1 11.1 12.5 13.7 15.3 16.1 16.7
Tesco 7.9 10.3 12.4 13.2 13.4 13.3 13.6 14.1 14.0
ASDA 5.7 6.3 6.6 6.9 8.4 8.6 9.3 9.3 9.8
Argyll N/C N/C N/C N/C N/C N/A N/A 4.6 4.5
Kwik Save 2.2 2.7 3.1 3.7 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.6
Fine Fare 3.4 3.4 3.6 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.3 3.9 3.7
International Stores 2.9 2.5 3.2 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 2.9 N/C
Safeway 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.5 2.0 2.1 2.7
W aitrose 1.3 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.3
Allied Suppliers 5.1 6.9 6.5 6.6 6.8 6.7 6.6 N/C N/C
Gateway N/C N/C N/C N/C N/C N/A N/A N/A 6.3
Total 38.7 44.0 49.2 51.7 56.1 57.4 60.0 58.8 63.6
Source: AGB (1996)
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The Effects of Price Competition
Price campaigns have had important consequences for the structure of the industry. 
International Stores, Allied Suppliers and Fine Fare, which had been among the largest 
companies at the beginning of the 1970s, had seen their relative importance in the 
market decreasing by the rapid expansion of Sainsbury, Tesco and ASDA. It did not 
come as a surprise when, between 1982 and 1986, the three businesses were taken over 
by other companies. Looking at these three businesses, we can see that they were all 
subsidiaries of groups operating in various industries. International Stores was part of 
British and American Tobacco (BAT Industries), a company operating mainly in the 
tobacco industry. In the GRI, it operated with three identities: International Stores 
(which formed the core of its retailing activities), Mainstop (the superstore business) 
and Pricerite (the discounter). Following the appointment of Patrick Sheehy as 
Executive Chairman in 1982, a new strategy was set up at the corporate level. The 
objective was to focus on a smaller range of activities. The group divested of Pricerite 
and Mainstop in 1982 (to Argyll) and of International Stores in 1984 (to Gateway). In 
commenting on the sale of International Stores in 1984 to Dee Corporation, Patrick 
Sheehy said (Annual Report 1984: 6) “we believe that food retailing is a specialised 
business that does not fit into our-long term plans”. BAT had taken over International 
Stores in November 1972.
Allied Suppliers was under the control of Generale Occidentale, a holding controlled by 
James Goldsmith. Goldsmith had little interest in developing a strategy of expansion for 
Allied. This is clear when we consider that between 1977 and 1982, £ 104m were 
extracted from the company, £ 33m of which were transferred from reserves.
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We do not know much about the reason, which led to the selling of Fine Fare by ABF (a 
food manufacturer and a retailing company). However, we know that Fine Fare market 
share had increased from 3.4% in 1976 to 4.4% in 1980, to start a long decline until 
achieving 3.5% in 1985. Between 1980 and 1985, the group had also been closing the 
less profitable stores. The number of stores had decreased from 662 in 1980, to 419 in 
1985. A likely reason for these groups divesting of their operations is that the 
management at the corporate level had lost interest in the GRI, probably because major 
investment were needed to improve the businesses, which management was unwilling to 
do.
The early 1980s also saw a major shakeout in ownership of medium-sized multiple 
grocers. Lennons, Amos Hintons, Key Market and others were taken over within a few 
years (Table 7.9). Many of these companies operated small supermarkets located in the 
city centres, and they had been badly hit by the price competition of the late 1970s. It 
also seems that after a decade, during which the concept of the out-of-town superstore 
had been seen with some reluctance by retailers, in the late 1970s to early 1980s, many 
companies in the industry developed the view that the future in grocery retailing was in 
the superstore business. Tesco had a strategy of developing a network of 400 superstores 
and Sainsbury had plans to open 15 large supermarkets per year.
ASDA was the only specialised superstore operator and had played a significant role in 
the development of this belief. ASDA, in the late 1970s -  in a context characterised by 
price competition, was the company with the highest profitability and highest margins. 
However, what was most impressive was that ASDA was achieving these results and
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still being shown by market research as one of the cheapest retailers for consumers
(Brooks and Davies 1989).
Table 7.8 Some Financial Figures of ASDA, Sainsbury and Tesco
Operating Profit
(£ Mn)
Return on Capital 
Employed (%)
Return on Sales
(%)
Year 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81
ASDA Group
Sainsbury
Tesco
39.7 49.1 51.1
30.8 40.5 54.5 
36.1 39.7 51.3
48.2 44.7 29.2 
15.4 17.4 21.1
21.3 21.6 17.9
5.0 4.9 4.3
3.1 3.4 3.6 
3.0 2.6 2.8
Source: Our Estimation on Datastream Data
However, the replacement of small supermarkets with a superstore network was not 
easy. Superstores presented advantages over supermarkets in terms of economies of 
scale and scope. However, the shift required some changes in the retailer’s positioning 
in the market place, with the related risks of being unable to maintain old customers 
and/or to attract new ones. Furthermore, it required the development of new functions 
for the new lines on offer2. Finally, the financial resources for developing superstores 
were significant and the timing for developing superstores was long. Everything 
required a sound financial basis and a long-term view.
It appears that many medium-sized companies were not in the position to effectively 
move into the superstore business. Fitch Lovell disposed of Key Market in June 1983, 
and the management explained that the retailing required major investments and they 
were inhibiting the Group’s excellent business in food manufacturing and distribution 
(Annual Report, 1983). The Managing Director of Laws stores, in commenting on the
2 This has been confirmed by A. Grant during the interview. In commenting Argyll’s strategy in the early 
1980s, he stated: "we were very poorly positioned in 1982 to participate in that superstore development 
Because Allied Supplier had very few good stores and it did not have the width of range, the own brand 
strengths, the in-house distribution you needed to”.
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take over by WM Low, said that Laws Stores was not large enough for “necessary 
modernisation and expansion.’’ (Textline)
Table 7.9 Corporate Activities in the early 1980s in the Grocery Retailing Industry
Year Buyer Company Acquired
1981 Argyll Oriel Foods (part of RCA International)
1982 Argyll Allied Suppliers (part of Generale Occidentale)
Argyll Pricerite and Mainstop (part of BAT Industries)
1983 Gateway Key Markets (Part of Fitch Lovell)
Gateway Dee Supermarkets*
1984 Wm Low Laws Stores
Gateway Lennons Supermarkets*
Booker Bishops
Argyll Amos Hinton
1985 Wm Low Laws Stores
1986 Gateway Fine Fare (part of ABF)
Barker & Dobson** Budgens (part of Booker)
* Merger ** Barker & Dobson changed its name to Budgens Stores
In this context, two companies Argyll and Gateway (which later became Dee 
Corporation), through multiple acquisitions, became significant players in the industry 
within a few years. Their strategy was to quickly build a significant presence in the 
industry and through the rationalisation of support functions to retailing activities 
(buying, distribution, finance, advertising and other central and middle management) 
achieve significant economies of scale and improve profitability in the short term, whilst 
developing a strategy for the future. Argyll was the first to address the problem of 
rationalisation. Its market share remained stagnant between 1984 and 1986, but through 
a rationalisation process, it quickly improved its profitability. An opposite strategy was 
followed by Gateway (Dee) which, in the same period, grew significantly without any 
logic. Size did not bring the benefit that was supposed to, as the company did not
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achieve the economies it was expected. This eventually led to the company running into 
financial difficulties and being taken over by the Isosceles consortium in 1989, after a 
bid by Budgens had failed in 1987.
A Boom in the Development of Superstores
Changes in the industry continued in the second part of the 1980s. Consolidation 
continued as Hillards was taken over by Tesco (1987); Argyll acquired Safeway (1987), 
the UK arm of Safeway US; and Iceland took over Bejam (1989). However, this period 
was marked by a boom in the development of superstores.
It had traditionally been very difficult to get planning permission for the development of
superstore, which had created unhappiness among some retailers. Lord Sainsbury, in
reviewing the strategy of Sainsbury in 1983, complained that it had taken three years to
get planning permission for a superstore at Ipswich:
“Surely it is time for the process and procedures of planning to be examined to try 
to simplify and speed them up. ... The planning process needs to be more 
predictable and this could be achieved by closer definition of what should be 
permissible and of the considerations which should influence decisions. The 
world has much changed since the post-war period when the present planning 
system was first established” (Lord Sainsbury, Annual Report, 1983: 5).
Nevertheless, large retailers continued to find it difficult to obtain planning permission
for large stores also because of the lobbying of local established retailers.
“There is often concern with protecting existing trade in town centres rather than 
permitting developments of supermarkets in new locations. ... The argument that 
a new store development would impact on existing traders so often given as a 
reason for returning planning permission fails to recognise the facts of changing 
commercial life and changing consumer needs” (Lord Sainsbury, Annual Report, 
1985: 8).
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In July 1985, the Secretary of State for the Environment, in a Development Control 
Policy Note, commented that “since commercial competition as such is not a planning 
consideration, the possible effects of proposed major retail development on existing 
retailers is not a relevant factor in deciding planning applications and appeals.” 
(Williams 1994: 185-186). This note came at a time where broader changes were taking 
place in the UK. The government was putting pressure on local authorities to reduce 
their spending and was encouraging them to sell unwanted land. Thus, the clarification 
of planning permission procedures was accompanied by an increasing availability of 
sites suitable for superstore development. Consequently, many companies increased 
their expansion programmes. In the late 1980s, Tesco, Sainsbury and Argyll were 
opening 20 new superstores a year.
Food retailing had traditionally been a cash generating industry, but as companies 
speeded up their expansion programmes, it suddenly became a cash consumption one. In 
1991, all the major retailers went for share issue to finance their expansion programmes. 
This was also due to the significant investments made in information technology as well 
as to the development of central distribution depots, which linked with the retailers’ 
strategies of developing own-label, profoundly transformed the supply chain.
Changes in the Supply Chain: The Establishment of Central Distribution Depots by 
Retailers
In the 1970s, Sainsbury and Marks and Spencer pioneered the development of 
centralised distribution networks (Key Note 1995). Instead of delivering the goods to the 
outlets, manufacturers delivered products to a central warehouse controlled by the
retailer. The retailer would then take care of delivering the goods to the outlets based on 
the demand. However, from the late 1980s, centralisation of distribution centres for 
major multiples became the norm. A prime motivation for the change was the need to 
improve efficiency, drive down costs and assume greater control over the distribution 
system. The main benefits of centralised warehousing include a reduction in inventory 
costs, improved scheduling and greater efficiency in picking and loading. 
Administration can be managed centrally. Furthermore, enhanced product availability, 
coupled with control over quality, increases customer service.
Before this centralisation, products were mostly delivered by suppliers or wholesalers 
from local distribution centres. Their deliveries involved multi-drop rounds with small 
quantities being delivered to numerous outlets within the region. In the past, there could 
be as many as 60 deliveries a day (Moore 1991). Centralised networks have resulted in 
retailers cutting deliveries to a dozen or less (Moore 1991). Lead times have gone down 
from 14 to 3 days, store and depot stock times have declined from 4 weeks to a week, 
and the number of lines carried has grown from 2,000 to 10,000 (Key Note 1995).
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Table 7.10 Percentage of Groceries Through Centralised Distribution (Volume) in 
1990
Retailer Percentage of Stock Going 
through Centralised 
Distribution
Argyll 90
ASDA 80
Kwik Save 80
Wm Morrison 90
Sainsbury 90
Tesco 90
Waitrose 80
Source: Moore (1991)
The development of multi-temperature distribution depot has been accompanied by the 
development of multi-temperature vehicles. “One vehicle can be used instead of five,
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resulting in reduced capital costs, reduced congestion in loading bays, lower overheads 
and running costs and fewer distribution centres. Such technical advancements facilitate 
frequent deliveries of concise multi-temperature assignments to stores assuring the 
customer of freshness and availability.” (Moore 1991: 19).
Changes in the Supply Chain: The Diffusion of Information Technology
However, changes in the supply chain have been more far reaching than a redefinition of 
roles between suppliers and retailers. This has been made possible by the rapid 
development of Information Technology.
“As in other industries computer technology has gone deep - into process control; 
into warehousing and transport control and into store operation. For years we 
have seen at each stage computer applications emerging. But only now we see the 
beginnings of an integrated system approach. And the key to bringing this about 
must lie with scanning and the information which it produces” (Beaumont 1989: 
12) .
Main retailers have developed computer networks linking stores warehouses and the 
company’s headquarter. The development of EPoS (Electronic Point of Sale) has 
enabled retailers to supply customers with itemised bills and to improve efficiency at the 
check-outs. It has enabled them to gather precise information on stock sales, which is 
used to inform management on sales trends for specific products, as well as for stock 
replenishment. A central store computer automatically calculates store stock 
requirements and generates order for delivery to stores. The store’s computer is linked to 
the regional depot that receives order from each store and the distribution is prepared. At 
the same time, the retailer is linked through computer systems (EDI) with 
manufacturers, which transmit orders and invoices, saving costs and time.
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The development of these Information Systems has enabled retailers to reduce stock 
levels and wastage, improve productivity at all levels and reduce the period in which 
products are out-of-stock.
“Logistics systems are designed to view the supply chain as a whole - from 
procurement and material flows to customer deliveries and cash collection. 
Activities such as inventory management, warehousing and transport are all 
viewed as part of the process. Technology is increasingly being used to answer 
the complexities of getting food and other products to the customer on time and 
in peak condition” (Key Note 1995: 31).
Major multiples have tried to claim major influences on the vertical chain. They have 
tried to manage more “tightly, both competitively and co-operatively, the vertical 
relationships in order to enhance horizontal competitiveness” (Shaw and Dawson 1996: 
56).
Another important element that has contributed to changes in the supply chain has been 
the development of retailers’ own-label products. Initially developed by Marks & 
Spencer, Waitrose and Sainsbury, own-label products have traditionally been seen as a 
quality substitute to branded products. The development of own labels by retailers 
occurred for two reasons. Firstly, retailers have higher margins for own-label products 
than for branded products. Secondly, it creates difficulties for consumer to compare the 
prices of products.
Table 7.11 Own Label - Share of Sales
1981 1994
Marks & Spencer 100.0 100.0
Sainsbury 54.0 65.8
Waitrose 47.0 56.0
Tesco 20.0 56.1
ASDA 7.0 40.5
Safeway N/A 51.5
Somerfield N/A 45.3
Kwik Save 0.0 13.4
Source: Fiori and Stellaielli (1983) for 1981; Key Note (1995) for 1994.
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Price and Positioning
Price was a major factor in the high inflation 1970s, especially in the selling of staple 
food commodities and the determining of store choice. After the recession of 1981-82, 
the market focused back to the product. Brooks and Davies (1986) indicate that quoted 
research shows that price dropped from first to sixth position in consumer rating for the 
choice of stores between 1980 and 1984. Convenience, quality, range and store 
environment were more important variables. In this period, companies strategically tried 
to move away from price. Price competition had had good effects on market share but 
not on profitability and companies were keen to increase their profitability.
Table 7.12 Market Share of Main Companies in the Grocery Retailing Industry 
between 1984 and 1990
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Sainsburv 16.7 17.6 18.4 18.6 19.0 18.9 19.6
Tesco 14.0 13.6 13.3 14.5 15.3 15.6 16.6
ASDA 9.8 9.7 9.6 9.7 9.4 9.2 10.4
Safeway* 2.7 3.0 3.6 4.1 5.1 6.6 8.0
Presto 2.4 2.4 3.0 3.2 2.6 1.7 1.1
Other Argyll 2.1 2.6 1.4 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.3
Total Argyll 4.5 5.0 4.4 8.2 8.6 9.5 10.4
Gateway 6.3 7.2 10.7 11.0 10.8 10.4 8.2
Fine Fare 3.7 3.5 N/C N/C N/C N/C N/C
Waitrose 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5
Kwik Save 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.2 4.7 5.3 6.1
Total 63.6 65.9 66.1 67.8 69.4 70.4 72.8
Source: AGB (1996) Note: * = Independent until 1987
Between 1980 and 1995, most of the leading players attempted to make significant 
changes in their market positioning. The established UK discount operators of the 
1970s, Tesco and ASDA, tried to change their strategic position and adopted a 
programme of store upgrading and broadening of ranges, thus emulating the up-market 
grocery multiples. With the acquisition of Safeway by Argyll, and the successive
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conversion of Presto outlets into Safeway, came the rapid development of a further 
strong identity at the upper end of the market. Sainsbury also expanded the geographic 
scope of its operations. After the price competition of the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
retailers developed the concept of ‘value for money’, while the prices of the goods 
stayed the same, new services were offered to customers in the form of long trading 
hours, payment with credit and debit cards, crèches for children, cafeterias, post-offices, 
chemists and petrol stations. Customers therefore had the impression of receiving more 
for the same price.
A homogeneous offering among the key players resulted, typified by the formula of 
national coverage, quality product ranges, quality images, service and out-of-town 
superstore locations. This is exemplified by the Which report in 19921 (Table 7.13)
Table 7.13 Which Report on Consumer Perception of Retailers’ Position
Low price Quality o f Fresh Food Quality of Products Best Range of Goods
Chain % Chain % Chain % Chain %
Kwik Save 96 
Tesco 45
Marks & Spencer 86 
Waitrose 72
Marks & Spencer 91 
Waitrose 75
Sainsbury 68 
Tesco 66
Gateway 38 
ASDA 31 
Sainsbury 30 
Safeway 20
Sainsbury 64 
Safeway 59 
Tesco 49 
ASDA 48
Sainsbury 67 
Tesco 52 
Safeway 51 
ASDA 45
ASDA 65 
Safeway 60
Marks & Spencer 57 
Waitrose 54 
Gateway 27 
Kwik Save 21
Waitrose 8 
Marks & Spencer 6
Gateway 29 
Kwik Save 15
Gateway 31 
Kwik Save 23
Note: Emphasis added on the companies examined in the next chapters;
Source: Which (1992).
The report indicates that the differences between retailers had significantly reduced in 
the 1980s. This was an opinion shared by analysts, as indicated by the following 
comment made in Retail Business (Economist Intelligence Unit 1990: 50): "While there
1 1,800 shoppers were asked to compare supermarket chains on a number of different factors. Price was 
the most important factor (33%), followed by range of products (30%) and quality (15%).
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are still differences between the chains these are much less apparent than ten years ago 
and the consumer would probably perceive the difference between a new style Sainsbury 
superstore and an old style Sainsbury supermarket as being greater than the difference 
between a Sainsbury superstore and a Safeway one”.
Because of the move upmarket by many retailers, discounters such as Kwik Save, which 
competes on price rather than range or service, had been left significant space to develop 
at the low end of the market. This move upmarket also created the conditions for the 
entry and development of a number of European discounters in the early 1990s.
The Entry and Development of Discounters
The period between 1982 and 1989 was a prosperous period for UK, but in 1990 the 
economy started to slow down and went into recession in 1991. This was to become the 
UK’s worst recession in the post-war period and was to last for much longer than 
expected. The economy came out of the recession in 1994. Food retailing had 
traditionally been a “recession proof’ sector. As recession hit the economy, prices of 
property, after booming in the second half of the 1980s, quickly went down. However, 
this was not the case for sites suitable for superstore developments, which remained 
high because of competition among large supermarket operators to acquire prime sites. 
Concern was expressed over the increasing price paid for new sites. In May 1992, WM 
Morrison announced a significant change to its accounting policies by depreciating its 
land assets. This came as their management recognised that the alternative use value of 
its sites might be much less than for purposes not related to food retailing: “In a high 
inflation environment this policy was considered appropriate as inflation offset any
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diminution in the underlying value of the asset. We have now moved to a low inflation 
environment with many of the more recently acquired assets staring at uncomfortably 
high valuations” (Shiret, food retailing analyst at Credit Lyonnais Laing, on The 
Financial Times, 22/10/92: 19).
In the meantime, the trend towards edge-of-town sites had left retail space in many city 
centres. Locations previously occupied by large retailers had been taken by traditional 
city centres operators such as Kwik Save and Iceland. The former had consolidated its 
position as a national discount operator with 750 stores by 1991, the latter as a city 
centre frozen food specialist. However, in the early 1990s, a number of ‘hard and soft’ 
discounters, such as Aldi, Netto, and Ed made their entry in the UK grocery retailing 
market.
The concept of hard discounting was unknown in the UK. Hard discounters were 
characterised by very low prices and a narrow number of lines. Prices on some lines 
were up to 50% cheaper than supermarket operators. Initially, their entry was not seen as 
posing a threat to large retailers operating at the higher end of the market. The argument 
was that they were targeting a different market segment and operators such as Safeway, 
Sainsbury and Tesco, which targeted customers towards the higher end of the market, 
would not have been affected. Nevertheless, the situation evolved in a different way.
In Winter 1991, ASDA changed its price position in the market. The company had 
previously attempted to position itself at the upper end of the market, alongside 
Sainsbury, Tesco and Safeway. However, its attempts failed and the new management 
decided to return to its roots as an edge-of-town discount chain. In May 1992, Kwik
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Save announced that it was reducing prices in response to competition from hard 
discounters. In January 1993, a report published by Verdict, the retail consultant, stated 
that discounters had been quickly consolidating their presence within the market. In May 
1993, Gateway launched a cut price “Price Check” campaign. In Autumn 1993, Tesco, 
Sainsbury and Safeway launched a cut-price own label, covering 70 products, which 
was to replace tertiary brands. The management of these companies admitted, for the 
first time, the growing threat posed by discount operators. They also acknowledged that 
they had not reacted promptly to the recession and had not recognised the changing 
priorities of its customers.
The introduction of tertiary brands effectively neutralised the potential effect of the 
discounters. Shoprite, which within a few years had become a significant discounter, 
was taken over by Kwik Save. Argyll divested of its Lo-Cost business. However, the 
other discounters, the German ‘Aldi’ and ‘Lidl’ and the Danish ‘Netto’, were slowly but 
steadily expanding. These privately owned companies took into account that their early 
developments in the UK GRI would have been difficult, and they forecasted that they 
might have been making a loss in their first years.
The development of discount chains initially scared large multiples. Companies were 
unable to understand if the losses in sales were due to the effect of discounters or to 
saturation in the industry. There was also a scare that warehouse clubs would have taken 
a significant share of the market. Warehouse Clubs are based on a membership -  cdge- 
of-town - storehouse trading formula. They trade on strongly discounted prices (20-30% 
cheaper). They stock around 3,500 lines (compared to 20,000 in a Tesco store) of food 
and non-food, but food is available only in bulk packs and continuity of stock is not
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guaranteed. They offer limited facilities. In the USA, they have been the fastest growing 
retail type with membership of over 21 million people.
In 1993 Costco, the US warehouse club operator, got the go ahead for the opening of the 
UK’s first such warehouse. The opening was delayed after Tesco, Sainsbury and 
Safeway had appealed on the ground that the venture should have been assessed as a 
retail outlet rather than as a wholesaler. The appeal was overruled on the condition that 
warehouse clubs could only have a percentage of their sales going to the final consumer 
market (25%). CostCo is nowadays the only UK operator, after Nurdin and Peacock, the 
cash and carry operator, sold its outlets to Sainsbury in 1995.
Because of the development of discounters and warehouse clubs, many companies 
initially reduced their expansion programmes and set up strategies aiming at increasing 
their sales. If retailers in the 1980s had directed their efforts to the acquisition and 
development of new stores, in the early 1990s, they mainly tried to increase their sales. 
In pursuing this strategy, companies again tried to change their market position. ASDA 
went back to its price conscious image. Tesco, having managed to develop a quality 
image among consumers, tried to develop a more popular price strategy while 
maintaining its quality image. Safeway aimed at the middle class families.
After the initial scare of saturation, retailers soon understood that this was a one-off 
price-reposition in the industry and resumed their expansion strategies. Some companies 
maintained their focus on superstore development, others on city centre stores.
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Table 7.14 Market Share of Main Companies in the Grocery Retailing Industry 
between 1990 and 1994
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Sainsbury 19.6 20.0 20.5 20.5 20.6
Tesco 16.6 17.0 17.4 17.9 19.1
ASDA 10.4 10.9 10.7 10.7 10.7
Safeway 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.9 9.0
Presto 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7
Other Argyll 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1
Total Argyll 10.4 10.3 10.2 10.7 10.8
Gateway 8.2 6.7 6.3 6.8 6.9
Kwik Save 6.1 7.2 8.7 9.2 9.2
W aitrose 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2
Total 72.8 73.5 75.2 77.1 78.5
Source: AGB (1996)
The development of discount operators, convenience stores and other chains that had 
taken the retail space left by operators moving to the edge-of-town, had demonstrated 
that it was possible to operate successfully in city centres. At the annual convention of 
the Institute of Grocery Distribution in October 1994, David Sainsbury suggested that 
the big groups had been mesmerised by the efficiency and popularity of edge-of-town 
supermarkets, and forgot that there would always be some business located in town 
centres. “The market did, however, work extremely effectively and a number of chains, 
including the discounters, moved in to fill the gap” (The Financial Times, 19/10/94: 8).
Table 7.15 The Development of Discounters in the UK Grocery Retailing Industry
Company
Aldi It started to operate in 1990. Since then, sales have risen to £ 547.7m in 1996. In 
1995, it operated 152 stores.
Lidi It started trading in 1994 with 17 stores. Since the sales have increased from £80m 
to £ 250m in 1996.
Netto It started trading in 1990 with 10 stores. Since then sales have increased from 
£14.6m to £375m in 1996. In 1995, it operated 111 stores.
Source Various Documents
Initially prices were effectively cheaper for edge-of-town stores but increasing 
competition for scarce resources pushed up prices. When ASDA developed the concept
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of out-of-town superstores in the UK, it was the only operator and the price of land was 
effectively cheaper for out-of-town sites than city centres ones, which positively affected 
profitability. However, as in the 1980s many large multiples focused on edge-of-town 
superstores, companies were competing for best sites and bidding up on prices. At the 
same time, prices for city centre sites went down as a result of the migration of many 
retailers to out of town sites, as a result the advantage initially offered by out of town 
sites compared to city centre significantly decreased.
Furthermore, in 1993, the Secretary of the Department of the Environment issued a 
guideline that planners should give priority to town development over other sites. 
Developers would have had to work harder to get planing permission for out-of-town 
stores if a more central site were available. However, companies are still opening edge- 
of-town superstores. Companies interested in developing superstores often help funding 
community projects as a condition of getting planning consent (e.g., building new roads, 
new bus routes, swimming pool and even football stadiums). These are called ‘planning 
gains’ and are entirely legal (Buckley in The Financial Times, 1995).
At the industry level, the price repositioning of many retailers and the strategies for 
increasing sales has resulted in further increases in concentration in the UK GRI. 
Smaller chains have been taken over or decided to divest of their interests in food 
retailing. In 1992, WM Jackson disposed of its supermarket business to Argyll and 
Kwik Save to concentrate on its convenience business. In 1994, WM Low was taken 
over by Tesco. In 1995, Merchant Retail Group divested of its superstore business by 
selling its superstores to various companies.
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7.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, the history of the UK GRI over the past years has been characterised by 
the increasing importance of a limited number of multiples. What emerges from the 
analysis is also the importance of assessing changes in their complexity, i.e., to look at 
changes in firms’ strategies, industry structure, consumers market as well as in the 
relationships between these entities.
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Chapter 8 Argyll Group PLC
8.0 Introduction
The origins of Argyll go back to 1977 when James Gulliver with the collaboration of 
Alistair Grant and David Webster founded James Gulliver Associates (JGA), a holding 
company specialised in taking management control of companies by acquiring minority 
share. Before launching this venture, James Gulliver had been, between 1961 and 1965, 
with Urwick Orr, the management consulting firm; in 1965, he had joined, as managing 
director. Fine Fare (the grocery retailing part of ABF), where he became chairman in 
1967. Gulliver was seen as being one of the most important factors in Fine Fare's 
success in those years. Alistair Grant joined Fine Fare in 1968 as director of business 
development after having had various marketing posts at Unilever, J. Lyons, and 
Connell May & Steavenson.
Grant and Gulliver left Fine Fare in 1972. In the same year, Gulliver, Grant and David 
Webster, an investment banker, acquired management control of Oriel Foods, where 
Gulliver had previously bought a significant minority share. A year later, Oriel was 
bought by RCA Inc. However, the three men stayed there until 1977 when they left to 
form JGA. Here, the first acquisition was a home improvements company. Later they 
began building their own food group by purchasing two foods companies Morgan 
Edwards and Louis Edwards, a Manchester meat business. At the same time, JGA took 
management control of Amalgamated Distilled Products (ADP), engaged in the 
marketing, distribution, and production of liquor products. The two food companies
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were integrated to form Argyll, which remained under the management control of JGA 
and soon became the take-over vehicle. The other two businesses were also under the 
direct control of JGA. The home improvement business was later divested, leaving only 
Argyll and ADP under direct management control of JGA.
8.1 1980-1985: Argyll under James Gulliver’s Chairmanship
In 1980, Argyll was mainly a small manufacturing company involved in retailing. The 
declared programme was the development of a broadly based food group, both through 
organic growth and, where appropriate, acquisitions (Annual Report, 1981).
In the early 1980s, Argyll’s strategy was to expand in the GRI. Between February 1981 
and August 1984, Argyll acquired Oriel Foods, 67 Pricerite outlets, the much larger 
Allied Suppliers' from Generale Occidentale, 26 retail outlets from George Mellis and 
Son, 5 Mainstop superstores from BAT, 2 stores from WBG, and it finally took over 
Amos Hinton. Furthermore, it also attempted to take over Linfood (Gateway's name at 
the time). At the end of this acquisition programme (1984/85), Argyll was the sixth 
largest UK grocery retailer (after Sainsbury, Tesco, Coops, Gateway and ASDA). Most 
of the companies that it acquired were stagnant businesses with fragmented consumer 
franchises and a poor infrastructure. Initially, the policy was to maintain all the retailing 
fascias although a profit-enhancing programme was implemented as these companies 
were acquired.
' Allied Suppliers had estimated sales of £847m and operated 918 stores (1981 data).
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Table 8.1 Argyll’s Acquisitions: 1981 - 1984
Year Acquisition Cost (£ m)
1981 Oriel Foods 19.5
Patterson 0.9
1982 Pricerite 3.4
Allied Supplies 101.0
1983 5 Mainstop Superstores 3.0
26 George Mellis Stores N/A
1984 6 Key Market Stores, and 2 development sites 9.0
2 Stores from WGB N/A
Amos Hinton 25.3
Source Various Documents
At the end of 1985, Argyll’s management announced, together with a three year 
expansion programme, the decision to concentrate on two fascias: Presto and Lo-Cost. 
Presto was set as the principal retail fascia. In the long term. Presto was supposed to 
compete for quality with the major industry players. Lo-Cost was set as an alternative to 
Presto, and it was to compete alongside Gateway and Kwik Save in the discount end of 
the market. The decision came as the company decided to make the most effective use 
of smaller stores with a more limited range concept, lower store investments and lower 
wages costs.
However, Argyll had not only been developing in the food retailing industry. In August 
1983, Argyll merged with ADP. James Gulliver, chairman at the time, said that the 
future would have witnessed intensifying competition among the big food retailers. 
When the expansion programme came to an end, companies would then have had to 
seek means of diversification. From this perspective, the Argyll/ADP merger was a 'far 
sighted union
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G r a p h  8 .1  A r g y l l  G r o u p :  S a l e s  1 9 8 1  - 1 9 8 7
19KVB1 1861/82 1962/83 1963/84 1964/85 1965/86 1966/87
Source: Based on Dala from Argyll Group Annual Reports
8.2 December 1985-January 1987 The Failed Bid for
Distillers and the Departure of James Gulliver
The merger with ADP was the basis for the bid by Argyll in December 1985 for 
Distillers (which had 79 brands of Scotch Whisky). However, it lost to Guinness in 
April 1986 “We had Distillers in view for three years One of the reasons we have a 
drinks division is that that was going to be a springboard into Distillers, the same way 
early Argyll business was the springboard into Allied Suppliers” (Grant, in Financial 
Weekly, 11/12/86: 12-13).
The failure to acquire Distillers was a turnaround in the company’s activities and its 
long-term strategy Distillers was an international player that had lost market share over 
the years, but it was a cash-generating business that owned premium brands. At the time
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the bid was made, the only “stars” in Argyll’s portfolio were the retail side led by Presto 
and the drinks business with ADP. However, Argyll’s drink division was too small, this 
being why Argyll wanted to acquire Distillers.
However, a few months after the failed bid for Distillers, Safeway US announced the 
sale of Safeway UK. Argyll showed immediate interest in buying the company, and as 
no one else was in the position to take it over, Argyll acquired Safeway UK in January 
1987.
In the meantime (December 1986), James Gulliver stepped down as chief executive of 
Argyll but maintained his chair. Alistair Grant, previously managing director of the food 
retailing division, became the new chief executive. Gulliver also announced that he was 
going to leave the company within one year. His personal ambitions were to develop a 
major force in UK grocery retailing, but more than anything, to direct a major 
international consumer-products business. His ambition had been thwarted when 
Distillers was acquired by Guinness. It is said that Gulliver had always maintained a 
proprietorial attitude when he was chairman of Argyll, that he saw Argyll as his 
company and that much of the strategy of Argyll during the early 1980s was the result 
of his view on what the company had to do on the market. When Gulliver left in June 
1988, Grant became the new chairman and chief executive of the company.
The acquisition of Safeway transformed Argyll’s profile. Argyll’s market share had 
been static over the previous two years as the company concentrated on improving 
profits and consolidating its retailing activities under the Presto and Lo-Cost fascia. In a 
time of much expansion by the major retailers, Safeway was the last major opportunity
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to catch up with the market leaders. Argyll, after the failure of the Distillers bid, needed 
a quality business.
Table 8.2 Argyll Group: Financial and Operational Statistics 1986/87
Note * Also comprising food manufacturing, wholesaling, frozen food retailing, off-licence chain. 
Source Various Documents
In February 1987, one month after the acquisition of Safeway, Argyll pulled out of its 
drinks business. The decision was taken as the company recognised that it could not 
become a heavyweight contender in the international arena. It was a middleweight 
player; it would have floundered and continued to be squeezed between the low cost 
competition and the well-established more expensive brands. Another acquisition was 
out of the question since there had been further consolidation in the industry with Allied 
Lyons’ purchase of Hiram Walker and Elder IXL’s purchase of Courage.
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By March 1988, the company was also operating 54 Galbraith Convenience stores in 
Scotland; Snowking, a frozen food distributor; Mojo, a cash and carry; Winterschladen, 
an off licence chain; and Vinters.
8.3 1987-1991: Safeway’s Conversion Phase
As Argyll acquired control of Safeway, the decision was taken to operate in the market 
through three fascias: Safeway, Presto and Lo-Cost. Initially, 160 of the largest Presto 
outlets were to be converted into Safeway stores. At the same time, Argyll planned to 
improve and refine the Lo-Cost business. The management decided to convert Presto’s 
stores to the Safeway’s format, because Safeway stores performed better than Presto 
stores, both in terms of sales pier square foot and profitability (Table 8.3).
Table 8.3 Presto and Safeway Stores at the Time of Argyll’s Takeover
Presto Safeway
Annual Turnover (£) 5,500,000 8,000,000
Weekly Sales per square foot (£) 6.50 10.10
Annual Contribution to Profitability (£) 290,000 510,000
Source Argyl 1 Group ( 1991 )
After one year, the conversion programme was enlarged as the first conversions 
achieved excellent results. It was then decided that the company would concentrate on 
two fascias, Safeway and Lo-Cost. The Lo-Cost chain had given very good results in 
1987/88 and 1988/89. Within a few years, the Presto outlets were to be converted into
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Safeway’s or Lo-Cost2. Lo-Cost aimed to become a national chain competing with 
Kwik Save. However, one year later, in March 1990, Argyll decided to retain Presto as 
a third fascia operating in the middle segment of the market with circa 190 outlets in 
Scotland and the north-east. The reason was that the stores were too small to fit the 
Safeway format and too big to become Lo-Cost. Argyll initially expected that the 
remaining Presto stores would go into gentle decline, but the fascia held-up very well. 
The management recognised that it had underestimated the strength of the Presto name, 
especially in depressed areas where Presto was more in line with consumers’ spending 
power than the more expensive Safeway. A programme was launched to revamp Presto. 
The stores would have emphasised general grocery rather than fresh produce.
By November 1990, Argyll completed the conversion programme. Over the following 
years, Argyll planned to focus on organic growth for the Safeway chain. It also planned 
to develop the Presto and Lo-Cost fascia. In the previous years. Presto and Lo-Cost had 
taken the back seat to Safeway development plans. However, the company’s plan was to 
push these brands, as the exceptional returns achieved from the big edge-of-town 
Safeway superstores were expected to begin to tail-off. In May 1991, few months after 
Tesco and Sainsbury, Argyll made a share issue of £387milIion. In the same month, the 
company disposed of the Winterschladen chain of 45 off-licences and North-West 
Vinters (Liquorsave). All its manufacturing interests, which had become less and less 
important over time, had been disposed of by March 1988. At the end of 1989, the 
company had also announced its withdrawal from the freezer centres sector and 
converted all the existing Cordon Blue stores to the Lo-Cost fascia. The plan, at the end
: "The trick in food retailing is to aim at the broad mass market, but also to focus on the higher end" 
(Grant, in Financial Weekly, 10/90,07/01/88: 40). Argyll's management thought that the Presto name and 
concept, which offered a narrower product range and only a modest involvement in fresh food, would 
have disappeared into the upmarket Safeway supermarket which emphasises high margin fresh foods.
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of 1990/91, was to spend £1.5 billion in the coming three years in organic expansion of 
the three fascias.
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In September 1989, Argyll, Casino, and Ahold formed the European Retail Alliance 
(ERA). Its purpose was to formulate and implement plans to exploit opportunities in 
marketing, distribution, purchasing, production, and management information systems 
(MIS). The three companies exchanged shares. A merger between the members of ERA, 
which was initially an option, was later rejected, as a full merger would have created a 
company that was too large to manage. A joint buying company was formed in 
September 1989 together with other European groups (Dansk Supermarkets of 
Denmark; La Rinascente of Italy; ICA of Sweden; Migros of Switzerland; Mercadone 
of Spain. Over the following years, other companies joined the buying group: Allkauf of 
Germany; Hagan of Norway; and Kensko of Finland).
own label products, chilled produce and prepared dishes.
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Having disposed of its food manufacturing and drinks business, Argyll set its sight 
firmly on developing as a food retailer, eschewing all temptations to diversify. “The 
strategy now for Argyll is to be somewhat international by 1995 and to be quite 
international by the end of the decade. It’s clearly difficult for us to be anything other 
than the third player in the UK food market. Tesco and Sainsbury are excellent 
businesses. I am looking at doing up to 3 major deals in the next 10 years. We know 40- 
50 things we are interested in and there will be 1 or 2 that become available... We are 
still open to the idea that we might be involved in non-food retailing in the UK. We 
would not look at anything that is not quality business. We would not look at fashion, 
nor anything that did not have scale and contributed strongly to our profits... In Europe 
we may through joint venture or merger, get into food retailing. We would also consider 
North America, but we are in no rush. We feel happy about our organic development for 
the next 3 years” (Grant, Argyll’s Chairman, The Times, 22/09/90).
8.4 1991 -  1995: The Turbulent Years of the GRI
In March 1993, Argyll split its retailing operations into two divisions, a Safeway 
division headed by Pat Kieran, and a Presto/Lo-Cost division headed by Charles Lawrie. 
"Presto and Lo-Cost are important businesses with clearly defined objectives. The 
creation of the new division, directed by a board which will have as its objective the 
expansion of these activities through organic development of new stores and the 
provision of the resources necessary continually to improve their operations, is a timely
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move” (JP Kinch, Argyll’s Group Company Secretary, from Regulatory News Service, 
03/03/93).
The group planned to accelerate the expansion programme. Argyll’s plan was to open 
25 Safeway stores a year until 1996/97 (four years) and to open 15 Lo-Cost and 4 Presto 
in 1993/94 (Annual Report 1993). However, nine months later, in December 1993, 
Argyll announced a revision of its expansion programme and other decisions that 
signalled a significant change in the group strategic direction. In order to fully 
understand how and why the group strategic direction changed, it is necessary to sum up 
a number of important events that had taken place in previous years.
In 1992, concern had been expressed over the increasing price paid for new sites. Argyll 
had in the past trumpeted its advantage as developer of cheap retail space. The average 
cost of new space for Safeway was being inflated by the development of a few 
expensive stores in prime locations. Argyll argued it was protecting positions of market 
leadership. The risk was that the company would have been drawn into an expensive - 
and ultimately fruitless - attempt to keep Sainsbury and Tesco off what it regarded as 
home turf. In May 1992, WM Morrison announced that it would start to depreciate its 
land assets. This came as Morrison’s management recognised that the value of its sites 
might be much less when used for purposes not related to food retailing. “In a high 
inflation environment this policy was considered appropriate as inflation offset any 
diminuition in the underlying value of the asset. We have now moved to a low inflation 
environment with many of the more recently acquired assets staring at uncomfortably 
high valuations” (Shiret in The Financial Times 22/05/92: 19). According to Shiret, 
food retailing analyst at Credit Lyonnais Laing, the effect of adopting ‘prudent’
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depreciation would have depressed Tesco’s earnings per share in the year to spring 1993 
by 21%, Sainsbury by 15%, and Argyll by 11%. Nevertheless, the latest of Safeway’s 
flagships opened in 1992 and produced a healthy return on capital. Argyll still preferred, 
where possible, to concentrate on cheaper space. Sales growth at Safeway was keeping 
up with the best of the competition. By increasing its investment at the discount end of 
the market through Presto and Lo-Cost, Argyll was spreading its risk.
In 1991, UK was hit by recession. This was to be the worst recession that the UK 
experienced in the post-war period and lasted for much longer than expected. The UK 
only came out of recession in 1994. Food retailing had traditionally been a recession- 
proof sector and none of the major retailers was preoccupied with the impact of 
recession on their own business. However, the recession and the expansion of hard and 
soft discounters had to have a strong impact on the future strategies of large operators. 
In the early 1990s, a number of hard and soft discounters (including Aldi, Netto, Ed) 
made their entry in the UK. Until then, the concept of hard discounting was unknown in 
the UK. On some lines, prices were initially up to 50% cheaper than they were in 
supermarket operators. As their presence spread in the UK, other traditionally 
established retailers were to reposition on prices as they started to lose customers.
Change in Strategic Direction
At the beginning of 1993, overseas acquisitions at Argyll were not precluded but they 
were unlikely to be in food retailing. Argyll was more than seven percentage market 
share points behind Sainsbury and Tesco. Grant believed it was possible to narrow the 
gap. Safeway covered 40% of the population compared to 60% for Sainsbury. At the
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same time, analysts affirmed that there were only a certain number of stores that could 
have been built before they would have started to cannibalise each other’s sales and 
Argyll was planning to increase space annually by the same proportion as the best of the 
competition. Compared to the largest Tesco and Sainsbury, Argyll was in a weaker 
position for own-label products, which accounted for a lower proportion of sales. 
Safeway was reputed in the industry for its customer services and the quality of its 
product range but it needed to improve customers’ perception that it offered good value 
for money. In January 1993, market research by Verdict Research declared that Safeway 
was the dearest of the grocery retailers. In May 1992, Grant had said “we cannot be the 
cheapest and provide the quality we do” (Supermarketing, 01/05/92: 18). In July 1983, 
analysts downgraded Argyll’s forecasted profits. In July 1993, Archie Norman, chief 
executive of ASDA, stated that the ‘halcyon days’ for the UK food retailing were over, 
with a decline in growth and the industry facing increasing overcapacity. In August 
1993, Tesco launched a cut-price own label, covering 70 products. This was to replace 
‘tertiary brands’ and was four to five per cent cheaper than those of Sainsbury and 
Safeway. Sainsbury followed in November 1993. According to analysts, Tesco was 
trying to regain some of the ground it had lost to discounters and chains such as 
Gateway that had launched a promotion called Price Check in May 1993, when it 
reduced its prices as part of a recovery programme. However, in so doing, Tesco was 
taking away customers from Sainsbury and Safeway, and they had to respond by 
decreasing prices.
In December 1993, Argyll announced a three-point plan as a response to the difficult 
trading climate. Firstly, an ‘everyday low pricing’ campaign was launched at Safeway, 
lowering prices on 200 basic products. Secondly, the group cut its planned capital
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spending Thirdly, it announced that it was going to write down the value of its 
properties This was accompanied by the split of the role of the chairperson from that of 
the chief executive. Colin Smith, previously the finance director, became Argyll’s new 
chief executive while Grant stayed as executive chairman. In February 1994, Argyll 
gave a profit warning, declaring that the year profits were going to be slightly below the 
previous year due to a fall in gross margins and like-for-like sales.
G r a p h  S .3  A r g y l l  G r o u p :  O p e r a t i n g  P r o f i t *  1 9 8 8  - 1 9 9 5
1987/86 1 986.89 1989/90 1 99091 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95
Source Based on Data from Datastream (it excludes exceptional charges)
In the year ending March 1994, for the first time, profits were lower than for the 
previous year. This was mainly due to the Presto and Lo-Cost chains, whose profits 
were down by 20%. Capital expenditure was reduced to £541 million from the planned 
£650 million. Capital expenditure was also set at, less than £500 million for 1995, £450 
million for 1996, and £400 million for 1997. The main purpose for reducing capital 
expenditure was to bring spending more into line with net cash flows.
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G r a p h  8 .4  A r g y l l  G r o u p :  C a p i t a l  E x p e n d i t u r e  1 9 8 7  - 1 9 9 5
Source Based on Data from Argyll Group Annual Reports
The appointment of Smith to Group Chief Executive can be seen retrospectively as the 
entry of the company into the third phase of its management history, as well as the main 
factor behind the changes in the group's strategy. In January 1994, following the 
appointment of Smith to chief executive, Tony Frendo, managing director of Finance 
and Administration, resigned after 10 years with Argyll He had hoped to be the new 
group chief executive. In October 1994, Simon Laffin, previously group financial 
controller assumed the duties of the finance director, although he did not take the title. 
In June 1995, George Charters joined the group as managing director for marketing and 
trading He was previously director of Merchandise and Marketing at Boots The 
Chemist Charters replaced Logan Taylor, a 17-year veteran of Safeway. Pat Kieran, 
chief executive of Safeway, retired at the end of 1995. All of these changes marked “a 
generation change”, with many of the senior Safeway executives, who pre-dated the 
take-over, departing or retiring.
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At the beginning of 1994, the group disposed of the Snowicing frozen food distribution 
and the Mojo cash-and-carry operations. A review of the Lo-Cost business was 
announced, as the chain had to cut prices to strengthen its position in the discount 
market. Consultants were appointed to review all operations in the Safeway chain. The 
aim was to conduct an exhaustive review of the business, for significantly improving 
Safeway’s marketing effectiveness and operating efficiency. The results of this review 
were announced in November 1994.
Between August and October 1994, the group divested its Lo-Cost discount chain and 
sold 28 smaller Presto outlets. The strategy for Presto was to concentrate its operations 
upon quality stores servicing well-defined smaller urban locations in Scotland and 
Northern England. In 1995, more of Presto’s smaller stores were closed. In May 1995, 
the closure of 20 smaller Safeway stores was also announced. By June 1995, Argyll 
operated 106 Presto stores with an average sales area of 7,600 square feet (compared 
with 205 stores as at April 1994 with an average sales area of 5,500 square feet, and 378 
Safeway stores with an average area of 21,900 square feet.
The review of the Safeway business in 1994 led to a programme called Safeway 2000. 
The traditional image of Safeway in the market had been one of a store for ‘topping-up’ 
the weekly shopping. Prices had generally been higher than in other chains. Safeway 
had been particularly successful in attracting ‘singles’. Following the review, the 
management's objective was to make Safeway more attractive to family shoppers. 
Safeway 2000 aimed to consolidate Safeway’s competitive position in the market. This 
programme was pursued in 1994 and 1995 and it continued in 1996. The company was 
trying to achieve this through changes in the ranges of products and services offered, 
accompanied by a more aggressive pricing policy and by more effective marketing. 
Changes in the management processes and its systems were introduced to support the
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group’s new strategy. This led to 4,800 redundancies in management at the store level. 
In October 1995, Safeway launched a national loyalty card.
Table 8.4 Argyll Group: Financial and Operational Statistics 1994/95
Groim Sales (£; 000; after taxes) ___________ 5.8 14.6(H)
Pre-tax Profit (£; 000) 375,300
Contribution of Safeway to Group's Sales* 85.7%
Contribution of Safeway to Group’s 
Operating Profits*
91.3%
Number of Outlets Safeway 378 
Presto 169
Total Sales Area (sq. ft.) Safeway 8,278,000 
Presto 1,038,000
Average Sales Area per Outlet (sq. ft.) 21,900 Safeway 
6,100 Presto
Market Position Safeway (high) 
Presto (medium)
Market Share (1994) Safeway 9.0% 
Presto 0.7%
Own Label Share of Sales ( 1994) Safeway: 51.5%
Information Technology developed
Centralised Distribution developed
Source Various Documents
8.5 Argyll and Grocery Retailing at the end of 1995
The readjustment in prices by the largest operators neutralised the discounters’ threat. In 
1993/94, sales at Safeway's existing stores were 0.7% higher than in the previous year, 
including 0.5% inflation. However, results for the six months to October 1995 showed 
like-for-like sales up by 7.8% including 3.1% inflation, and a 4.7% volume increase. 
This was less than Tesco’s 6% volume increase but well ahead of 2.2% decline at
Chapter 8 -  Argyll Group PLC - page 190
Sainsbury. Nevertheless, in November 1995, Argyll warned that price competition was 
not over, especially on fresh foods.
By the time this case study was written in December 1995, the repositioning process 
had not concluded and we felt that was not going to be over until the largest operators 
had successfully completed their respective repositioning processes. ASDA had solved 
its identity crisis, and Tesco and Argyll had successfully overcome the problems 
brought by the discounters and by the recession. Sainsbury had not.
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Chapter 9 ASDA Group PLC
9.0 Introduction
The origins of ASDA go back to the period that followed the end of the First World 
War. In 1920, J. W. Hindell, together with a group of farmers, formed a business 
partnership. The purpose of the partnership was to develop a wholesaling and retailing 
structure that, by controlling the distribution, would secure a market for the farmers’ 
milk and dairy products.
Over the following two decades, the partnership consolidated its activities through 
internal expansion and acquisitions. When, in 1949, the partnership became a public 
company, under the name of ‘Associated Dairies and Farm Stores Ltd’, it included 26 
farms, three dairies, two bakeries, 42 retail shops and pork butchering facilities. In the 
following 20 years, the company successfully continued to expand its operations in the 
food business, mainly in the Yorkshire and Midlands area.
In 1965, Associated Dairies had sales of £13.5 million and was highly profitable. In that 
year, the group entered the superstore business by acquiring a local food retailer and 
setting up a new business unit: ASDA Stores. Two large warehouse-like shops with big 
car parks were used to offer customers cut-price groceries, with limited fresh food and 
cheap non-food items. Although spartan in look and providing a limited range of goods, 
superstores offered significantly lower prices and appealed to the working class that 
constituted the greater part of the population where the superstores were located. The 
formula was an immediate success. Over the following years, supported by excellent
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results, operations were slowly but steadily expanded through the building of a network 
of superstores and large supermarkets in the north of England and Scotland.
By 1980, the group had significantly changed the balance of its business activities. The 
company was still involved in manufacturing milk and dairy products and in the 
processing and marketing of meat, but the importance of the original business had 
declined. From a group mainly involved in food manufacturing with some interests in 
retailing, it became a successful food retailer with some interests in food manufacturing 
and furniture retailing. The latter resulted from the acquisition, in 1978, of Wades 
Department Stores (a furniture and carpet retailer) and Allied Retailers [operating Allied 
Carpets (a chain of carpet retailers), Williams (a furniture retailer) and UKAY (a home 
furnishing super centres specialist)]. The group had a turnover of £999 million and a 
pre-tax profit of £49 million, with the superstore business contributing to more than 
80% of group turnover and of its profits. ASDA Stores had a market share in the packed 
grocery market of 8.4% and was the third largest retailer in the industry behind Tesco 
and Sainsbury. However, it had the highest profitability. The company operated 75 
superstores with an average sales area of 33,350 square feet. Located in edge-of-town 
sites, ASDA’s stores had large parking facilities and 35 of its stores had petrol stations. 
Inside, stores had wide aisles and stock was made of branded grocery products. 
However, a wide range of non-foods products (clothing) was also available. Fresh food, 
fruit and vegetables and in-store bakeries were introduced in new superstores.
The success of the superstore business was due to many reasons. Although in the 1970s 
other companies had tested the superstore format, ASDA was the only company in the 
sector that operated edge-of-town superstores on a large scale. In an economy where
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most retailers operated in city centres, the capital cost of an out-of-city building was 
significantly cheaper than that for the city centre. This, combined with the existence of 
clear economies of scale at the store level, gave ASDA a strong position as one of the 
most profitable large operators in the industry. Furthermore, ASDA’s retail formula was 
particularly appealing to the consumers of the 1970s, who had benefited from the 
proliferation of the automobile (that gave them more flexibility in their shopping) yet 
whose finances had been badly hit by two economic recessions and by high inflation.
Table 9.1 The Associated Dairies Group: Financial and Operational Statistics 
1980/81
Group Sales (£; 000; after taxes) 1,188,000
Pre-tax Profit (£; 000) 51,389
Contribution of ASDA Stores to Total 
Group's Sales*
> 80.0%
Number of Outlets 78
Total Sales Area (sq. ft.) 2,604,000
Average Sales Area per Outlet (sq. ft.) 33,385
Market Position _____ discount
Market Share 8.4%
Own Label Share of Sales (1981) 7.0%
Information Technology Little
Centralised Distribution Z ° 
1
Source Various Documents
In the late 1970s, notwithstanding strong price competition in the industry, ASDA was 
regularly shown by market research studies as the company among the major multiple 
food retailers with the lowest prices across the country. Its prices were, on average, ten 
percent lower than other main retailers. This was a remarkable achievement, especially 
when we consider that its operating margins on sales, at around four percent, were 
among the highest in the industry.
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In 1981, Peter Firmston-Williams, Managing Director of ASDA stores, retired. He was 
replaced by John Fletcher (previously of Oriel Foods, with an MBA from Harvard 
Business School). The plan was to continue to open between four and six superstores a 
year and to expand in the south, particularly in the London area and Home Counties, 
where the company did not have any stores.
9.1 1981 - 1984: The Erosion of the Competitive Advantage
At the beginning of the 1980s, most large companies in food retailing were regional 
operators with portfolios of stores mainly located in city centres. Stores were often 
smaller than 10,000 square feet and mainly displayed grocery produce. Economies of 
scale at the store and group levels meant that small chains with a network of small 
stores had a high cost structure. The price campaign of 1978 weakened the competitive 
position of many of these companies. In the early 1980s, a new recession hit the UK and 
price was still an important variable for competitors and shoppers. In 1982, Tesco 
launched a new price campaign-“Checkout 82”. This sparked off a new price war in the 
GRI. ASDA, whose volumes had also been going down, launched a strong advertising 
campaign stressing the competitiveness of its offer. The advertising campaign brought 
the desired results and in following years, ASDA continued to perform successfully.
However, the nature of competition in the GRI was changing. Since the mid-1970s, 
other companies had successfully experimented with edge-of-town superstores.
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Superstores offered a flexible solution to the problem of obtaining planning permission 
for city centre stores that had characterised the industry over the 1970s. Tesco and 
Sainsbury were particularly active in opening new larger units. Since 1978, Tesco had 
been busy in replacing small city centre stores with large edge-of-town outlets. The 
objective was to have a network of 400 large superstores, sized over 40,000 square feet. 
At the same time, Tesco was trying to improve its market position: new stores displayed 
nice outfitting, wide aisles, a large variety of quality food and non-food produce, and 
enabled the company to provide better customer services. Sainsbury had also been 
replacing smaller stores with larger supermarkets since the beginning of the 1970s, and 
in 1979, its management announced its intention to increase its expansion plans to open 
around 15 large supermarkets a year. Whilst replacing city centre stores with larger 
edge-of-town units, the two companies were also slowly expanding the geographical 
scope of operations.
Increasing expansion by some retailers was accompanied by increasing consolidation in 
the industry. Low profits, resulting from price competition and the recession, and a 
changing scenario (requiring high investments and the acquisition of new competencies) 
provided a fertile ground for increasing consolidation. Argyll and Gateway were 
particularly active in buying small regional companies. Within few years, they became 
significant players in the industry. Gateway with its rapid acquisition programme 
became the third largest company in the GRI, it overtook ASDA in terms of market 
share. Changes in the industry structure were accompanied by changes in consumer 
priorities. Among consumers, price was an important variable but quality, product 
ranges and store environment were becoming increasingly important elements for 
consumers choice of where to shop.
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In this evolving environment, little changed at ASDA. The company continued to 
expand its operations by opening stores, mainly in south England. By 1984, ASDA was 
operating 95 superstores, with an average sales area of 33,600 square feet. Although 
fewer stores than competition were opened, the increase in the sales area was keeping 
pace with the competition. At the operating level, ASDA’s focus was mainly on price 
competitiveness. Some of the older stores had been refurbished and new stores had in­
store bakeries, fruit and vegetable departments. At the same time, customer services 
were being improved. However, the superstore business operated in the same 
rudimentary fashion of the mid-1970s. The company had strong buying but very small 
marketing and merchandising functions. Only branded goods were on sale and were 
displayed by the manufacturers sales forces. There was little information technology 
and no centralised distribution system. Changes in the industry and in the consumer 
markets threatened the long-term prospects of ASDA in grocery retailing. The 
expansion by other major retailers in edge-of-town sites meant that the competitive 
advantage given by economies of scale at the store level could soon be lost. Further, the 
expansion by Tesco and Sainsbury in the north and by ASDA in the south was putting 
these companies in direct competition with each other. However, the superstore 
business continued to perform successfully, sales and profits continued to grow, with 
operating margins of the superstore business achieving the record level of 4.96% by 
1984. In May 1984, John Fletcher, managing director of ASDA Stores since 1980, was 
ousted in a boardroom fight. Fletcher had opposed the development of an own-label 
brand for ASDA. The argument was that it was too late, as other retailers had 
successfully done that years before. His strategy to increase profits had been to increase 
gross margins. However, higher margins meant higher prices for customers, who had
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started to shop around for better convenience. John Hardman, finance director of the 
superstore business since 1980, was appointed as new managing director of the 
superstore business.
Other Group’s Activities
At the group level, other businesses did not perform as well as the superstore business. 
Acquisitions of the furniture retailers, at the end of the 1970s, had been made with the 
objective of balancing the portfolio. The management at group level was worried of 
increasing saturation in the GRI. In 1980, the activities and administration of Wades and 
Williams were merged. However, the performance of the non-food businesses was poor. 
In 1981, ten UKAY furniture superstores were sold to Harris Queensway and two were 
closed in 1982, completing the disposal of the business. In January 1985, Wades, the 
department stores business, was sold for £19 million. Allied Carpets also performed 
badly in the early 1980s, but by 1984, profitability was improving.
In April 1984, two small dairy businesses, Hexam Dairy and Lakeland Creamery, were 
acquired at a cost of £ 420,000 to strengthen the fresh food division, which performed 
well but whose importance at the group level had been decreasing over time.
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9.2 1985 - 1987: Strategy Change at the Group and the Business
Level
Strategy Change in the Superstore Business
When John Hardman was appointed managing director of the ASDA Stores in June 
1984, a wide review of the superstore business was launched. The review indicated that 
customers were dissatisfied about the range and choice of products, customer service 
and the shopping environment. According to John Hardman, “the business was about to 
fall off the edge of a cliff’ (from The Financial Times, 17/08/89: 14). He argued that 
ASDA had lost its consumer franchise and that the previous management’s attitude was 
arrogant and ignorant’, with no intention of adjusting the retail formula despite 
changing customer demands. Based on the review, it was decided to launch an organic 
programme of change to strengthen the position of the business. The main points of the 
programme were to: re-vitalise the store opening programme; redesign and refurbish the 
stores to make them more appealing to customers; develop a range of own label goods 
and bring in more fresh foods, while paring the non-food ranges; to bring in information 
technology; and build a dedicated distribution network.
Fresh management was taken on-board to implement the programme and significant 
changes were made to the organisational structure that had, until then, been kept small 
and lean. An information technology function was set up. The merchandising and 
marketing functions were significantly strengthened. New layers of management were 
set up to control operations. The property division, which in the past had operated at the
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group level providing services to all the divisions, was closely aligned with ASDA’s 
retailing aims. The plan was to be completed by 1990.
In the GRI, changes continued throughout the mid-1980s. In July 1985, a clarification of 
planning permission procedures by the government made it easier to get planning 
permission for building edge-of-town superstores. Consequently, many companies 
increased their expansion programmes. Consolidation in the industry continued as 
Tesco took over Hillards, Gateway acquired Fine Fare, and Argyll bought Safeway.
The Merger between ASDA and MFI
While these important changes were going on within the business unit, in May 1985, the 
Associated Dairies group merged with MFI to form the ASDA-MFI Group. MFI was 
the leading UK furniture retailer, trading from 127 large edge-of-town furniture centres 
with a total of nearly 4 million square feet of selling space. The principal lines were 
kitchen and bedroom furniture. In the previous five years, MFI had quickly grown and 
in the year to May 1984, recorded sales of £301 million and pre-tax profits of £39 
million. The merger was valued at £615 million and involved a share issue.
For the management of Associated Dairies, there were various reasons behind the 
merger. Since the mid-1970s, it had worried about the dependence of the group on the 
food retailing business. “ASDA has for many years been the main contributor to Group 
profits, and in this context at the moment its contribution is in excess of 80%. It is 
logical, however, that the rate of growth experienced in the past cannot continue 
throughout the next decade, and furthermore in the opinion of your Board any attempt
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by the Group to acquire a major food retailing company would undoubtedly be blocked 
by the Monopolies Commission. Therefore when the unique opportunity arose to merge 
with MF1, your Directors considered this would complement ASDA, bringing together 
two outstanding teams who have a great depth of knowledge and experience in the art of 
operating retail stores from peripheral sites” (Noel Stockdale, Chairman, Annual 
Report, 1985: 7). Secondly, a number of senior executives at Associated Dairies were at 
retirement age, and the merger with MFI was to provide new management blood. It was 
also believed that there were many similarities in the physical characteristics and 
operating philosophies of the two businesses at the operating level, as both ASDA 
stores and MFI were operating large retailing centres in out-of-town sites. It was 
expected that the combined management was going to bring a broad spread of retailing 
skills, with particular emphasis on product development, marketing, location planning 
and employee motivation. Finally, benefits were to be obtained in the durable goods 
area with the carpet and furniture activities able to draw on joint strengths and expertise.
At the beginning of 1986, a management structure for the newly merged group was set 
up. Stockdale remained as group chairman. On his retirement, David Donne (non­
executive director) was to become the new non-executive chairman. Roy Bousfield 
relinquished his position as Group Managing Director whilst continuing as Group 
Deputy Chairman and taking the responsibility as chairperson of the new Executive 
Board. Derek Hunt, previously chairman of MFI, was appointed as Group Chief 
Executive and Deputy Chairman with specific responsibility for the Household 
Furnishing Division (comprising MFI and Allied Carpets). John Hardman, previously 
managing director of ASDA Stores, was appointed Deputy chairman with responsibility 
for both the superstore division and Associated Fresh Foods. A few months later, in
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October 1986, Stockdale retired after 47 years with the Group, the last 17 as executive 
chairman. He had played an important role in the initial phase of the development of 
ASDA Stores and in the merger with MFI.
The De-merger from MFI
The retirement of Stockdale signed the beginning of more change in the group’s 
strategy. Within one year of his retirement, the group had significantly changed the 
composition of its portfolio, having disposed of its interests in food manufacturing and 
de-merging from MFI.
In order to understand these changes, it is necessary to go back a few years to the 
merger with MFI. At the time, the decision to merge was not shared by Hardman. His 
plan was to transform ASDA into a national chain competing alongside Tesco and 
Sainsbury in the higher end of the market. Since he had been appointed managing 
director of the division, he had argued that it was necessary to increase the expansion 
programme of the superstore business. However, Stockdale and the senior management 
at the group level had a different view of how the group was to develop, a view that led 
to the merger with MFI.
With the departure of Stockdale, a new situation arose in the group. While Hardman’s 
plans for ASDA Stores had not gained the support of past senior management, this time 
his plans were backed by the new group chief executive. Hunt. However, the type of 
funding that the company needed could have only been provided by share issue or by 
the sale of some businesses. The former presented some problems, as the merger with
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MFI had already required a share issue. In the early months of 1987, it was decided that 
Associated Fresh Foods would be disposed of (sale finalised in August 1987), but this 
only provided £84 million. For the development programme of the superstore division, 
it was necessary to sell MFI. In June 1987, it was announced that MFI and Allied 
Carpets were for sale. In November 1987 (one year after Stockdale had retired), MFI 
de-merged from ASDA in a leveraged buy-out of £718 million led by Hunt, with ASDA 
retaining a 25% minority interest in the business.
It is unclear whether Hunt backed John Hardman’s strategy because of a shared view of 
what was best for the group or because the initial hopes a the development of 
management synergies between the two groups not being realised.
The decision to sell the Fresh Food businesses and de-merge from MFI had not been 
shared by all the senior management. In September 1987, Roy Bousfield and other 
executives and non-executives directors resigned. David Donne resigned in April 1988.
9.3 1988 - 1991: From the De-merger from MFI to the Departure
of Chairman and Chief Executive
Having de-merged from MFI and disposed of Associated Fresh Foods, the group was 
left with Allied Carpets and ASDA Stores. The management decided to retain Allied 
Carpet because the offers received did not reflect the value of the business. The group 
raised £500 million from the various disposals, which were to be used to implement the
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programme of expansion and consolidation of the superstore business. Plans were to 
spend £ 1 billionn over the three years from 1988-1991.
At Allied Carpets, a new management team was set up under the leadership of Richard 
Harker. A complete strategic review was launched. In April 1989, Gillow, a furniture 
retailer, was acquired for £29 million to strengthen the carpet retailing operations. 
Operations between Allied Carpets and Maples were merged in April 1990.
The plan, set up in 1985 for the superstore business, continued to be implemented and 
was expanded. Between 1987 and 1989, the company opened 18 superstores adding 
more than 1 million square feet. Old superstores were refurbished with the new ASDA 
look. The household goods and clothing sections, which achieved 25% of the total 
superstore sales, were reviewed and more space was allocated to fresh produce (i.e. fruit 
and vegetables, fish and meat, bread). An internal centre for the development of own- 
label products was set up. Initially, own label products were substituted for branded 
products, but in 1990, new own-label products, exclusive to ASDA, were to be 
introduced. In April 1989, an agreement was reached with George Davies, the founder 
of the Next retail chain, whereby ASDA took a 20% in the George Davies Partnership’s 
capital, which in return, took over responsibility for the design, buying and 
merchandising of ASDA’s clothing and footwear ranges.
The property development function was transformed into a business unit: Gazeley. The 
new profit centre was to develop retail parks and shopping centres, providing sites on 
the most advantageous terms for ASDA and Allied Carpets, while renting or selling 
other retail space to other retailers.
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At the beginning of 1989, an informal deal was made between the Isosceles consortium 
and ASDA, whereby the former agreed to sell about 60 Gateway superstores to the 
latter if it succeeded in taking over Dee Corporation (the third largest food retailer at the 
time). ASDA’s management believed that the move would have enabled the group to 
recover the ground lost to competitors at the beginning of the 1980s, when, according to 
Hardman, the business had not kept the pace with the main competitors in the 
superstores expansion programme.
In February 1989, David Gransby, deputy chairman, resigned, completing the 
management changes triggered by the de-merger with MFI. A new management 
structure was set up, with Hardman relinquishing the position of chief executive and 
concentrating on that of Chairman, while Graham Stow took the group chief executive 
position. Bill Bailey joined Tony Campbell as joint managing director for ASDA 
Stores.
ASDA Performance and the Departure of John Hardman and Graham Slow
The strategy change led by Hardman initially gave positive results. Although the 
increase in volumes on a like-for-like basis was disappointing (two percent in 1987/88, 
and nil in 1988/89), operating profits and margins of the superstore business continued 
to grow. However, things were changing. In the Summer of 1989, the new central 
distribution network started to operate but with noteworthy difficulties. The group had 
invested circa £100 million and worked on it for more than two years. However, for 
eight weeks, the central distribution system was not able to supply its stores with 
sufficient fresh foods (which knocked about £20 million off sales). Eventually the stores
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were able to carry the right levels of stock but this meant the company had to incur 
further costs of £16 million.
In September 1989, following the success of the Isosceles bid for Dee Corporation, 
ASDA finalised the acquisition of 60 Gateway superstores. The acquisition was to 
increase sales by an extra £1 billion, improving the company’s buying power, filling the 
distribution network more quickly and leading to marketing economies. The Gateway 
stores were not located as well as ASDA average and their sales per square foot were 
only two-third of ASDA’s own, leaving scope for a 50% improvement. The cost of the 
operation was of £705 million; stock in stores, valued at around £40 million, was 
bought separately. The deal was financed with a mix of short-term financial tools, 
mainly through bank borrowings. Because of the acquisition, ASDA became the third 
largest company in the GRI. However, within less than two years since the MFI de­
merger, the group had spent all the cash and had a gearing of 116%. In December 1989, 
the group merged the Gazeley subsidiary with Arlington, the retail property 
development subsidiary of British Aerospace, to form a 50:50 joint venture, ‘Burtwood 
House’. The newly formed company acquired 34 superstores and a retail site from 
ASDA, with a leaseback formula. The group raised £275 million in cash, which brought 
gearing down from 116% to 73%. However, there were some serious doubts about the 
group’s internal financial capabilities to support its strategy in the medium-term. The 
acquisition of the Gateway superstores “came ... at a time when ASDA was committed 
to new store development which was depleting its cash balances and leading to a build­
up in debt. ... The benefits of the store-opening programme were not likely to be felt 
until the year ending April 1992. In the interim ASDA would be unable to meet its 
capital expenditure from internal resources and would thus have no surplus to reduce
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debt” (Stephen Fidler, The Financial Times 13/02/90: 28). Furthermore, the sale and 
leaseback of 34 stores had reduced ASDA’s “financial flexibility by diminishing its 
assets base” (ibid.). This was the analysis of Standard & Poor when they downgraded 
ASDA’s commercial paper rating from A1 to A2 in February 1990.
The management hoped that the group’s financial position would improve in the 
following years, as the programme of change was completed However, this hope was 
not realised In 1989, the economic climate worsened and in December 1989, a profit 
warning was given. Difficult trading conditions for non-food items (clothing and 
footwear) had resulted in a decrease of volumes on a comparable basis often percent for 
the first half-year, with flat sales in food.
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Disappointing results also came from the carpet and furniture retail business (Allied 
Maples) and the MFI associate Results for 1989/90 were unsatisfactory. Turnover was 
up by 31% but pre-tax profits were down by 25%. The fall in profits was mainly due to 
high interest charges, weak furniture sales and distribution disruptions. To make things
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worse, the management took possession of the Gateway stores only in mid-May 1990, 
much later than initially planned, which meant that the group was unable to recover the 
costs of funding the purchase price in the year.
Between May and July 1990, in a move to cut gearing, three superstore development 
sites and two properties were sold to Tesco for £73.75 million and in October 1990, a 
convertible Eurobond issue of £73 million was made. However, by January 1991, the 
group had a net debt of £ 900 million and gearing stood at 76%. The superstore 
business, operating profits for the half year, were up by 30.8% on turnover up by 42% 
and former Gateway stores contributed fully for the first time, making £28 million in 
operating profits, but their interest bill for the same period was of £42 million, on top of 
a capitalisation o f interests of £16.3 million Because of substantially higher interest 
charges and weak trading in its home furnishings businesses, group pre-tax profits were 
again down by 25%.
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Management was confident of future prospects “We will start unwinding our capital
expenditure programme as we come through this year and we are fully confident that by 
the end of 1992 we will have our gearing in a highly satisfactory position” (John 
Hardman, in The Financial Times, 10/01/91: 22).
However, the situation did not improve in the following months and in June 1991, a few 
days before disclosing results for the 1990/91 financial year, Hardman and Stow, 
respectively group chairman and chief executive, resigned. Their sudden and 
unexpected departure was due to increasing pressure from institutional shareholders, 
unhappy at the poor performance of the group. When results were disclosed sales and 
operating profits were up, by 25.8% and 20.9% respectively but pre-tax profits were 
down by 8.9%. Again, the main reasons were high interests charges and poor 
performance by other businesses.
Godfrey Messervy, ASDA’s non-executive director, replaced Hardman as Chairman. 
His main task was to find a replacement for the two executive directors. In September 
1991, Patrick Gillam became the new ASDA chairman. His appointment came as it was 
disclosed that profits and dividends for 1991/92 were going to be lower than initially 
forecasted in the previous year. The performance of the businesses had not improved 
but the main problem was a precarious financial situation. In 1989, management had 
financed the acquisition of 60 Gateway superstores with short-term debt, rejecting its 
financial advisors’ recommendation to raise additional equity finance. With £600 
million of debt becoming due for repayment within one year, the group was about to 
breach its banking covenants. “At the moment the company has an unbelievable debt 
profile. It is a recipe for disaster” (Patrick Gillam, ASDA chairman, in The Financial
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Times, 01/10/91: 26).
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In October 1991, a share issue of £357 million was approved at the extraordinary 
general meeting (EGM). The share issue reduced debt from £931 million to £574 
million, and gearing from 72.1% to 36.6%. The success of the share issue was a 
necessary condition for the company to re-negotiate a £200 million syndicated loans 
with NatWest and the Swiss Bank Corporation, which occurred in the following weeks. 
At the EGM, the appointment of a new chief executive was also announced. Archie 
Norman, previously finance director of Kingfisher with an experience as a partner of 
McKinsey, was to try to reverse the group’s fortunes. In the meantime, 415 jobs were to 
be cut at ASDA Stores and Allied Retailers’ headquarters, which was to lead to cost 
savings of around £8 million a year.
ASDA's Position in the Industry
ASDA’s management had tried to compete with Tesco and Sainsbury in the upper end 
of the market but ASDA did not have the brand name, the managerial resources and the 
asset base of its main competitors. The group was undercapitalised in relation to its 
strategic needs, and the poor performance compared to main competitors since 1989 did 
not enable the group to raise funds through share issue. High gearing, generating high 
interest charges, also meant that by June 1991 only 37 ex-Gateway stores had been fully 
converted into the ASDA format, with consequently diminished benefits from the 
conversion programme.
However, there were other substantial problems. ASDA’s stores were positioned in 
parts of the country where customers were earning wages below the national average. In 
an attempt to catch up with the size of main competitors, the 60 Gateway superstores
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had been acquired but analysts argued that ASDA paid much more for shops that were 
less advantageously positioned than ASDA stores and had been considered by all the 
other major operators in the GRI.
At the operating level, while the company had initially claimed success in the 
programme of change, market analysts were not sure whether ASDA’s appeal was still 
based on low prices (as evidenced by the regular price campaigns) or whether it had 
moved upmarket. When, in the late 1980s, market reports indicated that ASDA was 
losing market share to Tesco, Kwik Save and Morrison in the Yorkshire heartland, it 
was clear that, while failing to attract the better off customers, ASDA was losing its 
traditional customer basis at the lower end of the market.
ASDA had been trying to catch up with more up-market operators but the structure of 
the industry and the positions of competitors had deeply changed over the 1980s. Tesco 
and Sainsbury had continuously invested in their businesses and had expanded and 
consolidated their market position. From 1987, Sainsbury increased the number of new 
stores opened from 15 to 20. Argyll, since acquiring Safeway at the beginning of 1987, 
had successfully converted its Presto stores to the more up-market Safeway format 
while also extended the scope of its operations.
The move up-market by most retailers, while crowding the upper end, left space at the 
lower end, where only Kwik Save and Lo-Cost were significant discount operators. As 
the economy started to slow in 1989, consumers moved toward cheaper operators. The 
result was that ASDA, together with Gateway, were squeezed into the middle, between 
discounters and other more up-market large food retailers (Sainsbury, Tesco, Safeway). 
To make things worse, in the late 1980s, a number of European "hard” discounters 
made their entry into the UK GRI.
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9.4 1992 - 1995: A New Programme of Change
In December 1991, six months after the departure of Hardman, Archie Norman took 
office as the group chief executive. Following Hardman’s departure, the group had 
performed poorly, with 50 of the group’s 204 superstores losing six percent of their 
sales to competition. One of Norman’s first moves was to launch a price freeze for the 
Christmas period. This was maintained over the following months, with the successive 
introduction of cheaper lines introduced in the worst performing stores. The move 
aimed to stop the haemorrhaging of customers towards main competitors. Following the 
initiatives to cut prices, market research studies showed ASDA as offering more 
competitive prices than at any time since 1987.
At the same time, a new team of directors was formed. The old management team that 
had been brought in by Hardman following the MFI de-merger was almost completely 
replaced. In January 1992, Phil Cox was appointed as new finance director. In March 
1992, Allan Leighton was recruited from Mars as marketing director. In the following 
months, new personnel and retail directors were appointed. By 1994, the only executive 
director who was left from the old guard was Tony Campbell (trading director).
In January 1992, the management explained that the group was to focus on improving 
operations in the superstore business and re-establishing financial stability. Details of 
how this was to be achieved were to be examined. “We are not coming in a 
swashbuckling way and saying that we have the magic formula for ASDA. What we 
have to do is look at the assets of the business and see whether there is potential for 
doing something better with them” (Archie Norman, The Financial Times, 16/01/92: 
23).
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The new management recognised that the company had lost the “me too” battle fought 
in the second part of the 1980s against the industry leaders Sainsbury and Tesco. The 
objective was thus to develop a formula that would ensure future prosperity. The most 
urgent problem was the poor performance of ASDA’s 49 older stores (some of them 25 
years old) where sales slipped six percent in the half year. There was an open question 
as to whether it was worth investing heavily in these outlets. One possibility was to 
launch a cut-price discount format, but this would lead to some of the worst performing 
stores being closed. The main concern was over what the impact of still expanding 
competitors on ASDA’s operations would be, as between January and June 1991, 
Tesco, Argyll and Sainsbury had all made capital right issues to finance their expansion 
plans in the retailing sector.
The new management team spent the first few months learning all about the business 
before embarking on this new strategy. All aspects of the Group and its businesses were 
examined. The financial options and product offering were reviewed with the help of 
McKinsey. The management also worked with Andersen Consulting to maximise 
information technology benefits and to introduce direct product profitability techniques. 
The cost-cutting exercise, which had started in 1991, was continued. In May 1992, 500 
management jobs at the store level were cut because of the cost benefits resulting from 
centralised distribution. In July 1992, it was decided to contract out much of the group’s 
legal, insurance and employee savings work.
Restructuring Operations
In July 1992, on the disclosure of results for 1991/92, the restructuring plan was 
presented. Its main objectives were to: revitalise the stores (with more imaginative and
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effective store refurbishments), the product ranges (with more regional ranges, 
increased emphasis on fresh foods, and greater product innovation) and the customer 
image; to improve the pricing strategy; to launch a new format discount store; and, to 
change the organisation structure by combining productivity benefits with simplified 
reporting. The plan aimed to give ASDA a distinct position in the grocery marketplace. 
Superstores would continue to stock a wide range of non-food items, but the layout of 
these departments would be significantly altered. The management believed it was 
possible to break out into a virtuous circle whereby improved productivity would 
increase price competitiveness, restoring customer flow and sales volumes, leading to 
better buying terms and increased profitability. The control of marketing was to be 
taken back from manufacturers. Although some changes had been introduced since 
1985, decisions about what to promote and when was still in the hands of 
manufacturers. In the following three years, ASDA also planned to redesign 140 of its 
200 stores; new stores were to put more emphasis on the values associated with the 
company’s new strategy.
In the meantime (in June 1992), ASDA opened its first new limited range discount store 
format: Dales. The store was an old 34,000 square feet ASDA superstore. The 
experiment was to be monitored carefully and important strategic decisions were going 
to be taken, based on the results achieved. If successful, the formula would be extended 
to 20 to 30 locations.
Results for 1991/92, indicated that operating profits were down by 31% because of high 
operating costs, promotions and tightening margins. Exceptional charges for £451 
million led to a pre-tax loss of £364.8 million. Exceptional charges mainly referred to a
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write-down of the value of the 60 Gateway superstores, which the previous management 
had put on the book at cost rather than value. Other exceptional charges were for the 
rationalisation at ASDA and Allied Maples.
Following the flotation of MFI in July 1992, the group disposed of its 25% shareholding 
in MFI for £73 million. In October 1992, it sold two development sites and one store to 
competitors raising a further £47 million.
In November 1992, a price campaign was launched using the ‘ASDA Price’ slogan, 
previously used in the early 1980s. The objective was to re-establish the company’s 
leadership as the lowest priced national superstore retailer. Gross margins that had 
constantly been rising since 1985 (because of the need to finance the expansion 
programme) were intentionally reduced throughout the recovery programme. The 
strategy review indicated that the loss of value competitiveness was one of the key 
factors behind the business problems encountered during Hardman’s chairmanship.
In January 1993, ASDA made a second capital right issue in less then two years, raising 
£347 million. This followed better than expected interim results for 1992/93. ASDA had 
a legacy of ‘first generation’ superstores in the north of England that did not stand up 
well to competition from new stores opened by rivals. They needed to be renovated, re­
sited or rebuilt, to protect their market shares. The revamp of two stores in 1992, at a 
cost of £2 million, had resulted in a 20% increase in sales in the same stores. The 
management also planned to re-site about 15 of the oldest ones (at a cost of between £12 
million and £20 million each) and rebuild five to 10 stores on existing sites (costing 
about £9 million each and involving closure of the stores for about eight months).
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Furthermore, as time between buying a site and opening a store is two or three years, the 
group needed to look to financing spending in 1995. “We can finance (capital spending) 
this year and next from trading, ... but in three years time the business would be getting 
smaller” (Archie Norman, The Financial Times, 29/1/93: 9).
Following the capital right issue, the syndicate loan with NatWest and the Swiss Bank 
Corporation was renegotiated again with better conditions for the company. By mid- 
1993, net debt has been reduced to £76 million. Like-for-like sales growth of two 
percent in 1992/93 was better than any of the big three.
Notwithstanding the improving performance of the business, Norman, ASDA’s chief 
executive, was pessimistic about the future prospects of the industry. Rumours of 
saturation had existed in the industry since the late 1980s, and with the entry of 
European discounters, the threat was now price competition. In November 1992, at the 
Marketing Society, Norman said that the continuous expansion of large food retailers, 
low inflation and slow growth in demand meant that the industry was set for a less 
profitable future with increasing saturation: “It is hard to understand why people believe 
the current situation is sustainable.” He believed that discount retailers were “only at the 
first stage of development” (The Financial Times, 19/11/92: 26). In July 1993, he 
restated that food retail growth was in decline, with increasing over-capacity and 
competition from cut-price discount operators: “We are planning on the basis that the 
halcyon days in the UK grocery industry in terms of profitability are over” (The 
Financial Times, 03/07/93: 9). Because of increasing saturation in the GRI, the ASDA 
format was unlikely to grow. “It is unlikely that we will increase significantly our 
selling space of over 8 million square feet, instead we will concentrate on upgrading the 
quality and resilience of what we have and continue to improve the service which our
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stores provide to their local communities” (Patrick Gillam, Chairman, Annual Report, 
1994: 5). Once the renewal programme was completed, ASDA would rely for profit 
growth on constantly improving its performance, along the lines of Marks and Spencer, 
rather than through constant expansion as Sainsbury and Tesco were doing. Group 
expansion was more likely to be in the Dales format.
The first experiments of the Dales format had been very encouraging with sale increases 
at around 50%, enough to offset the lower margin they achieved. With around 7,000 
lines, the format drew from both limited range discounters and conventional 
superstores. Compared to other discounters, there were more lines and more emphasis 
placed on fresh food which accounted for about a third of the range. The low cost and 
margin structure enabled the management to put prices on a similar level to those at 
Kwik Save, about 12% lower than the big three superstore operators.
Changes in the Industry Structure
Rumours of saturation and the threat of the expanding presence of discounters had been 
initially dismissed by all the other main food retailers, but the expansion of hard 
discounters came at a time of severe economic recession in the UK. The combination of 
these elements, together with the price repositioning by ASDA and the move by 
consumers towards cheaper operators, generated a “domino” effect in the industry. In 
May 1993, Gateway launched an advertising campaign (Price Check), focusing on the 
competitiveness of its price. In August 1993, Tesco launched a cut-price own label, 
covering 70 products replacing ‘tertiary brands’. Tesco recognised the threat of 
discounters and explained that the campaign aimed to regain some of the ground lost to
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discounters and to chains such as ASDA and Gateway. The move opened a four to five 
percent gap between Tesco’s cheaper brands and those of Sainsbury and Safeway. In 
November 1993, Sainsbury followed Tesco with the introduction of cheaper brands. 
Sainsbury management also announced that future growth would have to come mainly 
from other group businesses. In December 1993, Safeway also lowered prices on 200 
basic products and announced a cut in its capital-spending programme. In January 1994, 
Tesco announced cuts in its expansion plans. The price reposition by the big three had 
little effect on ASDA that had already changed its price position in the market. In 
October, its response was to freeze prices until January.
In December 1993, ASDA’s interim results were at the top end of market forecasts, with 
a 14% increase in operating profits and a nine percent increase in volumes from existing 
stores. The recent events in the industry seemed to confirm Norman’s hypothesis of 
market saturation and expanding discounting operators set to take market share away 
from superstore operators. However, Norman also argued that ASDA had found a 
“profitable route”.
The programme of recovery successfully continued over the following years. After 
closing the group last manufacturing interests (a loss-making sausage company) in April 
1993, ASDA sold Allied Maples to Carpetland in December 1993. ASDA had spent 
£100 million in trying to improve operations since the late 1980s with little result.
In January 1994, Allan Leighton was promoted from Marketing director to Retailing 
director. Since joining ASDA in March 1992, he had effectively brought the group back 
to a more price-led retailing by repositioning ASDA’s own-label and by reintroducing
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the ‘ASDA Price’ advertising campaign. He was to take over the last phase of the 
recovery programme of store refits, while retaining responsibility for the Dales discount 
chain.
Results for 1993/94 showed operating profits up by 3.4% with like-for-like sales on a 
comparable basis up by 8.9%. However, the group reported exceptional costs for £309 
million that generated a pre-tax loss of £126 million Exceptional costs were for the sale 
of Allied Maples (£130 million) and a property write down (£179 million). Between 
1993 and 1994, all the main food retailers reviewed their depreciation policy and made 
a property write down. Superstore developments were overvalued in comparison to 
market property prices. Since the late 1980s, the prices of property had been going 
down. However, this had not been the case for sites that were suitable for superstore 
development where prices had continued to increase because of the bidding up among 
superstore operators.
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Ending the Three Years. Restructuring Programme
By June 1995, the recovery programme launched in 1992 was completed. ASDA was 
the best-valued superstore and in the year; ‘Farm Stores’, a new own brand at 
exceptionally low prices, had been introduced to strengthen its price position. The group 
operated 203 superstores (7 Dales and 196 ASDAs), with an average sales area of 
40,400 square feet. In three years, significant results were achieved. The number of 
customers shopping at ASDA had gone up from 3.8 million in 1992, to 5.2 million in 
1995. The business had outperformed the industry in like-for-like sales for 32 months 
and ASDA had closed the gap in market share on Argyll. In 1994/95, turnover increased 
by 8.2%, but operating profit was up by 27.6% and like-for-like sales were up by 7.4%. 
Gross margins went down to maintain the leading price position, but because of higher 
productivity, operating profits were up. Total capital expenditure was £204 million but 
for the first time since 1988 and the company had positive net cash at the end of the 
year.
Since 1992, the group had undergone a period of physical and managerial 
transformation. At the organisational level, several layers of management were removed 
and staff was divided into 25 teams each covering different product areas. Each team 
had its area of business and was given weekly and daily sales figures. At the store level, 
the company was strongly focused towards active selling and less authoritarian 
management. Julian Richer, whose discount hi-fi chain. Richer Sounds, holds the world 
record for sales per square foot, was hired as a consultant to provide ideas on how to 
increase sales per square foot.
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A new 10-point three-year programme was unveiled. A ‘market hall’ atmosphere, 
similar to that used by Morrison, was to be introduced in stores to make ASDA a ‘fun’ 
place to shop. Fresh food, bakery and butchery departments were to be improved. There 
would be greater emphasis on sales of own-label and the ‘George’ clothing brand. Non­
food items only accounted for 15% of sales but they were growing faster than the 
mainstream grocery business. Norman also announced that ASDA was to resume store 
building, opening six superstores a year, with capital spending set to increase to £250 
million annually. After many years of attacks on other main retailers for their “hcad-in- 
the-sand” attitude to market saturation, the management changed its mind over 
expansion policies. In September 1995, Norman defended the decision to re-start 
building ASDA stores. The rate of opening had slowed since planning restrictions had 
been tightened, which provided the management with some reassurance about their 
physical expansion strategy. It was also announced that ASDA was looking for sites in
Northern Ireland.
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ASDA’s management change of mind reflected a change the mood among food 
retailers. They understood that in the 1992/93 period, they had experienced a one off 
repositioning in price rather than market saturation. With the introduction of ‘value’ 
lines, large supermarket/superstore operators neutralised the threat of discounters, and 
by continuing expansion, were to take market share from independent operators. This 
was confirmed by the fact that most retailers were having positive increases in like-for- 
like sales. Further, Tesco, after announcing a stop in its expansion programme in 1993, 
went back on its decision in 1995. Despite the 1993 announcement, the group was to 
expand its ASDA format rather than the Dales one, which had been performing well but 
did not grant the profit margins of the ASDA format.
I able 9.2 ASDA Group: Financial and Operational Statistics 1994/95
Group Sales (£; (XX); after taxes) 5,285,301
Pre-tax Profit (£; (XX)) 246,2(X)
Contribution of ASDA Stores to 
Group’s Sales
99.5%
Contribution of ASDA Stores to 
Group’s Operatine Profits
98.3%
Number of Outlets 203
Total Sales Area (sq. ft.) 8,210.000
Average Sales Area per Outlet (sq. ft.) 40,440
Market Share (1994)
Own Label Share of Sales (1994) 
Information Technolonv__
Centralised Distribution_____
Source Various Documents
discount
developed
developed
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9.5 ASDA at the End of 1995
“Corporate strategies are often a matter of post facto rationalisation. So it has been with 
ASDA. The company’s dedication to improving sales from existing space largely 
reflects the lack of any alternative. With the weakest of the big grocery brands and 
severe financial restraints in the past, ASDA was forced to stop opening new stores 
some time ago. So it sought another means of salvation. Fortunately, its emphasis on 
permanently low prices and increased productivity has anticipated the needs of the 
1990s perfectly well. ASDA is therefore at present registering the strongest like-for-like 
sales increases in the sector. It is, of course, easier to make such gains from a low base. 
But one should not dismiss the real progress being made” (Lex, The Financial Times, 
01/07/94: 20).
This comment in the Lex Column well summarises ASDA’s strategy since 1992. In the 
second part of 1995, the group continued to perform well. In December 1995, ASDA 
reported its highest increase in like-for-like sales among the market leaders (nine 
percent) for the first 1995/96 half. As part of the company’s strategy to increase sales of 
non-food items, in the second part of 1995, the company launched a fierce campaign 
aiming at halting the net book agreement and the retail price maintenance on vitamins, 
succeeding in the former but not in the latter.
In August 1995, ASDA bought back all its superstores by acquiring, for £88 million, 
British Aerospace’s share in Burwood House, a joint venture set up in 1989. Burwood 
House had net assets of £250 million and owned 34 ASDA superstores, 4 shopping 
centres and a number of development sites. The four shopping centres were to be sold.
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Chapter 10 J. Sainsbury PLC
10.0 Introduction
Sainsbury was founded in 1869, when John and Mary Sainsbury opened their first outlet 
in London. The history of the company and its strategies are intimately linked to the 
Sainsbury family’s philosophy about business. The company was wholly owned by 
members of the family until 1973 when it was floated on the London Stock Market. 
Today, members of the Sainsbury family still own 43% of the issued shares and David 
Sainsbury, a fourth generation descendent of the company’s founders, is the group’s 
chairman and chief executive. Sainsbury is, with Tesco, a market leader in the UK GRI.
Since the beginning, quality produce and customer service characterised Sainsbury 
shops. In 1882, a branch in Croydon was opened using advanced design and materials. 
The walls, floor and counter fronts were tiled, the countertops were marble slabs and 
customers were seated on bentwood chairs. The stores, nice outfitting, services and 
quality food attracted prosperous customers. To obtain quality food, Sainsbury 
established close relationships with suppliers, and controlled and distributed stock from 
a central depot. The company performed successfully but expansion was slow. By 1940, 
the company operated 249 shops, mainly in the London area. During the Second World 
War, several branches were bombed and by the end of the war, sales were half that at 
the pre-war level. Alan and Robert Sainsbury, grandsons of the founder, started a 
recovery programme by opening other stores. In 1950, the first self-service shop was 
opened. During the 1950s and 1960s, the company expanded its operations. The number
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of outlets went down from 244 in 1950 to 225 in 1970, but smaller counter service 
outlets were replaced by larger self-service supermarkets. At the same time, to support 
the expansion programme, facilities of central depots were expanded and the 
distribution system was computerised. By 1970, about half of the 225 Sainsbury’s stores 
were supermarkets. The slow conversion was mainly due to the high capital investment 
required. In 1969, John Sainsbury became chairman and chief executive. At the time, 
Sainsbury was a large regional operator, with only 20% of the population living within 
an accessible distance from a Sainsbury outlet. However, higher sales per outlet 
compared to the industry average made Sainsbury one of the largest operators in the 
industry by sales behind Allied Suppliers and Tesco. In 1973, Sainsbury was floated on 
the Stock Market. In 1974, during a difficult period for the UK economy, the 
government put a cap on the company’s gross margin. In the following years, the 
company started a diversification programme. “This decision was taken at a time when 
a combination of economic instability and the government’s discriminatory attitude to 
food retailing threatened to curb the growth of the core business” (Williams 1994: 212). 
In 1975, Sainsbury and British Home Stores (BHS) formed a 50/50 joint venture, 
launching Savacentre, a hypermarket chain. Sainsbury retained control of all food- 
related operations, leaving non-food lines to BHS. The first Savacentre outlet was 
opened at the end of 1977. In the early years, the venture was very much in an 
experimental phase. By March 1980, two Savacentres were operating. In 1979, 
Sainsbury also started a joint venture with GB-Inno-BM (GIB), a Belgian retailer, 
known for its leadership in merchandising products and ‘Do It Yourself’ (DIY). 
Sainsbury owned 75% of the new company and GIB the remaining 25%. The objective 
of the joint venture was to operate a home and garden (DIY) chain in the UK.
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Throughout the 1970s, in the traditional grocery retailing business, the company 
continued its programme of replacing old smaller stores with larger new ones, while 
slowly expanding the geographic scope of operations by opening new outlets in other 
regions. The main obstacles to Sainsbury’s development programme were the 
difficulties in obtaining planning permission for new town centre stores. In December 
1974, partly as a response to planning permission problems, Sainsbury opened its first 
edge-of-town store. In 1979, John Sainsbury announced that the company had plans to 
open 15 new supermarkets a year in the following years. By 1980, Sainsbury operated 
231 outlets with an average size of 11,975 square feet, compared to 225 with an average 
size of 4,670 square feet back in 1970. In 1980, Sainsbury also operated outlets in South 
Wales, Yorkshire and South West.
In the 1970s, Sainsbury also entered the rapidly growing frozen food market. 
Sainsbury’s chain of freezer centres operated independently of the main supermarket 
business. Old counter service branches that were too small for conversion to 
supermarket trading were used for this purpose. The first freezer centre was opened in 
1974. However, one year later, the company decided that when possible it would 
integrate freezer centres into supermarkets. There were 21 freezer centres in 1980.
Within the GRI, the second part of the 1970s was characterised by strong competition. 
In June 1977, Tesco dropped trading stamps, first introduced in 1963, and launched one 
of the most successful retail price promotions under the name ‘Operation Checkout’. 
Prices of products were cut by three to four percent on average. This was the beginning 
of a period where competition among grocery firms was mainly based on low prices. 
All the other main chains reduced prices to maintain customer loyalty. In January 1978,
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Sainsbury launched a price initiative called “Discount ‘78”. Items were reduced in price 
by as much as 15%. The discount scheme proved very successful and by December 
1978, the increase in sales had been in the order of 25%. Many independent stores and 
small chains, unable to compete on prices, were being either driven out of the market or 
taken over by larger firms. Over this period, Tesco surpassed Sainsbury to become the 
largest operator in grocery retailing by sales.
Table 10.1 J. Sainsbury PLC: Financial and Operational Statistics 1980/81
Group Sales (£; 000; after taxes) 1,531,196
Pre-tax Profit (£; 000) ________ 62 025
Number of Outlets 237"
Total Sales Area (sq. ft.) 2,978,000
Average Sales Area per Outlet (sq. ft.) 12,570
Market Position Hiçh
Market Share (1980) 12.5%
Own Label Share of Sales (1981) 54.0%
Information Technology Developed
Centralisée! Distribution Developed
Source Various Documents
10.1 1980 -1986/87: Continuing the Programme of Change
In the first part of the 1980s, the UK GRI was still in a state of flux. As recession hit the 
UK economy, price was still an important variable for competitors and shoppers. In 
1982, Tesco launched “Checkout ‘82”, cutting prices between from three percent and 
25% on around 1,500 food items. This started a new price war in the GRI that eased as 
the economy situation improved. However, if price was the most important competitive
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weapon in the short term, most companies’ longer-term strategies were to improve their 
competitive position by opening larger stores in edge-of-town sites.
Sainsbury continued its programme of updating its retail portfolio, replacing old stores 
with larger new ones and refurbishing some old branches while also slowly expanding 
its geographical scope of operations. Expansion was done organically rather than 
through acquisition. “We have always believed in expansion through investment within 
the Company rather than by acquisition. We do not seek greater size for its own sake, 
but we do set the highest priority in constantly updating the business so that we may 
better meet our customers’ needs. It has always been our policy to close outdated stores 
whenever we can build a replacement supermarket or to expand and modernise stores 
when possible” (John Sainsbury, Chairman, Annual Report, 1985: 5).
New, larger stores enabled the company to broaden the product range and provide more 
services to customers. The company was thus less exposed to price competition in the 
traditional grocery market. In the industry, most companies had stores operating in city 
centres, which were often of small size, displaying mainly grocery produce and with 
little customer services. The absence of economies of scale for small stores also meant 
that costs for stores in the city centres were proportionally higher than for edge-of-town 
stores. Only a few companies operated on edge-of-town sites. In 1982, the last counter 
service shop was closed and this completed the change over to self-service that had 
begun in 1950. In 1981, Sainsbury surpassed Tesco to again become the largest food 
retailer in the industry by sales. In the first part of the 1980s, despite difficulties in 
getting planning permission, the company opened 15 to 17 new stores a year. The 
programme was financed internally and with funds generated by the sale of old
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dismantled stores. Its programme of replacing smaller units with larger ones was 
supported by higher operating margins, productivity and sales achieved in the new 
larger stores. In May 1984, the company was honoured by the Food Marketing Institute 
of America as “The Outstanding Supermarket Chain”.
The Diversification Programme
The company continued its diversification programme throughout the early 1980s. In 
1981, the first Homebase home and garden centre, resulting from the joint venture 
between Sainsbury and GIB, was opened. “The new company, ... was ... able to 
combine (GIB’s) international expertise with Sainsbury’s experience of British 
Retailing. The setting up of Homebase represented Sainsbury first venture into retail 
business totally unrelated to food” (Williams 1994: 214). The launch of Homebase was 
viewed with scepticism by some city analysts, who believed that the market for DIY 
was already saturated. Homebase’s success was greater than expected. Consequently, 
further expansion was planned with confidence. By the end of 1986, there were 28 
Homebase stores. In January 1987, a new depot was commissioned to serve Homebase. 
Fifty percent of goods were be handled through Homebase’s own distribution centre. 
The system was, at the time, unique in the DIY industry. There were plans to open 25 
further Homebase stores by 1990. “The Sainsbury trading philosophy is reflected at 
Homebase in the quality and value of its product range and its dedication to customer 
service. Homebase is following the Sainsbury tradition of developing its own label 
products” (Annual Report 1987: 8).
In November 1983, Sainsbury acquired a 21.2 % share in Shaw’s, a supermarket chain
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operating in New England (US). As part of its diversification programme set up in 1977, 
Sainsbury had decided to acquire a minority interest in a US company in order to learn 
more about American food retailing before purchasing a controlling interest. 
Consultants had been employed to help in the search for a suitable company.
In the early 1980s, Savacentre took a back seat and by the end of 1986, only six 
hypermarkets were operating.
10.2 1988 -  1991: Consolidating the Superstore Business
As in the past, in the late 1980s, Sainsbury continued to expand within the UK GRI. The 
policy was still to replace old city centre stores with larger edge-of-town ones while 
slowly expanding its geographical coverage in the UK market. Edge-of-town stores 
achieved higher sales, operating margins and retums-on-investment compared to city 
centre ones. In 1987, the management announced its intention to increase the average 
number of new stores to be opened each year from 15 to 20. This came because of 
changes in governmental policies that made it easier to obtain planning permission. At 
the same time, more sites suitable for superstore developments became available 
because of changes in Britain’s economic infrastructure.
Sainsbury’s capital expenditure continued to grow at constant rate. The company 
financed its expansion plans with its cash flows, profits sale and leaseback and 
investment bonds. Investment in new stores was accompanied by investment in 
information technology and own-brand products, which had traditionally played an
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important role in the company’s strategy. Compared to its main competitors, Sainsbury 
was better positioned in terms of brand name, own label, information technology, and 
distribution systems. In 1989, the company celebrated its tenth successive year during 
which profits increased by more than 20%.
G r a p h  1 0 .1  J .  S a i n s b u r y  P i c :  C a p i t a l  E x p e n d i t u r e  1 9 8 1  ■ 1 9 9 2
Source Based on Data from Sainsburv's Annual Report
Since the price war in 1982, shoppers had become more concerned about value for 
money and services than price. Sainsbury had a long established tradition of quality 
food, value for money and a nice shopping environment, but competitors, attracted by 
higher profit potential, were trying to position themselves at the same end of the market
In the UK GRJ, Sainsbury’s competitors, whilst trying to improve their market position, 
were also successfully expanding the scope of their operations. If the early 1980s had 
been characterised by price competition and consolidation of the industry, in the late 
1980s, Sainsbury’s competitors (Tesco, ASDA and Argyll) were engaged in large 
expansion programmes and opening new large edge-of-town stores. This was achieved
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at the expense of independent retailers whose total number continued to decline over the 
1980s
Sainsbury had been among the first companies to target this market segment on a broad 
scale, but others were trying to do the same, consequently increasing potential 
competition This trend was not followed by all companies Budgens, Iceland and Kwik 
Save preferred to stay and expand in city centres.
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The Diversification Programme
Sainsbury continued its diversification programme during the late 1980s. In July 1987, 
the remaining share of Shaw’s was acquired. After the acquisition in 1983 of 21.2% of 
the capital, Sainsbury had increased its holding to 28 5% in 1986 and to 49 4% in the 
early 1987. Shaw’s had been founded in 1860 and had a similar history to Sainsbury of 
quality food and good price, with particular strength in computer technology. When
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Sainsbury first invested in 1983, Shaw’s had 41 stores. The acquisition was not 
welcomed by the city. The US had a £250 million highly fragmented grocery market, 
with each region having its favourite chain. Few retailers, like Safeway US, A&P and 
Kroger, were operating nation-wide. As Sainsbury gained complete control of the 
company, a strong development programme was set. At the end of 1987, Iandoli, a 
small chain of 10 stores also operating in New England, was acquired and, in the 
following year, integrated under the Shaw’s fascia. In 1990, drawing on Sainsbury’s 
experience for quality control and buying methods, Shaw’s launched its own brand, 
with the same slogan used at Sainsbury’s: ‘good food costs less’. By 1990, all existing 
stores had been converted to scanning. Shaw’s was also one of the first companies to set 
up a centralised distribution network of depots and to change it to contract distribution 
systems.
During the 1980s, the number of Savacentres grew slowly. This was primarily due to 
difficulties in finding suitable sites and in obtaining planning permission for very large 
hypermarkets. In March 1989, the 50% share owned by Storehouse was acquired by 
Sainsbury for £123 million. Savacentre was planning a £200 million development 
programme over the following three years. Storehouse was not interested in further 
investment in the business. To ensure continuity, while the management built up 
expertise in clothing, a five-year agreement was made with Storehouse to supply 
Savacentre, through BHS, with textiles and other non-food lines. BHS products were 
gradually phased out following the launch of the Sainsbury Lifestyle range of own 
brand clothing.
DIY was one of the major growth sectors of the 1980s. Between 1985 and 1990, the
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number of DIY superstores almost doubled from 560 to 1,019. At the same time, DIY 
retailers’ gross margins increased from 30% to 34.5%. (Central Statistical Office’s 
Retailing Inquiry, from The Financial Times, 15/09/94: 24). In a heterogeneous market, 
with products ranging from cement and construction to gardening products, Homebase 
positioned itself at the upper end of the market, with a ‘soft’ range (decorative and 
gardening products). The company had expanded organically and, similarly to what it 
had previously done in the supermarket chain, it developed a quality own-brand and its 
own central distribution system. By the time the fiftieth store was opened in 1989, it 
was the fourth largest DIY retailer in terms of sales. The plan was to continue to expand 
operations.
10.3 1992 -  1993: The Turbulent Years of Grocery Retailing
Sainsburv’s Position in the Market
At the beginning of 1991, Sainsbury was the market leader in UK grocery retailing and 
was on the way to establishing itself as a true national operator with its first outlets 
Scotland and in North Wales opening in 1990. This was accompanied by increasing 
sales, profits and operating margins. Economies of scale, tight control of costs and 
increased productivity, resulting from investment in information technology contributed 
to increased profitability.
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In November 1992, Sainsbury announced its best interim results for five years. In the 
same month. Lord Sainsbury, chairman since 1969, retired on his 65th birthday. He was 
succeeded by his cousin, David Sainsbury, who had been working with the company 
since 1963. The new chairman made it clear that there would be no ‘cabinet reshuffle’ 
as a result of the change in chairing: “We share very similar views on the direction of 
the business and very similar values. We have a clear strategy and I have been involved 
in developing that strategy” (David Sainsbury, Chairman, from Williams, 1994: 211). 
He highlighted: “Food retailing is a very dynamic and a very competitive business. It is 
a market of changing fortunes. We are leaders now and it is absolutely my intention to 
have a bigger lead when I cease to be chairman. But we will only do so by changing our 
business. I am certain we will be a very different business in 10 years’ time.” (David 
Sainsbury, Chairman, from The Financial Times, 11/06/94: XXII).
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The Grocery Retailing Market at the Beginning of the 1990s
Sainsbury had successfully transformed itself from a large regional operator with stores 
located in city centres to a national operator with large city centre supermarkets and 
large edge-of-town superstores. However, several events occurred in the early 1990s, 
which had significant consequences on competition in the GR1 and on Sainsbury’s 
strategy.
In the early 1990s, some of Sainsbury main competitors were in trouble. Gateway had 
been taken over by Isosceles and was struggling under a high debt burden. ASDA was 
also having problems in digesting a large acquisition of Gateway’s superstores and 
changing its own market position. In January 1990, Verdict Research, the retail 
consultant, published a report affirming that price competition was unlikely in the near 
future. Only Sainsbury and Tesco would have had any chance of fighting a price war. 
The focus was to stay on quality rather than price. However, things soon began to 
change. In 1990, the British economy started to slow and in 1991 went into recession. In 
the meantime, the trend towards edge-of-town sites left retail space in many city 
centres. Locations previously occupied by large retailers were taken by traditional city 
centres operators such as Kwik Save and Iceland. The former consolidated its position 
as a national discount operator with 750 stores by 1991, the latter as a city centre frozen 
food specialist. However, in recent years, a number of ‘hard and soft’ discounters, such 
as Aldi, Netto, Lidl and Ed had made their entry into the UK GRI. Initially, their entry 
was not seen as posing a particular threat to large retailers operating at the higher end of 
the market. The argument was that discounters were targeting a different market 
segment. Hence, operators such as Safeway, Sainsbury, and Tesco, which targeted
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customers at the higher end of the market, would not be affected. However, things were 
to work a different way.
In the winter of 1991/92, ASDA changed its price position in the market. The company 
had previously attempted to position itself at the upper end of the market, alongside 
Sainsbury, Tesco and Safeway, but its attempts failed and the new management decided 
to return to its roots as an edge-of-town discount chain. In May 1992, Kwik Save 
announced that it would be reducing prices in response to competition from hard 
discounters. In September 1992, Tesco produced disappointing interim results. In some 
parts of the country, Tesco had losing market share to discounters and had responded by 
offering cheaper lines. In November 1992, Norman, chief executive of ASDA, warned 
that the ‘halcyon days’ of grocery retailing were at an end. In January 1993, a report 
published by Verdict, the retail consultant, stated that discounters had quickly 
consolidated their presence within the market. In May 1993, Gateway launched a cut- 
price “Price Check” campaign. In August 1993, Tesco launched ‘Tesco Value’, a cut- 
price own label, covering 70 products, which was to replace tertiary brands. In 
September 1993, Tesco produced disappointing half-year results, with lower than 
expected profits and lower margins. Tesco management acknowledged, for the first 
time, the growing threat posed by discount operators. They also acknowledged that 
Tesco had not promptly reacted to the recession and that they had not recognised the 
changing priorities of its customers. Tesco’s repositioning opened a gap of four to five 
percent between the price of its basic products and those of its competitors such as 
Sainsbury and Safeway.
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Change in Strategic Direction
Unlike Tesco, Sainsbury operations had not been directly hit by discounters and results 
in 1992 and 1993 were in line with expectations. However, the price repositioning 
exercise by Tesco had left a gap that could have consequences in the longer term. It was 
not surprising, therefore, that in November 1993 Sainsbury announced that it was 
repositioning on price by launching a new “Essential-for-Essentials” own-label discount 
brand covering 300 popular lines. In this way, Sainsbury closed the gap that Tesco had 
opened two months earlier. Furthermore, the management recognised that there had 
been big and long lasting changes in the grocery market and announced a review of the 
company’s strategic direction. Expansion in the traditional core grocery retailing 
activity was to remain at the same level, with a fall only planned for the end of the 
decade. However, in future, the company was to step up expansion plans for other types 
of retailing, at home and overseas. Two months later, in January 1994, Sainsbury 
produced a disappointing Christmas trading notice and announced £365 million in 
property write-down and changes in depreciation policies. This followed similar moves 
taken by Safeway and Tesco between December 1993 and January 1994. Safeway and 
Tesco also declared their intentions to cut expansion plans and Tesco reported plans to 
build smaller and cheaper stores.
As at Tesco and Safeway, management at Sainsbury had initially argued that 
discounters did not pose a real threat to large operators. However, as at other 
companies, management did not expect that the expansion of discounters would 
provoke a “domino effect” .
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The Other Businesses
The decision to consolidate other businesses did not come as a surprise. All the other 
retail businesses had been performing very well and, since 1992, an increasing 
proportion of group capital expenditure had been devoted to the development of the 
retail subsidiaries as the management declared its intention to consolidate the 
diversification programme.
In the US, Shaw’s had gone through a difficult period between 1989 and 1992, as New 
England’s economy went through a recession. As the economy recovered, performance 
started to improve with operating profits in 1993/94 up by almost 50% on sales that had 
increased by only 6.7%. Since the acquisition in 1988, Sainsbury had been transferring 
its expertise in centralised distribution, internal computer systems, and own-label 
development to Shaw’s. The own-label development was a remarkable achievement 
since, in the US, own-label traditionally signified low quality. Shaw’s managed to 
transmit the message to customers that own-label could also represent quality. Own- 
label products accounted for 25% of sales by 1993, compared with the 14% average for 
US food retailers. Value-adding services such as pharmacies had also been introduced. 
The company expanded its operations and operated 87 stores in 1994, with a sales area 
of 2.7 million square feet compared with 60 stores in 1988 with sales area of 1.6 million 
square feet.
Savacentre was also successful, with progressively improving operating profits. Since 
the acquisition of the 50% share from Storehouse, three new outlets had been opened 
and the sales area had increased by almost 50%. Savacentre’s systems for
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administration and buying had been integrated with those of Sainsbury, whilst retaining 
a separate marketing identity and operating responsibility.
The best performance was, however, achieved by Homebase. The business continued to 
expand with higher sales and operating margins. This was achieved despite, since 1990, 
the D1Y market had been depressed by a housing market recession and fierce 
discounting since 1992.
10.4 1994-1995: Consolidation of the Diversification Programme
Between 1994 and 1995, in line with what had been announced at the end of 1993, 
Sainsbury made three important moves aimed at consolidating its diversification 
programme.
In October 1994, Sainsbury acquired a $325 million (£205 million) stake in Giant Food, 
a supermarket chain based in Washington DC and also operating in Maryland and 
Virginia. Giant was the 15th largest US food retailer. Sainsbury acquired 16% of the 
equity but controlled 50% of the voting rights, together with the possibility of electing 
three of Giant’s seven board directors. Sainsbury acquired the share from family 
members of one of the founders of Giant. The remaining 50% of voting shares was still 
in the hands of the other founder of the business, Israel Cohen. Giant Food dominated 
the Washington DC grocery market with a 44% market share. In 1993, it had sales of 
$3.57 billion and pre-tax profits of $151.8 million. David Sainsbury, chairman of
Chapter JO -J . Sainsbury PLC - page 240
Sainsbury, commented: “This is very much a first step. ... We will see how things 
develop. We regard the North American market as one of the major areas of growth for 
the group in the future” (The Financial Times, 04/10/94. 21). Giant was founded in 
1935 and had a trading philosophy similar to Sainsbury, emphasising customer service 
and value for money. Giant planned to expand into the surrounding states of Delaware, 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey; taking the chain into states where Shaw’s was also 
planning to expand. Giant and Shaw’s made a good fit. Combined, the two companies 
had a turnover of $6 billion and a strong position in seven out of 10 of the US’s most 
prosperous states. However, Sainsbury was still examining expansion options in 
continental Europe.
In January 1995, Sainsbury acquired, at a provisional cost of £290 million, Texas, the 
homecare subsidiary of Ladbroke. Texas was the second largest DIY retailer in the UK 
with sales of £658 million in 1994 from over 240 stores. There was little overlap 
between the Texas and Homebase chains. The plan was to integrate Texas into 
Homebase’s operations, making Homebase Britain’s second largest DIY operator 
behind B&Q. Homebase would reach a market share of about 10%, with sales of more 
than £900 million from about 260 stores. Profitability would benefit from substantial 
economies of scale in buying, own brand development, advertising and head office 
support.
Finally, in June 1995, Sainsbury announced its move to Northern Ireland, where it 
planned to invest £100 million in building seven edge-of-town superstores. The Ulster 
grocery market was dominated by three chains: Wellworths, Stewarts and discount 
chain Crazy Prices. In the longer term, the management would also take into
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consideration the possibility of extending operations to the Republic of Ireland. The first 
store started operating in summer 1996.
Improving Profitability and Consolidating the UK Grocery Retailing Business
Reducing prices on the kind of basic products sold by the discount chains neutralised the 
discounters’ threat. Operating margins fell because of the price repositioning but gross 
margins soon stabilised. Following its repositioning on price in November 1993, 
Sainsbury management was mainly concerned with improving profitability. Between 1993 
and 1994, the company extensively reviewed the supermarket’s operations. The purpose 
was to improve the efficiency and efficacy of operations. As a result, the company 
restructured store management, reorganised the management of the logistics function, 
rationalised the system for purchasing goods and services not for resale, simplified the 
construction of new stores and reduced the need for clerical support by the introduction 
of new systems. The review led to the loss of 650 jobs and savings of around £50 
million a year.
At the same time, in April 1994, Sainsbury management announced that a new town 
centre format called Sainsbury's Central was to be launched. This followed a similar 
successful experiment by Tesco, which had launched the Tesco Metro format in June 
1992. Whilst, since the early 1980s, Sainsbury had been replacing smaller city-centre 
stores with larger edge-of-town superstores, more than 100 of Sainsbury’s 340 stores 
were still on the high street. Three stores were to be converted to the new format and, if 
successful, other stores would then be converted. The new-style shop was to provide a 
service geared to the needs of town-centre shoppers. Shops were to be refitted, the
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product range slimmed down and tailored to meet city centre needs, space was to be 
made for new delicatessen, fresh hot foods and meat counters. The refitted stores would 
have an average size of 12,000 square feet, about half the size of an edge-of-town 
superstore. The decision to revitalise city centre stores was due to a number of reasons. 
The government had given guidelines for stricter planning permission policies for edge- 
of-town superstores and had implemented policies aimed at a revitalisation of city 
centres. Further, discount operators and other chains, that had taken the retail space left 
by operators moving to the edge-of-town, had demonstrated that it was possible to 
operate successfully in city centres. At the annual convention of the Institute of Grocery 
Distribution in October 1994, David Sainsbury suggested that “the big groups had been 
mesmerised by the efficiency and popularity of edge-of-town supermarkets, and forgot 
that there would always be some business located in town centres. ... ‘The market did, 
however, work extremely effectively and a number of chains, including the discounters, 
moved in to fill the gap’ ” (The Financial Times, 19/10/94: 8).
In July 1994, Sainsbury bid against Tesco to acquire WM Low, a Scottish chain of 57 
supermarkets. WM Low had been badly hit by the expansion of discounters and the 
repositioning of large operators. The acquisition would have consolidated Sainsbury 
presence in Scotland where the company had only two superstores and a market share of 
4.6%. However, Tesco acquired the company for £257 million after it increased its 
offer.
In November 1994, Sainsbury announced that tougher government planning restrictions 
were starting to bite. The group expected to open only 12 new stores of the 20
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previously planned for 1995. However, a higher proportion of capital expenditure was 
going to be invested in refurbishing older stores.
In March 1995, Sainsbury bought Nurdin and Peacock’s three warehouse clubs outlets. 
The warehouse club retail concept had been introduced in 1993 by CostCo, the third 
largest US Warehouse Club operator that had acquired two sites in the UK. Initially, it 
was thought that the Warehouse Club would have been a credible threat for supermarket 
operators, but the retail formula did not encounter the expected success. Nurdin and 
Peacock’s withdrawal left just one significant UK operator, CostCo Europe, which 
operated in two places and had plans to expand.
In April 1994, Sainsbury formed retail partnerships (SEDD) with the Italian Esselunga, 
the French Docks de France (owner of the Mommouth hypermarket chain) and the 
Belgian Delhaize ‘Le Lion’. The partnership aimed to form a strong buying group, but 
the companies were also committed to work as a multi-functional alliance where all 
members would exchange knowledge in areas such as information technology and 
systems, and co-operate in marketing and distribution. The groups were said to be 
‘culturally alike’ and all retained a strong family influence (the partnership was the 
development of links previously established with Docks de France). Sainsbury and 
Docks de France jointly opened an off-licence in Calais in April 1994.
Sainsburv’s Position in the UK Grocery Retail Market
Results for 1994/95 were positive, with strong results coming from Sainsbury’s other 
businesses. Assisted by Docks de France, a major review of hypermarket format was
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carried out at Savacentre, which resulted in a new look and a more ‘hypermarket’ 
trading style. Plans for the following years were to open one Savacentre a year. The 
management believed that the expansion of Savacentre would be easier because most of 
its developments involved a major element of urban regeneration, strongly favoured by 
local authorities (Annual Report 1995). The UK supermarket business accounted for 
87% of the group’s operating profit and 80% of its sales. However, over the previous 
three years, Savacentre, Homebase and Shaw’s had increased their sales by 31.2% and 
their operating profits by 74.2%. In the traditional supermarket business, operating 
profits were up, mainly because of cost savings achieved through the review of the 
supermarket business. However, like-for-like sales on a comparable basis were down by 
0.5%, with the trading statement for 1995/96 also showing like-for-like sales down on 
the previous year.
In June 1995, Sainsbury launched a new advertising campaign aimed at portraying 
Sainsbury as a warmer and friendlier place to shop. The focus was on services: extra 
bag packers; checkout improvements; and better facilities for mothers and babies, the 
elderly, and the disabled. However, the results achieved were poor. In October 1995, 
interim results at Tesco showed that the company had increased its volumes by six percent. 
The following month, Sainsbury reported a decline in the same period of 2.2%. Things 
were not working according to plan and Sainsbury was still losing market share to its main 
competitors.
In the late 1980s, large operators in the UK GRI were following the same strategy of 
expanding their operations by building large superstores. In contrast, from 1993, firms 
started to follow different strategies. ASDA, Safeway and Tesco, having reviewed their
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expansion plans, mainly focused on gaining market share and increasing like-for-like 
sales In September 1994, Safeway launched a new own label range covering 100 goods at 
low price, called “Safeway Savers”. In October 1994, ASDA announced a “No Nonsense” 
price freeze on 7,000 items until January. In February 1995, Tesco, followed by Safeway 
in October 1995, launched a nation-wide loyalty card scheme All these measures were 
aimed at attracting more customers and increasing volumes.
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At Sainsbury, there was little scope for improving volumes as most of its stores were 
trading at full capacity. Sainsbury still had less retail space than its main rival Tesco, but 
higher sales per square foot, higher operating margins and a higher return on capital 
invested than anyone else in the industry. Its rivals had traditionally lagged behind and it 
was expected that they would catch up with Sainsbury in the long term However, financial 
analysts were very critical about Sainsbury’s management and, in particular, its marketing 
campaigns. Sainsbury had traditionally been very conservative in its marketing 
campaigns and seemed to be having difficulties compared to competitors. Analysts 
accused the management of not adjusting to the new competitive climate and of not
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being as aggressive in its advertising campaign as some of its competitors who were 
building on their success by continuously introducing new marketing initiatives.
10.5 Sainsbury at the beginning of 1996
Poor results and pressure from institutional shareholders brought some changes in the 
company’s management. In November 1995, a new marketing director, Kevin McCarten, 
previously at Woolworth and Procter & Gamble was appointed. He replaced Ivor Hunt, 
who had resigned in October over criticism of Sainsbury’s marketing campaigns. In 
January 1996, a new management structure was announced. The roles of chairman and 
chief executive were to be split. David Sainsbury stayed on as executive chairman, 
responsible for the group’s strategy. There were to be two chief executives responsible for 
the two newly created divisions of the group. One group comprised the UK supermarket 
and hypermarket businesses. The other included Homebase and the overseas operations. 
Following changes in the management structure, David Quarmby, joint managing director, 
resigned and David Bremmer, previously chief executive of Watson & Philip (cash and 
carry operator), was appointed as chief executive of the ‘other retailing interests’ division.
At the beginning of 1996, the main worry was whether Sainsbury was going to recover the 
lost ground. According to Harris International Marketing, the retail consultancy, 
Sainsbury was still the UK’s most popular grocer, in terms of the number of shopping 
families and shopping trips, it attracted each week. However, Tesco and ASDA both 
increased shopper numbers substantially over two years. In January 1996, Sainsbury
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launched an aggressive marketing campaign aimed at regaining its position. Sales 
improvements were still behind those of Tesco and Safeway but the company was no 
longer losing out to the main competitors.
Table 10.2 J. Sainsbury PLC: Financial and Operational Statistics 1994/95
Group Sales (£; 000; after taxes) 11,357,000
Pre-tax Profit (£; 000) 808.200
Contribution to Group’s Sales Sainsbury’s Supermarkets 79.6% 
Savacentre 5 8%
Contribution to Group’s Operating 
Profits
Sainsbury’s Supermarkets 87.2% 
Savacentre 4.5%
Number of Outlets Sainsbury’s Supermarkets 355 
Savacentre 10
Total Sales Area (sq. ft.) Sainsbury’s Supermarkets 9.338,000 
Savacentre 864,000
Average Sales Area per Outlet (sq. ft.) Sainsbury's Supermarkets 26,304 
Savacentre 86,400
Market Position high
Market Share (1 9 9 4 ^^ 20.6%
Own Label Share of Sales (1994) 65.8%
Information Technology Developed
Centralised Distribution Developed
Source Various Documents
Competition in the industry will remain tough over the next few years. However, 
competition has always been very tough. Sainsbury’s management has demonstrated 
over the decades the value of its long-term perspective and its ability to maintain 
leadership in the market by slowly but steadily building and renewing the business. 
They have also demonstrated their capability to transfer the knowledge developed in 
UK grocery retailing to other businesses and other markets. The main challenge for 
Sainsbury in the future will be to maintain these characteristics in the presence of a 
multiplicity of large businesses operating in diverse geographic areas.
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Chapter 11 Tesco PLC
11.0 Introduction
Tesco’s beginnings are linked to the career of Jack Cohen, a serviceman of the Royal 
Flying Corps. In 1919, Cohen opened a small grocery stall in the East End of London. 
Within few years, he had become a successful trader and was soon wholesaling for 
other traders. In 1931, he founded Tesco Stores Limited. In the following years, under 
Cohen’s guidance, the company grew to become one of the main operators in grocery 
retailing. Cohen’s expansion strategy was accompanied by a ‘pile it high, sell it cheap’ 
retail formula that made Tesco a very popular brand at the low end of the market. Cohen 
remained in charge of company activities until the early 1970s. Under his guidance, the 
company continued to expand its scope of activities.
By 1972, Tesco had 790 stores around the UK and was, with Allied Suppliers and 
Sainsbury, among the largest operators in grocery retailing. The company had a market 
share of around seven percent and operating margins of about six percent. However, its 
performance had been declining in the previous few years. In 1973, following the 
resignation of Kreitman, Leslie Porter was appointed as Tesco’s chairman, with Ian 
MacLaurin as managing director. In the following years, Tesco’s market share remained 
static and operating margins started to go down. Tesco had a serious image problem 
among consumers. The company had, in the past, mainly focused on expansion, without 
developing adequate support systems such as distribution and central buying. Ai the 
same time, it had paid little attention to changes in the consumer market. Hygiene
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standards were low and shops were seen as over-crowded with all sorts of items. In the 
1960s, the company had entered the non-food business by adding clothes lines into its 
food shops. However, “Home ‘n’ Wear" was the least profitable line and took 
considerable space in Tesco retail outlets. Furthermore, competition at the low end of 
the market had become stiffer because of the expansion of ASDA and Kwik Save.
In 1977, in an attempt to improve competitiveness and to increase sales, in a period 
when consumers were spending less on food purchases, Tesco dropped trading stamps' 
and launched one of the most successful retail price promotions, under the name 
‘Operation Checkout’. Prices of products were cut by three to four percent on average. 
This was the beginning of a period where competition among grocery firms was mainly 
based on low prices. All the other main chains reduced prices to maintain customer 
loyalty. Many independent stores and small chains, unable to compete on prices, were 
either being driven out of the market or taken over by larger firms. This initiative 
increased the company’s market share from 10% to 12% and Tesco became the largest 
operator in grocery retailing. However, market share had been gained at the expense of 
operating margins.
During the same period, as part of the strategy of aiming to improve competitiveness 
and profitability, Tesco management also embarked on a massive restructuring 
programme. The objective was to move to a middle-up position in the market, away 
from the low-quality low-price image that Tesco had traditionally had. The strategy 
involved basing operations around a smaller number of larger stores. Small unprofitable 
stores were being closed and investments were to be made in buildings around 400 large 
superstores sized over 40,000 square feet, which had, in previous years, shown a higher
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profitability. Tesco’s “Home ‘n’ Wear” department, which accounted for 38% of sales 
area in 1978 (Retail Business 1981: 31), was rationalised. New Tesco’s superstores 
included: in-store bakeries, self-service restaurants, wine and spirits departments, petrol 
stations, garden centres, Do-It-Yourself (DIY) departments and fresh produce (fruit and 
vegetables, cheese, fish, meat). In the traditional dry grocery business, the focus was to 
be on quality and choice. Large superstores were to make food shopping a more 
pleasant activity for shoppers and to provide more services to customers. Investments 
were also to be made in distribution systems and own-label products.
Table 11.1 Tesco PLC: Financial and Operational Statistics 1980/81
Group Sales (£; 000; after taxes) 1.820,656
Pre-tax Profit (£; 000) 35,591
Number of Outlets 554
Total Sales Area (sq. ft.) 6,840.000
Averace Sales Area per Outlet (sq. ft.) 12,347
Market Position low end of the market
Market Share (1980) 13.4%
Own Label Share of Sales (1981) 20.0%
Information Technology Little
Centralised Distribution No
Source: Various Documents
In a period characterised by high costs for rents and property of the city centres outlets, 
the move towards out-of-town superstore made a lot of sense. Large out-of-town 
property was less expensive and superstores were cheaper to run. Profit growth 
depended on the success of the policy aiming to generate higher volumes and a 
reasonable return on the capital spent.
Tesco firstly introduced Green Shield trading stamps in 1963.
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In 1979, Tesco diversified abroad, by acquiring ‘3 Guys Ltd’, an Irish supermarket 
chain which became ‘Tesco Stores Ireland’ in 1980. Tesco also considered the 
possibility of diversifying in the USA, but decided against the project.
11.1 1980-1985: The Difficult Years of Strategy Change at Tesco
In 1980, Tesco was in the middle of its repositioning strategy. Between 1977 and 1980, 
226 outlets were closed, 39 were opened, and 17 outlets were acquired from Cartiers 
Superfoods, a chain operating in Kent. Tesco had 552 stores, with a total area of 6.2 
million square feet and an average size of 11,250 square feet. The company was still the 
market leader in the dry grocery market with a market share of 13.4%. However, 
operating margins had gone down to 2.6%.
At the beginning of 1980, Tesco announced a five-year plan to ‘expand dramatically’ its 
total selling area (Porter, Tesco’s Chairman, Annual Report, 1980: 3). The objective 
was to have eight million square feet of larger units by the February 1984. Investments 
in central distribution facilities, information technology, as well as improving older 
stores through refitting and refurbishment, were to be continued. The management also 
planned to expand operations in Ireland. However, at the same time this plan was 
announced, the UK economy slowed and went into recession. In a highly competitive 
environment, price was again to become a key competitive variable. Tesco’s strategy 
was at risk. There was a danger that in an attempt to move towards a middle-up position 
in the market, the traditional consumer base would erode without securing a new one. 
By late 1981, food sales started to go down. In May 1982, in an effort to regain sales,
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Tesco launched “Checkout ‘82”, cutting prices between 3% and 25% on around 1500 
food items. This touched off a new price war in the GRI. Once again, competitiveness 
was maintained at the expenses of operating margins.
In the early 1980s, the company did not expand at the same rate as originally planned. 
Investments were regularly lower than what had initially been suggested. Tesco’s 
expansion programme required high borrowing levels. In a high inflation - high interest 
rates period and with low operating margins, interest rates were depressing pre-tax 
profits. In 1981, Tesco share price reached an all time low at around 45 pence which 
valued the company at less than 50% of its asset value. The financial market, which had 
not looked favourably on Tesco ‘Operations Checkout’ in 1977, had maintained a 
sceptical attitude about the company’s ability to turn its performance around.
In 1981, Sainsbury overtook Tesco to become the largest operator in the industry by 
sales. Sainsbury was also following an expansion program in the market, but its 
operating margins had improved since mid - 1970s and like-for-like sales had been 
growing at a faster rate than inflation. Within the market, Sainsbury had an established 
reputation for quality of produce and services to customers.
In 1982, Tesco experimented with a second fascia. The decision was taken in order to 
make the most effective use of smaller stores which did not fit Tesco’s new format and 
which, according to original plans, were to be closed or sold. The new fascia, “Victor 
Value”, was a discount chain, operating with a limited range concept. Its stores had a 
size of up to 9,000 square feet. They required lower store investments and were cheaper 
to run. “Victor Value ... uses former Tesco stores which have become too small or
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uneconomic to continue trading under the parent company's name In the normal course 
of events, such stores would have closed and been sold The Victor Value project, ... has 
proved an effective way of utilising such premises with the benefit of Tesco’s back-up 
resources” (Annual Report 1985: 13).
By February 1984, sales area was 7.4 million square feet, compared with 8 million 
square feet planned in 1980. Although results from the new investments in larger stores 
(improved services and range of products, information technology and distribution 
facilities) generally supported the company’s strategy, operating margins had remained 
at around 2.5%. However, Tesco’s image in the financial and consumer market was 
slowly but steadily improving Volume gains in existing stores were at six percent and 
profitability was improving mainly because of lower interest charges. Good progress 
had also been made in the rationalisation programme, where Tesco hoped to achieve 
significant economies
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At the beginning of 1985, the plan was to continue expansion and the repositioning 
programme. The focus remained on building large superstores with a selling area of
40.000 square feet able to accommodate all activities. Stores with a selling area of
20.000 square feet were also being searched for. “The core of the company’s business 
is, and will continue for the foreseeable future to be, in its traditional market place - the 
High Street. Although many existing Tesco stores cannot conform to the company’s 
present superstore development criteria, they are nevertheless very successful. ... From 
time to time a store inevitably becomes uneconomic and it is sold for redevelopment or 
to be occupied by another trader” (Annual Report 1985: 8). The rationalisation and 
refurbishment programme was continued. Plans were also made to expand the 
operations of Victor Value. “Victor Value improves slowly but surely and we look 
forward to its making a relevant contribution to our business” (Annual Report, 1985: 4). 
To provide funds for the development programme, a £145 million right issue was 
launched in April 1985.
11.2 1985- 1990/91: The Superstore Development Phase
In 1985, Tesco’s chairman, Leslie Porter, retired and Ian MacLaurin was promoted as 
the new executive chairman. David Malpas, previously managing director of ‘trading , 
became the new group managing director. The changes in the executive board also 
brought about some marginal adjustments in the company’s strategy. While the 
programme concerning the Tesco fascia remained the same - organic expansion - the 
company disposed of Victor Value and the Irish operation. Victor Value, which had
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grown to 45 stores, was sold in February 1986 to Bejam Group for £5.25 million. 
"Victor Value, ... was moving further away from Tesco in terms of store image and 
market place identity. The sale reflects our resolve to concentrate on the mainstream 
superstore business” (Ian MacLaurin, Annual Report, 1986: 4). The Irish Operation was 
sold in May 1986 “because this business was not fulfilling our expectations and 
continuing losses left us with no alternative but to withdraw from this market, which is 
currently overprovided with food retailing space” (Ian MacLaurin, Annual Report, 
1986: 4-5).
In the years that followed, Tesco continued to expand. In 1987, Tesco acquired Hillards, 
a grocery chain based in Yorkshire. In the following years, plans were regularly revised 
and expanded: “contrary to the general market fears of saturation, all our detailed 
research has led the Board to conclude that there is substantial profitable opportunity for 
new superstores and so our development program is being increased to 790,000 sq. ft in 
1989/90, and we envisage at least this level in 1990/91” (Reid, Finance Director, 
Annual Report 1989: 7). The decision to further expand the activities was reinforced by 
the success of large out-of-town stores, which achieved, on average, higher sales per 
square foot than stores in city centres. This combined with a better margin mix and the 
economies of scale, produced higher net margins: “currently, our conforming stores, 
including new space, are producing a net margin of around 9%. The higher margins are 
required to provide good return on the substantial cost of investing in today superstores 
in terms of site cost, building, quality fixtures and fittings and extensive customers 
facilities” (Reid, Annual Report 1990: 9).
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Between 1985 and 1991, Tesco invested £3.03 billion in new stores, technology, own- 
label products and distribution systems. Capital expenditure achieved the maximum 
level of £952 million in 1990/91 (it was £170 million in 1984/85). In the same period, 
total sales area grew from 7.4 million square feet to 9.7 million square feet. The number 
of outlets reduced to 384 but average size was around 23,300 square feet, more than 
double the size they had in 1980 (11,250 square feet) New stores were profitable in 
their first year of trading, and on maturity, they were showing higher operational and 
financial results in terms of sales and return on capital. Internal re-organisation of 
functions, investment in technology and distribution significantly increased 
productivity. The investment programme was financed by a mix of financial tools such 
as internal resources, convertible eurobonds, a loan from a syndicate of banks and sales 
of some property development to property companies with a leaseback formula. Tesco’s 
operating margin went up to 6.24% in 1990/91.
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In the second half of the 1980s, Sainsbury maintained its leadership terms of sales2. 
Concentration within grocery retailing continued to increase. This was partly due to the 
take-over of some companies within the industry but also to the large expansion 
programmes of most large operators within the industry. A more liberal attitude to large 
shopping developments was taken by planning authorities from the end of 1985, which 
supported this trend. Competition within the industry remained tough but it was mainly 
on criteria other than price. Quality, choice and services had moved to the top of 
consumers’ list of priorities. Sainsbury and Safeway (which had become an important 
player since it had been taken over by Argyll) were perceived by most to be a better 
brand and had a better customer profile. However, Tesco was narrowing the gap.
11.3 1991/92 - 1994/95: The Turbulent Years of Food Retailing
In 1990, some of Tesco’s main competitors were in trouble. Gateway had been taken 
over by Isosceles and was struggling under a high debt burden. ASDA was also having 
problems in getting over a large acquisition of Gateway’s superstores and in changing 
its own market position. In January 1990, Verdict Research, the retail consultant, 
published a report affirming that price competition was unlikely in the near future. Only 
Sainsbury and Tesco would have had any chance of fighting a price war. The focus was 
to stay on quality rather than price. However, things began to change over the next few 
years,
2
S a in sb u ry  h ad  a s m a lle r  s a le s  a re a  th an  T e s c o  bu t h ig h e r s a le s  p e r  sq u a re  foo t.
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In 1990, the British economy started to slow and in 1991 went into recession. This was 
to become the UK’s worst recession of the post-war period and lasted for a much longer 
period than expected. The UK only came out of the recession in 1994. Food retailing 
had traditionally been a recession-proof sector. Tesco’s management was initially 
confident about the company’s future prospects: “despite the economic climate, and 
lower food price inflation, our food sales are holding up well and we are maintaining 
our real volume growth.’ ... ‘no business can be totally immune from the changed 
economic climate and our management will be facing this challenge during the year” 
(MacLaurin, Annual Report 1991: 5).
As recession hit the economy, prices of property, after booming in the second half of the 
1980s, quickly went into decline. However, this was not the case for sites suitable for 
superstore developments, which remained high because of competition among large 
supermarket operators to acquire prime sites. In 1992, concern was expressed over the 
increasing prices being paid for new sites. In May 1992, WM. Morrison announced a 
significant change to its accounting policies by depreciating its land assets. This came as 
its management recognised that the alternative use value of its sites might be much less 
than for purposes not related to food retailing.
In the meantime, a number of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ discounters (Aldi, Netto, Ed) had entered 
the UK grocery retailing market. Their entry was not, however, seen as posing a 
particular threat to large retailers operating at the higher end of the market: “We 
welcome the advent of Aldi and others to come. We can live quite happily in our part of 
the market and they can live in theirs” (Malpas, Tesco’s Managing Director, from The 
Financial Times, 20/09/90: 28).
Chapter 11 - Tesco PLC - page 259
Tesco’s Strategy
In the early 1990s, Tesco’s strategy remained the same - expansion within grocery 
retailing: “there is no sign at the moment of this so-called saturation level. We have 
scanned the whole of the UK a few months back and found that there were in excess of 
200 sites we would like to trade from. There is still enough opportunity for the 
foreseeable future” (MacLaurin in The Financial Times, 20/09/90: 28). In May 1990, 
Tesco bought three superstore development sites from ASDA. In January 1991, Tesco 
made a right issue of £572 million: “The size of the issue is to take account of the 
expansion of our existing businesses. We have no current plans to diversify” 
(MacLaurin in The Financial Times, 30/01/91: 1). The company planned to open 2.35 
million square feet of new selling space between 1991 and 1993, requiring an 
investment of circa £1.4 billion. “It is our policy only to develop quality sites which can 
deliver significant returns on investment. The return on capital being achieved in our 
conforming stores continues to underpin our substantial investments programmes and 
demonstrates our view that there is an adequate supply of potentially profitable sites for 
the foreseeable future” (Annual Report, 1991: 6). In 1991, Tesco opened its two- 
hundredth superstore. However, the company was expected to look for alternative 
solutions in the market. “Britons now live, on average, only 11 minutes from a decent­
sized supermarket; 90% of the population live within 10 minutes of a Tesco store; 73% 
within 15 minutes of a Sainsbury” (The Economist, 13/06/92, 323). Going back to city 
centres was seen as a viable strategy as relative costs of running high street food stores 
were again becoming favourable. Changing trends in demographics and travel, the 
growing importance of offering frequently purchased fresh foods and the current 
availability of cheap sites were elements adding to this trend. In June 1992, Tesco
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opened its first ‘Metro’ shop, in Covent Garden. Metro was a format designed to meet 
the needs of city-centre shoppers.
Chance in Strategic Direction
In 1992/93, sales on a like-for-like basis were down by 0.9%. The objective in the short 
term was to sharpen performance in existing stores through improved standards of 
service to customers, more attractive promotions, competitive prices and value for 
money. The expansion programme was to be kept at the planned levels. However, the 
financial market and market research companies were sceptical about maintaining 
similar expansion plans: “Retailers will have to restructure their businesses to cope with 
a permanent era of low margins, according to a report from the Verdict retail 
consultancy. The report sees weak demand and overcapacity continuing to depress the 
sector’s profitability for the foreseeable future” (Thornhill, The Financial Times, 
23/10/92: 14). In January 1993, a report by Verdict Research stated that supermarket 
operators were building outlets more quickly than the grocery market was expanding. In 
March 1993, rumours spread in the market that CostCo, the third largest US Warehouse 
Club operator, had obtained two sites in the UK. In May 1993, Gateway launched a 
‘Price Check’ campaign that signalled a repositioning on price. According to Verdict 
Research, growing competition from discount operators was leading to lower retail food 
prices in many parts of the country. Tesco launched ‘Tesco Value’ a cut-price own label 
in August 1993, covering 70 products, which was to replace tertiary brands. Its purpose 
was "to more effectively communicate the value Tesco has always given” (Leahy, 
Tesco Marketing Director, The Financial Times, 03/08/93: 6). In September 1993, 
Tesco’s half year results were disappointing, with lower than expected profits and lower
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margins. MacLaurin acknowledged, for the first time, the growing threat posed by 
discount operators. He also acknowledged that Tesco had not promptly reacted to the 
recession, nor had it recognised the different aspirations of its customers. Tesco’s 
repositioning on price opened a gap of four to five percent on basic products between it 
and competitors such as Sainsbury and Safeway. Compared to the main competitors, 
Tesco was more exposed to sales of low-margin petrol and non-food items such as 
clothes. Its stores were located in some of the economically worst hit areas of the 
country. At the same time, Tesco’s stores, compared to its main competitors, had been 
more expensive to develop and they were producing lower return on capital invested. 
“We have more customers in the younger age groups - between 25 and 40 - who by and 
large have been affected worse by the recession than senior citizens” (McLaurin, 
Tesco’s Chairman, The Financial Times, 23/09/92: 23). The long-term perspective did, 
however, remain good. Hughes, analyst from Nomura said that: “If the economy begins 
to recover more quickly than forecast ... then Tesco will be one of the biggest 
beneficiaries in the foods sector” (The Financial Times, 23/09/92: 46).
In November 1993, Sainsbury followed Tesco by indefinitely cutting the price of 300 of 
its most popular own-label products. In December 1993, Argyll announced cuts in 
capital spending, store expansion and a new accounting policy that depreciated 
buildings at a rate of 2.5% per year. In January 1994, Tesco announced a review in its 
plans. Changes mainly concerned superstore development plans: “It is widely 
understood that there is a diminishing number of profitable prime superstore sites 
available” (MacLaurin in The Financial Times, 20/01/94: 22). “We have carefully 
reviewed the prospects for superstore development in the light of changing trading 
conditions in the food retailing industry, the number of superstores opened in recent
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years by the major operators, and tighter planning policies. As a result, we decided to 
revise our forward programme and to increase our rate of re-investment in existing 
stores. In the UK we expect to open 821,000 sq. ft next year including 4 Tesco Metro 
stores in prime high street sites. We expect thereafter that the total will decrease to 
around 600,000 sq. ft in 1995/96 and 450,000 in 1996/97. At around 20 new stores a 
year” (MacLaurin, Annual Report, 1994: 2-3). Tesco also announced that it would 
change its amortisation policy and depreciate buildings over a 40-year period. The 
management recognised that it had paid ‘premiums’ for much of its land above its 
alternative use value and decided to amortise those premiums over 25 years In February 
1994, Tesco announced cuts of 800 full-time jobs in head office and distribution staffing 
in the following six months.
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The repositioning on price, accompanied by an aggressive advertising campaign 
brought positive results. In 1993/94, operating margins went down from 6.51% to 
5.72%, but the negative like-for-like sales trend had been reversed “There has been 
fierce competition between the superstore majors as consumers have become more
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demanding than ever about value for money. Price has become increasingly important 
as a competitive tactic as superstore operators have also sought to reduce or eliminate 
the price differential established by the discounters on a limited range of basic 
groceries” (Annual Report, 1994: 16).
New Strategic Developments
In the meantime, Tesco diversified abroad. In May 1993, the company acquired 85% of 
Catteau’s capital for £158 million. Catteau was a family-owned company operating 90 
stores in the Lille region (North East of France). Catteau had sales of £341 million. “We 
have been looking for a suitable European partner for some years. Catteau ... met our 
criteria. It is a successful food retailing company of the right size, with an excellent 
track-record of profitability and growth; it offers potential for further expansion; it has a 
strong management team in the Catteau family and the senior executives, who will 
continue to run the business; and Tesco will be able to offer the local management the 
benefit of our buying, distribution and systems skills” (MacLaurin, Annual Report 
1993: 4). “ ‘Over the next months and years, we will get to know how a French retailer 
works,’ says Sir lan. ... According to Sir lan, Tesco has been studying opportunities 
overseas for the past 5 years. After considering the US, he said, ‘we favour the 
European route’ ” (De Jonquieres, The Financial Times 19/12/92: 7). In 1994, Tesco 
also acquired 57% of the capital of Global TH, a Hungarian food retailing company 
operating 44 stores in the North West of Hungary, at a cost of £15 million. Tesco had 
provided the company with technical and operational advice for over two years. By the 
end of 1994, Global TH opened its first 14,000 square feet store under the Tesco brand 
in Hungary. The plan was to open 20 supermarkets over the next five years. In
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December 1994, the control of Catteau in France was brought to 100%. Investments had 
been made in centralised distribution, retail operations management, and systems 
development. Future plans for the French operations were to expand the scope of 
operations.
In 1994, the focus remained on price. The decrease in prices on basic products sold by 
supermarket operators had neutralised the discounters’ threat. Still, an uncertain climate 
remained in the industry. In 1993, new recommendations were introduced for tighter 
planning permission on out-of-town developments. In a highly competitive market, 
grocery retailers needed to look for alternatives to expansion of out-of-town 
developments. Tesco had already been experimenting with a city centre retail format 
(Metro) since 1992. In April 1994, Sainsbury also announced the launch of a new town- 
centre format called Sainsbury’s Central, designed to provide for convenience and top- 
up shopping. In May 1994, after the ‘Superstore’ and the ‘Metro’, Tesco experimented 
with a third format, ‘Tesco Express’, which consisted of stand-alone roadside petrol 
stations with 2,000 square feet convenience stores attached. Later in the year, Tesco also 
defined a fourth format, between the Superstore and the Metro formats - ‘Compact’, 
which was designed to offer the range of Tesco superstore products on a smaller scale.
In August 1994, Tesco took over WM. Low, a Scottish chain of 57 supermarkets, for 
£257 million. Tesco’s acquisition came after the initial bid launched in July had been 
topped up by Sainsbury, forcing the management to further increase the price of its bid.
As the economy moved out of recession in 1994, Tesco’s performance improved 
considerably. Aggressive marketing campaigns brought positive results and like-for-like
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sales grew at a faster rate than inflation and competitors. By the end of the year, Tesco 
management had regained its confidence. “I believe that these results show that there is 
still much scope for growth in food and grocery retailing in the UK for those who read 
market trends accurately and trade flexibility” (MacLaurin, Annual Report 1995: 2). 
Tesco had identified 80 potential sites in the UK for its Metro stores and estimated that 
30% of grocery spending was still in high-street shops. “That is clearly an opportunity 
for us. We have the technical skills to run quite small stores profitably now” 
(MacLaurin, The Financial Times, 04/08/94: 15).
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11.4 Tesco and Food Retailing at the end of 1995
In February 1995, Tesco launched a card (Clubcard) nation-wide, giving special 
discount to regular customers. The scheme was strongly criticised by some of the main
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competitors as being a form of “electronic green shield stamp”. However, its success 
meant that Sainsbury and Safeway responded with similar schemes in the following 
months.
In August 1995, expansion plans for Tesco Metro were enlarged as recently opened 
‘Metro’ shops had performed successfully. In September 1995, it was also announced 
that Tesco was going to expand in Northern Ireland. A Tesco Metro was to open in 
central Belfast. This followed a similar move by Sainsbury in June 1995. In November 
1995, Tesco also acquired, at a cost of £8 million, 79% of Savia, a Polish food retailer 
operating 36 stores, with a total selling area of 190,000 square feet.
In September 1995, half-year-results were excellent, with sales in the UK stores up by 
25%, and volumes were up by 6%, more than Safeway’s 4.7% and the 2.2% decline at 
Sainsbury’s. However, a 0.3% decrease in the gross margin suggests that competition 
on prices was still on. In 1995, Terry Leahy, two years after joining the main Board as 
marketing director, became deputy managing director. Tim Mason was appointed as the 
new Marketing Director. At the end of the year, the future Tesco’s board was 
announced. In 1997, Ian MacLaurin (chairman) and David Malpas (managing director) 
were to retire. Terry Leahy was to become Tesco’s chief executive, and John Gardiner 
(deputy managing director) was to be appointed as non-executive chairman. Leahy had 
been appointed in October 1992 to strengthen the marketing function, which had been 
compared unfavourably by some critics to that of Sainsbury’s. He had been behind the 
success of the Tesco Value brand, the Clubcard and other successful marketing
initiatives.
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Table 11.2 Tesco PLC: Financial and Operational Statistics 1994/95
Group Sales (£; 000; after taxes) 10,101,000
Pre-tax Profit (£; 000) 595,200
Contribution of Tesco to Group’s Sales 95.6%
Contribution of Tesco to Group's 
Operating Profits
97.2%
Number of Outlets 519
Total Sales Area (sq. ft.) 12,641,000
Average Sales Area per Outlet (sq. ft.) 24,900
Market Position medium-high
Market Share (1994) 19.1%
Own Label Share of Sales (1994) 56.1%
Information Technology developed
Centralised Distribution developed
Source: Various Documents
Tesco was one of the first companies to understand that changes in consumer behaviour, 
planning permission and city centres property prices were creating new possibilities in 
the market. With its four formats, catering for the different needs of customers, Tesco is 
also the only company with a fully articulated strategy to address new opportunities. 
However, as a typical Tesco Metro is only a quarter the size of a new superstore, 
moving back into the high street will not offer the same scope for growth as superstore 
expansion did in 1980s. Recent government regulations to discourage further out-of- 
town retail development have been criticised as they discriminate in favour of those 
already operating by sheltering them from fresh competition, whilst increasing threats 
for traditional city centre grocery retailers. Competition in the industry will remain 
tough in the next few years, especially given Argyll’s divestment of Lo-Cost to 
concentrate on Safeway, and the successful comeback of ASDA. Recent Tesco success 
has mainly been at the expense of its main rival, Sainsbury. This indicates that if a gap
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between the two main companies in the 
of the consumers. In the next years, it 
respond to Tesco’s challenge.
industry still exists, it is not perceived by most 
will be interesting to see how Sainsbury will
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Chapter 12 Discussion
12.0 Introduction
In Chapter seven, we analysed the changes that have occurred in the GRI since the end 
of the Second World War. Chapters eight to eleven described the strategies of the four 
largest firms operating in the UK GRI between 1980 and 1995. Having analysed the 
strategies of the four companies separately, the objective of this chapter is to discuss the 
two themes and research questions developed in Chapter five in the light of the 
information gathered through the empirical research. The first theme aims to analyse the 
mechanisms characterising the dynamics of industrial and business change. The second 
theme analyses similarities and differences among firms relative to a number of issues 
of importance to strategic groups’ research. An important introduction to the discussion 
will be the following brief review of Lewis and Thomas’ (1990) study of strategic 
groups in the UK GRI.
12.1 Strategic Groups Research on the UK GRI
This section analyses the content of an article published by Lewis and Thomas (1990)' 
on strategic groups in the UK GRI. This article contains the results of a typical strategic 1
1 This research served as a basis for the development of other papers on strategic groups in the UK GRI 
(e g., Carroll et al. 1992, Lewis and Thomas 1994; Carroll et al. 1994).
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groups study. Therefore, it will be a useful basis for subsequent discussion of firms’ 
strategies and industry structure in the GRI.
The objective of Lewis and Thomas’ (1990) paper was to test the hypothesis that a 
relationship between strategic groups and financial performance exists. Three different 
techniques were used to identify strategic groups, reflecting the researchers’ concern 
that findings in the existence of a relationship between strategic groups and performance 
may be equivocal because of the methodological techniques used. The UK retail 
grocery sector was described as “a static market where considerable consolidation is 
continuing to take place”2 (387). The industry was chosen because although “dominated 
by a small number of large multiples, they differ from each other along a number of 
merchandise, store portfolio, and service dimensions. We would therefore expect to be 
able to identify a number of distinct groups” (387, emphasis added). The 1982-86 
period “was chosen because it represented a stable strategic period” (ibid. 395).
Table 12.1 Strategy Variables in Lewis and Thomas’ Research
Number of Stores 
Average Size of Stores 
Advertising Expenditure / Sales 
Number of Food Lines
Proportion of Own Label Lines_____________________
Source Based on Lewis and Thomas (1990)
A distinction was made between multiples, independents and co-operatives, which, as 
we argued in Chapter seven, represents a customary way to distinguish firms in the 
industry. Lewis and Thomas specifically focused on the multiples, and in particular, on
2 It can be noted that the term static is defined in the Collins English Dictionary as «not active or moving; 
stationary», and in management research is directly related to the market being in equilibrium. The latter 
is defined in the Collins English Dictionary as «any unchanging condition or state of a body, system, etc»  ^
These are two important conditions for the measurement of the relationship between strategies and 
performance.
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the 16 largest retailers which formed about 60% of the sales of the industry. A number 
of variables representing firms’ strategies were also identified (Table 12.1) and firms 
were clustered into groups. Various techniques were used to cluster firms (Table 12.2). 
The first technique used the “relative size” of a firm as a proxy for strategic group 
membership based on Porter’s (1979) paper. A second used strategic dimensions 
reflecting “firms’ scope and resource commitments” based on Cool and Schendel’s 
(1987) paper. Initially, seven variables were identified, reflecting firms’ scope and 
resource commitments. As high correlation was found between some variables, they 
were subsequently reduced to five variables (Table 12.1).
Table 12.2 Strategic Groups in the UK GRI
Clustering Approach Used Results
Size (sales) Marks & Spencer, Tesco, Sainsbury 
Dee, Argyll, ASDA
Waitrose, Safeway, Kwik Save, Fine Fare, Iceland, Budgen, WM Low, 
Hillards, WM Morrison, Bejam
Five Strategy Variables Marks & Spencer 
Argyll
Kwik Save, Dee, Budgen 
Iceland, Wm Low, Bejam 
Hillards, Tesco, Sainsbury. Fine Fare 
Safeway, Waitrose 
Wm Morrison, ASDA
Factors Marks & Spencer 
Dee, Argyll
Bejam, Kwik Save, Iceland
Budgen, Fine Fare, Wm Low
Hillards, Tesco, Sainsbury, Wm Morrison
Safeway, Waitrose
ASDA
Discernible Strategic Groups Marks & Spencer 
Dee, Argyll
Hillards, Tesco, Sainsbury (Wm Morrison) 
ASDA (Wm Morrison)
Safeway, Waitrose
Source B ased on Lewis and T hom as (1990)
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According to the clustering method used, Lewis and Thomas found that a number of 
companies changed their group membership (Table 12.2). However, “a core of stores 
occupying clearly distinguishable groups is discernible” (ibid.: 391).
Lewis and Thomas did not find unequivocal results about the relationship between 
strategic groups and financial performance. However, they argued that research should 
be extended longitudinally to allow for an examination of the difficulties firms may face 
in shifting strategic group membership. They specifically referred to Argyll and Dee 
Corporation. Argyll’s acquisition of Safeway to augment its upgrading “will not involve 
the transformation of the newly acquired stores. There is thus less learning involved in 
Argyll’s strategy. Argyll’s strategy for moving up-market appears to be more soundly 
based than Dee’s” (ibid.: 391). Furthermore, a longitudinal analysis would provide 
richer evidence of the extent of intra and inter group rivalry.
Within the context of this research, the analysis of Lewis and Thomas’s (1990) paper 
aims to show the characteristics of a typical strategic groups piece of research which, in 
this specific case, has been made by using data related to the UK GR1. What emerges is 
that:
1. the focus was on the relationship between strategic groups and performance or the 
dynamics of groups’ structures. The observable variables were deemed to be the 
determinants of firms’ performance;
2. attention was on groups rather than on firms;
3. attention was on asset endowments deemed to represent firms’ strategies; and
4. the industry was seen as static and in equilibria.
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In the following sections, we discuss the questions outlined in Chapter five, given the 
information gathered through the empirical investigation.
12.2 Theme 1: Analysis of the Mechanisms Characterising the 
Dynamics of Industrial and Business Change
12.2.1 Question 1 How do changes in firms’ strategies relate to changes in the 
industry structure? Are firms responsible for the process of change or do 
they react to changes in the external environment?
Strategic groups theory is silent on the origins of changes in competitive structure. This 
question aims to provide an in-depth examination of the characteristics of strategic 
change in the industry. The objective is to understand the characteristics of industrial 
and business change, to see how industrial change relate to business change, and to 
understand the relationships between firms and the external environment.
In management research, there has been a long debate about the role of strategy choice 
versus environmental determinism. We want to understand to what extent the external 
environment influences firms' strategies and how firms influence the external 
environment. However, it will also be important for understanding the synchronism 
existing between industry and firms’ strategic changes. This will enrich our 
understanding of the relationships existing between the strategies of firms competing
within a similar environment.
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In the following section, we analyse this issue by looking separately at changes in 
industry structure and firms’ strategies. This is the basis for a further analysis of the 
relationships between firms’ strategies and industry structure.
12.2.1.1 The Dynamics of Industry Structure
In traditional strategic groups research, the structure of an industry is seen in equilibria, 
broken at some points in time when changes in the structure of the industry take place. 
Our analysis indicates that the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure are 
characterised by the existence of simultaneous continuity and change. Our approaches 
to strategy analysis are wrong in dichotomising continuity and change. We can see 
much continuity in the analysis of firms’ strategies and industry structure and indeed 
many important elements remain important over time. However, there is also 
continuous change taking place in the industry structure as well as in firms’ strategies.
In the analysis, we noticed how important changes have taken place in the structure and 
nature of the industry. We have seen how, since the end of the Second World War, the 
number of grocery retailers and grocery outlets has been continuously decreasing. We 
have progressively passed from an industry composed of firms mainly offering dry food 
products to customers to an industry composed of firms offering a wide range of food, 
household products and other services. Thus, the traditional distinction between grocery 
retailers and other food retailers has progressively diminished in importance.
There has always been a differentiated approach to retailing. In the past this took the 
form of specialist shops (butchers, greengrocers, bakers, etc.) and grocery shops. Today,
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differentiation has changed. With the transition from specialists to large multi-product 
retailers, retailing has lost, to some extent, its character of specialisation and 
differentiation. However, more differentiation exists in the grocery category, which 
encompasses retailers in the comer shop to those of the hypermarket. The development 
of superstores and hypermerkets has brought more differentiation in terms of store 
choice within the grocery category. Furthermore, the expansion of store size has created 
the condition for more differentiation in terms of product ranges.
However, there has also been continuity in the importance of some characteristics of 
industry structure. Retailers still perform their retailing function in a similar way. 
Customers visit a shop where they can choose among a variety of products and the 
retailer’s role is to maximise sales (and profits) by attracting the highest number of 
customers. This is done through the combination of a number of marketing variables 
concerning location, price, choice, ambience, and services.
Another element of continuity concerns the distinction between multiples, independents 
and co-operatives. According to this classification, important distinctive elements can 
be identified. Co-operatives have institutional characteristics that considerably influence 
the dynamics of their strategies. Co-operatives operate under statutes that state saying 
that they are not profit-making companies. They are not quoted on the stock market and 
cannot raise external funds in the same way as other quoted companies. It is therefore 
possible to say that this classification still distinguishes important differences among
retailers.
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We can therefore see how the dynamics of the industry structure are characterised by 
contemporaneous continuity and change. Changes in the characteristics of the industry 
have been progressive rather than immediate.
In the analysis, we have identified a number of elements that play an important role in 
the changes occurring in the industry structure: firms’ strategies, consumer markets, 
legislation and technology. In the following sections, we assess the relationship between 
changes in these variables and industry change.
12.2.1.1.1 The Role of Firms’ Strategies on Industry Changes
The GRI is characterised by a stable consumer market, with expenditure on food not 
growing significantly since the 1960s. In a stable market, companies have few strategic 
options: divestment, price competition, market growth and market penetration. Large 
grocery retailers do not want to compete directly. In a mature market, this would lead to 
price competition and take profits away. Price competition in the multiple sector is a 
short-term strategy aimed to increase sales. Examples are the price campaigns of Tesco 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Market growth is a difficult strategy to follow, given 
the trend towards controlling our diets and eating out. Firms’ strategies are generally 
aimed at penetrating their market geographically as well as at expanding their range of 
products and services.
Large multiples have followed, over the past two decades, a geographic flanking 
strategy (Duke 1991). They have expanded the geographic scope of their operations and 
taken market share away from weaker companies. Large companies have competed 
indirectly by opening new stores where weaker companies were present. This is clear if
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we consider that large multiples all have had positive “like-for-like sales”, which would 
not occur if these companies were competing directly. Sometimes large retailers have 
entered in price competition. However, because this is an unprofitable option, no 
operator in the industry has an interest in price competition, especially in a situation 
where large retailers are still growing. For a long time, there have been rumours of 
saturation in the industry but until newly established shops are profitable and like-for- 
like sales for most large operators are positive, companies will continue to build new 
stores. Positive like-for-like volume sales are an indicator for large retailers that 
cannibalism does not exist among large operators and that they all take sales from 
smaller retailers.
The obvious victims of expansion strategies by a number of retailers have been weaker 
retailers, specifically independent retailers, whose share of the market has been 
constantly decreasing. Co-operatives have also been the victims of multiples’ strategies. 
The effects have been slow because the market is geographically dispersed and 
population is sparsely distributed.
Firms’ strategies have, therefore, influenced the industry structure. However, there has 
also been an impact on the nature of the industry. Large companies have also pursued a 
strategy that aims to expand the ranges of products and services available to customers. 
In this way, they have enlarged the basis of competition among retailers. They have, 
therefore, developed an element of differentiation. This has been possible because of the 
progressive development of large supermarkets and superstores located on edge-of-town 
sites, providing shoppers with all the services they need in a specific place.
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12.2.1.1.2 Consumer Market, Firms’ Strategies and Industry Change
In order to understand the changes in the industry, it is also necessary to look at the role 
played by the consumer market and by the changes in the consumer markets.
By looking back at some characteristics of British society in the 1950s and 1960s, we 
can understand and justify the structure of the industry at the time. In 1960, 99% of 
households used to shop once a week, and of these, 23% went everyday and another 
36% twice a week (Economist Intelligence Unit 1961). Thus, almost 60% of population 
were food shopping at least twice a week. By 1969, only 61% of British Households 
had a refrigerator (Retail Business 1973), which meant that food had a short life and 
shopping had to be done often. Only 58% of households owned a car, driven by men, 
while shopping was done by women. Therefore, it is not surprising that retailing was 
concentrated in city centres where it was easily accessible for consumer3. Over the past 
30 years, the consumer market has significantly changed. Refrigerators, microwaves, 
deep freezers and cars have become widespread facilities. There has been a shift 
towards equal roles for women and men. The result has been that shopping has 
significantly changed. Consumers tend to go shopping less often and spend more. 
However, there has also been a shift towards convenience food. “Time pressures have 
... resulted in consumers wanting to spend less time shopping and to do it less 
frequently. Greater affluence enabled consumers to buy refrigerators and freezers, 
which enable to store foods longer and reduce the need to do a daily shopping. For
’ In commenting a study made by Fine Fare on the relationship between distance travelled and turnover at 
the Fine Fare superstore in Aberdeen, Retail Business argued: «It is noteworthy ... that around half (56%) 
of the Aberdeen store's turnover derives from an area within walking distance of the store. If at all 
representative, this factor would seem to indicate the value to superstores of a heavy local resident 
population within their inner catchment» (Retail Business 1973: 26). We also note that 74% of household 
shopping at the store were within a three miles distance from the superstore.
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packaged groceries, weekly shopping has become the norm, with more affluent 
shoppers tending to shop even less frequently for basic items” (AGB 1996: 7).
From the analysis of changes in the consumer market, two interesting elements emerge 
for the analysis of the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure in the GRI.
• First, the analyses of changes in the consumer market are necessary conditions to 
explain how and why multiples with their strategies have taken market share away 
from other retailers and why the industry structure has changed over time.
• Second, clear advantages for multiples did not exist a priori. If this were the case to 
start with, then changes would have happened instant. The reality is one of 
“becoming” rather than of “existing”. Multiples have become important because of 
the combination of their strategies and changes in the consumer markets; multiples 
were not important to start with.
12.2.1.1.3 The Dynamics of Industry Structure and Governmental Policies
The analysis also indicates that government intervention had an important effect on the 
dynamics of the industry structure.
In the 1960s, the abolition of the Retail Price Maintenance (RPM) created the possibility 
for companies to adopt a differentiated approach to price. Thereafter, companies were 
able to develop their strategies based on a policy of price differentiation. Public policies 
in 1985 and 1993 contributed first to the development and later to the restriction of 
edge-of-town developments. The most recent guidelines protect operators that, over the 
past years, developed a consistent network of superstores but not companies that have 
traditionally been operating in city centres. Following the sharp decline in city centre
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developments, large operators have been re-discovering, since the early 1990s, the 
potential for doing business in city centres.
Government policies have therefore created asymmetries in competition, with city 
centres operators unable to invest in edge-of-town development, while edge-of-town 
operators are able to do so in city centres.
In the 1970s and 1980s, retailing in city centres had become very expensive because of 
planning permission constraints and high competition for the best sites. This is why ^ 
companies pushed for a relaxation of planning permission. However, competition 
between companies for the best edge-of-town sites and falling prices for city centre 
commercial property (resulting from the decline in the number of companies and stores 
operating in retailing, as well as from the migration to edge-of-town stores), means that 
the gap between city centre retailing and edge-of-town superstores significantly 
narrowed in the 1990s.
However, if governmental policies affect the dynamics of the industry structure, firms 
also play an important role in the process that leads to the decision to be taken. The '  
adoption of government policies followed a long period of public debate about the 
usefulness and the implications of the above-mentioned policies. This was the case for 
the abolition of the RPM, as well as for changing planning permission policies. 
Companies and lobbying groups have exerted significant pressure on government. In 
both cases mentioned above (RPM and liberalisation of planning policies), there has 
been pressure from companies.
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In 1961, Tesco put the price of “Bex Bissell Shampoo Master” below the resale price. 
British Xylonite, the manufacturer, took legal action. Tesco restored the resale price, but 
with a poster-sized apology to customers:
Figure 12.1
BEX BISSELL SHAMPOO MASTER 
Because the manufacturers have taken legal action to maintain resale price
You Have to Pay 67/6
They Only Cost Us 36/-
Showing 87.5% Profit Equals 31/6
Our Price was only 47/6, Saving You £ 1
This is What RPM Means to You!
(Source: Powell 1991: 99)
These campaigns were widely publicised in the media, creating awareness of the 
existence of the issue, which was later addressed by the government.
Another important example of companies influencing government policies occurred in 
the early 1990s. At the time, some warehouse club operators were investing in the UK. 
CostCo got planning permission for the development of a warehouse club. Tesco, 
Sainsbury and Argyll got together and went to court arguing that warehouse club 
operators received their planning permission as wholesaling operators. Hence, they 
could not retail to mass consumers. Alternatively, they had to be considered as retailers 
and therefore needed to go through the lengthy procedure of obtaining planning 
permission characterising grocery retailers. The result was that warehouse clubs could 
only have a percentage of their sales going to the mass consumer market (25%).
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12.2.1.1.4 Technological Change and the Dynamics of the Industry
By looking at the characteristics of the UK GRI, we cannot say that it has been 
characterised by significant technological breakthrough. Although, experiments have 
been undertaken in relation to the development of home shopping through computer 
terminals, retailing is still characterised by customers visiting a shop and choosing what 
to buy among a variety of products. However, retailing has significantly changed as a 
result of technological innovations that have been developed in other sectors. 
Specifically, the development of the food processing industry has had important 
consequences for the development of convenience food that is distributed through the 
GRI. This has contributed to the development of the grocery industry at the expense of 
specialist shops. More recently, the development of Information Technology has also 
influenced the way of doing business within the industry. Retailers have a centralised 
control of the distribution system as well as of the sales of product, which has 
significantly affected internal operations as well as relations in the supply chain. These 
elements have played an important role on the dynamics of firms’ strategies and 
industry structure.
12.2.1.2 The Dynamics of Firms’ Strategies
Having analysed the characteristics of the dynamics of the industry structure, we now 
focus upon the characteristics of the dynamics of firms’ strategies.
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In strategic groups analysis, strategies are seen as static. When analysed longitudinally, 
firms’ strategies are in equilibria with the industry structure. When the equilibria end, 
firms change their strategies.
In the analysis of the characteristics of the industry structure, we have argued that 
continuity and change have been characteristics of the UK GRI. The same can be said 
about firms’ strategies. What emerges is that in the analysis of firms’ strategies we can 
always identify these two interconnected elements of continuity and change.
Tesco and Sainsbury’s are of the four companies analysed those with the longest history 
in the industry. In the period considered, they have remained market leaders. In the 
1980s and, to a lesser extent, in the 1990s, they have continued their programmes of 
replacing old, smaller stores with larger retail units. Hence, it is possible to identify 
important elements of continuity in the strategies of Tesco and Sainsbury. However, it is 
also possible to identify important changes in their strategy. Both companies have 
significantly increased their total sales area and the geographic scope of their 
operations. While at the beginning of the 1980s, Tesco and Sainsbury were mainly 
operating through a network of small city-centre supermarkets, by the mid-1990s, both 
had a network of large supermarkets and superstores located in city centres and edge-of- 
town locations. The larger sales area of their outlets also enabled them to expand their 
range of products. We can therefore see continuity and change in Sainsbury and Tesco’s
histories.
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Table 12.3 Argyll, ASDA, Sainsbury, and Tesco: Financial and Operational Statistics 
in 1980 and 1995
____ Argyll ASDA Sainsbury’s Tesco
Group Sales (000)
1980/81 (aft taxes) 102,000 1,188,000 1,531,200 1,820,656
1994/95 (aft taxes) 5,814,600 5,285,300 11,357,000 10,101.000
Pre-tax Profit (000)
1980/81 1,600 51,389 62,025 35,591
1994/95 375,300 246,200 808,200 595.000
Number of Outlets
1980/81 0 78 Sainsbury’s 237 554
Savacentre 4
1994/95 Safeway 378 203 Sainsbury’s 355 519
Presto 169 Savacentre 10
Total Sales Area 
(000 sq. ft)
1980/81 0 2,604 Sainsbury’s 2,978 6,840
Savacentre 275
1994/95 Safeway 8,278 8,210 Sainsbury’s 9,338 12,641
Presto 1,038 Savacentre 864
Average Sales Area 
per Outlet (sq. ft)
1980/81 n/c 33,385 Sainsbury’s 12,570 
Savacentre 68,750
12,347
1994/95 Safeway 21,900 40,400 Sainsbury’s 26,304 24,900
Presto 6,100 Savacentre 86,400 (exc. Metro and 
Express Stores)
Market Position
1980/81 n/c Discount Sainsbury’s (high) 
Savacentre (high)
Low
1994/95 Safeway (high) Discount Sainsbury’s (high) Medium / High
Presto (medium) Savacentre (high)
Market Share
1980 n/c 8.4% 12.5% 13.4%
1994 10.8% 10.7% 20.6% 19.1%
Own Label Share of 
Sales
1980/81 n/c Marginal (7.0%) Important (54.0%) Marginal (20.0%)
1994/95 Important (51.5%) Medium (40.5%) Important (65.8%) Important (56.0%)
Centralised
Distribution
1980/81 n/c No Developed No
1994/95 Developed Developed Developed Developed
Information
Technology
1980/81 n/c Little Developed No
1994/95 Developed Developed Developed Developed
Source Based on Various Documents
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The same can be said about ASDA. If we look at the average sales area of retail units at 
the beginning and end of the period (Table 12.3), what emerges is that ASDA has 
maintained its focus on large retail units and has expanded the total sales area and 
number of retail units. The company has also maintained its traditional focus on the 
discount end of the market. However, having analysed the history of the company in 
Chapter nine, we know that ASDA has gone through two large programmes of change, 
it would actually be more appropriate to speak of several changes. In the early 1980s, 
after 15 years of continuous expansion, a new managing director was appointed and 
there was a change in the strategy at the business level. The main objective was to 
maximise profitability. The new managing director did not believe that the company 
could play an important role in the GRI and the expansion programme was slow. In 
1984, a new managing director for the ASDA Stores business unit was appointed, who 
stressed the importance of expanding the geographic scope of the activities and the need 
to change the market position by following what Tesco had done. In 1985, the group 
merged with MFI, but two years later, the company de-merged from MFI and set up its 
strategy looking firmly at the GRI. In 1989, the company acquired 60 Gateway stores. 
In 1991, the chairman and chief executive resigned after a series of profit warnings. In 
autumn 1991, the new chairman and chief executive were appointed and the company 
initially put a halt to the expansion programme and decided to re-focus on the discount 
end of the market. In 1995, the company announced a new expansion programme.
What we see is a succession of relevant events characterising the history of this 
company within a relatively small span of time. These changes have had real impact on 
the company’s performance and its competitiveness in the market. However, these 
changes have occurred amid elements of continuity resulting from past strategy, 
enabling the company to go back to its roots - as a discounter - in the early 1990s.
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Changes are even more evident for Argyll, which came to exist in 1977. The rapid 
growth within a small period tends to highlight change rather than continuity. However, 
there is continuity as the senior management has been there since the company’s 
inception, and before going into this venture, had important experience in the GRI.
We can therefore see the issue of continuity and change. However, but this will be 
addressed in more detail in the following section as we analyse the relationship between 
strategy stocks and strategy flows.
12.2.1.2.1 The Dynamics of Firms’ Strategies: Strategy Stocks and Strategy 
Flows
In Chapter four, we argued that no distinction had traditionally been made in strategic 
groups analysis between asset endowments (strategy stocks) and firms’ strategic 
investments (strategy flows). Having analysed the strategies of these four companies, 
we believe this is an important distinction for the analysis of the dynamics of firms’ 
strategies, and specifically, for the analysis of the issue of continuity and change.
Firms’ asset endowments represent the “hard” part of firms’ strategies and from the part 
where it is possible to identify the continuity of firms’ strategies. Strategy flows 
represent the dynamic part of firms’ strategies. They represent the changing part of 
firms’ strategies.
The analysis of Tesco’s strategy in the period considered, indicates how important can 
be to distinguish between the two issues. In the late 1970s, Tesco wanted to change its
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position in the industry and its way of doing business. To achieve this objective, 
changes were needed in the store portfolio, the company’s support activities and its 
approach to customers.
In the analysis of elements such as the average size of Tesco’s retail outlets in the early 
1980s, we can see an element of Tesco’s strategy stock. By analysing the investments 
made (e.g., the new sales area opened and the average size of new retail outlets), we can 
see an element of the strategy flow (the changing element). By then comparing the 
average size of the new retail outlets in year (x) with the average size of outlets in the 
year (x+1), we can see the small impact that the strategy flow had in that specific year. 
However, the continuous amount of investment made over a longer period of time 
eventually led to significant changes in the strategy stocks (Table 12.4).
Table 12.4 Tesco Stores Statistics
Year Total Sales 
Area
(sq. ft.)
Number of 
Stores
Average 
Store Size 
(Sales 
Area) 
(sq. ft.)
Sales Area 
Opened in 
the Year
(sq. ft.)
Average 
Sales Area 
of Stores 
Opened in 
the Year 
(sq. ft.)
Number of 
Stores 
Opened in 
the Year
1979/80 6210000 552 11250 524000 16500 32
1980/81 6840000 554 12347 747000 32500 23
1981/82 7203000 544 13241 532000 31000 17
1982/83 7425000 489 15184 584000 33400 17
1983/84 7362000 461 15970 241000 25300 9
1984/85 74l5000 441 16814 352000 368(H) 9
1985/86 7502000 395 18992 568000 371(H) 15
1986/87 6997000 337 20763 432000 349(H) 12
1987/88 8220000 379 21689 582500 34300 17
1988/89 7986000 374 21353 557500 34800 16
1989/90 8442000 379 22274 757000 34400 22
1990/91 8956000 384 23323 831000 41550 20
1991/92 9661000 396 24396 9505(H) 39600 24
1992/93 10352000 412 25126 859000 34400 25
1993/94 11006000 430 25595 790000 30400 26
1994/95 12641000 519 *24900 **830000 25150 33
1995/96 13397000 545 *25600 **673000 29300 23
Note: * = Excluding Metro Stores; ** Excluding Tesco Express
Source: Tesco Annual Reports 1988-1996
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In relation to strategy flows, we have to bear in mind that what we see ex-post is only 
the final result of the dynamic part of firms’ strategies. Mintzberg’s model (which 
represents the difference between intended and realised strategy, with part of the 
strategy being abandoned and an emergent part) well describes the dynamics of the 
strategy process (Figure 12.2). In the analysis of Tesco’s history we have seen how, at 
the beginning of the 1980s, the management aimed to increase the sales area by a much 
higher rate than it actually did. A part of the plan had to be revised as a result of some 
emerging issues (high interest rates resulting from high gearing were depressing 
profitability). »
Figure 12.2 MinUberg’s Strategy Model
Strategy Unrealized
Strategy
Deliberate
Strategy
Strategy
Source Mintzberg and Waters (1982)
A complete assessment of changes in firms’ strategies requires an analysis of both 
strategy flows and strategy stocks. Firms’ strategy stocks have an important influence 
upon firms’ strategy flows. The analysis of Tesco and Argyll is again indicative of this 
issue. Both companies had a network of small stores; although the companies aimed to 
have a larger network of stores, the existence of a number of small stores was critical
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for Tesco s decision to set up of the Victor Value retail chain at the beginning of the 
1980s, as well as to the launch of the Metro concept at the beginning of the 1990s. In 
the case of Argyll, the existence of a small network of stores was critical for the launch 
in 1985 of the La v  Cost retail chain, as an alternative to Presto that instead was to make 
use of larger stores. Thus, we can see the important influence of strategy stocks upon 
firms decisions. However, we cannot talk about past strategies determining future 
behaviour. If this were the case, we would not witness innovations in firms’ strategies. 
Management plays an important role in defining the future direction and in adjusting the 
strategy based on new opportunities and threats rising in the external environment4.
Finally, strategy stocks play an important role in the strategy process and their 
importance needs to be properly valued for the success of the change programme. 
ASDA had significant problems when attempting to change its market position. The 
reasons are various: management incompetence, competition and its asset endowments 
not reflecting the characteristics of the market it was targeting. ASDA superstores were 
positioned in relatively bad geographic areas. The company had a discount reputation 
among consumers. The management did not value properly the characteristics of the 
company’s assets and changes in the external environment.
We have therefore seen the importance of distinguishing between strategy stocks and 
strategy flows, a distinction that stresses both continuity and change as intertwined 
elements that characterise the dynamics of firms’ strategies.
' This is an issue that has already been addressed in management research in the form of the debate 
between strategy choice and environmental determinism. The dispute between Child (1972) and Aldrich 
( 1979) is well known. In this context, we can say that the main problem lies in the dichotomization of the 
terms. In reality, decisions are the result of the history of the company, of the pressure from competition, 
and of management creativity. We may talk, instead, of constrained choice, where the ideas/direction 
developed by management about the company's future are constrained by past resources and by the 
external environment.
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12.2.1.3 The Relationships between Changes in Firms’ Strategies 
and Industry Structure
Having separately analysed the mechanisms characterising the dynamics of firms’ 
strategies and industry structure, in this section we analyse the relationships between 
changes in firms’ strategies and the industry structure.
It is possible to affirm that the existence of heterogeneity among grocery retailers linked 
to changes in the external environment and firms’ strategies, continuously create 
changes in the structure of the industry. These changes threaten the position of 
established firms and create opportunities for other firms. There is, therefore, an 
interrelationship between changes in firms’ strategies and industry structure. They 
influence each other; as this process occurs in time, it is difficult to establish a primary 
determinant (it is a bit like the question of the chicken and the egg).
The interrelationship between firms’ strategies and industry structure is evident when 
we consider that in the 1980s, a significant number of large retailers tried to move to the 
higher end of the market by developing larger stores, offering services to customers and 
developing own-label products. Brand tends to be important and consumers tend to be 
more loyal, at the higher end of the market. Companies operating in this end of the 
market will be protected from potential entry, as new retailers do not have the consumer 
franchise and reputation of existing retailers. This is not the case for retailers operating 
at the discount end of the market where brand has little value and price is the most
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important variable. Existing companies are therefore under the threat of the 
development of new discount operators.
Figure 12.3 Retailers’ Position in 1980
National Operators Regional Operators Local Operators
Specialist Marks & Spencer
High Waitrose
Sainsbury
Safeway
Medium
Low
Discounters
Specialist
Tesco 
Kwik Save
Budgen Hillards 
Wm Low Morrison 
Gateway
Presto
ASDA
Iceland
City Edge of 
Centre Town
City Edge of 
Centre Town
City
Centre
Edge of 
Town
Source: Interpretation based on available data.
Figure 12.4 Retailers’ Position in 1995 and Relative Changes compared to 1980
National Operators Regional Operators Local Operators
Specialist
High
Medium
Discounters
Specialist
Marks & Spencer
Sainsbury’s Waitrose 
Safeway
Tesco
Budgen
Gateway J  Presto Morrison 
ASDA <  s ------------------
Iceland ^ -------------------------------------------------------- —----
City Edge of City Edge of City Edge of 
Centre Town Centre Town Centre Town
Source: Interpretation based on available data.
In pursuing their re-positioning strategies, companies closed city centre outlets and 
opened edge-of-town ones. Expansion policies of some companies had important 
consequences on the industry structure. Larger stores negatively affected small retailers;
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this is clear when we consider the decline in their numbers of operators and outlets. 
However, new opportunities have also emerged for other retailers. The decline in the 
number of operators and the move to edge-of-town sites has created space for new 
discounters who have seen the possibility for profitable development in the industry. 
They have been helped in their strategies by the fact that the price of city centre sites 
decreased while that for edge-of-town superstores increased, thus contributing to level 
the price competitiveness between the two forms of retailing. The changes in the market 
position described here have also been described in research as the “wheel of retailing" 
(Markin and Duncan 1981).
Because of the interrelationship between firms’ strategies and industry structure, it is 
therefore easy to explain the domino effect that has taken place at the beginning of the 
1990s and to partly explain the difficulties that ASDA has had in changing its market 
position.
The domino effect of the 1990s was the result of an excessive gap between the average 
price of goods supplied by new entrants in the industry (hard and soft discounters) and 
the average price of goods supplied by extant companies. Companies positioned at the 
lower end of the market were affected first but as they adjusted to the new competitive 
climate, new differences emerged between them and other companies positioned in the 
higher end of the market. The re-positioning of companies continued until all the 
companies operating in the industry narrowed the gap.
ASDA had some problems in moving towards the higher end of the market because this 
part of the market had successfully been taken by other operators. At the same time, its
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successful strategy of going back to its discounter image was also helped by the absence 
of similar retailers in the industry.
It is therefore possible to see how changing firms’ strategies have had important 
consequences on a changing industry structure and have produced effects whose results 
could not have been foreseen. These effects affected the dynamics of firms’ strategies. 
If a single firm had followed a strategy of edge-of-town superstore development, there 
would not have been major changes in the industry but as this policy was systematically 
followed over a long period of time by many companies and it was accompanied by a 
continuous decline in the number of retailers and outlets in the industry, some 
unbalances were created in the market, with opportunities for new companies to rapidly 
build a presence in the market, even in the presence of increasing concentration. In this 
context, a specific firm could be responsible for introducing an important innovation 
that starts a process of important change in the industry. However, that firm cannot 
completely control this change process, and at a later stage, may be a victim of it. 
Researchers are therefore wrong to dichotomise the issue of firms starting the process of 
change and reacting to external change. When analysed longitudinally, the same firm 
can be, over different historical periods, both an active and passive participant in the 
change process. In this context, the case of ASDA is particularly interesting.
ASDA went into grocery retailing in the mid-1960s, by developing a new retailing 
formula built around two concepts: one of superstore and one of discount. Around this 
formula, it established its success and developed. In the 1970s, the group continued to 
invest in the superstore business and was highly successful. However, in the 1980s, the
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group ran in difficulties as other companies were expanding their network of 
superstores.
Companies running into difficulties or stopping their development are a necessary 
requisite for change in the players operating in an industry. This is clear when we 
consider that firms established at different times have become important players in the 
UK GRI. Argyll went into the market in the early 1980s, at a time when many 
companies were willing to dispose of their interests in food retailing as a result of the 
strong price competition of the late 1970s, as well as because of the necessity for change 
in the nature of the service provided to customers.
12.2.1.4 Summary
Having analysed the issues in detail, we can briefly summarise the main research 
findings before moving to analysis around the second research theme. What emerges 
from the research is that:
1. The dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure are characterised by two 
interconnected elements of continuity and change. It is not possible to say that 
firms’ strategies and the industry structure are static or continuously changing. 
Continuity and change are two important interrelated characteristics of firms’ 
strategies and industry structure.
2. Firms' strategies affect the dynamics of the nature and structure of the industry.
3. The dynamics of the industry and competition influences the dynamics of firms’
strategies.
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4. It is necessary to study longitudinally the changes in firms’ strategies, industry, 
consumer markets, technology and government policies in order to understand the 
dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure.
5. Strategy is a complex concept. By distinguishing between strategy flows and 
strategy stocks, intended and realised strategy, our understanding of its complexity 
and of its dynamics improves.
6. Top management, competition and firms’ strategy stocks play an important role in 
the dynamics of firms’ strategy flows.
12.3 Second Theme: Similarities and Differences among the Four 
Firms Analysed
The second theme of this research assesses the importance of similarities and 
differences among comparable firms operating within the industry. The existence of 
important similarities in firms’ competitive positions in the industry is a key issue in 
strategic groups research.
Given Table 12.3, it is possible to start a comparative analysis of the four companies. 
By comparing the data for 1994/95 with that for 1980/81, it is clear that the four 
companies followed a strategy of market penetration. Their sales areas increased. In 
1995, Argyll, ASDA and Sainsbury also operated more outlets than in 1981 while Tesco 
operated fewer outlets in 1995 but their average sales area was larger than in 1981. The 
trend has been towards larger retail units. Sales and profits have significantly increased, 
indicating that the expansion of these four companies has been profitable. Having given
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a brief overview of the four companies, let us now look at the similarities and 
differences that exist among them.
The analysis starts with Argyll, whose story appears particularly remarkable. At the 
beginning of the 1980s, Argyll was a small company, not involved in the GRI. Within 
15 years, it has become the third largest player in the industry. In achieving this 
position, the strategic path which was followed was significantly different from the 
other three companies, especially in the first part of the 1980s when the company 
expanded through acquisitions [Sainsbury’s expanded only through internal 
developments. Tesco made two acquisitions (however, their role has been marginal to 
the development of the company, the main source being internal development). AS DA 
developed internally but also made one big acquisition (the Gateway superstores from 
Isosceles)]. If a comparison is to be made, especially for the period between 1981 and 
1987, the comparator for Argyll is Dee Corporation (previously Linfood and 
subsequently Gateway). This similarity between the two companies has also been noted 
by Lewis and Thomas (1990), who, in their study, clustered the two companies as part 
of the same strategic group. In the first half of 1980s, both companies were active 
buyers of businesses operating in GRI and within few years, they built a significant 
presence in the industry. However, significant differences also existed between Dee and 
Argyll. Soon after acquisition, Argyll’s management restructured operations by 
eliminating the duplicate structures. In 1985, following its acquisition programme, 
Argyll announced an expansion programme and the decision to concentrate on two of 
the eight fascias that the company was operating. Dee Corporation continued its 
acquisition programme without rationalising its retail portfolio or eliminating duplicates 
in the organisational structure and functions. Dee was therefore operating with many
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fascias. Synergies and economies of scale, which could have been achieved by 
centralisation of some functions, were not achieved. This was one of the elements 
responsible for the problems encountered by Dee in the second part of the 1980s.
In understanding the emergence and development of Argyll, it is important to analyse 
the management background of the senior executives. For a long period of time (over 
the 1960s and 1970s), Gulliver and Grant worked together at Fine Fare. They left in 
1972 to found, together with David Webster, Oriel Foods, successively sold to RCA 
Inc. They got back to grocery retailing by buying back Oriel Foods in 1981. They were 
therefore very experienced in the GRI and had many contacts within the sector.
In the initial view of Argyll’s management, the acquisition programme in the GRI ended 
in 1985. At the time, the objective was to strengthen the drink business. However, the 
failure to acquire Guinness in 1986 and the decision of Safeway US to sell its British 
subsidiary led to a change of strategy at the corporate level on what strategic direction 
to take. Subsequently, the company decided to focus its interests exclusively on food 
retailing and to sell its interests in the drink business and other retailing activities. 
Between 1987 and 1995, Argyll followed a strategy of internal development for its 
activities in the GRI. Thus, a second element of importance is that in the strategy 
process, events external to the firm can lead to notable changes in the strategic direction 
of a company. Some objectives may be abandoned as result of external events, while the 
rise of new opportunities also can bring changes in strategic direction.
At the end of 1995, Argyll operated in the industry with two fascias: Safeway and 
Presto. The first represents the core activity of Argyll, producing 86% of sales in
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1994/95 and 91% of the operating profits. The analysis focuses therefore on Safeway. 
Safeway is positioned at the higher end of the grocery market alongside Sainsbury and 
Tesco. At a competitive level, there are many similarities between Safeway and 
Sainsbury. The two businesses have a similar total sales area, a similar number of retail 
units and their units are also similar in average sales area. However, Sainsbury produces 
much higher sales and profits.
Table 12.5 Safeway and Sainsbury’s Supermarkets: Financial and Operational 
Statistics 1994/95
Safeway
(Argyll)
Sainsbury’s
Superm arkets
Sales (£; incl. taxes; 000) 5,325,500 9.597,200
Operating Profit (£; 000) 349,600 784,300
Operating Margin 6.56% 8.17%
Number of Stores 378 355
Total Sales Area (sq. ft.) 8,278,(XX) 9,338,000
Average Sales Area per 
Stores (sq. ft.)
21,900 26,304
Market Position High High
Average sales per sq. ft 
(incl. taxes; £ per week)
12.37 18.53
Source: Based on Various Documents
Sales per square foot are an important element of difference between the two 
companies. At the end of 1995, Safeway achieved only 67% of what Sainsbury 
achieved from its sales area. Not surprisingly, the primary objective of Safeway was to 
increase its sales per square foot, to change its image among consumers from being a 
place where to shop for topping in the weekly shopping, to being a place where 
consumers would do their weekly shopping. This has not been an easy task, as David 
Webster argued during the interview: "learning how to trade superstores effectively, 
which is where we are now, is a more complex process than many imagine.” On the
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other hand, this was not as important to Sainsbury’s management, whose main objective 
was to expand the geographic scope of operations. Therefore, we can identify two 
significant differences in strategic behaviour at the business level.
In order to understand the differences between the two businesses, it can be useful to 
analyse the histories and paths they followed after the Safeway acquisition in 1987. 
Until December 1986, Safeway had been the UK subsidiary of Safeway USA. 
Established in the mid-1960s, the company had been growing slowly in the early 1980s 
(Table 12.6).
Table 12.6 Safeway: Financial and Operational Statistics in the Five Years before the 
Acquisition
Source: Argyll Annual Reports
In January 1987, the business was sold to Argyll. Argyll was operating in the UK food 
retailing industry with two retail brands: Lo-Cost and Presto. Argyll’s management 
decided that larger Presto stores would be operating under the Safeway retail brand. 
Some 160 stores were converted to the Safeway format; an expansion programme of 
building new stores was also set up for Safeway. After the take-over in 1987, 
management was mainly concerned with the conversion programme. Safeway stores
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were performing better than Presto stores, both in terms of sales per square foot and 
profitability (Table 12.7).
Table 12.7 Financial Statistics of Presto and Safeway Stores at the Time of the 
Safeway Acquisition
Presto Safeway
Annual Turnover £5.500,000 £8,000,000
Weekly Sales per square foot £6.50 £10.10
Annual Contribution to Profitability £290,000 £510, (XX)
Source: Argyll 1991
In order to explain the rapid expansion of Safeway in the late 1980s, it is necessary to 
consider that Argyll had an assets base that could be used for the Safeway format. It is 
difficult to explain the strategic dynamics of the Safeway business without making 
reference to the corporate strategy and the other retail fascias the company was 
operating. Having decided to convert a part of the Presto’s stores into Safeway, the 
primary objective of Argyll’s management was to ensure the smooth conversion of 
Presto’s stores into the Safeway format and to further expand the Safeway network of 
superstores by building new stores. Since the end of 1985, it had become easier to build 
superstores following the clarification and simplification related to planning permission 
procedures. All the large retailers were rapidly strengthening their presence by building 
superstores. Expanding the geographic scope of operations and building new 
superstores was seen by Argyll’s management as a valid way of increasing sales and 
profits. By expanding its presence in the market, the company also consolidated its 
position in the market and made entry less attractive to other firms. In 1993, Safeway 
started to lose sales to competitors (sales per square foot remained the same, but this 
does not consider inflation; Table 12.8), a worrying signal. In the meantime, the 
situation changed; it became difficult to get planning permission for new superstores.
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The strategy review in 1994 indicated that the new priority of Safeway management 
was to increase sales.
Sainsbury, on the other hand, has traditionally had very high sales per square foot. The 
objective of Sainsbury management in the 1980s was to expand the scope of operations 
in the industry by building superstores in new geographic areas and by replacing smaller 
supermarkets with superstores. Growth had been slow but steady. Sainsbury 
management preferred internal expansion to acquisitions. Continuous investments were 
made in each of the areas that were reputed as important at the competitive level. The 
main challenge for Sainsbury in the 1980s was to transform itself from a city centre 
specialist operating at a regional level to a national retailer operating in city centres and 
edge-of-town sites without affecting its up-market image. The management managed 
this transition process very well. Sales per square foot had been slowly but steadily 
increasing in the same period.
Table 12.8 Safeway: Financial and Operational Statistics 1988-1995
Safeway 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 199.3 1994 1995
Sales (£; inc. tax; 
000)
1,400,000 2,071,(XX) 2.806,000 3,497,000 3,905,000 4,424,000 4,868,000 5,325,500
Oper. Profit (£; (XX)) N/A 105,600 158.800 222,500 275,300 336,200 329,200 349,600
Operating Margin N/A 5.10% 5.65% 6.36% 7.05% 7.60% 6.76% 6.56%
Number of Stores 176 240 291 310 322 345 365 378
Total Sales Area 
( s c p f n ^ ^ _ _ _ _
2,873,(XX) 4,265,000 5,436,000 6,011,000 6,424,000 7,143,000 7,753,000 8,278,000
Average Sales Area 
per Stores (sq. ft)
16,324 17,771 18,680 19,390 19,950 20,704 21,241 21,900
Market Position High High High High High High High
Average sales per 
sq. ft. (incl. taxes; £ 
per week)
9.37 9.47 9.91 11.19 11.69 11.69 12.07 12.37
Source: Argyll Annual Reports and Various Documents
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Table 12.9 Sainsbury’s Supermarkets: Financial and Operational Statistics 1988-1995
Sainsbury’s 
Superm arkets____
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Sales (£; incl. taxes; 
000)
4,421,100 4,903,600 5,644,800 6,515,200 7,347,900 8,276,900 8,864,600 9,597,300
Oper. Profit (£; 000) 276,000 341,800 409,000 515,700 603,800 715,900 697,000 784,000
Operating Margin 6.24% 6.97% 7.25% 7.92% 8.22% 8.65% 7.86% 8.17%
Number of Stores 283 292 291 299 313 328 341 355
Total Sales Area 5,463,000 5,964,000 6,434,000 6,951,000 7,632,000 8,303.000 8,827,000 9,338,000
Average Sales Area 19,304 20,425 22,110 23,247 24,383 25,314 25,886 26,304
per Stores
Market Position High High High High High High High
Average sales per sq. 15.56 15.81 16.87 18.03 18.51 19.17 19.31 19.79
ft (incl. taxes; £ per
week)______________________________________________
Source: Sainsbury Annual Reports and Various Documents
Having analysed Argyll, we now look at Tesco. Again, it is particularly interesting to 
compare Tesco’s history with that of Sainsbury. In their analysis of strategic groups in 
the UK GRI, Lewis and Thomas (1990) classify the two companies as being part of the 
same strategic group. Our analysis shows that important similarities and differences 
exist between the two businesses:
• Sainsbury and Tesco have been, over the period, the two largest operators in the 
industry with similar market share, both at the beginning of the 1980s and by the 
end of 1995.
• Over the period, the two companies followed a strategy of market penetration whilst 
also replacing smaller units with larger ones.
• Both at the beginning and at end of the period, the two companies operated with
stores of similar sizes.
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• Of the four companies, Tesco and Sainsbury are the two oldest operators. In the 
1970s, they had set up the policy of building larger units that enabled them to 
enlarge the product and service range offered to customers. However, at the 
beginning of the 1980s, the two companies still had a network of older stores that 
needed to be replaced by larger units.
In analysing the similarities in their investment strategy, the age of the two companies 
seems to be an important element for consideration. The oldest companies were 
traditionally city centre operators (in contrast to ASDA which started to operate in the 
mid-1960s and was always an edge-of-town operator), they therefore tended to have a 
network of smaller stores than some of the newer companies.
However, it is also possible to note important differences between Tesco and Sainsbury. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, Tesco had a much larger sales area than Sainsbury 
(which reflected its broader geographic scope of operations and its past strategy of 
aiming to be a national operator), but a much lower sales per square foot. Over the 
period under examination, these differences narrowed, but at the end of 1995, they were 
still important. It is not surprising, therefore, that following the readjustment of 
competitive positions in 1993, the priority for Tesco management was to increase sales 
whilst at Sainsbury the objective was to further expand the geographic scope of 
operations.
Further differences exist in the market position of the two companies. Sainsbury 
traditionally has had a quality image among consumers; Tesco used to have a low-price, 
low-quality image among consumers. In the 1980s, Tesco pursued a programme of
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change aiming at improving its image in the consumer market. Notable investments 
were made to support the new strategy: the development of quality own-label lines, 
better ambience in shops and services to customers. At the beginning of the 1980s, 
Tesco did not have centralised buying functions or distributions systems and little 
information technology. The company made many investments in these areas in the 
1980s. Sainsbury had always been paying a lot of attention to these issues. Sainsbury 
had been responsible, with Marks and Spencer and Waitrose, for developing the concept 
of quality own-label products for the mass consumer market. Sainsbury had also 
traditionally had a centralised distribution system and had pioneered the utilisation of 
information technology in retailing.
Table 12.10 Tesco and Sainsbury’s Supermarkets. Financial and Operational Statistics 
1980 and 1995
Tesco Sainsbury’s
Superm arkets
Tesco Sainsbury’sl
Superm arkets
l!>80/8r~ 1980/81
Sales (£; incl. taxes; 000) 1.916.-100 1,5 89,200 9,655,000 9,597,300
Operating Profit (£; 000) 51,300 64.400 561,000 784.37)0
Operating Margin 2.68% 4.05% 5 81% 8.17%
Number of Stores _______  554 241 __________  519 355
Total Sales Area 6,840,0(X) 2,978,000 12,641,000 9.338.000
Average Sales Area per 
Stores
12,347 12,357 24,900 
(excl. Metro and 
Express Stores)
26,304
Market Position Low ___________High Medium - High 1 Hijëh
Average sales per sq. ft 
(incl. taxes; £ per week)
5.02 10.26 14.69 19.76
Source: Based on Tesco Annual Reports. Sainsbury Annual Reports and Other Documents
As for Sainsburv. much has already been said. For its story and competitive position in 
the early 1980s, the most appropriate comparator for Sainsbury would be Waitrose, the 
grocery retail arm of the John Lewis Partnership. However, the comparison with
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Waitrose would be more appropriate for the early 1980s than for the end of the period 
under consideration. Waitrose has, similarly to Sainsbury, an upper end image among 
consumers and a reputation for quality own-label products. Also similar to Sainsbury, 
Waitrose was operating city centres stores in the South-East of England. However, in 
the period from 1980 to 1995, Waitrose followed a significantly different strategy from 
other large grocery retailers. Whilst most of large retailers were engaged in large 
expansion programmes of edge-of-town superstores, Waitrose decided to maintain its 
position in the market of city centre retailer operating in the South-East. It did not 
significantly expand the scope of the operations. Because of the significant difference in 
the investments’ strategies followed by the two firms, at the end of the period, there 
were significant differences in their asset structures5. For the strategy followed in the 
1980s and 1990s, the most appropriate term of reference is Tesco. However, the 
analysis of the similarities between the two companies has just been made.
Finally, we can look at ASDA. It is more difficult to find a comparator for ASDA than 
for the other companies. Established in the mid-1960s as the superstore arm of a food 
manufacturing business, ASDA established its position and reputation from the 
beginning as a superstore business operating at the discount end of the market. The 
company successfully developed in the 1970s and, although small in terms of sales and 
sales area, it had the highest profitability in the business. This was the result of the 
successful development of a business idea. As we have seen in our examination of 
ASDA’s history, the company was the first to develop the concept of edge-of-town 
superstores on a large scale. Initially, there were a number of cost advantages associated
'  It is not clear why Waitrose’s management decided not to expand the scope of its operations in food 
retailing. What can be noted is that the company is a partnership of employees. Therefore, it is 
particularly difficult to raise capital on the stock market to expand operations. Its particular status makes 
it also very difficult to find published material on this company.
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with this idea. Edge-of-town sites were significantly cheaper to develop and run than 
city centre sites. Most retailers operated in city centres. In a context characterised by 
strict planning permission, the consequence was a rise in the cost of the available city- 
centre commercial sites. This was not the case for edge-of-town sites. However, from 
the end of the 1970s, more companies started to pursue this strategy. This was 
particularly the case for Tesco, which, in the strategy set in the mid-1970s, had an initial 
long-term objective to replace its network of stores with some 400 superstores. 
Sainsbury also pursued a strategy of replacing smaller stores with larger supermarkets 
and superstores. However, in taking the initial idea developed by ASDA, these 
companies further explored it, by developing superstores for a different market segment, 
by developing information technology, and centralised distribution systems. This 
influenced ASDA’s strategy, which later attempted to imitate the strategies followed by 
other firms. It evident therefore, how it can still be very important to compare the 
ASDA’s strategy with those of its competitors.
Based on the analyse made, it is possible to try to respond to other research questions 
posed in Chapter five.
12.3.1 Question 2 What are the similarities and differences in the strategies of 
comparable firms within the industry?
The concept of strategic groups asserts that firms within the same strategic groups are 
similar in all relevant aspects. Because of these similarities, firms have similar 
performance and will follow a similar investment and competitive strategy. Caves and
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Porter (1977) argue that these similarities emerge from a similar history of investment 
and strategic behaviour, as well as from recognition of the interdependence among firms 
of the same group.
In the industry analysis Chapter, we saw that a traditional way to distinguish between 
retailers is to distinguish them in multiples, co-operatives and independents. Important 
strategic differences can be identified for each of these forms and we could argue that 
mobility barriers exist between these groups. By classifying firms in this way, we would 
be able to speak about the rising power of multiples and the decline of co-operatives 
firms. However, we cannot talk of multiples as a strategic group as argued by population 
ecologists. Speaking of multiples as a strategic group would lead us to assume that 
multiples initially ‘collectively’ recognised the existence of asymmetries within the 
industry and ‘collectively’ decided to compete against other types of grocery retailers 
(independent and co-operatives) and other types of food retailers (specialists). Our 
analysis indicates that each retailer has been operating in a very individual way. This is 
clear when we examine longitudinally the similarities and differences among multiples. 
If we consider the largest multiples operating in the GRI in 1970, and compare them to 
those operating in 1995, we see that most of the large companies of the 1970s have 
disappeared and that many large companies of the mid-1990s either did not exist in the 
1970s or had marginal positions in the industry. This demonstrates, in our view, that a 
‘collective’ mind-set called multiples did not exist as such, as otherwise, we would be 
able to observe a similar structure in the two periods.
The existence of important differences between multiples is also confirmed by Lewis 
and Thomas (1990) who focused on multiples (which could be argued to have similar
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characteristics). They found important differences among multiples, which led them to 
recognise that those firms could be clustered in different strategic groups. However, 
when we look at two firms, as we have done here we find differences that are important 
in explaining the dynamics of firms’ strategies.
Tesco and Sainsbury were put in the same strategic groups by Lewis and Thomas 
(1990), and it is often argued that important similarities exist between the two 
companies. Our analysis indicates that both companies have followed a strategy of 
expansion and have replaced small retail units with larger ones. Both developed a large 
range of products and a successful own-label. Further, they have increased their control 
of the supply chain. However, there were significant differences in terms of their 
respective strategies. Sainsbury has traditionally had a reputation for good products and 
customer services and has been positioned at the high end of the consumer market. 
Tesco has been a discount operator, providing mainly branded goods at the low end of 
the market. Sainsbury has had among the highest sales per square foot in the industry 
whilst Tesco’s was much lower. Moreover, Tesco was more geographically spread than 
Sainsbury.
Because of these differences, we have found that firms followed a different strategic 
behaviour. In the 1990s, Tesco’s strategy has mainly aimed at increasing the sales per 
square foot. Sainsbury was a regional operator until the early 1980s. In the 1990s, its 
objective was to continue to expand the geographic scope of its operations by opening 
superstores in new geographic areas. However, Sainsbury has traditionally had a very 
high level of sales per store. A strategy aiming at increasing sales per store could have 
created problems as its shops would have been regarded as being overcrowded by 
customers. This also explains the differences in the type of advertising campaign chosen
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by the two companies in the mid-1990s. Sainsbury’s advertising campaign was 
criticised because it was not as aggressive as Tesco’s. This is probably true but it is also 
true that Tesco needed to increase its sales more than Sainsbury.
Other important differences include their diversification strategies. In the 1980s, Tesco 
divested of its business venture in Ireland to concentrate on UK business. This decision 
was reversed at the beginning of the 1990s when the group started a geographic 
diversification programme in Europe. Sainsbury’s diversification strategy was set up in 
the 1970s and has been slowly pursued over the past 20 years. It has developed a DIY 
chain in the UK and has diversified geographically by buying two chains in the USA.
The two companies also have different approaches to expansion in the UK GRI. Tesco 
has traditionally been prompt to expand through acquisition. For a long time, Sainsbury 
has been reluctant to make acquisitions in the UK GRI, preferring an internal 
development option.
The problem with strategic groups theory is that it stresses similarities and gives little 
attention to the differences. The problem with any clustering technique is that it places 
excessive emphasis on similarities. Consequently, there is a natural tendency to re­
ification (we argued about this in Chapter four when we discussed the epistemological 
characteristics of strategic groups research). What emerges is that, although similarities 
are important, so are the differences. For an understanding of the dynamics of firms’ 
strategies, we cannot ignore the differences in firms’ strategies, these being found in 
their asset structure, operational issues and other characteristics. Differences among 
similar firms are important for analysing differences in the strategic behaviour of similar
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firms. It is not a case of saying that similarities are more important that differences. It is 
a matter of recognising the importance of both similarities and differences.
12.3.2 Question 3 How did firms come to develop their respective strategies? 
Are there important similarities in their origins and strategic investments 
over time?
Although important similarities exist among the four companies at the end of the period, 
our analysis indicates that the companies have very different histories in terms of how 
they developed their position in the market.
Within strategy research much attention has been given to the issue of the origins of 
firms, and to the similarities and differences in their approaches. This has been a key 
concern for strategic groups analysis as well as for population ecologists. Caves and 
Porter (1977) argue that firms operating in the same strategic groups probably have 
similar origins and histories of investment strategy. In population ecology, a 
considerable attention is also paid to the period of establishment of a specific group as it 
is assumed that this determines some fundamental characteristics that continue 
throughout the life of the companies. The institutionalisation of these characteristics 
might create inertia in the company. Therefore, if the company is forced to change its 
ways of operating, it may face significant barriers created by the institutionalisation
process.
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The four companies have significant differences in terms of their origins and in the 
paths followed to get to their position in the UK GRI. They all followed an expansion 
strategy, a necessary requisite to becoming a large grocery retailer. However, the timing 
and mode they followed differed significantly. Argyll, ASDA and Tesco came to the 
grocery market much later than Sainsbury. Argyll was the exceptional case, coming to 
the market only in early 1980s, more than a century after Sainsbury. Nonetheless, these 
companies managed to build a significant presence in the UK GRI in much less time. 
This has been possible because of the continuous change taking place in an apparently 
mature industry, which (as we discussed earlier) continuously threatens the positions 
developed by some firms whilst creating opportunities for others.
Historically, there has been a variety of means for developing a significant presence in 
the market. Tesco, ASDA, and Argyll have developed their presence through both 
internal expansion and acquisition of existing businesses. However, Sainsbury has 
developed its presence in a planned way without making acquisitions. The company has 
traditionally replaced stores reputed to be inadequate for new trading conditions with 
new stores that met the company’s definition of new trading standards. In analysing the 
slow growth of Sainsbury compared to many of its competitors, we have to consider 
that, although it was formed in 1869, the company was only quoted on the stock market 
in 1973. Today, the Sainsbury family still controls 43% of the issued capital. It is not 
surprising that the company has been growing slowly as, for a long time, its expansion 
programme has been financed through internal funds. This situation changed under the 
chairmanship of Lord Sainsbury, who became chairman in 1969, brought the company 
onto the stock market in 1973 and set up a strong expansion programme. We can 
compares it with Argyll, which was created in 1977, was always on the financial market
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and, within a small period of time, managed to build a significant presence in the GRI. 
However, this has only been possible because Argyll’s management made great use of 
the financial market as a means of raising funds to finance both its acquisitions and the 
expansion programme, and because there were favourable external conditions for doing 
so (i.e., companies to take over and favourable planning conditions).
Thus, the four companies have some significant similarities in their respective positions 
in 1995 but their origins and developments are characterised by significant differences. 
The issue then becomes, how and why do these companies come to develop comparable 
positions at a certain point in time?
We cannot say that they have a comparable market position because they recognised 
specific opportunities at a specific point of time. What emerges from the empirical 
research is that, over a period, companies developed a cue about a strategy for the 
future, a cue that was reinforced both by a positive feedback from investment decisions 
and positive results for companies following similar strategies. This has been possible 
because a significant amount of information is available from secondary sources on the 
UK GRI and also because, as discussed earlier, there have not been important 
technological innovations in the GRI that have transformed the industry and that could 
be protected by patents.
The importance of the feedback effect in the development of the strategy flows is clear 
when we consider that as the development of hard discounters started to affect the 
performance of large retailers, the management of Tesco and Argyll, unable to
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understand the reasons and the scale of the effects, announced cuts in their expansion
programmes.
12.3.3 Question 4 Are there reference points in the industry influencing 
management in its strategic decisions about investment strategies?
In strategic groups theory, it is argued that some groups are more profitable than others, 
and because of their higher profitability, the firms in other groups will try to copy their 
strategies. At the same time, firms operating within the same group influence each 
other’s strategic investments. In order to enrich our understanding of the dynamics of 
firms’ strategies and industry structure, we need to understand more about the potential 
existence of points of reference within the industry for firms’ management.
This is perhaps the most complex of all the issues analysed here because it relates to 
how firms develop their strategy, as well as the analysis of the influence exercised by 
the competitive environment upon management. In an analysis of strategic groups, the 
industry is seen as being in equilibria and information is available to all firms. The 
condition of equilibria and the availability of information enables firms’ management to 
develop cues about the competitive structure and other firms’ strategies. On the basis of 
this , management develops strategic plans for their own firms.
What emerges from the research is that there is not a single reference point in the 
industry. There is no specific group that has got the best strategy in absolute terms, as 
suggested in strategic groups theory but rather a multiplicity of reference points.
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Strategy is a complex issue. It is the coming together of decisions referring to different 
functions performed in the company. Because of these complexities, reference points 
are multiple. At any time, the reference point for a firm’s management can be company 
A for store layout, B for distribution systems, C for own-label and so on. For Tesco 
management, at the end of the 1970s, ASDA was the reference point for store concept, 
Sainsbury and Waitrose for own-label and quality of products. Thus, there is not a 
single firm that is a reference point but a multiplicity of firms.
Furthermore, at firm level, the reference points for the same issue can be many. The 
companies analysed consider what other large companies are doing at the level of the 
business. However, when they have to take their decision about where to open outlets, 
they prefer to take away sales from weaker companies. Therefore, reference points are 
both similar and dissimilar firms.
The issue of reference points becomes even more complicated if we consider that the 
industry and firms’ strategies have not been static. Because strategy is a process in time 
and firms’ strategies and industry structure are stable yet also changing, reference points 
tend to change. At the beginning of the 1980s, Sainsbury was the reference point for 
many companies operating in the industry, in terms of market position as well as of its 
own-label, information technology and distribution system. Tesco was among these 
companies but as Tesco changed its position, it also became a reference point for other 
companies (e.g., ASDA). We can therefore talk of some sort of dynamic imitation 
where the original idea is taken from outside but further developed. What emerges from 
the research is that this is not imitation in a traditionally defined sense, one firm being 
the innovator and other firms ‘copying’ the innovation. Because strategy is a process
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over time, imitation tends to be accompanied by further innovation. Companies develop 
ideas that were originally proposed by others. This is done by integrating elements that 
have been developed in the external environment, and combining firms’ specific 
resources and the vision management has about its firm’s strategy to the idea from 
outside. This has been the case for Tesco strategy since the late 1970s, Tesco took the 
idea of edge-of town superstores, initially developed by ASDA, and developed it with 
own-labels, information technology, distribution, and customer services. This implies 
that a firm may develop something new.
Until now, we have looked at the cognitive structure of single firms. The research 
indicates that the environment influences top management in its decision process, and 
that external reference points exist. However, it also stresses the complexity of this 
issue. There are multiple reference points for firms’ strategies in the external 
environment but reference points change over time because of continuous change in 
firms’ strategies and industry structure. Does this imply that no similarities exist among 
the cognitive structures of the firms operating in the industry? Does the analysis of 
cognitive structure have to be made only on specific firms? In the analytical response to 
the next question, we address this issue.
12.3.4 Question 5 Are There Similarities in the Cognitive Structures of Firms 
Operating in the Industry?
The existence of similarities in the cognitive structures of firms operating in an industry 
is a theme that strategic groups share with cognitive communities. In cognitive analysis.
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it is argued that there are well defined cognitive structures in the competitive 
environment and that they play an important role in the dynamics of firms’ strategies 
and industry structure (e.g., see Porac el al. (1989) on the Scottish Knitwear Industry).
As we have already seen, at the end of the period under study, important similarities 
existed between the firms in terms of store network, distribution systems, own-label and 
information technology. Over the past two decades, they all expanded successfully by 
opening new large supermarkets and superstores and by taking market share away from 
other companies. If important similarities existed between the firms analysed here, it is 
because these companies followed a similar investment strategy in the past. Intuitively, 
we would expect some important similarities in the cognitive structures of these 
companies to exist. The examination of the dynamics of the cognitive structures of 
companies analysed in relation to the effects that the development of the hard 
discounters had at the beginning of the 1990s provide the opportunity to analyse the 
issue in more details.
In the late 1980s, the management of Sainsbury, Tesco and Argyll (Safeway) thought 
that discounters did not represent a threat for large operators “We welcome the advent 
of Aldi and others to come. We can live quite happily in our part of the market and they 
can live in theirs” (David Malpas, Tesco’s managing director, from The Financial 
Times, 20/09/90: 28). Their cognitive structure changed when they noticed that they 
were losing market share to other companies. They then themselves had to cut price in 
response to competition from newly established hard discounters. The companies 
reacted by introducing value lines and announcing cuts in their expansion programmes. 
As wc have seen in the analysis of Sainsbury’s history, David Sainsbury (The Financial
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Times, 19/10/94: 8) argued that: “the big groups had been mesmerised by the efficiency 
and popularity of edge-of-town supermarkets, and forgot that there would always be 
some business located in town centres ... ‘The market did, however, work extremely 
effectively and a number of chains, including the discounters, moved in to fill the gap’ ” 
. Ex-post, we can say that after ignoring discounters for a long period, these companies 
initially over-reacted. What emerges is that the management of Argyll (Safeway), Tesco 
and Sainsbury did not expect to lose market share and they did not know whether lower 
sales were due to saturation in the market or to a one-off repositioning due to the entry 
of discounters. This ambiguity was due to widespread rumours of saturation in the 
market. ASDA was, in particular, a strong supporter of the hypothesis of saturation, 
with Archie Norman (chief executive) accusing other companies of a head-in-the-sand 
attitude towards the development of new stores. We argue that there was an initial over­
reaction by large retailers. By 1995, most of large retailers had understood that lower 
sales were due to a one-off repositioning in the market as new stores were still 
profitable and they announced new expansion programmes. ASDA itself announced 
new expansion programmes. Norman’s initial statements probably reflected a tactical 
move rather than a true belief that the market was saturated. Superstore developments 
take time because of planning permission and building, and in the late 1995, ASDA was 
already opening new stores. This indicates that ASDA publicly argued that saturation 
had occurred yet privately did not believe it. A more plausible reason is that ASDA did 
not wish for other companies to expand at a time when it was unable to do the same. As 
financial constraints were hampering ASDA’s expansion programme, the company tried 
to stop others from expanding.
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Because a wide number of information sources are available on the GRI, similarities 
exist in the cognitive structure of companies. Relative stability in the external 
environment and positive feedback tend to strengthen management’s cognitive 
structure. If feedback is contradicting the cognitive structure, or messages are 
ambiguous, uncertainty threatens the established cognitive structure. New stability will 
come from the management receiving expected feedback.
However, this does not mean that a unique cognitive structure exists within the industry 
or within the same firms. The existence of a multiplicity of cognitive structures is 
evident when we consider who a firm argues its competitors are. In the theory of 
strategic groups, the firm is seen in relatively simplistic terms, and it is assumed that the 
entire firm has the same cognitive structure. However, if we consider the manager of 
store X located in city Y, we would expect that its cognitive structure of competition is 
going to be very much influenced by companies operating in the same geographic area, 
with the importance of competitors changing according to its size and the geographic 
proximity. This mental structure is going to differ from that of an area manager or a 
chief executive who looks at competition from the point of view of someone 
considering between 200 and 400 stores. This has been confirmed by a study by 
Hodgkinson and Johnson (1994) on the mental models of competitive strategies in the 
UK GRI. Their research indicates that there are further differences in the cognitive 
structure of competition within the same company, showing that an objective cognitive 
structure does not exist but also that cognitive structures change within the same 
company. A similar argument can be used in the analysis of the cognitive structure of 
chief executives according to the company size. If the focus of the analysis is on large 
multiple operators, it seems normal that it is on what is going on at the industry level. If
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one takes a comer shop, the cognitive structure will probably be simpler and will only 
consider the companies operating in the same city or village. Therefore, it seems 
plausible to argue that some similarities exist in the cognitive structures of firms 
operating within the industry. However, this structure is complex in its nature and 
changes over time because of the combination of markets rumours and the effects of 
competitors’ activities. In terms of concluding remarks on the analysis of reference 
points to firms’ management and cognitive structure, we can say that this is a much 
more complex issue than has been proposed in strategic groups research.
12.3.5 Question 6 Is it possible to identify unequivocal determinants of firms’ 
performance in a way that they can be quantified and clear relationships 
between these determinants and firms’ performance can be drawn? If this 
is the case, is it possible to use successful past strategies as a recipe for 
strategy formulation?
At the basis of strategic groups research, there is a hypothesis that it is possible to 
classify firms’ strategies into variables without missing out significant information. It is 
possible to define clear cause-and-effect relationships between these variables and 
performance, and this analysis can be used as a recipe for strategy formulation.
In the analysis of the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure, it was argued 
that it is difficult to explain the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure by 
looking only at firms’ strategies. It is also necessary to analyse the dynamics of the 
industry and the external environment (consumer market, technology and government 
policies). However, this may not be the case for the analysis of firms’ performance; and
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the analysis of variables related to firms’ strategies may be sufficient for the analysis of 
the determinants of firms’ performance and their dynamics.
Determinants of firms performance and whether we can use past performance to 
indicate what the profitable options might be, are two interrelated issues that are 
difficult to tackle. In examining them, we cannot use econometric techniques because 
these techniques require the existence, a priori, of a well-defined theoretical framework. 
The analysis starts with an examination of the performance of these companies. It will 
then examine whether the determinants of firms’ performance can be identified, and 
finally, there will be an assessment of whether or not this exercise can be fruitfully used 
by management to identify the best strategy to follow.
12.3.5.1 Performance
Before starting to measure the performance of these companies, we should define what 
we mean by performance. By using “survival rate” as an indicator of the relative 
success of these companies (as in population ecology), it could be argued that the four 
companies have all been successful. However, as we are more interested in a detailed 
analysis of the relative performance of the companies. Thus, we will look at financial 
data.
In deciding which variables to consider, some problems emerge. We could be looking at 
business units only: Tesco, Sainsbury’s Supermarket, ASDA and Safeway. However, 
for Safeway, it would be difficult to explain the growth in sales without referring to the 
fact that the assets of other business units (Presto) were converted to the Safeway
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format. Furthermore, by looking only at Safeway, we would not consider possible 
economies existing at the corporate level for functions such as buying, distribution 
systems and store developments. The same can be said for Sainsbury supermarkets and 
Savacentre (the hypermarket format of Sainsbury). However, by looking at data at the 
corporate level, it would be difficult to understand the dynamics of profitability for 
specific businesses.
Bearing in mind this first set of problems, it was decided that we would examine three 
variables: (a) sales of the business unit, (b) return on sales of the business unit (ROS; 
operating margins) and (c) the return on capital employed (ROCE) of the group. The 
longitudinal analysis of the companies’ sales gives an insight into the firms’ capacity for 
growth. Operating margins reflect the capacity of the company to grow in a profitable 
way, and highlight the operational efficiency of the business. The ROCE gives an 
overall picture of the company and of the group’s capacity of earning a good return on 
the capital engaged in its activities. According to retailers, ROCE is more important 
than the return ROS (at the beginning of the 1990s, many retailers were accused of 
making excessive profits as their operating margins were among the highest in Europe. 
Retailers then argued that, although it was true that operating margins were among the 
highest, ROCE did not differ much from that of firms operating in other European 
countries).
Analysis of graphs 12.1, 12.2, 12.3 and 12.4 shows a number of interesting issues.
Overall, we can see that sales and profits have been increasing over this period (Graph
12. 1. 12. 2) .
(£.
00
0)
Chapter 12 -  Discussion - page 322
G r a p h  1 2 .1  S a l e s  1 9 8 0  - 1 9 9 6
i  $
§ § S e g S 5 
8 1 I  I  I  g  I
Source Based on Data from Argyll. ASDA. Sainsbury and Tesco Annual Reports
G r a p h  1 2 . 2  O p e r a t i n g  P r o f i t s  1 9 8 0  -  1 9 9 6
I------------------------------
■ Sainsbury*s Supermarkets
------*—  ASDA Stores
------ Safeway
------*-----  Tesco
Source Based on Data from Argy ll, ASDA, Sainsbuiy and Tesco Annual Reports
This indicates that the expansion strategies followed by these companies over the period 
have been profitable Because concentration in the industry increased, over the period, 
and the four companies increased their market share, it could be argued that these
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companies took advantage of their dominant position to earn extra-profits. However, the 
analysis of the companies’ ROCE (Graph 12.4 although it refers to the group level, sales 
from the grocery retail divisions account form most of sales) shows that, despite the 
increase in concentration, there was not an increase in relative profitability. Therefore, 
we can exclude the possibility that there has been collusion among these firms.
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By looking at the trends of ROS over time, other interesting elements emerge:
1. There is not always a constant positive relationship between growth of sales and 
growth of profits. The analysis shows that, in the 1980s, there was a positive 
relationship between increases in sales and increases in operating profits. However, 
since the beginning of the 1990s, there have been companies that have increased 
their sales. However, profits have not always followed. It is therefore problematic 
for us to draw a constant positive relationship between an increase in sales and an 
increase in profitability.
2. The graphs also show that all the four companies had a moment of difficulty at the 
beginning of the 1990s. However, we can note that (a) the scale of the difficulty was
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different for each company (ASDA was the hardest hit), (b) the timing of the 
difficult period was different for each firm, (c) their reactions to the difficult period 
differed significantly.
These elements show the problem with generalising. What emerges is that there are 
important differences in a somewhat similar effect The companies have all increased 
sales and profits, yet their trends tend to differ. Strangely, the highest volatility came 
when the business units had become more similar in terms of asset endowments (all the 
companies have a centralised distribution system, own-label, offer similar services and 
range of products to customers and have a similar network of stores and sales area).
Source Based on Data from Datastream
By comparing the ROCE of the four companies, we do not see the same growth that we 
saw for ROS and operating profits in absolute terms. There has actually been a relative 
decline since the late 1980s (probably due to the high investments made in not yet 
mature superstores). What emerges is that there are important differences between these 
companies (in terms of ROCE) in the first part of the 1980s However, since 1986/87,
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ROCE has followed a similar trend and since 1990/91, there has been a convergence in 
the relative profitability of Sainsbury, Argyll, Tesco and ASDA. In the early 1990s, we 
therefore have a ROCE situation that contrasts to the findings of the analysis of 
operating profits. While there was convergence in the former, there was volatility at its 
maximum, for the latter.
12.3.5.2 The Determinants of Profitability
Having analysed the profitability of the companies, we can now see if it is possible to 
identify the determinants of their performance.
Lewis and Thomas (1990) identify a number of variables that were reputed to 
significantly represent firms’ strategies. These were: number of store, average size of 
stores, advertising expenditure on sales, number of food lines and proportion of own- 
label lines. According to the theory of strategic groups as developed by Caves and 
Porter, based on these variables, we could identify a number of groups. Firms in these 
groups would have similar origins, follow similar strategic behaviour and have similar 
performance.
There is no doubt that these variables play an important role on firms’ performance. 
However, they do not exclusively account for the elements determining firms’ 
performance. For example, by comparing Tesco and Sainsbury at the beginning of the 
1980s, we know that Sainsbury was achieving higher sales and profits from a smaller 
number of stores and from a smaller total sales area (Table 12.10). This was the result of 
their reputation established over the years, as well as of attention to product quality and
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customer services. Furthermore, if we look at the profitability trend of the two 
companies in the early 1990s, we see that large retailers had to cut their gross margins 
the recession and because of the development of discounters. However, Tesco was 
affected in a stronger way and earlier than Sainsbury. It had been argued that this was 
due to Tesco having a weaker market position than Sainsbury and to Tesco having a 
younger customer base. Younger people had been hit more by the recession and were 
trading down. Some also forecasted that Tesco would have picked up quicker as soon as 
the recession ended. Hence, we can see the complexity of drawing relationship between 
various variables and performance.
What emerges is the complexity of the determinants of firms’ profitability and its 
dynamics, and the necessity of a detailed analysis for understanding the dynamics of 
firms’ performance. This does not happen in strategic groups research where the 
variables are seen as the only determinant of firms’ profitability.
The complexity of firms’ performance is also made clear by the analysis of ASDA’s 
performance over the same period. Despite a number of stores and the total sales area 
continuously increasing, the company deciding to develop an own-label and centralised 
distribution system, the profits did not always increase (Graph 12.3 for ASDA ROS). 
Through the case study, we know that at the beginning of the 1980s, the managing 
director did not believe that the company would survive in the long term and its 
objective was to maximise short-term profitability. The group initially improved its 
performance by increasing margins. Later, this price policy had an effect in terms of 
losing customers, and an unsuccessful programme of change, linked to a recession and 
the development of new discounters, decreased profitability further. This led to a
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reposition strategy and a successful programme of change. Financial difficulties, bad 
management, competition, operational difficulties and disenfranchised customers all 
combined to contribute to the relative decline of profitability in the late 1990s.
It is not possible to explain ASDA’s performance without referring to the broader 
context and considering variables other than firms’ strategies. Asset structure has been 
an important influence. This is clear when we analyse the relatively successful 
performance of ASDA in the 1990s. We can see that an important network of 
superstores, linked to the traditional discount image, low competition in the targeted 
market, management capabilities and good timing were responsible for good company 
performance. However, what re-emerges is the complexity of the determinants of firms’ 
performance.
Therefore, we can see that strategy, in terms of asset endowments, is important for 
firms’ performance. However, strategy is not a holistic concept. By looking at the 
variables that refer to firms’ strategies, it would not be possible to understand the 
elements determining a firm’s success and its dynamics. Firms’ strategies, quantified 
into variables, do not include all the elements responsible for firms’ performance. 
Firms’ histories, corporate level (financial ability) and at the business level elements, 
the management, external factors and so forth all influence the dynamics of firms’ 
performance.
However, if it is difficult to identify the determinants of firms’ performance, the 
complexity of the issue increases when the analysis is carried out over time.
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At the beginning of the 1980s, firms with a centralised distribution system may have 
had better performance compared to other firms that did not have such a system. 
However, as other companies started to develop similar systems, this element for 
potentially creating a difference disappeared. This variable thus changed in importance 
over time. The same can be said for own-label products and superstores. There could 
have been cost advantages that later disappeared. Therefore, in order to say whether a 
factor creates a competitive advantage, a detailed longitudinal analysis is required. 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to say when a variable identified as important is mature for 
producing higher profitability, and when imitation takes place and means that this 
variable no longer plays a role in creating differences in performance.
Thus, the analysis showed that the performance of a firm is due to its strategy and other 
elements: management, competition, imitation and innovation. These elements are 
highly interrelated and it is very difficult to identify individual elements that are 
responsible for the dynamics of firms’ performance.
12.3.5.3 Strategic Groups as an Ex-Ante Technique for Analysing the Strategic 
Options Available to Firms
In the development of the concept of strategic groups at Purdue, it was thought that 
strategic groups could be used as a technique to examine ex-ante the different strategic 
options, with a view that if a strategic option was seen as profitable, that would be the 
strategy to follow.
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What emerges from the analysis is that even if it is possible to identify the variables 
responsible for firms’ performance, they can not be used to indicate what the successful 
options are for future strategies.
ASDA attempted to change its competitive position and failed because of a combination 
of elements (poor management, operational inefficiencies and a poor financial base). 
However, Tesco was also in financial difficulties in the early 1980s. These two stories 
also led to different results because of the different historical periods of time in which 
the strategies were proposed and implemented. Tesco’s decision to move up-market 
came at a time when the economy was prosperous and consumers were putting elements 
other than price at the top of their priorities. Tesco also had little competition in the 
consumer market it was targeting. Its decision was also indirectly supported by other 
firms’ decision’s to no longer compete on price. Tesco was therefore seen as being 
competitive on price and able to maintain its existing customers while changing its 
market position.
ASDA did not succeed because of poor management, financial weaknesses and because 
when the company decided to move upmarket, this end of the market was already 
occupied by other companies. Safeway, Sainsbury, and Tesco had expanded and were 
consolidating their position in this area. Further, ASDA’s competitors had opened new 
superstores in wealthier areas when changing their store portfolios while ASDA 
superstores were positioned in relatively poorer geographic areas. Finally, consumer 
priorities were again changing, but this time in the opposite direction. Price was moving 
on top of consumer priorities.
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Conditions had completely changed and ASDA management did not recognised this. 
However, ASDA’s strategy of going back to its roots as a superstores discounter 
operator at the beginning of the 1990s was successful because of a combination of 
favourable external conditions and top management ability. They refocused on the 
discount segment at a time when the economy was in recession and customers were 
again sensitive to prices. Further, there were not many companies operating with large 
superstores at the discount end of the market.
“Choice is the daughter of time” and does not exist in absolute terms. Companies 
continuously make choices, but each time, the available options are different and/or 
have different implications. Because firms are never the same and changes are 
continuously taking place in the environment and because performance is determined by 
elements inside and outside the firm, it does not make much sense to use the past 
strategies of other firms in a recipe for strategy formulation.
12.4 Summary of Research Findings
Having discussed all the research questions highlighted in Chapter five, we will now 
summarise the findings. This will form the basis for assessing the limits of strategic 
groups research.
The empirical research confirms the fundamental hypotheses that heterogeneity exists 
between firms operating within an industry, and that important similarities also exist 
among competing firms. The empirical research also reveals other interesting issues:
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1. The first theme assessed the mechanisms characterising the dynamics of industrial 
and business change. In traditional strategic groups research, firms' strategies and 
industry structure are seen as being in equilibria and in disequilibrium changes in 
the structure of the industry and in firms’ strategies take place. Longitudinal 
research into strategic groups uses a multi-static approach. Our analysis indicates 
that the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure are characterised by the 
existence of simultaneous continuity and change. Changes are progressive rather 
than immediate. There are also underlying continuous dynamics characterising the 
industry structure. Although organisational types have remained the same 
(multiples, co-operatives, and independent), their fundamental characteristics have 
significantly changed. We cannot say that there have been revolutionary inventions 
in the GRI. However, retailers’ strategies, combined with changes in the 
environment, have been such that the nature of retailing has completely changed 
over the past 25 years. In such a context, it is difficult to talk of the GRI or firms’ 
strategies as static. It is more appropriate to say that the main characteristic of the 
industry has been its dynamism. This is an issue that has already been highlighted 
by strategy process research. Pettigrew (1985) argues that strategic change should be 
regarded as a continuous process which occurs in a given context.
2. The concept of strategic groups argues that all the information we need to study the 
dynamics of firms’ behaviour and industry structure are to be found in strategic 
groups. The analysis indicates that strategic groups is not a holistic concept.
First, continuous changes in the consumer market, firms’ strategies, industry 
structure, technology, in combination with government policies, create the basis for 
the entry and development of new firms with new strategies. This is not considered
Chapter 12 -  Discussion - page 332
when using strategic groups as a technique to analyse the strategy option available 
to firms’ management.
Second, there are strategic options that are not taken into account when conducting 
strategic groups research. The concept of strategic groups only looks at the past and 
assumes that, in absence of relevant industrial change, firms will reproduce past 
strategies. This research shows that firms are innovative in their strategies, 
introducing important elements that would not be taken into account if the analysis 
were only based on past strategies.
Third, in order to understand and explain the dynamics of firms’ strategy and 
industry structure, we need to examine both firms’ strategies and the external 
context. These two elements are complementary, as they both have features that are 
exclusive.
3. Firms’ strategies, industry structure, and consumer market influence each other to 
the extent that a primary determinant factor cannot be identified. Firms’ strategies 
impact on the industry structure and changes in the consumer market and industry 
structure impact on firms’ strategies by threatening some retailers and creating 
opportunities for other retailers.
4. Continuity and change characterise the dynamics of firms’ strategies. It is useful to 
distinguish between strategy stocks and flows. Flows from the changing dimension 
of firms’ strategies. Decisions about strategy flows are taken in a competitive 
environment characterised by uncertainty. Because strategy is a process over time 
and management does not have complete control of the external environment, initial 
objectives may not be realised. There is unpredictability in the strategy process,
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which can, itself, work in favour or against a firm. We could therefore incorporate 
an element of luck in the strategy process6.
5. Similarities as well as differences exist between comparable firms and are important 
for the dynamics of firms’ strategies. However, it is difficult to argue that 
similarities overarch differences to produce homogeneous groups. Differences 
between firms are in the nature of firms. Because the consumer market is 
heterogeneous and changing, because the competitive structure is varied and 
changing, because firms are continuously making investment strategies, because 
there are not stable equilibria and there are differences in management, firms cannot 
reach a situation of absolute identity, as assumed in strategic groups research.
6. The companies examined here came to develop similar positions in an industry from 
significantly different positions. However, strategic similarities arose from firms’ 
management recognising similar opportunities over a period of time and developing 
a similar view with regard to their future asset endowments. Thus, although the 
investments differ in nature and there are differences in the pace of these 
investments, over a long period of time, similar investments have produced 
similarities among firms. However, the companies had some specific characteristics 
(both in terms of asset endowments as well as in terms of management views and 
capabilities) which enabled them to take advantage of the external changes. 
Therefore, the relative position of a company at any point in time is important for
6 Barney (1986: 1234) has addressed the issue of luck in the strategy process: «Even well-informed firms 
can be lucky in this manner. Whenever actual returns to a strategy are greater than expected returns, the 
resulting difference is a manifestation of a firm's unexpected good fortune.»
During one interview, the issue of luck in the strategy process emerged. When talking about the strategy 
change in Argyll in the 1985 -  1987 period, one interviewee said: «1 think it is sometimes terrible difficult 
to rationalise these decisions. ... There were two issues; if we could have bought Distillers, then that was a 
unique opportunity, so I think that we should put that on one side. I think that as far as our existing food 
business was concerned, it was a good food business, but it was not a great food business, ...so what we 
saw was the opportunity to buy Safeway’s, which gave us the brand, and to build that brand through an 
organic development programme, building superstores. So it would have been a very difficult thing to 
build a business the size and quality of what we have got today if we had not been able to buy Safeway.
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the dynamics of its strategy as well as for the development of similarities among 
competing firms.
7. There are reference points for firms’ management but these are complex in 
character, as there may be different reference points for different elements of firms’ 
strategies and they change over time.
8. There are similarities and differences in terms of the cognitive structures of 
management. Cognitive structures seem to develop over time as a result of feedback 
reinforcing the cognitive element. When the feedback does not reinforce the 
cognitive structure, the management may ignore it for a while. However, if it stays 
then there is a period of high uncertainty during which the management observes the 
external environment, how the situation evolves and hence it makes corrective 
manoeuvres. After a while, a new cognitive structure may develop. However, this is 
a complex issue as differences in terms of cognitive structures may exist within 
firms, as well as among firms competing in the industry.
9. Although a number of variables may define a firm’s strategy, it is difficult to define 
a relationship between these variables and profitability. Firms’ profitability at a 
specific point in time is the result of firms’ investment over a long period of time. 
Investment that may have been successful because of firms’ decisions and also 
because of favourable external conditions for these investments. There are many 
elements impacting upon firms' performance. It is, therefore, difficult to draw a 
relationship between strategy and performance. A detailed analysis is needed to 
understand the dynamics of firms’ performance.
10. It is problematic to use past strategies as an ex-ante technique to analyse strategy 
options available to firms. First, past strategies do not embrace all the new options
We could have built Prestos superstores, but they would have not been, in a brand sense, as strong as
Safeway. So you could argue that we were just lucky, that Safeway became available.»
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available to firms because they do not take innovations into account. Second, 
external situations, which were favourable in the development of a past strategy, 
may have changed over time. Sainsbury and Tesco make considerable profit, in an 
absolute sense, because they have a large floor space and a large network of stores 
of relatively large size. However, these companies have a large floor space because 
they have taken a decision to invest over a long period of time and because this was 
possible (i.e., with availability of many sites for superstore development, favourable 
planning permission, little existing competition). These conditions are much less 
likely. We therefore note the difficulty of drawing a relationship between strategy 
and performance, as well as using strategic groups as a technique to examine 
strategy options available to firms.
12.4.1 How do the Research Findings Impact upon the Concept of Strategic 
Groups?
The research shows important limits in the theory of strategic groups and its ability to 
explain the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure. The theory of strategic 
groups is based on assumptions and hypotheses that show clear limits in the analysis. 
Strategic groups, as developed by Caves and Porter, appears to be a superficial concept 
which tries to address too many issues at the same time. This analysis shows the 
complexity of issues such as the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure, the 
strategy concept, similarities and differences among firms and the complexity of the 
elements determining firms’ performance and its dynamics. Further, there are clear 
problems in using strategic groups as a technique to identify the most profitable options
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available to firms. The concept of strategic groups has been very appealing in strategy 
research for a number of reasons. However, we do not think that significant progress 
can be made by continuing to undertake research which is based on a theoretical 
framework that contains significant flaws, both at the theoretical and when assessed in 
practice.
12.4.2 Research Findings and Other Theoretical Approaches
In Chapter five, we have saw how the development of other theoretical approaches has 
contributed to further questions on the relevance of strategic groups research. These 
approaches have not been the primary focus of this empirical research. However, given 
the extensive review in Chapter five, we can make inferences from the research findings 
on these approaches. This indirectly contributes to a better understanding of their 
potential and limitations. In this section, we will briefly analyse how the issues that 
emerged can impact on the approaches analysed in Chapter five.
The empirical findings seem to confirm the limits of population ecology of organisation 
as a means of explaining the dynamics of firms over time. Population ecology 
approaches are concerned with the dynamics of the population of firms in the same 
environment. However, the analysis is limited to death and birth rates rather that 
seeking to explaining how and why the nature of firms, resources and the external 
environment change over time. The empirical research indicates that what could be 
identified as organisational species have significantly changed over time; and a 
necessary pre-requisite for understanding the dynamics of organisational species is the
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study of the nature of change over time. This is never considered in population ecology 
studies. Furthermore, as the focus is on species, population ecology fails to understand 
the importance of similarities and differences among comparable firms. Finally, the 
empirical research shows that adaptive and selective mechanisms both characterise the 
dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure, and the exclusion of one will 
seriously impair further development in the strategy field.
With regard to cognitive analysis, empirical findings confirm the importance and 
complexity of cognitive issues. There is no objective environment, and research 
findings confirm that managerial cognition plays an important role in the dynamics of 
firms' strategies. This indicates the importance of studying the dynamics of cognitive 
structures. In Chapter five, we argued that, having recognised that the importance of 
managerial cognition, the new challenge for cognitive research is to develop a better 
understanding of the dynamics of cognitive structures. The empirical research here 
confirms the importance of conducting longitudinal analysis for understanding the 
dynamics of management cognition. Ambiguity and uncertainty seem to play an 
important role in the dynamics of cognitive structure, and significant advancements 
could be achieved by considering the role of ambiguity and uncertainty in the dynamics 
of cognitive structures and firms’ strategies. However, we can re-emphasise that 
cognitive research, on its own, is unlikely to bring significant results to the study of the 
dynamics of firms’ strategies, industry structure and firms’ performance. Thus, while 
we may think that further research in the cognitive sub-field of research will be 
important, the most significant results are likely to be achieved by researchers of other 
sub-fields that take into account cognitive research.
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With regard to the resource based view of the firm, the research shows that firms’ 
resources (strategy stocks) play an important role in the dynamics of firms’ strategies. 
However, we again think that the RBV of the firm is too introspective and looks too 
much to the past. Thus, there is a failure to address the important issue of understanding 
the dynamics of the strategic relevance of firms’ resources, as well as of changes in the 
competitive environment. Past resources play an important role in the dynamics of 
firms’ strategies. However, innovations in strategy play an important role in the 
dynamics of firms’ strategies. This is not considered in the RBV of the firm. Further, 
there is nothing in the RBV that helps us understand the dynamics of firms’ 
performance.
The most important research finding related to the evolutionary theory of firms’ 
strategies. Many hypotheses related to the characteristics of the competitive 
environment and to the dynamics of firms’ strategies, are confirmed by the empirical 
research. First, the empirical research confirms that the dynamics of firms’ performance 
and firms’ strategies can be easily explained in terms of elements creating potential 
rents and those which preserve it (isolating mechanisms). This analysis requires an 
examination of firms’ characteristics and behaviour, as well as of the dynamics of the 
external environment. Therefore, the focus of the analysis should be on both firms and 
the interface between firms and the external environment.
Second, the empirical research also shows that there are continuous dynamics at play in 
firms’ strategies and the industry structure. This has important consequences for the 
utilisation of past strategies to assess ex-ante strategy options available to firms. Choice 
is the daughter of time. It is difficult to reproduce past strategies because they have 
resulted from a unique combination of managerial activities and favourable internal and
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external conditions. These elements, combined with the existence of ambiguity and 
uncertainty characterising the strategy process, imply that it is easier to explain strategy 
ex-post and that econometricians are economic historians (see Chapter 5). Hence, we 
believe that history is an important variable that should have a key place in strategy 
analysis and formulation.
Finally, the research confirmed that strategy stocks play an important role in the 
dynamics of firms’ strategies. That is, it showed the importance of firms’ histories for 
the dynamics of their strategies, as indicated in the analysis of the organisational 
characteristics of evolutionary approach.
In Chapter five, it was argued that the main limits of the evolutionary theory of firms’ 
strategies are in dealing with a undifferentiated competitive environment as well as in 
understanding the mechanisms characterising the dynamics of firms’ strategies and 
industry structure. The empirical research shows the importance of firms’ relative 
positions in the competitive environment, the importance of similarities and differences 
between comparable firms and the importance of comparative analysis.
On the basis of these research findings, it is possible to say that the evolutionary theory 
of firms’ strategies has the potential to become a much more important approach in the 
strategy field. This issue will be addressed in more details in the next chapter.
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Chapter 13 Conclusion
13.0 Introduction
In Chapter one, it we stated that the key objective of this study was to analyse the limits 
of strategic groups research in its for analysis and explanation of the dynamics of firms’ 
strategies and industry structure. In the first part of the research, our analysis focused on 
the origins of the concept of strategic groups and its developments. What emerged was 
that the concept of strategic groups developed independently in SM and IO. However, 
its development has been marked by the use of a theoretical framework that was initially 
developed in IO, and by a method that is deterministic in nature. As such, it is 
characterised by a simplification of the complexity of firms’ strategies, industry 
structure, and their dynamics. The underlying view of firms’ strategies and industry 
structure which has resulted from strategic groups research has been the object of, direct 
and indirect, critiques in the strategy field. In the 1980s, a number of research streams 
have emerged that tried to further develop the theoretical basis of strategic groups by 
highlighting firms’ specificities in a group structure. However, some fundamental 
problems exist with this approach. Other research developed which looks at the 
relationships between firms’ strategies and competitive structures from different 
perspectives (population ecology, cognitive research and the evolutionary theory of 
firms’ strategies). However, each research approach has its own limitations and strategic 
groups remains an approach that addresses a number of interesting issues in strategy 
research in a comprehensive way. However, it is built on the assumption that it is
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possible to identify groups structures in an industry and a performance relationship 
exists between groups and performance. While some researchers recognise that groups 
structures exist in an industry, important doubts still exist as to the relationship between 
groups and performance.
The review of the theory and past empirical research left us with a situation of 
uncertainty, which led to the development of two themes for this empirical research. The 
first theme involved the analysis of the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry 
structure; the second assessed the importance of similarities and differences among a 
number of firms. The objectives were to: (a) empirically assess the limits of strategic 
groups as a theoretical and practical mean to study firms’ strategies, industry structure 
and their dynamics, and (b) develop a better understanding of these fundamental issues 
for strategy researchers.
In the empirical research, the historical developments of the UK GRI and the strategies 
of a number of firms over a certain period was studied. This formed the basis for the 
discussion in Chapter twelve on the issues outlined in Chapter five.
The objective of this final chapter is to assess how this research has contributed, and 
may lead to further contributions, to the development of a better understanding of the 
importance of similarities and differences between firms, as well as to understand the 
dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure.
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13.1 Strategic Groups Research and the Research Findings
At the end of the last chapter, it was argued that the concept of strategic groups has been 
very appealing within strategy research for a number of reasons. However, no significant 
progress can be made by continuing research which uses a theoretical framework that 
contains significant flaws both at the theoretical and empirical levels.
At the end of Chapter two, it was stated that the theory of strategic groups, as developed 
by Caves and Porter, should have been considered as the starting, rather than the end 
point of research programme on the firms’ strategies and firms’ performance. However, 
the development of empirical research which studies the relationship between strategy 
and performance, and an incremental approach to strategic groups research, has led to 
the “structurisation” of Caves and Porter’s theory of strategic groups as a complete 
theoretical framework. This has been made worse by the failure of critical research on 
strategic groups to deliver alternatives to strategic groups.
However, if the tendency in strategic groups research has been towards an increasing 
simplification of the strategy construct, the trend over the past 20 years, outside 
mainstream strategic groups research yet within the strategy field, has been towards 
highlighting the complexity of firms’ strategies. A strange mechanism has been at work 
within the strategy field that has contributed to re-establish the balance in research, 
which looks at the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure. Thus, if, on the 
one hand, we have a shift in strategic groups research towards an increasingly simplistic 
and deterministic approach, on the other hand, the strategy field has been characterised 
by an increasing differentiation of research interests. Cognitive research, population
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ecology and evolutionary theory of firms’ strategies, directly or indirectly, have all 
criticised some of the fundamental assumptions characterising strategic groups research 
and have proposed different ways of looking at firms’ strategies and competitive 
structures in an industry and their dynamics. In different ways, they show the complexity 
of strategy issues. In this context, it is not surprising that the most important critiques to 
strategic groups have made indirect, i.e. by researchers not using a strategic groups 
approach.
However, each of the approaches, which were analysed, has its own limitations, and 
compared to strategic groups, none contemporaneously consider the same wide range of 
issues that was initially considered in strategic groups research. Notwithstanding their 
limitations, the development of other research frameworks has created a theoretical 
plurality that was needed as a basis for the development of further strategy research on 
these issues. In Hegelian terms, they have created the anti-thesis to strategic groups, and 
therefore the necessary conditions for improving our understanding of the dynamics of 
firms’ strategies and industry structure. They have created the necessary conditions for 
synthesis (See Appendix 1).
The issue therefore becomes one of recognising the historical role of strategic groups 
research and the need to move forward. Strategic groups should be used as a starting 
point for the development of research which further explores the issues highlighted by 
strategic groups theory. This is what the remainder of this conclusion will be concerned 
with: to see how our knowledge of the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry 
structure has increased through this study and to assess how the findings can be used 
fruitfully both, in management research and by firms management.
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13.2 Towards a New Approach to the Study of the Dynamics of 
Firms’ Strategies and Industry Structure
We can start from the analysis of issues that have been highlighted by strategic groups
research and confirmed by the empirical research. Strategic groups theory has helped
developing the following issues:
1. There has been a decline of the idea that a best strategy exists for firms competing in 
the same competitive environment. Firms can profitably follow different strategies. 
In strategic groups research this is shown by the existence of groups of firms 
following different strategies.
2. Important similarities as well as differences exist among firms competing within the 
same environment. In strategic groups research it is possible to cluster firms so that 
similarities would be more important than differences. This analysis shows that, 
among similar firms, there also are important differences.
3. Asymmetries are potentially associated with differences (multiples and Co-operatives 
have different characteristics that may create differences in terms of a firm from a 
group being more able to take advantage of opportunities emerging in the 
environment more than firms from another group).
4. There are mechanisms inhibiting firms from changing their strategy. In strategic 
groups, mobility barriers rest at a group level. We think that the starting point should 
be single firms rather than groups.
5. Firms’ relative position is important for the dynamics of their strategies. Caves and 
Porter argued about the possibility of entry paths in an industry and that groups are 
not all dissimilar in the same way. They indicated the existence of a sort of industry
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structure with firms having various positions. Analysis confirmed the importance of 
relative position as well as industry structure. This was clear when we found that 
some large retailers (Tesco, Sainsbury) were more able to take advantage of the 
liberalisation of superstore development in the mid-1980s than other companies 
because of their relative size.
These are important issues that have been confirmed by our research. Because of the 
historical nature of the research, these findings transcend the problems highlighted in 
strategic groups theory. Strategic groups research is therefore important in developing 
these issues in the strategy field. From the empirical research, other interesting issues 
emerged which are important for developing a framework for the analysis of the 
dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure. The empirical research showed 
that:
1. Firms' strategies and industry structure are characterised by continuity and change. 
These two elements are interrelated. The study clearly indicated that there were slow 
but continuous changes in firms’ strategies and industry structure. However, because 
these elements came on an established structure, their impact tended to be marginal. 
It is not contradictory to talk of concomitant continuity and change. For example, in a 
changing structure, it is possible to see continuity in the organisational forms 
(multiples, independents, co-operatives) - or in the presence of certain firms in the 
industry. However, it is also possible to see that there are continuous dynamics 
characterising firms and industry. These dynamics are necessary for phenomena such 
as the entry and development of new firms at different times.
2. The dynamics of firms ’ strategies impact upon the dynamics of the industry structure. 
However, changes in the industry structure create opportunities for the development
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of other firms that threaten the positions of established firms. One old unresolved 
debate in management research concerns strategy choice and environmental 
determinism. The analysis showed the existence of an intermediate position. Choice 
does not exist in absolute terms; it is constrained by the external environment. 
Choices exist because of the entrepreneurial activities of firms’ management. 
Constraints also result from the history of the firm, the management background 
(with their respective routines) the competitive structure and competitors’ behaviour.
3. Because of the changing nature of the industry and its competitive structure, it is 
possible for firms to develop a significant presence in an industry, even when an 
industry is reputed to be mature. The issue of changes always creating new 
opportunities in the market is clearly exemplified here by the development of 
discounter chains in the early 1990s and by the development of Argyll in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1993) also argue that it is possible for 
companies to succeed and develop an important presence in industries reputed to be 
declining or mature, where higher profits can only be gained through rationalisation 
processes.
4. We can note the importance of detail in explaining the dynamics of firms ’ strategies 
and industry structure. It is possible to describe, in broad terms, the dynamics of 
firms’ strategies and industry structure. However, there is a significant difference 
between describing the dynamics of a phenomenon and understanding the 
mechanisms responsible for them.
According to the theory of strategic groups, “what is seen is what there is” (i.e., it is 
possible to describe and explain the dynamics of firms' strategies and industry 
structure through variables and know what is responsible for what). This research 
shows the importance of an in-depth analysis for the understanding of the
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mechanisms driving industrial and business change. As discussed earlier, multiples 
were not important to start with. They became important. However, it is possible to 
understand this only through in-depth analysis. A superficial analysis will only find 
that the share of multiples in the GRI has increased over time. It will not say or 
explain how it was done. In this research, it was shown that changes in the consumer 
market, firms’ strategies and governmental policies were a necessary condition. The 
analysis of Argyll also shows the importance of detail. The initial objective of 
Argyll’s management was to create a group operating in grocery retailing and the 
drink business. Argyll’s management saw the possibility for developing an important 
presence in the drink business. However, their objectives were not realised because 
they lost the bid to Distillers to Guinness (i.e., reflecting importance of external 
environment). This important opportunity disappeared, external conditions changed 
because many companies realised the existence of important opportunities in the 
drink industry and no further opportunities to develop an important presence in the 
drink business were foreseeable. At once, a new opportunity arose in the UK GRI: 
Safeway US decided to sell its UK subsidiary that was later bought by Argyll. Thus, 
(a) Argyll would have not taken over Safeway if its bid to Distillers had succeeded 
and (b) Safeway would have not been sold if Safeway US had not had a management 
buy-out as a response to a hostile bid that led to the it and, as a consequence, the 
management had to sell its UK business to reduce gearing. This shows the 
importance of an in-depth analysis for analysing and explaining the dynamics of 
firms’ strategies.
5. Similarities and differences exist among comparable firms and are important for the 
dynamics of firms' strategies. However, each firm is a unique entity. Important 
similarities exist in some firms characteristics. These may be their asset endowment,
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strategy flows and management views of the competitive environment. However, 
important elements are firms-specific and are responsible for differences in firms’ 
investments or position in the consumer market. Indirectly this means that maps 
recognising similarities and differences among firms are important, but in analysing 
general concepts such as multiples, edge-of-town operators, or family controlled 
firms, it is necessary to recognise the specificities of a firm. As we said earlier, it is 
detail that makes it possible to identify mechanisms responsible for the dynamics of 
firms’ strategies.
6. Strategy is a complex issue and complex relationships exist among its parts. 
Researchers need to recognise that strategy is a complex issue; this is fundamental to 
an understanding of the dynamics of firms’ strategies. Differences between intended 
and realised strategy, and between strategy stocks and strategy flows, are important 
for understanding the dynamics of firms’ strategies. Further, at any specific point in 
time, firms with apparently different strategy stocks may invest in similar strategy 
flows. Firms with similar strategy stocks may have different strategic investments. 
This implies that different types of maps may be proposed for the analysis of the 
dynamics of firms’ strategies (e.g., strategy stocks and strategy flows).
7. “Strategy is not everything”. A good strategy will not automatically lead to victory. 
“Napoleon is ... reputed to have said ‘No strategy ever survived a battle’.” (Wensley 
1985: 415). Strategy is not a holistic term including all the internal and external 
dimensions of the firm. Other non-strategic dimensions may play a role in the 
dynamics of firms’ strategies and performance. This does not mean that a firm does 
not need a strategy. As Rumelt et al. (1994) argue, strategy is a critical influence in 
the success or failure of the enterprise. However, in order to study the dynamics of 
firms’ strategies, firms’ performance, industry and competitive structure, we need to
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look at elements other than a firm’s strategy, and particularly, the dynamics of the 
competitive structure and the external environment, and to their interrelationships 
with changes in firms’ strategies.
Here, an important similarity exists with the view of firms’ strategies in the 
evolutionary theory of firms’ strategies. As we saw in Chapter five, Rumelt 
(1984:568) argues that “a firm’s strategy may be explained in terms of the 
unexpected events that created (or will create) potential rents together with the 
isolating mechanisms that will act to preserve them. If either element is missing, the 
analysis is inadequate.” Therefore, stressing the importance of analysing both firms’ 
strategies and the external environment. The main difference with Rumelt’s view 
relates to the importance of a firm’s relative position in the competitive structure. In 
the empirical research, we saw that there were opportunities in the superstore 
development business. However, firms were not in the same relative position in the 
industry to take advantage of this opportunity in the same way.
8. Because strategy is a process over time, the dynamics of the process plays an 
important role on the success o f a firm's strategy. The process strongly influences the 
dynamics of firms’ strategies and performance. By definition, strategy is a concept 
that requires the existence of another entity (other firms). Management cannot control 
the entire environment. Furthermore, continuous changes are taking place in firms’ 
strategies and the competitive environment. Because of this “state of becoming", 
there is uncertainty in the strategy process. It is in the process that management plays 
a determinant role. Once a decision is taken, management has to follow the dynamics 
of the process in order to manage uncertainties threatening the success of its firm’s 
strategy.
9. Firms ' management plays an important role in the strategy process, both in defining
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where the company is going in terms of strategy and in making sure that the strategy 
process is successful. This issue is linked to the previous one. The empirical analysis 
showed that management was been very important in developing firms’ strategies as 
well as in limiting the negative effects of the external environment on other firms’ 
strategies. Because of the “state of becoming” mentioned above, and because 
management cannot control the internal and external environment, there is always a 
risk associated with investment. However, management can try to limit the risks by 
intervening in the external environment. This is clear when we consider the case of 
ASDA. In the early 1990s, Archie Norman (ASDA chief executive) said that the 
market was saturated and that competitors had a ‘head-in-the-sand’ attitude towards 
superstore development. However, a few years later ASDA resumed its plan for 
superstore development. Norman intervened in the competitive environment to limit 
the negative effects of other operators’ development plans by trying to influence the 
financial market to take a negative view of these plans and encourage them to 
pressurise companies to not pursue them.
10. It is important for firm s’ long-term survival that they continuously renew their 
activities. Firms that stop to renew their activities also start to decline. Renewal does 
not mean to completely change the way of doing things but to aim to improve 
operations, either by cost reduction or by improving the attractiveness of the 
company to consumers. The ASDA case study shows that its management, through 
entrepreneurial activities, created something completely new (a discounter superstore 
operator) and for a long period of time, it was the only company pursuing this idea. 
The company was an important innovator in the industry. This innovation came on an 
existing competitive structure but did not revolutionise it. In a heterogeneous and 
geographically-dispersed consumer market, there was space for other businesses (city
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centre operators and up-market operators). However, the idea originally developed by 
ASDA was later used by other companies that, in developing it, further innovated it. 
In the early 1980s, ASDA stopped to innovate, marking the beginning of a period of 
relative decline. It has been argued that the decline of the co-operative system has 
been due to a similar reason. Co-operatives developed the concept of supermarket in 
the UK GRI but then stopped innovating. Bamfield (1987) argues that a lot of 
rationalisation was made in the co-operative system. However, this only worked in 
the short term. Because there was not a drive towards building something new. The 
co-operative system started to decline. We agree with Hannan and Freeman (1977) 
that inertia is responsible for firms’ decline. However, we disagree with their view 
that inertia characterises all firms of a specific type in the same way. We also 
disagree with their assertion that changes mainly occur in the external environment. 
Within market-based economies, changes also come from within firms, and 
entrepreneurial activities.
11. Ex-post analysis of past strategies may be used to analyse the strategy options 
available to management but in a complete different way than has traditionally been 
argued in strategic groups analysis. Market opportunities are located in time and 
because of the heterogeneity that characterises firms, these opportunities are not 
available to all firms [this is an example of the uniqueness of market opportunities: 
Safeway was on sale in 1986/87. Thereafter, there were no other Safeway available. 
An Example of opportunities not being available to all firms: Is when, Gateway had 
taken over Fine Fare and could not afford another take-over. Argyll was in the best 
position to take over Safeway). Because of continuous changes in firms’ strategies 
and competitive structures, opportunities also change. Recipes do not recognise any 
role to time and history. Recognising history implies an understanding that
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opportunities are context-specific. This specificity is given by the competitive 
structure and firms’ positions at that particular point on time. However, this does not 
mean that market opportunities have a very short life. Our analysis indicated that take 
over activities lasted in the UK GRI for a long period of time, which means that it 
was possible to develop a significant presence in the UK GRI by taking over 
companies for long period of time (four to five years). Another example of market 
opportunities lasting for a long period of time is given by superstore development. (It 
has also to be noted that although it has become much more difficult to build 
superstores, this does not mean that no other companies can become an important 
superstore operators in the future. Indeed, this is what WM Morrison is undertaking 
to do).
The issue, then, is of understanding potential market opportunities and whether and 
how past strategies can be used to develop future strategies. It is here that the 
management plays a determining role and this has been shown by our research. 
Companies have important reference points in the industry and what other firms do, 
plays a part in the decision taken. However, firms need to be creative in theirs 
imitation activities, indeed we spoke of dynamic imitation, where firms further 
develop ideas originally proposed by other firms. In our view, this has a number of 
implications. Any managerial analysis must recognise (a) the specificities of any 
historical period, (b) the similarities and differences existing between firms, (c) 
understand when and how external conditions are changing; and, (d) be aware of its 
firm’s history and strategy stocks.
This position is somehow different from the evolutionary theory of firm strategies. 
The use of past strategies for the development of future ones is very problematic in 
the evolutionary theory of firms strategies. Instead, we argue that there may be a
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period during which some past successful strategies can be important reference 
points for the development of similar strategy. However, much depends on the 
specific position of the firm in the competitive structure.
12. The nature of prescriptive analysis. The issues exposed above also have some 
prescriptive characteristics. Prescriptive elements in strategic groups research 
emerged in terms of the strategy to follow to increase performance. This research 
showed a prescriptive element in a different way. Rather than indicating the 
successful strategies, it showed that the dynamics of firms’ strategies and the 
competitive environment are complex in nature and therefore top management is in 
the best position to make sense of it and act on it. It leaves autonomy to top 
management but also suggests a number of factors that management has to take into 
account.
This is a position that has already been taken by researchers of the evolutionary 
theory of firms strategies.
These are issues about which we can start thinking in order to develop a better 
framework for the analysis of the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure. 
However, further research needs to be undertaken. Obvious directions are to develop 
stronger links with strategy process research and the evolutionary theory of firms' 
strategies, as important similarities and possible complementary elements exist between 
these approaches.
We believe that if an important alternative is to be provided for the concept of strategic 
groups, this will eventually come from the evolutionary theory of firms’ strategies as 
important common elements exist in these research findings and the assumptions and
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hypothesis characterising this theory (continuous dynamics characterising firms’ 
activities and the external environment, the importance of ambiguity and uncertainty in 
the strategy process, the importance of internal and external processes for explaining the 
dynamics of firms’ strategies and their performance, and difficulties in using past 
strategies as recipes for strategy formulation). The main contribution that this research 
may give to the development of evolutionary frameworks concern clarification of the 
nature of industrial and business change, showing the complexity of firms’ strategies, 
indicating the importance of attention to detail in research and firms’ relative positions 
in explaining the dynamics of their strategies.
At another level, the research also shows the importance of historical analysis, an area 
that finds little convergence in the strategy field (for example, there have been several 
special issues of the Strategic Management Journal on various subjects, but none have 
been dedicated yet to historical analysis in strategy research).
13.3 Conclusion
Weick (1990) argues that the job of a researcher of management and of companies’ 
strategies is similar to that of a cartographer. Both draw maps to make sense of the 
territory and its dynamics.
A map is the result of a process of abstraction1 and classification of elements of the 
territory. The difference between the map and the territory is that the territory concerns
1 Weick (1990) argues that an abstraction process is a continuous activity of selecting, omitting, and 
organising the details of reality so that we can experience the world as patterned and coherent.
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the world of events and things whilst the map is the world of words about events and 
things (Weick, 1990). The distinction between a map and a territory serves the specific 
purpose of warning us not to treat nouns as anything but crude static rendering of a 
much more complex changing territory. The content of maps consists largely of 
differences that are presented in a simple and logic manner in order to be accessible to 
the most people. Maps are important because (i) they are surrogates of space, (ii) they 
put people in their space both literally and figuratively, (iii) they capture time and (iv) 
they emphasise classification and assignment of things to classes.
The content of a map varies according to (a) the standpoint taken when drawing the map 
and (b) the purpose the map was been built for. Maps are references to the people using 
the map. Once people are aware that maps are the results of an abstraction process and 
there exist differences between maps and territories, people can improve the content of 
the maps. “The map prefigures their perception, and they see what they expect to see. 
But, as discrepancies accumulate, they pay closer attention to what is in their immediate 
experience, look for patterns in it, and pay less attention to the maps.” However, it is 
necessary to have a map. “It takes a map to make a map because one points out 
differences that are mapped into the other one” (Weick 1990: 5). The main problem is 
that the distinction between maps and territory sometimes disappears in managerial life. 
“The map is not the territory when the territory is described with particulars, but it is 
more like the territory when those particulars are ignored and treated as non existent” 
(ibid.: 4).
Researchers using strategic groups to study firms' strategies and their dynamics are 
mapping firms' strategies and the competitive structure. The territory comprises firms
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operating in an industry. The problem with strategic groups is that a map is supposed to 
contain all the important information. According to strategic groups theory, there is no 
difference between the map and the territory. However, we have seen that firms’ 
strategies and competitive structures are complex concepts and a single map cannot 
show this complexity. Furthermore, strategy is not a holistic concept. It does not include 
the entire firm or all of the firms’ decisions or its past, present and future. Further, it 
does not include all the external elements that may influence the success of a firm’s 
strategy.
Having said this, it is not possible, at this time, to substitute the concept of strategic 
groups with another concept that addresses the same number of issues at the same time. 
There are many interesting issues in the concept of strategic groups, but each need to be 
further investigated. Only knowledge of both the detail and general trends can lead us to 
better understand and explain the dynamics of firms’ strategies, industry structure, and 
performance.
Before being able to build a good map, it is necessary to have good knowledge of the 
characteristics of the elements that are being mapped. In this research, we started to 
develop this. The analysis of the dynamics of firms’ strategies and industry structure is 
an issue that has recently attracted a lot of attention in strategy research. The 1997 
Summer Special Issue of the Strategic Management Journal was dedicated to The 
Interactions of Organizational and Competitive Influences on Strategy and 
Performance. Henderson and Mitchell (1997: 5), in their introduction, wrote: “there has 
been much debate in the strategy literature as to whether organizational capabilities or 
market competition are more important in shaping firms' actions and outcome but this
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debate has generated surprisingly little consensus”. They also argued that the
inconclusive nature of much of the existing research is probably because “organizational
capabilities, competition, strategy and performance are fundamentally endogenous”
(ibid.: 6). Hence, interactions between these elements exist at multiple levels. They
continue by saying, “of course, researchers in ... strategic management ... have in
principle long recognised this endogeneity. But for a mixture of reasons our
understanding is still at a very rudimentary stage” (ibid.: 6). In summarising the papers
of this special issue, Henderson and Mitchell note that what emerges is that both
organisational capabilities and firm’s environment drive strategy and performance.
However, firms and the environmental levels also have reciprocal relationships and
there is a dynamic between the internal and external elements, characterised by a
continuous influence. Therefore, they conclude:
“We suspect that longitudinal studies that expecially focus on the nature of these 
organizational and environmental interactions as they evolve over time, and that 
pay particular attention to the ways in which capabilities and environmental 
conditions shape each other, are thus likely to be particularly fruitful for both 
theory and practice.” (ibid.: 12).
This research started to analyse these issues in detail. Areas that need further 
investigations include (1) strategy and competitive processes, (2) reference points, 
cognitive structures, and strategy formulation, and (3) the relative positions of firms in a 
competitive structure and the dynamics of their strategies.
The concept of strategic groups will be an important starting point for further work that 
has to be undertaken in a critical fashion. Maps that refer to different issues can be 
made, but we also need to link them. It is on the links that more research needs to be
carried out.
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Appendix 1 The Researcher and the Research
A 1.0 Introduction
In this study, personal preferences shaped research interests and the research question in 
way that had strong influences on the research method. At the same time, my own 
preferences have been largely influenced by both the undergraduate degree I have done in 
Italy and the continuation of my studies in England.
My first degree is in Economia Aziendale, badly translating to Business Economics. The 
problem with the term Business Economics is that is seen as a borderline subset of 
Economics. In the Italian university system, Economia Aziendale is a field of study that 
encompasses three main branches: administration, organisation, and economics. The 
degree had a bias toward theoretical discussion. Students were often asked to compare 
and contrast theoretical approaches. In Economia Aziendale, there is a fundamental belief 
that (a) theories cannot have an absolute value and (b) that theories have a meaning only if 
they can support firm’s management in their administrative tasks.
The study of various theoretical positions provided me with a strong basis for the 
continuation of the studies and taught me to be sceptical of any single, specific and 
supposedly superior theoretical or methodological approach. However, whilst sound 
knowledge was developed through comparing and contrasting approaches, few skills were 
acquired in analysing the work of specific authors (we rarely read the work of specific 
authors). Furthermore, this type of degree did not teach me much pragmatism. This was
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acquired during my stay in England, where the way of studying at university concerns 
reading, understanding and critically assessing specific works and authors. However, 
critique has to be pragmatic and take into account the real problems existing in research. 
During my stay in England, 1 have acquired a more pragmatic spirit in research.
I believe that the combination of the more discursive approach of my Italian degree and the 
more specific and pragmatic approach of the British system have shaped my research 
interests and the method I chose in this research.
A l.l Epistemological Underpinnings of the Research
The approach taken in this research derives from Hegelian philosophy and critical theory, 
and is emancipatory in character. Among the different types of emancipatory approaches, 
this research is questioning in its nature and incremental in objective (Alvesson and 
Willmott 1996).
At.1.1 The Hegelian Idea of Dialectics
Dialectics has its origin in the philosophy of Socrates and Aristotle. For a long time, 
dialectics had a negative connotation as it was seen as useful for highlighting 
contradictions in the logic used in speeches.
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In the philosophical thought of Hegel, dialectics does not limit its range of action to logic, 
but assumes an ontological meaning. Dialectics characterises the process shaping the 
development of the world. The dialectical development of the world is characterised by 
three elements: the thesis, the anti-thesis and the synthesis. The thesis represents the 
system of positive aspects relating to a specific issue. This issue can be dominant in society 
and accepted by the majority. The anti-thesis represents the system of critiques relating to 
the same issue. The anti-thesis is not negative in its purpose. Its objective is positive in that 
it aims to overcome the negative elements characterising the specific issue. Thesis and 
anti-thesis are both real and their coming into conflict will lead to synthesis that represents 
the re-conciliation of the thesis and anti-thesis. The reconciliation is ontologically superior 
to that of the thesis and anti-thesis, as it considers the issues highlighted by both. With the 
synthesis, the dialectical cycle is closed. However, this is temporary as each a dialectical 
cycle is followed by another. The continuous dynamics of the world mean that the 
synthesis will become a thesis and will give rise to new divisions represented by the anti­
thesis. These divisions will again be reconciled into a new synthesis. There is circularity in 
the positivism characterising the dialectical process of Hegel. There is no perfection in 
absolute terms. The intellect and ideas have an important role in Hegelian thought as they 
are necessary to develop the anti-thesis. The philosophy of Hegel has had an important 
impact upon philosophy, and especially upon the development of Critical Theory.
Al.1.2 Critical Theory
Although critical theorists recognise the importance of ideas, they also recognise that 
knowledge, which orients human behaviour, is not only based on ideas. Habermas
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(1972) defined as the illusion of pure theory the belief that “perfect, a-historical, 
disembodied knowledge can be produced by imperfect, historical, embodied (human) 
beings” (Alvesson and Willmott 1996: 50). The fundamental ontological position is that 
a best way does not exist and knowledge cannot be separated from the politics driving 
its production. There is a symbiotic relationship between knowledge and politics. 
“Whatever is deemed to be objective knowledge, whether by scientists or lay persons, is 
conditioned by power relations in which competing ideas, methods and findings are 
developed and sanctioned as authoritative forms of knowledge” (ibid.: 49). This 
positions critical theorists in contrast with the Weberian idea of ‘value-free knowledge’ 
and conception of science where the main objective is the refinement of a methodology 
for discovering the truth about some parts of reality.
Critical theory has often been accused of nihilism. However, it is fundamentally 
emancipatory in character, and its research programme is fundamentally positivist. Central 
to critical theory is the understanding that, in the form of critical reflection, reason can be a 
stimulus and medium of human emancipation. Differences exist among the central figures 
in critical theory. However, there is a shared vision of the possibility of promoting and 
guiding emancipatory change through the mobilisation of the transformative power of 
reason. (Alvesson and Willmott 1996). As in Hegel’s philosophy, critical theory has kept 
alive the Enlightenment idea that critical reason can be mobilised to transform society. It 
“retains a belief in the possibility of applying reason to dissolve, and not just to expose, 
forms of irrationality” (ibid.: 48).
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Burrell and Morgan (1979) posited critical theory as being part of a radical humanist 
paradigm, where a subjectivist philosophy of science approach is combined with a radical 
change theory of society.
Figure A.l The Four Sociological Approaches
Adapted from Burrell and Morgan (1979)
Subjective
Radical Change
Radical Humanist Radical Structuralist
Interpretativist Functionalist
Regulation
Objective
Subjective philosophies of science assume that social phenomena are fundamentally 
different from natural phenomena and cannot be analysed through supposedly objective 
instruments. Subjective philosophies understand the social world as being continuously 
constructed, reproduced and transformed through inter-subjective processes of 
communication. Oppositely, objectivist philosophies assume the existence of a reality ‘out 
there that can be faithfully captured or mirrored by the application of scientific methods.
Critical theory also falls into the radical theories approach to society. Radical theories of 
societies assume that contradictory pressures for transformation condition social relations. 
This is in contrast with theories of regulation, which assume that modem societies and 
their organisations are characterised by order rather than by conflict.
Burrell and Morgan recognise that they have problem in locating critical theory, given its 
inter-paradigmatic characteristics. This is particularly important because Burrell and 
Morgan (1979: 297), while recognising that “it is through the dialectic that the objective
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and subjective aspects of social life are thought to be reconciled” also contend that the four 
paradigms are incommensurable. The main consequence of this approach is that this 
protects each of them from external critique and impedes the development of a synthetic 
approach. However, this idea of incommensurability is against the Hegelian idea of 
dialectics, as well as against the idea of emancipation through the criticism of theories, 
which is fundamental to critical thinking. If we believe in the enlightening spirit of 
research, then until better means of analysis are developed, we must be aware of the 
strengths and the weaknesses of the theory, methodology and technique we use for the 
purpose of improving them.
Oliga (1988) argues that in critical thinking, it is possible to solve the problem of 
incommensurability in Burrell and Morgan’s framework by incorporating Habermas’ 
interest constitution theory. In this theory, Habermas (1972) recognises the existence of 
different types of knowledge and cognitive interests. Specifically, he argues that 
individuals have (i) a technical interest for prediction and control, (ii) a practical interest 
for communicating and (iii) an emancipatory interest in assessing forms of domination. 
These forms of interests are, in Habermas’ view, individually necessary for the acquisition 
of knowledge and they represent the relationship between human beings and nature. 
Therefore, they are not to be regarded as alternative but rather as complementary. 
Analogous research interests exist within social sciences. “The approach of the empirical- 
analytic sciences incorporates a technical cognitive interest; that of the historical- 
hermeneutic sciences incorporates a practical one; and the approach of critically oriented 
sciences incorporates the emancipatory cognitive interest that, as we saw, was at the root 
of traditional theories” (Habermas 1972: 308). Oliga (1988) argues that strong similarities 
exist between the classification proposed by Habermas and that proposed by Burrell and
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Morgan, and it can be useful to overlay Habermas’ interest constitution theory with Burrell 
and Morgan’s classification.
The technical interest for prediction and control relates to the interaction between the 
humankind and the nature. It constitutes empirical knowledge and can be compared with 
Burrell and Morgan’s functionalist paradigm. The practical interest for understanding 
refers to human communicative interaction and constitutes historical-hermeneutic 
knowledge, which has parallels with the interpretative paradigm. The emancipatory 
interest refers to social relations of power, domination and alienation and constitutes 
critical knowledge, which has parallels with both the radical-humanist and radical- 
structuralist paradigms of Burrell and Morgan (1979).
Using Habermas’ theory, the various approaches are therefore no longer to be seen as 
alternatives but as complementary. This interposition is extremely important in the context 
of this research as it enables us to look at research that has been typical of the functionalist 
paradigm. The three different kinds of knowledge imply different methodological 
approaches: empiricism, hermeneutics, and critical methodologies.
Figure A.2: Matrix of the Combination of Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) 
Sociological Approaches with Habermas’ (1972) Interest 
Constitution Theory
(Adapted from Rivest 1997)
Sociology of Radical Change
Radical Humanist and Radical Structuralist
Subjective
(Emancipatory Interest)
Interpretativist Functionalist
(Practical Interest) (Technical Interest)
Objective
Sociology of Regulation
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Poststructuralist theory, and in particular, the work of Foucalt on power, truth and 
subjectivity, warns of the possibility that the critique of ideologies can be separated from 
relations of power (Alvesson and Willmott 1996). It is important to be cautious of 
emancipatory projects as they have the potential to become a new source of domination. 
Indeed, Burrell (1994) argues that this idea of enlightenment is fundamentally modernist 
and positivist in character.
There is always a dilemma for researchers who are conscious of the possible consequences 
and misinterpretations of their research. Bearing in mind the critiques of Poststructuralist, I 
do not believe that a ‘grand’ emancipatory project is possible. I believe that the spirit of 
critical theory is fulfilled in a better way by an emancipatory study that is questioning in its 
characteristics, and incrementalist in its change effort. The questioning approach has been 
defined by Alvesson and Willmott (1996: 176) as “principally directed at challenging and 
critiquing dominant forms of thinking. Dominant ideas ... are met with suspicion and are 
scrutinized. The objective is incremental as we favour “a gradualist or reformist approach 
to emancipatory transformation” (ibid.: 177). This is clear when we look at the objective of 
this research, which has led to the specification of a number of more detailed research 
questions.
Compared to the work of Hegel, critical theory is much more focused on the role of power 
supporting the thesis and the difficulties characterising the recognition of the anti-thesis. 
Because we can only advance hypotheses about why strategic groups has become such a 
widespread concept for the analysis of similarities and differences existing between firms 
competing in the same industry, the reader, may initially have the impression that this
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research is much closer to the original Hegelian approach. The thesis would be that 
strategic groups is a valid concept for the analysis of firms’ strategies and industry 
structure; the anti-thesis, that strategic groups is not a valid concept for the analysis of 
firms’ strategies and industry structure. Through the research, we would look for the 
synthesis. However, because, we are aware of the importance of power in the development 
of dominant issues, we can say that the approach taken is characteristic of critical theory.
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Appendix 2 An E x-post Analysis o f the Research 
Technique
A2.0 Introduction
In Chapter six, we expressed some anxiety about the research technique decided on for 
the empirical research. A key question was whether the use of newspaper articles would 
form a sufficient basis for the reconstruction of the histories of the companies. 
However, having undertaken two interviews in one company, we were reassured about 
the validity of the research technique. The objective of this appendix is to describe what 
has been learnt from the use of the research technique. It is thus an ex-post assessment 
of the technique used in the research.
A2.1 Characteristics
The use of newspaper articles provided an accurate basis for the development of the 
companies’ case studies, and ex-post, we believe that it was the right technique for this 
research. The following are some of the benefits that have emerged:
1. Accuracy of data. Newspaper articles give a very accurate account of the evolution 
of events characterising firms’ strategies, especially for longitudinal studies such as 
this, which considers a 15-year time span for the analysis of firms’ strategies. 
Newspaper articles provided an ideal basis for the development of case studies, 
better than would have been the case with other sources such as interviews.
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Interviews rely upon interviewees’ memory and personal views, which can bring 
bias or distorted facts from recollection. For example, in one of the interviews, we 
asked about the precise organisational changes that had taken place in the early 
1990s. These changes were quite important because they signalled that the company 
was taking a specific strategic direction. However, the manager was unable to recall 
the date of this event. The interviewee said: “In fact, I have forgotten. Was it only 
March 1993?” To the manager the event seemed to management much further back 
in time because many relevant events had taken place in the following months, 
significantly affecting its firm’s strategic activity. Although this event did not occur 
at other times, it seemed to us that the use of newspaper articles was an accurate 
basis for writing the case studies.
Furthermore, it was possible to talk about particular and important details in the 
interviews, without going through the whole story, mainly because we had already 
developed the case study and the interviews’ main role was to see whether or not 
what we had reconstructed about the firm’s strategy made sense. We doubt that this 
would have been the case if the case study had not already been developed. We 
believe that without the case study as a basis for the discussion, the interview would 
have been much more superficial in character. Therefore, there was, indirectly, a 
stronger validation of the research technique, as even a detailed interview did not 
bring any new insight to the analysis made.
2. Better understanding of the relationships between firms' strategies and external 
environment. As already said in Chapter six, there are many articles on each of the 
companies analysed here, as well as on competitors. This enabled us to develop a 
good view of what the companies were doing in terms of both strategy and 
performance, and, at the same time, to have a feeling of what competitors were
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doing. This has been particularly important for understanding the interrelationships 
between firms and the external environment, as well as for understanding the 
importance of the specific historical period for the analysis of firms’ strategies. 
These are elements whose complexity did not emerge during the interviews. It 
seems that in the interviews, the complexity of these interrelationships between 
firms and external environment was simplified. We do not know to what extent this 
was due to the limited time of the interviews, a possible ex-post rationalisation of 
the strategy process or fading memory.
3. Better understanding of the continuous dynamics characterising firms’ strategies 
and the external environment. The quality and quantity of articles available and the 
fact that they were used in a longitudinal type of research helped us to understand 
the continuous dynamics characterising firms’ strategies and the competitive 
environment. Decisions and actions are continuously taken and external events often 
affect firms’ strategies and actions, which means that strategy is a continuous 
process. Furthermore, as newspaper articles also report rumours about important 
strategic decisions (e.g. potential mergers, acquisitions and diversification), firms’ 
complex histories emerge with the intended strategy, emerging strategy, abandoned 
strategy and realised strategy. In interviews, the complexity of firms’ strategies and 
the fundamental uncertainty characterising it also emerged (e.g., during the 
interview, one of the interviewees was asked his opinion about a change in strategy. 
He replied: “I think it is sometimes terribly difficult to rationalise these decisions” 
and continued by explaining the complex system of decisions, actions and events 
that led to the result). However, given time and resource constraints, interviewees 
tended to simplify the issue and we did not learn about the complex system of 
events and actions that eventually led to something. Further, there is a tendency to
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talk more about what happened rather than about what could have happened. 
Therefore, the role of potential strategic actions tends to be marginalised.
A2.2 Limitations of the Study
The use of newspaper articles is a valid technique for the analysis of the dynamics of 
firms’ strategies and industry structure from an external point of view. However, this 
technique can provide very limited insights into the internal dynamics of firms’ 
strategies (i.e., differences in a firm’s management view as well as the internal 
processes of reconciliation of different views).
An internal analysis of the dynamics of the strategies of the four firms based on 
observation and the analysis of internal data (as would be the case in a typical strategy 
process research) could have been useful for highlighting the internal complexities of 
the strategy process the political characteristics of the dynamics of firms’ strategies. 
From this analysis, we only got a hint of the dynamics of internal processes of firms’ 
strategies. However, it has to be said that internal observation would not have been easy 
given the longitudinal characteristic of the research. Furthermore, the focus of this 
research is on the external rather the internal dynamics of firms’ strategies, justifying 
the research technique.
Future research may take this issue into account and propose to use the two techniques 
at the same time, that is, the use of newspaper articles to study the dynamics of firms’
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strategies and the competitive environment, and internal observation to study the 
internal dynamics of firms’ strategies.
A2.3 Generality of the Research Technique
This technique was particularly appropriate for studying the dynamics of firms’ 
strategies and industry structure in the UK GR1, an industry with a high profile in the 
consumer market and where operational issues have a high strategic content. Much 
information was available and it was possible to understand, through the analysis of 
newspaper articles, the dynamics of firms’ strategies at the business level as well as the 
dynamics of the competitive environment. These represent very specific conditions that 
may not be found in other industries, thus limiting the use of this technique in other
research contexts.
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Appendix 3 List of the Largest Companies Operating in the UK Grocery 
Retailing Industry in 1980 and 1995
1980 1995
ABF (Fine Fare) Aldi
Amos Hinton and Sons Argyll
Associated Dairies (ASDA) ASDA
BAT (International Stores) Budgens Stores
Bejam Co-operative Retail Services
Bishops Foods Stores Co-operative Wholesale Society
Booker McConnell (Budgen and Rusts) Iceland
Co-operative Retail Services John Lewis Partnership (Waitrose)
Co-operative Wholesale Society Kwik Save
Fitch Lovell Lidl
Generale Occidentale (Allied Suppliers) Marks and Spencer
Hillards Netto
Iceland Sainsbury’s
John Lewis Partnership (Waitrose) Somerfield Holdings (Previously Gateway, and Dee
Kwik Save Tesco
Laws Stores 
Lennons Supermarkets
Linfood (Later Gateway, the Dee Corporation) 
Marks and Spencer
Normans (Later Merchant Retail Group)
RCA International (Oriel)
Safeway
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